PhD Dissertation

National and Transnational Identities: Turkish Organising Processes and Identity Construction in Denmark, Sweden and Germany

by

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Chapter 1
Introduction and Research Questions

Introduction
In recent decades international migration has become a worldwide phenomenon. The novelty is not migration as such, but rather the challenges recent migration has created for the modern nation-state and in particular for the welfare state. Thus Brochmann points out that in earlier times receiving countries had time to wait for settlers to assimilate slowly over history, whereas modern welfare states of today do not have time for this due to the dynamics and expenses of the welfare system itself (Brochmann, 2003: 6-7; Schierup et al., 2006).

Among several challenges issues of citizenship and integration stand out as some of the most important. Increasing active civic participation is of crucial value for the democratic development of contemporary Europe. Immigration has challenged both the ideal of the homogeneous society as well as the conventional notion of citizenship as phrased by T. H. Marshall (1992 [1950]). Social communities and organisations such as trade unions, political parties or religious and cultural associations have usually been ascribed the capability to enhance relations between individuals and to extend trust, values, identity and social belonging. Whether we focus on the individual and the value of face to face contact or we focus on the role of the organisation as an intervening institution between the state, the political system and the citizen in strengthening democracy (Mikkelsen, 2003a: 18-19), such types of engagement will also have an effect on the processes of integrating immigrants in the host society. Participation in civil society through voluntary organisations and associations can thus be considered as a key factor for the functioning of civil society as well as serving as an important supplement to the state and reproducing democratic culture by bringing new claims, values and ideas forth in the public sphere. In this sense, civil society can be conceived as “the totality of social institutions and associations, both formal and informal, that are not strictly production oriented nor governmental or familial in character” (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 29; see also Fennema, 2004; Odmalm, 2004). Thus organisational engagement can be a vehicle for active citizenship and may lead to resistance towards constraining notions of national identity, integration and excluding structures as it can create a platform for new types of claims making and identity positions.

When speaking of identities I here refer to (collective) political identities more than cultural identities in an ethnographic sense or psychological notions of identity, which will be
elaborated in Chapter 3. Collective identities are allocated by the host state through its political and discursive opportunity structures but can also be challenged by organisations and individuals through new types of claims making. Immigrant organisational claims making is always associated with identity politics, whether the specific content is political, cultural or social. As Meindert Fennema states: “We should […] always realise that all ethnic organisations tend to be identity organisations” (Fennema, 2004: 445). However from this elusive truth it does not follow that all immigrant identities only are ethnic identities. Part of the analysis is exactly to map the diversity of identities at stake. Some may be detached and others embedded, and the questions are why this is the case and how identities are constructed discursively. Consequently, the notion of identity becomes a central concept in this analytical scope. Immigrant organisations are a site for expressing collective identity and can be a way of fencing off ethnic or national identity from others. It is also through organisations that others can address specific immigrants collectively. Organisations are in a ‘Barthian’ sense about demarcations and boundaries within and between immigrant groups, and between immigrants and the host society (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005).

Although the institutional arrangements, in this case the integration and citizenship regimes (in the literature perceived to be the main political opportunity structures), are decisive for both the organisational form that immigrant organisations will adopt and the claims making allowed into the political decision making process, the ability to penetrate these structures in order to defend interests and raise new claims should also be recognized. Immigrant organisations are not just restricted to being victims of the receiving country’s political governing and decisions; rather their agency in the socio-political discourse should be recognised and their influence on the political decision making process investigated (Yurdakul, 2006). Hence, I revisit the familiar sociological discussion on the relationship between structure and agency. Paul Hirst has described this alternative political framework as associational democracy, and Chantal Mouffe has described the relationship between power, legitimacy and the hegemonic social order as agonistic pluralism (Hirst, 1994; Mouffe, 2000). This type of civil engagement will at times, and probably most often, be taking place within the nation-state but occasionally it will be directed at a cross-national or transnational levels. In any case the dictum of ‘rights must be taken’ is the backdrop for discussions. It is this understanding of the interrelationship between the institutional arrangements, civil society and immigrant organisational forms that sets the backdrop for this dissertation.

In the dissertation I investigate how the national political and discursive opportunity structures, i.e. the integration and citizenship regimes, are constructed in terms of actions, political,
institutional and discursive structures. Secondly, I investigate how these structures and power relations affect (a given set of) actors, agency and identity making at meso-level. Structure and agency are perceived to be reciprocally constituted but likewise defined through particular power relations. Thirdly I investigate how and why transnational social formations may affect established conceptualisations of incorporation (mainly integration) from both an empirical and theoretical perspective. Finally I wish to emphasise the importance of context and a transversal consideration consequently is to identify what role the national context has on identity making and organising processes through a comparative perspective.

**Research position**

Before outlining the structure and research design I find it important to situate my own position and point of departure in the research field. Very often social research on integration and immigration has perceived immigrants within a problems/victims couplet (Florence & Martinelli, 2005; Yurdakul, 2006). One camp focuses on the problems with immigrants and descendants (in relation to issues of unemployment, ‘lack’ of integration, crime and presumed cultural differences). Bourdieu states in *Practical Reason*: ”The public administrations and its representatives are producers of 'social problems' and when the social sciences adopt these problems and make them sociological problems, they have not done anything besides to ratify these problems” (Bourdieu, 1998: 101) and Castles somewhat continues this claim when he states that:

> The key point is that policy-driven research can lead not only to poor sociology, but also to bad policy. This is because narrowly-focused empirical research, often designed to provide an answer to an immediate bureaucratic problem, tends to follow a circular logic. It accepts the problem definitions built into its terms of reference and does not look for more fundamental causes, or for more challenging solutions (Castles, 2003: 26).

Thus it is immensely important to keep a critical stance to the ‘problematisation’ of immigrant issues. On the other hand there is the danger of ‘victimizing’ the immigrants, which also should be avoided, *e.g.* by ‘blaming’ the structures only and thereby removing the personal responsibility and motives for action or not being able to criticise cultural repressive patterns (Necef, 1997; Phillips; 2007). Both positions deprive the immigrants of agency.

Social researchers should be careful not to take over readymade definitions; definitions made first and foremost from above by policymakers and public administration but insist on looking at the specific questions and problems from other theoretical and analytical angles (Diken & Hamburger, 1993; 1994). The discourses of integration and immigration are framed in specific ways, and certain ways of asking and answering the questions and practices related to immigrants establish a pre-constituted framework, *e.g.* the now extremely influential para-
digm of human capital or earlier rational choice inspired approaches. Such frameworks make certain statements possible in a discourse and others impossible. For instance, understanding a phenomenon as dual citizenship in a rational choice framework easily be understood from purely instrumentalist reasons. Questions in this sense can become already given answers. As empirical studies have shown, dual citizenship is indeed most likely to depend on both instrumentalist and intrinsic reasons and potential analytical answers should not be dismissed by limiting the questions. But as researchers we tend to internalise the norms of our scientific communities, which explains convergence in results. The researcher adopts the basic metaphors, argumentative turns, and the ways of re-presenting knowledge on ethnic matters and so on. I in all modesty try to remain aware of this and focus also on the ‘unsaid’ – in Michel Foucault’s words seek “to problematize the facile gestures” (quoted from Diken, 1998: 47). Hereby I seek to put forward a critical perspective that reflects critically on chosen field of research as well as the research in this field.

**Research design**

In substantive terms the aim of my dissertation is firstly to identify the integration and citizenship regimes in Denmark, Sweden and Germany, secondly to investigate how these influence the organising processes and collective identity constructions within the Turkish minority in the three countries with special focus on the influence of transnational social transformation. Also in this initial phase I wish to underline and repeat the possibility for agency within the structural framework. Summarising the specific political and discursive opportunity structures is regarded as being able to influence organisational formation and collective identity constructions. However, this is also a very complex and dynamic relationship and while the institutional arrangements are expected to influence the organisational forms these formations are set in a field of negotiation that may also include challenges to and transformations of the institutional arrangements themselves. In other words the different components from my problem formulation are perceived at one and the same time to be mutually constitutive and constituted by particular power relations.

The dissertation is structured around three interconnected parts. The first part is a macro analysis of the integration and citizenship policies in the selected countries that will be analysed within a theoretical framework (to be elaborated in Chapter 3) looking at the dynamics between concepts as citizenship, integration and political and discursive opportunity structures. The main purpose is here to identify the integration model at stake and to identify its consequences for the next level of analysis; collective identity formations and immigrant or-
ganizing processes. As ‘integration’ itself is a problematic term that carries pre-given connotations and designates a specific political approach I use the term ‘incorporation’ when referring more broadly to the process of including newcomers in the host society.

In the second part I investigate the possibilities and incentive structures for participation, influence, mobilisation and claims making in relation to processes of integration and citizenship. This part furthermore discusses the role of the individual within the organisations and focuses on strategies, motivations for this type of engagement. Together these two levels of analysis deal with conflicting identity politics among minority groups and majority society.

The third part of the analysis includes a transnational perspective that can help rethink findings from the first two parts and be a determining factor that opens up for the empirical and theoretical understanding of the emergence of new types of identity positions negotiated through transnational claims making and transnational identification in general. Here I intentionally use the term ‘perspective’ as that is exactly what the literature on transnationalism offers.

I employ a comparative cross-national research strategy including Denmark, Sweden, and Germany. The choice of these specific countries will be elaborated in Chapter 4, but as a preliminary argument I have chosen this approach to be able to explain differences in outcomes of a given integration and citizenship regime (the particular political and discursive opportunity structure at stake in this analysis) by locating the explanation in the differential functioning of the (national and local) context in which the immigrant group is living. Hence, I prioritise the role of institutions over the explanatory power of concepts as culture or ethnicity etc. That said, such concepts will also be introduced in the analysis but at a level where it is investigated how cultural, religious and ethnic particularities, if possible, can explain why different variations within the same national group, the Turkish minority, occur within the same institutional context. Consequently I end up with a double comparative perspective looking at cross-national differences and at differences within the Turkish minority. In the actual analysis I rely on thick descriptions of the national cases from a synchronic perspective which constitute the basis for comparison. In the final chapters the comparative perspective will be the guiding principle for the analysis.

Methodologically my design combines theories from political science, sociology and anthropology. Although some of these theories, those deriving from political science, have mainly been used in combination with quantitative data, the data used in this dissertation is mainly qualitative in nature and thus involves a methodological challenge besides the analyti-
cal ones just outlined, that is, how can a given theoretical framework be combined with a
given type of data – these questions will be dealt with later in this chapter and in Chapter 4.

**Research strategy and organisation**

In the following sections I discuss the research strategy in more detail and elaborate my ana-
lytical research questions with a set of substantive questions addressed to each of the main
three parts of the dissertation

**Studying the structural framework for incorporation**

The point of departure is the assumption that negotiation of identity is framed by structural
and political opportunities and limitations regarding rights, obligations and membership. In
the literature these are conceptualised as the political and discursive opportunity structures
(Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Koopmans *et al.*, 2005). Hence, I claim that the specific na-
tional integration and citizenship regime and organisation of society will have an effect on the
identity positions offered by both the state and by the ones taken by the subjects at stake,
which hypothetically can end up in antagonistic and subordinated relations and basically point
to a politisation of identities within a conflict theoretical perspective.

Governmental policies not only affect the process of integration and the specific identity
constructions by putting up structural limits for the individual (and collective groups) but also
set the field in which identity can be negotiated (Kastoryano, 2002a; Soysal, 1994). Govern-
mental policies are connected to organisational practices concerned with procedures govern-
ing legal residence and the rights associated with such a status; naturalisation and nationality
laws; access to labour market and the welfare state; political rights, and policies that seek to
preserve, promote or protect aspects of immigrants’ cultural identity. In short all issues related
to civic, social and political citizenship.

National models are not created in vacuum. Historical trajectories influence how politi-
cal developments turn out later in history as captured in the heading and literature on path-
dependencies.¹ Such ‘paths’ obviously must be taken into account to understand the diversity
in citizenship models today (*e.g.* Brubaker, 1994[1992]). Likewise can the welfare regime and
labour market arrangements affect the understanding and processes of integration as these
policy areas intertwine. For example, job protection schemes may end up being indirect barri-
ers to labour market integration. Research has shown that employers may be more reluctant to

¹ The path dependency approach may sometimes end up being too rigid and not move beyond the claim that
’history matters’. Newer approaches like historical institutionalism have moved beyond this by showing how
history matters (through institutionalisation of past events) and through which mechanisms (self-reinforcing
feedback related to legitimacy, efficiency and power) (Bengtsson, 2007: 25).
hire people with immigrant background within institutional settings where it is difficult to fire people again (as in France and Sweden) and paradoxically a protectionist policy for labourers has indirect and unintentional discriminatory effects. Another example is the positive influence of the Danish voting system. The historically established voting system combines a proportional system based on open and semi-open party lists with strong influence from the number of personal votes, which has proved exceptionally beneficial for the political representation of immigrants (Togeby, 2008). However, also this effect is unintentional as the system by no means was introduced to accommodate multicultural needs end representations.

I also allow for the possibility that the private market may have another agenda towards inclusion, diversity and integration than policy makers, which can also effect the institutional arrangements over time. The dissertation thus presumes that different contextual backgrounds (i.e. the organisation of the nation-state) will also have a direct effect on the expectations for integration. In other words I expect differences on how integration is conceptualised in Denmark and Sweden. In my analysis I confine the analysis to the synchronic perspective and pay attention to overlapping policy fields that possibly influence the particular integration and citizenship regimes. This does not mean that I do not acknowledge the historical process of institutionalism, the role of actors within the institutionalisation and policy building and coalition building in general, but it would be far too demanding to include also this analytical perspective.

Derived from this backdrop the first two substantive sets of questions I seek to address in the dissertation are:

- How are integration and citizenship regimes constructed and how can they be theoretically conceptualised? These questions will be answered in the analysis of the Danish, Swedish and German cases.
- What consequences do the specific models have for the construction of immigrant identity among Turks in the three countries, e.g. how is the well integrated subject defined? What are the main forms of corporate identity? Which kind of collective organisations are sponsored over others? Which incentive structures for mobilisation and participation can be detected?

2 Within this perspective the role and influence of the press on political agenda-setting and decision making could also be investigated. This would be another kind of analysis and way too consuming for my research design. Subsequently, I confine this aspect to discuss the likelihood of gaining visibility in the mass media, of cooperating with other collective actors and of achieving legitimacy in public discourse (cf. Chapter 3).
How do the political and discursive opportunity structures impact on the immigrant organising processes?

The next part investigates the composition and role of immigrant organisations within the given integration and citizenship regime and investigates how immigrant organisations can affect and challenge the notions and processes of integration and democratisation.

Riva Kastoryano writes that: “Negotiations of identity appear in various realms: in rhetoric, actions, and organizations” (Kastoryano, 2002a: 13), which leads me to investigate how organisational activities and participatory citizenship can affect the resources for action and political mobilisation and lead to claims of recognition, inclusion and equality, here understood as both political and social citizenship. Immigrant organisations are the expression of mobilised resources and ambitions that can seek to alter the conditions for integration. While the institutional arrangements may be said to determine the opportunities and scope of actions for organisations, individuals can mobilise and change the landscape of organisations and – if successful – contribute to significant changes in the structural and institutional arrangements (Penninx, 2004a). Organisations and social movements can from one perspective provide socially excluded and marginalised groups with an opportunity to establish alternative social belonging and identity and to strengthen their claims making from a common platform. Furthermore participation potentially enhances the social networks among immigrants and allows them to pool their resources and not only strengthen their social position but also make them bridge builders between the immigrant communities and the state. Both perspectives point to notions of empowerment and mobility.

Whether this benefits social integration has been discussed within the research. European studies have argued that social exclusion and marginalisation have made Turkish youth, in particular, turn towards more radical forms of Islam and Turkish nationalism, which has been described as reactionary identity formations (e.g. Heitmeyer et al., 1997; Schiffauer, 1999; 2004; see also Berger, Galonska & Koopmans, 2004). Other studies have argued that despite the tendency of some groups to withdraw from society the outcome has been positive in terms of social and political trust, which leads to higher political participation. The level of ethnically based civic associations is in this perspective favourable to immigrant integration into majority politics (e.g. Aleinkoff & Klusmeyer, 2000; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; 2004; Jacobs & Tillie, 2004). A third position has argued, although being closer to the second type of studies, that it is dangerous to subscribe to one-to-one path dependencies and that from an anti-essentialist position what is needed is sensitivity and careful accounts of the different cases in order to move beyond the homogenous constructions of the link between social base
and political identification (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). Layton-Henry (1990) has studied immigrant organisations over time and constructed a typology for how organisations have changed over time in relation to the nexus between homeland and receiving country. He states that: “Associations initially established to preserve culture, religion, language and ethnic identity of migrant groups, are inevitably, over time, drawn into closer contact with the institutions and authorities of the country of settlement” (1990: 102). Although some types of organisations are supported by the homeland he concludes that: “Paradoxically then, even associations which are opposed to integration and assimilation contribute in the long term to the integration of their members in the host societies” (1990: 112). Layton-Henry’s typology definitely has its shortcomings; thus the transnational perspectives, which will be discussed shortly, are more or less left out, but if we follow this argument the question becomes how organisational activities affect the integration processes more specifically.

However, membership and activism in social movements and organisations have dropped dramatically over time. In the US this led Putnam to present the dictum that the ‘Americans are even bowling alone’ (Putnam, 2000) and the same tendencies can be traced in Europe where for instance membership of political parties has been decreasing rapidly (with some exceptions) (Goul Andersen, 2004). The decline in civic participation can also be found among immigrants and descendants but the explaining factor need not be the same as for the majority population; another explanation could be that the opportunity structures are non-favourable for immigrant organisational activism. Basically, main determinants such as migration status (in regards to social, economic and politics rights, citizenship acquisition and status (some activities only possible for naturalised persons) should be taken into consideration.

The analytical classification of immigrant organisations, associations and people, i.e. elites, as well as the discussion of what makes an association an immigrant association will be discussed further in Chapter 2 and 3. Focusing on organisations and participation, my main target-group becomes, with an initial definition, the so-called well-integrated and upward mobile group. The representatives of this group can also be termed ‘agents of change’. This characteristic somewhat reflect Gramsci’s distinction between traditional and organic intellectuals. People participating in immigrant organisations may obviously be traditional intellectuals but the social basis and background of many of these members and people with trusted positions in immigrant organisations rather resemble the organic trajectory. Following this logic organisational participation may lead to counter-discourses and new identity formations within civil society. Without buying further into the Gramscian position, there are consequently good rea-
sons for focusing on this group that obviously also have consequences for the analysis. Taking the case of Denmark as an example, the Turkish minority has over the years been one of the least educated.\(^3\) The lesser resourceful, marginalised youth etc., has been given quite a lot of political attention and has been the object of various research (\textit{e.g.} Hummelgaard \textit{et al.} 2002; Jæger & Holm 2005; Schmidt & Jakobsen 2000). However, not all Turks are left without education, but handle education and participation in the labour market very well. It is my argument that we should also pay attention to this group – the resourceful and participating – and from a qualitative perspective try to understand if and how they differ from the rest of the Turkish minority. Likewise, we should reflect on whether they may hold the potential to affect the general Turkish minority in positive or negative ways.

Although having introduced the notion of elite I am doubtful if a distinct immigrant elite can be said to exist as such, and if it indeed existed, it would certainly not be limited to persons with a Turkish background. Thus, I have turned my focus the other way around, by not looking at ‘members’ of the majority elite with immigrant background but instead at the ‘elite’ in the Turkish minority group itself (this perspective is inspired by Rogstadt, 2002). This makes it possible to study internal Turkish organisational processes but also to interview members of mainstream organisations and the political elite who have a Turkish background. The term elite itself is a fuzzy term that very often is used along a number of synonyms; however, when I here speak of an elite, I wish to delete any connotations of superiority. Elite as a concept inevitably relates to power structures and privileged positions of a limited group within majority society. I have chosen a target-group who holds a position where they can articulate claims and interest in civil society as well as in the established institutional channels and furthermore bring their influence to bear both within the minority group and the majority frame. Interests and identity are negotiated within this arena. A more functional definition of this group could be to regard them as gatekeepers, but as such not being the legitimate representatives of the Turkish communities in any formal sense. Labelling this group elite or other terms does not change the fact that I am talking about a group of persons with characteristics, resources, and motivations that may be very different compared to their ethnic next of kin. It also follows that identity formations within this group may not reflect the reality of the Turkish community as such. However, I will also argue that as in any other setting of social transformation the elite obviously may influence the broader group affiliated to this group and directly and/or indirectly create the incentives to mobilisation and social change. Thus, although

\(^3\) Although an increasing mobility can be traced in the next generation of Turks, especially among young female Turks, the young men still seem to be left behind (Seeberg, 2002).
I am looking a specially defined group this analysis may predict possible scenarios for social change in the future. The top-down bottom-up discussion is just one aspect of the elite perspective; another interesting aspect is to investigate how the political opportunity structures in the nation of residence can effect the actual formation of transnational elites (e.g. Rupp, 2001).

An initial premise is that all subjects do not possess the same resources (economic, social or cultural), but that organisational and political participation can serve as a strategy of empowerment. Part of the analysis will thus be to explain the possible transformation from engaged individual to civic activist and a possibly shaping influence on the incorporation of whole communities. Furthermore I will argue that levels of participation and engagement cannot fully explain why some handle the structures better than others, basically learn how to cope with the structural possibilities, limitations and barriers. The analysis must be set in relation to a more elaborate understanding of identity that takes individual resources, dispositions, capital, background and foreground, which all serve as markers for identification, into consideration as well.

Here it is also necessary to point to a limitation in the research design. The analysis by no means includes all Turkish minority organisations in the individual national context but only the most prominent ones and furthermore aims at including the different minority groups within the Turkish immigrant minority to secure that the heterogeneity of the Turkish minority is acknowledged and respected. By prominent I understand organisations with a large foundation of members, a consolidated profile, well-established in terms of longevity and reputation, e.g. visibility in the media and public in general, and who takes part in the political decision making processes and immigrant orientated political institutions.

Consequently, I will not be able to present a deep understanding on how many organisations are working with integration issues, how many are homeland orientated and so on from the whole population of organisations. I will be able to present a deeper understanding on how political opportunity structures affect specific organisations (and their individual members) and how they organise themselves within these structures. I will connect the organisations analytically on a larger scale by looking at interlocks among the organisations. I will return to this discussion in Chapter 4; however, this demarcation needed to be addressed in relation to the overall research strategy before continuing.

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4 A dynamic also pointed to by gender studies. Where women are visible in elite positions, more women participate in general (e.g. Sainsbury, 2004).
Thus concluding, I do not claim to include or account for the Turkish community in the three countries as such and can only present the general organisational trends and patterns. The Turkish immigrants in Denmark, Sweden and Germany are not a homogeneous group but indeed a very heterogeneous group, and my choice of respondents constitutes only one small part of this. Hence, I deal with the role of the individual within the collective to obtain a better understanding of the dynamics of the collective organising processes that is looking at the dynamics of social participation and agency with the structures.

The substantive research questions addressed in this part of the dissertation investigates:

- How do the specific integration and citizenship regimes affect the immigrant organising processes in the three countries?
- Which patterns of convergence and divergence do we find in the organising processes and internal discourses and what influences either pattern?
- Do the organisations adapt the ruling discourse of incorporation or how is this challenged?

**The relationship between models of incorporation and transnational affiliation and formations**

A final but no less important assumption already touched upon is that the transgression of the national border in regards to claims making offers a new field for the negotiation of identity, which can be summarised as a transnational perspective. Hence, I investigate to what degree national policies have fostered the conditions for organisational claims making and for the establishment of transnational networks/spaces and try to answer to what degree such networks may affect the integration process and the construction of immigrant identity.

Although the transnational perspective has recently been under siege by its most sceptic critics (e.g. Koopmans & Statham, 2000, Joppke, 1998; 2000; see Vertovec, 2004 for a summary of the criticism) it is my argument that although some findings certainly have exaggerated the importance of transnational influences, transnational engagement *does* offer a field for the emergence of new political subjects, positions, claims, identities and basically recognition. Thus, I follow the position of scholars, like Thomas Faist, who have investigated the role migrant associations play in contributing to the ideal construct termed “transnationalising civil society” (Faist, 2000a). At the same time I claim that transnational engagement can be qualitatively distinct for different minority groups, viz. not just a question of degree of engagement as earlier studies suggested. Transnational engagement and activities can be a mobilising force and can be used strategically in redefining allocated positions and stereotypical
notions of nationality (Sassen, 2002). It need not be deemed equally important by all groups. As such it can be seen as a general phenomenon of this phase of globalisation and late modernity but cannot be regarded as a necessary characteristic of immigrant organisation in society *per se*.

Determinant factors for explaining transnational engagement and activities include the mobilising role of the sending countries, mode of migration, length of stay, the strength and level of networks, strategies and frames employed, structural position and political opportunity structures in the receiving country (Faist, 2000a; Ögelman, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a:18-22). On the one hand transnational engagement is rarely something that happens over people’s heads, but is the result of strategic choices and deliberate actions. On the other hand people are simultaneously born into a transnational framework, e.g. having family in Turkey, going there yearly on vacation etc. Thus I believe it is necessary to pay special attention to context and to investigate which intersections are important for the transnational identity construction and development of transnational spaces. Moreover I will argue that the most radical versions of transnationalism and the related concept of postnationalism may have been too eager to write of the importance of the nation-state (e.g. Soysal, 1994). Instead I subscribe to the versions regarding transnational activities as obviously transgressing the nation-state but also working alongside it and within it (Kastoryano, 1998; 2002a). Taking the Alevi communities as an example, I find that their claims making at one and the same time is directed at the national level(s), the European level and towards the former homeland Turkey. Relating this initial discussion of transnationalism to the former parts of the dissertation the substantive research questions addressed are:

- To what degree have national policies fostered the conditions for organisational claims making and for transnational engagement and identification?
- What role do such formations play for organising processes and for the construction of immigrant identity?
- How do transnational activities and claims challenge national fixed notions of incorporation and to what extent can they be said to construct a new site for political engagement?

While the analytical steps put forth so far describe the overall framework of my work it needs to be refined in order not to be too encompassing, which obviously may limit the analytical strength. Subsequently, I will clarify my analytical scope and operationalise the different ana-
lytical components and further steps. This exercise begins with a review of the state of art within the existing literature. Before entering that discussion I will outline the structure of the dissertation.

**Structure of chapters**

Chapter 2 provides a state of the art review of existing research in the field. Mainly three different strings of literature are scrutinised and critically reflected upon; (a) challenges to the nation-state in relation to immigration; (b) research and studies of integration processes in the host society linked with studies of citizenship; and (c) studies on immigrant organisations and mobility and participation in relation to the integration processes. This overview will both point to the gaps in the existing literature and provide the necessary backdrop to further develop the theoretical and methodological framework needed to answer the research questions.

Chapter 3 provides a critical discussion of concepts and theories. It presents a conflation of theory, methods, operationalisation and context. I first discuss the citizenship models outlined by Koopmans and Statham (2000), Koopmans *et al.* (2005), which they themselves relate to the framework of political opportunity structures (POS). This discussion is related to concepts like integration, discrimination, the welfare state, the market and transnationalism as illustrated in Figure 3.1. In this part I present various examples on how the analytical dimensions are operationalised taken from both my own case studies but also going beyond these specific cases to minimise redundancy. Moreover I discuss how the concept of opportunity structures can be elaborated to account for more than shaping only political participation but also social, cultural and economic participation which indicates a broader perspective that can accommodate the role of social networks compared to the narrower focus on political channels. Furthermore I try to develop the POS model into a model that can encompass transnational social formations and engagement. I regard the totality of this framework as the field for negotiation of identity as claimed by Kastoryano, which again calls for a more subtle discussion of identity. Finally I outline the approach taken to identify, differentiate and analyse the immigrant organisations and understand internal dynamics, drawing on different approaches and classifications.

Chapter 4 deals with methodological issues at stake. In the research design I bridge between more analytical levels, which of course have implications for the data needed and for the analytical outcome. First I outline my epistemological position. Following this part I introduce and discuss the various models used in the analysis, which will consist of a combination of discourse analysis and textual content analysis and will deal with the notions of con-
ceptualisation, contextualisation and generalisation, which basically have to do with the methodological consequences of the chosen approach. Next I outline the choice of cases and reason for and consequences of these choices. This leads to the third part of this chapter, which discusses the theoretical operationalisation of the interviews. Finally the data themselves are presented. The chapter is concluded with a general discussion of reliability, validity and generalisation and specific relation to this particular research design.

Chapter 5, 6 and 7 initiate the actual analysis. In these three chapters I conduct a macro level analysis of the integration and citizenship regimes in three countries and present an overview on recent policy transformations and continuities. Basically I outline the institutional and discursive context. These chapters individually provide thick descriptions from a synchronic perspective. In each case I pay special attention to the impact on the welfare state model in the given country. Furthermore I outline the state-sponsored incorporation structures and look at the structural framework for immigrants organising processes.

Chapter 8 constitutes the main analytical chapter in regards to collective organising processes. Here I adapt the particular structural framework identified in each national setting and investigate how the collective organising processes are situated within this framework. The chapter begins with a targeted analysis of respectively the Danish, Swedish and German cases, succeeded by a comparative conclusion focusing on divergence and convergence the countries and organising processes in between. Here I focus on national claims making, the political opportunity structures and the transnational challenge. Anticipating one of the main conclusions I argue that the methodological nationalism underlying the existing models of integration cannot encompass transnational social formation and engagement in a convincing or adequate manner and we subsequently need to develop the transnational perspective further and look at the interplay of processes of integration and transnationalism.

Chapter 9 concentrates on the discursive construction of identity. While Chapter 5 to 7 looked at the national integration and citizenship regimes and identified the framework for incorporation that sets also the framework for the negotiation of identities and Chapter 8 investigated the relationship between the political and institutional structures and the collective organising processes, I here go one step further and refine the analysis to look specifically at Turkish identity construction within and across the three national settings.

Chapter 10 completes the analytical chapters and presents an analysis of transnational social formation and engagement among Turkish groups in, between and across the three countries. I begin by looking at the national structures and discuss how these may impede or hinder transnational activities. Following this, I investigate the transnational political oppor-
tunity structures offered by the Turkish state. I then look in detail at the political organisation, mobilisation and transitional networks of different Turkish groups. Specifically I analyse different aspects of transnational formation in relation to ‘Euro-Turks’ (transnational orientation as an inherent part of identity); the Armenian European lobby; the Kurdish question; Assyrian transnational identification; and Alevi organising processes. Finally I discuss the consequences of transnational formations for the conventional integration theory and the potential outcomes for civil society.

The dissertation is concluded with a comparative and concluding chapter, which summarises the main findings and discusses them from a theoretical perspective.
Chapter 2
Outlining a Theoretical Framework and State of the Art

Introduction
The topic of my dissertation can be situated within the existing literature on immigration, integration and ethnic relations. In this sense it can be regarded as a response to a number of shortcomings and pitfalls within the existing literature. The literature on immigration, integration, and ethnic relations can definitely be characterised as both vast and diverse, ranging from differences in theoretical, methodological and empirical backdrops, to differences within disciplines, to levels of analysis and to different intentions (e.g. political, normative) behind the research. It is probably much more accurate to say that there is not one literature treating this field but several sub strands, each dealing with their specific topic. I will begin with an outline of research within three (somewhat inter-connected) scholarly branches that deal with (a) challenges to the nation-state in relation to immigration; (b) research and studies of integration processes in the host society linked with studies of citizenship; and (c) studies on immigrant organisations and mobility and participation in relation to the integration processes. Of course such an outline will be rather simplistic and by no means exhaustive. However it will be extensive and it will touch upon the main literature laying the ground for this dissertation and point to theoretical, methodological and empirical limitations and shortcomings. However, this chapter will not only serve as a critical review but also as a theoretical clarification of the framework put forth in the dissertation. Thus definitions for the further analytical framework will be derived partly form this chapter.

Challenges to the nation-state
The last two decades has seen a plenitude of research on the future trajectory of the nation-state fuelled by internationalisation, globalisation and transnationalism, of which immigration can be seen as an important part. Earlier the studies of nationalism and (development and establishment of) the nation-state were framed in a theoretical discussion between ‘essentialists’, ‘primordialists’, ‘modernists’ and ‘constructivists’ that mainly dealt with the basis of the nation and nationalism. How did it come into being, what were the determinants, was it created from above or below by the people, was it driven by ‘natural’ (even eternal) forces or

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1 Apart from the first section, ‘Challenges to the nation-state’, the discussions mainly reflect the literature dealing with integration processes. Thus the literature on patterns of migration, policies of asylum, conceptual discussions of wordings, status and consequences (illegal, irregular, undocumented, under-documented, paperless etc.) is more or less left out. My primary focus is on foreigners already residing in the country, patterns of organisation, identity processes and societal responses to accommodating these people.
simply a construct? These issues were debated intensely by Anthony D. Smith, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, Michael Billig, Miroslav Hoch and Montserrat Guibernau to mention a few of the most important scholars (for an overview of these discussions see Hedetoft, 2003; 2006b; Woolf, 1996). Concepts like belonging, culture, identity, ethnicity, nationality were crucial in these debates and obviously still are in the recent and contemporary academic debate on the role and future of the nation-state. However, the new challenges created by globalisation and immigrations have taken the discussions in another direction. Hedetoft sums up these discussions when he states that:

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\text{[T]he modernity of national communities and the postmodern phenomenon of globalization need not be mutually exclusive. No doubt globalization demands that nation states and national identities adapt to new circumstances and reinvent themselves, but it does not necessitate their disappearance. In fact, the adaptability (and willingness to adapt) of national belonging is manifested in all the forms discussed so far (Hedetoft, 2006b: 319).}
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This conclusion does not mean that we will have to abandon the idea of the nation-state; rather it opens up for new types of explanations and frameworks. The question of immigration is a trigger in this regard, as it disturbs the notion of the homogeneous nation-state – in its ‘essence’ the nation-state is an exclusivist entity so the question becomes how it deals with these challenges and of course whether immigration constitutes a challenge at all.

Identity, belonging and culture are still important concepts in these new discussions as well, but have been supplemented by concepts like citizenship, integration, transformation and multiculturalism. Some argue that the nation-state will have to incorporate the challenges within the existing framework. One example is Brubaker, who in his comparative historical work takes the nation-state as the independent variable, whose historical legacies have formed national variants of incorporating immigrants (1994[1992]). He distinguishes between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ forms of nationhood and citizenship and describes Germany as being based on ethno-cultural belonging and France on civic culture and political institutions. The reason is that citizenship is not just seen as a form of membership but also as a cultural imprint on nationhood in regards to who is to be included in the nation and thus functions as a form of symbolic closure.

In a European and even global perspective, citizenship is a powerful instrument of social closure, shielding prosperous states from the migrant poor. But citizenship is also an instrument of closure within states, where each state establishes a legal and ideological boundary between citizens and foreigners. Thus, every state discriminates between citizens and residing foreigners, reserving certain rights and benefits, as well as certain obligations for citizens. For some immigrants the status of immigrant is sustained by maintaining them in a status that
permits them to remain indefinitely in the country and, outside the political domain, to participate in social and economic life on virtually the same terms as citizens. A status Brubaker has termed “membership without belonging” and Hammar terms “denizenship” (Hammar, 1985).  

Brubaker has been criticized for neglecting the cultural rights dimension central to the discussion of multiculturalism (Koopmans & Statham, 2000:19), and especially on that account for overstating the ‘openness’ of the French citizenship regime, which may grant easy access to formal membership, but simultaneously couples this with expectations that the new citizens, the immigrants, will assimilate to the same national political culture (ibid.). The ‘riots’ in the French banlieues in the fall 2005 demonstrated that this is not necessarily the case. Likewise the paradox of the situation where, at least before the German economic recession, migrants had been excluded from formal membership in the German society, but not from being economically integrated. Brubaker has also been criticized for essentialising the different ideal-types and, perhaps one could add, for exaggerating the divergences (Favell, 2003; Soysal, 1994). Nonetheless he has pointed to a very central conclusion, namely the fact that the nation-state still holds immense importance and that the different national models and opportunity structures will affect the way a given country incorporates immigrants.

This type of research has been continued within the field of immigration and ethnic relations, where scholars have tried to develop and distinguish between different types of citizenship regimes and most often end up with three distinct types, labelled ‘ethnic’ or exclusivist (cultural criteria for naturalisation etc., the given example usually is Germany), a second type labelled ‘civic’, ‘assimilationist’ or ‘republican’ (France being the primary example, easy access to citizenship, but actual demands of assimilation as mentioned above), and thirdly the ‘pluralist’ or ‘multicultural’ type of regime (stressing both easy formal access to citizenship but also recognizing and accepting cultural differences, examples being the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Britain, Australia and the US) (see for instance Castles & Miller, 1993 for such a typology). Some of the criticism raised against Brubaker’s model could be raised here; do three types make a difference in regards to this? Somewhat or hardly the answers could be. If used too rigidly it definitely neglects or obscures the dynamic aspects of the process of migrant integration (Entzinger, 2000). It also simplifies the different strategies used by different

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2 Brubaker has later responded to the critique by looking at the relationship between the sending and the receiving countries and proposed a triadic ‘model’ including government and authorities in host-country, government and institutions in immigrant associations the home-country (Brubaker, 1996). Brubaker tries to combine different levels of analysis in his study of nationalism and new forms of identity constructions. The idea of a triadic relationship provides a useful understand by outlining the different actors involved and provides an understanding away from migration as a one-way relationship or simplistic push-and-pull model.
political actors, the state only being one such, but also among the policies applied to different categories of migrants. Koopmans & Statham suggest that we stop perceiving citizenship in static categories of typological models or regimes but rather see it as a conceptual space in which different actors and policies can be situated and developments traced over time, where the contours of this space are defined by the cultural and formal dimensions of citizenship (Koopmans & Statham, 2000: 20-29). As mentioned in first chapter, I find this approach very fruitful and will discuss it in more detail in the following chapter on my theoretical framework. Their model is not without flaws either, which I will get back to as well. No matter how we define the different conceptualisations of citizenship it will inevitably be coupled with definitions of nationhood. Nationhood is a discursive construct that has been decisive for the specific historical trajectory linked to the nation-state and today makes certain claims and self-understanding more realisable than others.

**Citizenship and conceptions of nationhood**

When the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen in his New Year Address 2003 stated:

> We have freedom of speech. Also the freedom to say something foolish. And there must be freedom for diversity. We neither should nor will interfere in how people dress, what they eat, or what they believe in. Danishness is more and something else than meatballs and gravy ['frikadeller og brun sovs']. But the Danish society rests on some fundamental values, which you have to accept if you want to live here (Statsministeriet, 2003).

This speech was delivered long before any ‘caricature crisis’ took place and illustrates how historical conceptions of nationhood and perceived national values can be articulated in discourse. As such the outline of a so-called Danishness touches upon both civic and cultural forms of nationhood (Mouritsen, 2006). But how this understanding of nationhood became taken for granted obviously cannot be derived from a statement as given above.

The classification of nation-state models as belonging to this or that type may be too constraining, and even Brubaker himself admits that: “French and German understandings of nationhood have not been fixed and immutable. They have been more fluid plastic, and internally contested than I have suggested” (Brubaker, 1994[1992]: 13). It is not that the almost caricatured distinction between France and Germany is without validity. It is more the fact that these models tend to be much more fused, dynamic and flexible and not least open for changes than such dichotomies let us know (as the 1990 and 2000 changes in German citizenship law have demonstrated clearly). However, we do find a much larger number of immigrant organisations carrying *Gemeinde* in their name in Germany than in Denmark and Swe-
den for instance. Despite the criticism of such typologies, Kastoryano makes a convincing argument when she states that:

Whereas the French nation is *invented* in terms of a historic process deriving from a will of the kings and from an emotional bond, the German nation is *imagined* in terms of organic bonds between individuals sharing the same origins, in terms of membership in the German people [...]. The two approaches are quite similar in their overlap of culture and politics; a political identity is considered the basis of a cultural identity in France, and a cultural identity constitutes the basis of a political identity in Germany (Kastoryano, 2002a: 43).

Which I take to understand that modern nationhood and modern nationalism is a combined structure of cultural and political components located in a structure of power. What becomes interesting for my further analysis is how a historical trajectory become established as political traditions.

‘Nations are invented where they did not exist before’, states Anderson (1983) and characterises not only nations but all communities larger than ‘face-to-face groups’ as imagined communities. The nation is in the word of Hall not only a political formation (*cf.* Kastoryano) but also a system of cultural representation (Hall, 1996). It is a type of narrative and a discourse that presents a way of constructing meaning on who we are as a nation (culture, ethnicity), where we come from (past and traditions), what we strive towards (future, ideology) and thus very much constitutes a narrative on who can be included in this collective identity. This self-understanding combines both cultural and political traits but history, no matter how contingent, has led towards more or less emphasis being placed on either civic or cultural components – sometimes conceptualised in terms of path-dependencies. But when a given model, due to historical circumstances, gains precedence over others and becomes institutionalised, the original peculiarities disappear and the particular gains status of being universal in nature. This is what Bourdieu understands as *doxa*. Although Bourdieu has written about almost everything, he has written surprisingly little about the nation-state, but in an early work he provides an important contribution to this discussion when he writes that:

The adherence expressed in the doxic relation to the social world is the absolute form of recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness. Since it is unaware of the very question of legitimacy, which arises from competition for legitimacy, and hence from conflict between groups claiming to possess it (Bourdieu, 1977: 168).

The concept of doxa, captures the dominant culture’s capability to appear unconditional and seem neutral. The process of blurring the contingency of the structures (that makes national identity become something taken for given) is sedimented over time and constantly repeated through socialisation. In the article *Rethinking the State* Bourdieu further claims that:

Through classification systems (especially according to sex and age) inscribed in law, through bureaucratic procedures, educational structures and social rituals [...], the state moulds *mental structures* and imposes common principles of vision and division [...]. And it thereby contributes to the
construction of what is commonly designated as national identity (or, in a more traditional language, national character) (Bourdieu, 1994: 7).

Thus coming to a conclusion on this part of the framework, the historical path to the nation-states of today, established through the mechanisms just outlined, can provide an understanding of why newcomers disturb the nation-state and why different nation-states have taken to different solutions. Power easily appears invisible as it is coupled with ideological and symbolic power but only indirectly tied to the explicit exercise of power (Brochmann, 2002a). This section serves as an elaborated argument for the analytical value of looking back in order to understand contemporary political and cultural norms and to understand why the discursive structures are most likely to be open for certain opportunities and why these can be extremely difficult to penetrate or change.

Postnationalism

Returning to the future trajectory of the nation-state in the light of increasing immigration, another approach is given by Soysal, who coins the term postnationalism (1994; 1996a; 1996b; 2002). As the notion almost implies, Soysal goes beyond the nation-state and reflects on postnational belonging. While Brubaker took partial membership or ‘denizenship’ to be a deviant phenomenon that the nation-states would have to learn how to include, Soysal regards it as a type of membership in its own right (Soysal, 1994). She argues that rights and identities formerly fused in the notion of national citizenship have become decoupled and that postnational membership changes the position of immigrants and their descendants in Europe. The rights of Turks in Germany are not contingent on their nationality. What has replaced this former relationship is a universalised discourse of entitlement derived from international human rights that underpins the claims for social and political inclusion made by immigrants and their descendants. Soysal phrases it in the following way:

In the new model, the membership of individuals is not solely based on the criteria of nationality; their membership and rights are legitimated by the global ideologies of human rights. Thus, universal personhood replaces nationhood; and universal human rights replace personal rights. The justification for the state’s obligations to foreign populations goes beyond the nation state itself. The rights and claims of individuals are legitimated by ideologies grounded in a transnational community, through international codes, conventions and laws on human rights, independent of their citizenship in a nation state. Hence, the individual transcends the citizen. This is the most elemental way that the postnational model differs from the national model (Soysal, 1996b: 23).

In this perspective identity politics serves as a means to partake in and negotiate belonging within, but in the sense that it asserts immigrants’ identities and claims at the European level, as a way of making space for and be recognised as themselves.
Like Brubaker, Soysal has also faced a lot of criticism. Few scholars would go as far as buying into the idea that the nation-state has been made redundant (e.g. Joppke, 1998), and Soysal perhaps admits the same herself when she tells us that the nation-state still remains the organisational frame for implementing universal rights of personhood. The situation essentially seems to be that there (so far) are no alternatives for the nation-state (Hedetoft, 2003; 2006b; Joppke, 1998). Secondly as Joppke argues, nation-states are more than institutions for handling migrants, migration has always been and still is a fringe problem – most people simply do not migrate (Joppke, 1998), which makes it hard to see why they should be made redundant from this factor. Wimmer and Glick Schiller make the same conclusion when they write that:

Stuart Hall’s […] dramatic statement that ‘we are all migrants now’ is no more true in 2001 than it was in 1989 […] Not only does it remain true that 95 per cent of the people of the world are not migrants but it is also true that, despite global media and rapid flows of information, national identities remain salient in many localities around the world (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002: 326).

However, Soysal made a crucial point when she argued against a one-sided state-centred emphasis on national cases as isolated entities; the question then is what the outcome will be (see also Hedetoft & Hjort, 2002). Riva Kastoryano somewhat bridges between Soysal and Brubaker, by building on both (positions at least) (Kastoryano, 1998; 2002a). She acknowledges as well the historical trajectories as the discussions of a possible postnational citizenship but brings in the notions of multiculturalism and ‘politisisation of identities’ (Kastoryano, 2002a: 8-9; 99). The latter is important as she moves beyond the very structuralist and constraining way of seeing the nation-state and instead conceptualises it as an arena for negotiation of identity where the historical national model will have its imprint on the state’s capacity to negotiate but which still is a possible site for transformation. She supports this position by looking at transnational formations that transgress the nation-state and thus opens up for (non-national or trans-national) identity positions. Transnationalism clearly indicates a transgression of the nation-state, but not necessarily an eradication of the nation-state as some scholars would argue. Transnationalism overlaps with globalisation, but where global processes are largely decentralised from the nation-state territories and take place in a world context, transna-
tional processes are most often are anchored in the existing nation-states. The theoretical developments within this perspective will be the last topic I will deal with among the challenges to the nation-state.

**Transnational perspectives**

The literature on transnationalism has demonstrated very convincingly that the migration/immigration movement is not necessarily a one-way ticket. Links between sending and receiving countries could be and are being maintained and developed with the emergence of transnational communities or transnational social spaces linking sending and receiving countries (Faist, 2000a). The transnational aspects could point to an important correction to the understanding of immigrant political identity and membership, by assuming that such constructions are not just the function of integration into the receiving country, but a result of the complex interplay between the events and policies of the country of origin, and the process of migration and settlement in the receiving country.4

Transnationalism is not a new phenomenon, but the literature dealing with it as a social and analytical phenomenon is nonetheless still being developed. Portes points to three problems that have arisen with the transnational studies (Portes, 2001). The first is the problem of numbers. How comprehensive is this phenomenon? He rightly suggests that transnationalism is only one form of political, cultural, and economic adaptation that co-exists with other forms (ibid: 183). The second problem touches the problem of newness. What is new about this? People have always been travelling and resettling, the critics rightly argue. Technological developments without doubt have strengthened this development but that still does not make it a new phenomenon. Portes describes this position as the fallacy of adumbration. Certainly, there are precedents, but these have only begun to make sense after looking back with a transnational perspective. In the absence of a theoretical perspective these examples remained isolated and disparate. Within migration research the transnational turn has offered a perspective that can bundle earlier observations and contributed “to reconnect the study of international migration on the one hand and immigrant incorporation on the other” (Faist, 2004b: 334). Transnationalism also goes beyond the migration systems theory by looking at the relationship between policy and politics in both the emigration and immigration countries and

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thereby challenges the position of methodological nationalism. The third problem Portes mentions is the problem of multiple meanings. The term itself is used as early as 1916, but has since and especially in the last two decades been used to describe very different processes. Some scholars have taken ethnographic detailed bottom-up approaches, while others have looked at top-down approaches. This is a difficult problem to transgress, but as the literature has evolved convergence in terminology has also evolved. There is consensus about the claim that transnationalism basically investigates social transformation due to immigration, e.g. transnational social spaces and the sustained ties that link societies of origin and settlement. The typology may be irrelevant and what is important is to include processes of interaction and interchange into the perspective.

In addition to these three problems the problem of sampling on the dependent has been inert in the other three problems. Especially the first generation of transnational studies tended to focus on instances where the phenomenon was present but seldom on those in which it was absent. Analyses therefore should present a comprehensive understanding of the given analytical field and not only describe the transnational ties etc, but also the situations where they do not occur and more importantly rethink the two together. Doing so can cast further light on immigrant adaptation. Finally, the critical insight by some scholars that transnationalism as a phenomenon not only should be applied to immigrants but is a much more general phenomenon exactly because it describes social transformation (see Faist, 2004b; Vertovec, 2004). The literature is still developing and as of today there is no sociology of transnationalism, but scholars like Castles and Faist have made powerful contributions in filling the gap (Castles, 2003; Faist, 2004a; 2004b). My study links up with this development and in all modesty has the ambition to contribute further to this.

Transnationalism touches upon issues and concepts of integration, assimilation and culture. As a concept it both rejects constraining essentialist notions of culture and identity and rejects the understanding of migration as the process of people leaving one country for good and definitively resettling in a new host society. Thus, discussions of displacement or whether migrants ‘loose’ or ‘retain’ their original culture are not the focus for a transnational understanding as it indicates that people on the contrary bridge across cultures, nations and time and are fully capable of maintaining and reliving ties in all of these sites. However, transnationalism should neither be regarded as a token of a free-flowing de-territorialised life characterised by belonging neither ‘here nor there’ – Homi Bhabha’s often cited ‘third places’ might not be easy to identify if they even exist (Guarnizo & Smith, 1998: 11). Transnationalism must and always will be contextualised within the general constraints and opportunity struc-
tures. At the same time migrants’ transnational political practices may challenge state institutions and change domestic integration policies and foreign policy decisions (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a: 11). Transnationalism is the processes whereby “migrants forge and sustain simultaneously multistranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Glick Schiller et al. 1995: 48). Transnational practices are embodied in specific social relations between specific people, situated in unequivocal localities and historically determined times (Guarnizo & Smith, 1998). Østergaard-Nielsen captures the complexity of this relationship well when she writes that:

While sending countries are quick to call for their expatriate population’s economic and political contribution to development in the country of origin it is clear that most expatriates and their representative organizations expect this to be a two way deal. Emigrants want their country of origin to support their struggle for equal rights and against discrimination on the labour market. More established migrant and diaspora groups demand more transparency and good governance in order to feel that their remittances and foreign direct investment is spent in the best possible way. And if migrants are expected to be good representatives and do some lobbying for their country of origin abroad, then they would often like some influence on the policies that they are expected to represent (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b: 4-5)

Thus, there are no clear-cut or simple path-dependencies, as each string and actor can affect the other. As Østergaard-Nielsen claims, the Turkish state want Turkish migrants to integrate in the settlement countries but in doing so ‘remain Turkish at heart’. Immigrants from Turkey, on the other hand, have put pressure on the Turkish state in terms of facilitation of voting procedures and minority rights in Turkey in general.

**Studies on integration, institutional arrangements and citizenship**

In the introduction of Chapter 1, I reflected upon the value of contested concepts or concepts loaded with political connotation. One such concept is the notion of integration, which has been criticised immensely during the last years (e.g. Favell, 2001; 2003). Why then do I want to take over a notion now mostly used by politicians and policymakers that holds so many connotations that its meaning seems to be everything and nothing? The (easy) answer is that none of the substitutes, e.g. inclusion, incorporation, participation, accommodation, absorption, seem to go beyond the qualitative meaning of the concept of integration, nor do they, to quote Adrian Favell: “invoke a broader vision of an ideal end-goal for society as a whole” (Favell, 2003: 15, italics in original). The concept is part of a political discourse, i.e. being located in integration policies, which basically makes it something that a state can do. This conception is currently being challenged by the people, which are the immigrants, subordinated to this political logic.

Thus, an essential task for this project is both to investigate how the integration discourse is produced in a specific political context of three distinct nation-states and to examine
how this understanding is received and challenged by the immigrants at stake. As Vermeulen and Penninx write: “Integration is a long-term process and policies should take this into account” (2000: 2), and thus should be characterised by patience, but it is not, and as they continue: “on the contrary, democratic impatience focuses on the ‘lack of progress’, and is a product of genuine concern as well as of fear of crisis and disintegration” (ibid).

The discussion of integration can be contextualised within both a normative angle (already touched upon) and a theoretical-operational angle, which very often leads to the application of the concept in empirical analysis. I will discuss both these aspects.

**Integration as a normative concept**

Despite the criticism of integration it is still an important concept when conceptualising the relationship between the nation-states and the incorporation of newcomers. Thus, the concept obviously is connected to the discussion of the nation-state touched upon in the previous section. The linkage to the nation-state is due to an underlying equation of the concept of society and the nation-state in modernity (Chernilo, 2006). This has been described as methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). Ulrich Bech has perhaps been the fiercest opponent to this way of thinking and has suggested the cosmopolitan perspective as way out (Beck, 2000; 2002). Without devaluing the work by Beck there obviously could be a danger in replacing one methodological ‘ism’ with another. I will not venture further into this discussion but simply argue that the overall field of integration, empirically, theoretically and in regards to policy making has been framed by methodological nationalism, which for the moment makes all contributions challenging and moving beyond this position valuable and necessary.

Ultimately integration denotes an end-goal of society. It contains the principles for who can be accepted in the nation-state and who cannot. Hence, *power* is a crucial dimension in the integration concept. As Foucault has stressed, every regime of representation is a regime of power, in his terminology the pairing of knowledge/power. Those who dominate economically and socially also hold the significant ideological and symbolic power. One way to articulate such discursive dominance is by the use of definitions. Definitions function as an extremely efficient tool to express justification and entitlement. Definitions seek to advance ‘why’ questions by putting up premises for why ‘things are as they are’ (van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). To define is thus always connected to a discursive strategy and contains a (latent)

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5 See Favell (2001) and (2003) for a very extensive discussion on the research studies on integration. His two articles cover both academic and national and European commissioned studies and give a detailed account the state of the art in different European countries.
ideological aim. Politics of immigration and integration are per se characterised by being dependent on categories and definitions. Who is to be integrated and into what, who is already integrated and who decides who should be integrated, why should people be integrated and how is it going to take place? The state and the majority form the social order and hold the power to state which processes of change and transformation are acceptable. In this understanding integration first and foremost becomes something that the state can do (Favell, 2003). Seen from a top-down perspective, integration in Favell’s description: “then, is about imagining the national institutional forms and structures that can unify a diverse population; hence imagining what the state can actually do to ‘nationalize’ newcomers and re-constitute the nation-state under conditions of growing cultural diversity” (ibid: 18). However, looking at the objects for integration it is not clear whom we most of the time are talking about. Are we, as Favell asks, talking about: “‘Legally resident foreigners’, ‘immigrants’, ‘illegal/undocumented residents’, ‘third-country nationals’, ‘ethnic groups’, ‘racial minorities’, new or naturalized ‘citizens’, or simply formally indistinguishable ‘nationals’ with a different de facto cultural history or skin color?” (2003: 18). Clearly there must be two main ‘partners’ taking part in the integration processes; the target-group itself (with its distinct characteristics) and the receiving society (with its characteristics), however as just stressed these two partners are fundamentally unequal in regards to power and resources. The receiving society and the institutional settings are far more decisive both for the expectations to and outcome of the process than the target group itself. With the transnational perspective in mind, the institutions and structural arrangements in the sending country and transnational ties obviously can be of importance as well.6

Trying to answer this question makes things even more slippery. As a minimum we need to know who is already integrated. The power of the majority speaks it own language here and the majority is seen as the ‘normal’, unproblematic and non-deviant group, but even if we took that at face value how do we pick a control group? This dilemma points to the underlying assumption of the integration concept and the linkage with the nation-state. In essence it is a highly conservative term that aims at preserving the status quo. When investigating the debate, the real debate seems to focus on the preservation of the welfare state services

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6 The Turkish writer Zafer Şenocak, who has been living in Germany since 1970, addressed the dilemma of who we are talking about very elegantly at a recent conference in Maastrict 2005. – Earlier that month he had observed the now almost established May 1 riots in Berlin-Kreuzberg, where radical leftists, punks and autonomous join forces and create a highly visible form of disturbance and protest. At the conference he asked ‘who is most integrated? The punk throwing stones at the police and burning cars, or himself, a member of the so-called non-integrated Turkish minority in Berlin?’ Thereby he also touches the into what question (see also Şenocak, 2000).
(most notably in the North European countries) and on maintaining a homogeneous national identity. That is only possible, according to the arguments, if newcomers are integrated into the labour market and thus do not become a financial burden for the state. The reciprocal relationship between having a job, paying your taxes and thereby earning the right to welfare is crucial for this understanding.

Concurrently, there is a general unease with ‘foreign cultures’, which definitely has been strengthened further after 9/11 and the terror acts in Madrid and London. The discourse of integration has become conflated with a discourse of security (against terrorism) (Faist, 2006; Kastoryano, 2004). In recent policy programs crafted across Western Europe focus seems rather to be on notions such as social cohesion, societal stability, and homogeneity than on integration (seen from the macro perspective as here, integration refers to the characteristics of a whole social system). At the same time the different countries are in dire need of labour force and hence need to be more inclusive for non-European labour, which sometimes creates paradoxes in national legislation.

Integration and multiculturalism

The idea of multiculturalism is criticised on the same ground for shattering the ‘normal’ national homogeneity – the idiom ‘the death of multiculturalism’ became prominent a few years ago (e.g. Kundnani, 2002) – and in most (Western European) countries the notions of pluralism, multiculturalism and diversity are now being scrutinized and debated heavily. Whereas theoretical discussions of migrant settlement and integration have moved from earlier assimilation models to contemporary theories on multiculturalism back to neo-assimilationism (Martikainen, 2005; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002), the political agenda seems to have moved from assimilation over state-sponsored versions of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism back to a somewhat assimilatory approach (Brubaker, 2001; Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Geddes, 2003; Ireland, 2000; Koopmans et al., 2005). From a de facto perspective it may be that ‘we are all multiculturalists now’ as Nathan Glazer put it, but from the perspective of the policy makers and the political discourse this might not be acknowledged as the reality.

Several attempts have been made to explain the reluctance towards multiculturalism and to analyse the European experience with immigration, where one repeated explanatory vari-

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7 For an example see the report published by the British Home Office Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review.

8 Bearing the often-raised critique of multiculturalism in mind: For multiculturalism and related discourses it is assumed that for each identifiable group there is a single culture, which is seen as homogeneous, always stays the same, and when it travels it will remain the same with no reference to context or patterns of interaction (for a more elaborated criticism see Baumann, 1999; Moodod, 1997; Moodod et al., 2006).
able is the fact that the European nation-states were not built on immigration like the US or Australia, although most would agree that the European countries now have become ‘countries of immigration’ (Joppke, 1998; 1999). However, it may become increasingly difficult for the politicians to maintain demands of such an exclusively nation-state orientated definition of integration in the light of the processes of internationalisation, European integration, transnationalism and globalisation, when, as once again, Favell emphasises:

In the nation-state centered version of integration research in the larger European countries, there is something odd about the fact that the status and success of immigrants gets measured entirely in the terms of social mobility relative to norms of integration into the nation-society, or average national mobility paths; yet it is increasingly normal to think of elites in the same country becoming increasingly transnational in their roles, networks and trajectories. The exclusive destiny of full integration into host nation-states may however not be the norm for immigrants in the future (Favell, 2001: 33).

**Conceptualisations and operationalisations of integration**

It is not only policy makers who face difficulties in defining integration; also academics have had a hard time creating a conceptual space that can encompass the different aspects attached to the concept.

When analysing integration there seems to be two possible trajectories. Either one can look at the policies themselves or one can investigate the concept from theoretical angles. Analysing the policies would imply to look at measures such as:

[B]asic legal and social protection; formal naturalization and citizenship (or residency based) rights; anti-discrimination laws; equal opportunities positive action; the creation of corporatist and associational structures for immigrant or ethnic organizations; the redistribution of targeted socio-economic funds for minorities in deprived areas; policy on public housing; policy on law and order; multicultural education policy, policies and laws on tolerating cultural practices; language and cultural courses in the host society’s culture (Favell, 2001: 351).

There are several studies of that kind, ranging from more descriptive patterns of integration done by NGO’s as the Migration Policy Group (e.g. Niessen & Schibel, 2003; Niessen et al., 2005) to national evaluations of own integration policies to academic contributions focusing empirically on the political institutional arrangements for explaining different national patterns of migration, integration and ethnic relation policies (e.g. Geddes, 2003; Ireland, 1994; Kastoryano, 2002a; 2002b; Soysal, 1994; Togeby, 2003; Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). Another type investigates the nexus between the (multicultural) nation, the welfare state and immigration and integration (Borevi, 2002; Brochmann, 2002a; Brochmann & Hagelund, 2005a; Ekberg, 2006; Entzinger, 2000; Goul Andersen, 2006; Hedetoft, 2006b; Necef, 2004; Social Forskning, 2005). Others again have looked at differences in policies from a theoretical conceptual angle and best practices (e.g. Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Penninx, 2004b).
If we trace the notion of integration back in time, the Chicago School of Sociology, linked to Robert Park, Louis Wirth, William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki among others, formed a now classical approach in the 1920s, with the so-called ‘race relations cycle’. The model distinguishes between four stages of integration (or in fact assimilation): contact, conflict, accommodation and assimilation, which set the theoretical basis for the American Melt- ing Pot ideology (Martikainen, 2005). Later these theories were criticised for the evolutionary aspects with the underlying assumption about the homogeneous society and inevitably ending up with the primacy of the one and unified nation-state. Nevertheless what also came out of this research is the acknowledgement that incorporation into a host society is far more complex than the ‘straight-line’ theory assumes (Layton-Henry, 1990). Instead researchers have tried to disentangle the different components fused in the integration concept.

Looking briefly through some of these attempts we come up with differentiations between integration, assimilation, pluralistic integration and segregation (where focus is placed on the assumed consequences of these when implemented in policy) (Hamburger, 1990), between cultural (integration on the same level as the majority population in regards to religion and norms) and structural integration (integration on the same level as the majority population in regards to political and labour market participation and education) (Schierup, 1993; Spencer, 2006), distinctions between social integration (i.e. civil society) and system integration (societal structures and institutions, e.g. Lockwood, 1964). This leads to discussions of the relationship between and investigation of which types are the determining factor – can social integration be expected if immigrants are not integrated into the system (Hamburger, 1997), or differentiation into more subsystems such as social, political and labour market integration (ibid.), or finally suggestions to combine the integration/ disintegration and inclusion/exclusion dichotomies (coming up with the following typology: excluded and segregated; included but segregated; integrated and substantial equal possibilities and assimilated (Emerek, 2003)). Lately the transnational perspective has gained more prominence and led to studies looking at transnationalism and societal integration (Faist, 2007b). Common for these categorisations is that they try to include the possibility structures, investigate access to the different spheres of society and thus involve a dichotomy between formal and substantial access/membership etc.

However, these conceptualisations have difficulties coping with anomalies, for example groups that are not interested in getting political rights but are integrated on the labour market, something that characterises many of the first generation Turks in Germany. These typologies do not tell us how to measure ‘successful’ integration or rather they can mainly point to disin-
The problem is that they cannot imagine integration processes that go beyond or outside the sphere of the nation-state and national model (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). One example pointed to in the literature is the Turks in France who have consistently shown to perform “worst” (i.e. the least “French”) in the main categories of the inquiry (the example is taken from Favell, 2001, who describes the results from the reports by Michèle Tribalat and her associates in France). The Turkish resistance to French social norms and non-assimilatory progress has earned them the classification as an ‘integration failure’. However, it is not clear if they would be classified as such in another national system or conceptual frame that mainly focuses on labour market participation, youth crime or poverty.9

Integration and discrimination

The mentioned studies do point to a very crucial point, that is making the structural limitations and barriers visible. Lower rates of political and labour market participation may not be the ‘immigrants’ own intentions, but could be explained through the unintended consequences of an education system that favours the majority group. Hypothetically we could imagine a situation where certain sectors in the labour market could be more willing to accept Bosnian refugees than Somali. In this sense it precedes contemporary studies on structural and institutional discrimination, which are a quite recent contribution to this research field.

While several, primarily quantitative, studies both in Denmark and on a European level have focused on face-to-face discrimination (EUMC, 2005; Gaasholt & Togeby, 1995; Mikkelsen, 2001, 2003b; Togeby, 2003) from ‘native’ Danes to minorities and vice versa, we have very limited knowledge for instance on discrimination between ethnic minority groups. There is almost no research on how the education system, access to the same types of housing as the majority population or on how certain job categories (may) set up limits for ethnic mi-

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9 Former Danish Minister of Integration Bertel Haarder illustrates many of the above-mentioned problems in understanding integration. When asked by a journalist to point to a well-integrated group (of foreigners) in the Danish society, he pointed to the Chinese minority. That can at first hand seem very strange as the Chinese minority scores very low on level of education, rarely masters the Danish language, has no social contact with Danes, no intermarriages, has created its own business niches and to some degree even has its own banking systems. What is important is that they are not common guests or recipients of social benefits, as some of the other foreign groups in Denmark tend to be, and thus do not abuse the Danish welfare system. Haarder’s statement shows how the discourse of integration is contextualized in other social spheres and how integration (in the Danish case) is first and foremost understood as labour market integration and strongly connected to the welfare state (the analysis of the Danish integration regime will be taken up in Chapter 5; see also Bak Jørgensen, 2006). Also, the French example demonstrates the importance of finding compatible measures; can we even compare integration processes in different countries? Entzinger and Biezeveld describe the problem in measuring the effectiveness of integration policies when comparing the level of employment among Turks in The Netherlands and Germany. The level of unemployment among Turks is twice as high as the national average in Germany while its three to four times higher the national average in The Netherlands. But in absolute numbers, 18 pct. of all Turks are unemployed in Germany compared to ‘only’ 10 pct. in The Netherlands. The question that Entzinger & Biezeveld raise is: Who fares better then? The country with the lowest unemployment rates or the one with the lowest gap between ‘natives’ and immigrants? (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003: 42).
norities. Focus has to a large degree been placed on the barriers and limitations the ethnic minorities have put up for themselves (e.g. low degree of education as a limitation for entering an evermore specialised labour market), but as stated above there has been no systematic research on alleged discrimination on a structural level.

**Integration and citizenship studies**

Several scholars have tried to get beyond the normative involvement in regards to outcome that characterises a lot of the research when dealing with or defining integration. There now seems to be a certain consensus about differentiating between different spheres of society in which integration takes place and not necessarily evaluating the outcomes. The result is that integration is fused with the concept of citizenship. Most such calls seek to extend the Marshallian framework (of especially social) citizenship.\(^{10}\) Within such a framework citizenship refers to: “a general corpus of rights, duties and activities of individuals and groups relevant to the expression of their interests with regard to public sphere decisions effecting life opportunities, quality of life, and/or representation to others in society” (Vertovec, 1999b: 23). Basically it revolves around the notion of ‘equity’. Marshall himself distinguished between civil, political and social rights. Citizenship in this sense is seen as a universalistic egalitarian principle of status, as he writes: “Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (1992[1950]: 84) and furthermore: “Citizenship requires a bond of a […] kind, a direct sense of loyalty to a civilization which is a common possession. It is a loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law” (ibid: 92).

Marshall’s framework is no longer as plausible today as it was then. First the universalism inert in this understanding has been challenged by immigration, in the sense that immigration has revealed that citizenship is not only a system of rights, but also a mechanism for social closure that demarcates the boundaries of states, dependent upon the distinct cultural and national imprint of the individual state and in Soysal’s terms functions as a device of exclusion (e.g. Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Soysal, 1994). Furthermore does the immigration experience show that even though (political) citizenship is acquired (through naturalisation) it does not follow that people automatically will enjoy equal rights (Joppke,

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\(^{10}\) In English the word citizenship covers both the formal juridical/political part and the sociological meaning of the word., Danish distinguishes between statsborgerskab (formal citizenship) and medborgerskab (substantial membership). German distinguishes between Staatsbürgerschaft and Mitbürgerschaft (sometimes Staatszugehörigkeit and Staatsangehörigkeit), which makes it necessary to explicitly state which meaning of the word is at stake. It is a distinction very much used in the research on immigrants, the nation-state and systems of inclusion and exclusion (e.g. Alsayyad & Castells, 2002; Brochmann, 2002b; Brubaker, 1994[1992]; Galal, 2001; Geddes, 2003; Schierup, 2003; Siim, 2003).
1999). Secondly, Marshall’s concept lacks a cultural dimension; religion and cultural ideologies have been very influential in shaping both modern citizenship and nationhood and from the political-philosophical perspective overseeing this dimension makes it difficult to conceptualise notions of multiculturalism (Jæger, 2000; Kymlicka, 1995). Thirdly, Marshall does not distinguish between active and passive citizenship, which has become a very central distinction in the recent research. Finally the framework is orientated towards consensus and cannot really incorporate conflicts (as a vehicle for social transformation). These shortcomings can be located in the already mentioned one-sided focus on the nation-state as the natural and unquestionable territorial, organisational and symbolical frame for citizenship. But citizenship obviously cannot be disconnected from the nation-state either. As the difference in naturalisation practices and discussions on dual citizenship both show, citizenship clearly means more than the mere distribution of rights and duties, it also contains notions of national identity and belonging that are meant to secure social cohesion.

Although many scholars have begun to conceive of social and political entities beyond the nation-state in terms of transnationalism and postnationalism, the actual situation seems to be that you cannot live out citizenship without the social and state structures that make its components realisable, in historical terms; that is undeniably the nation-state. As stated there is no alternative, or at least not yet. Nonetheless the literature points to possible conceptual challenges to citizenship. Citizenship could be expanded, which could be an outcome of the increased struggle for rights. Citizenship can be eroded, which Putnam’s conclusions suggest, or it can be endangered by the neo-liberal tinge entering politics and changing the relation between individual rights and the collective dimension (Faist, forthcoming). Citizenship could be extended, e.g. increasing rights for non-citizens (i.e. postnational citizenship), implementing dual citizenship or developing into transnational citizenship (Bauböck, 1994).

For the state of art this has led to two trajectories; one being the emergence of a comparative cross-national field, which brings me back to the type of research discussed earlier in this chapter, namely the comparative investigations of different (ideal-) types of citizenship regimes. These also deal with integration, as citizenship is located as a part of the incorporation regimes. I will not repeat the criticism of these studies, but instead take the position that these classifications can be too rigid, but the best of them, and many of them actually, have been able to develop a framework for the analysis of migration and ethnic relations as a field of contention and thus been able to cope with the complexities and anomalies that characterises this research field (e.g. Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Koopmans et al., 2005). Secondly, these studies have put an increased focus on the role of political institutions and focused on
the political institutional arrangements also mentioned earlier, often described by the concept ‘political opportunity structures’ (POS) (e.g. Favell & Geddes, 2000; Fennema & Tilie, 1999; Guigni & Passy, 1999; Ireland, 1994; Joppke, 1998; Kastoryano, 1998; Koopmans & Olzak; 2004; Koopmans & Statham, 2000; 2001; Kriesi et al., 1992; McAdam et al., 1996; Soysal, 1994; Togeby, 2003). When combined with a focus on the discursive opportunity structures (DOS) such an approach has shown to bear considerable analytical strength.

The second outcome of the concept of citizenship has been to distinguish between the different aspects or dimensions of citizenship. Penninx distinguishes between the legal/political dimension (whether immigrants are full-fledged members of society, do ethnic minorities hold the same formal political rights and duties as the majority, acquisition of national citizenship and thus access to the formal political system and structures for less formal political participation), the socio-economic dimension (social and economic rights of residents related to institutionalised facilities in regards to social benefits, social housing and care etc.) and finally, the cultural and religious dimension (equal rights to organise and manifest themselves as cultural, ethnic and religious groups, level of recognition and acceptance) (Penninx, 2004b; see also Penninx et al., 2004: Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). Penninx and his colleagues in another study combine these dimensions with focus on the opportunity structures for participation and notions of inclusion and exclusion. In particular they try to supplement the top-down approach with a bottom-up perspective by measuring how the institutional arrangements have encouraged participation via channels of mobilisation (participation via the mainstream political system within the three dimensions mentioned) and channels of activation (participation via parallel institutions and policies launched alongside the formal political system through local governments and consultative bodies etc.) (Penninx, 2004a). In a report for the European Commission, Entzinger and Biezeveld come up with a similar approach, although with integration as their starting-point rather than citizenship, but adding a fourth dimension, namely the receiving societies’ attitude towards migrants (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003). The last dimension acknowledges the fact that integration, at least in definition, is not a one-sided process and refers to issues as the aforementioned structural discrimination and in general to inclusion and representation of immigrants in society.

**Studies on immigrant organisations, participation and mobilisation**

As discussed, social citizenship can be understood as inclusion and participation. One indicator is the level of participation in organisations of civil society and in organisations initiated and managed by the state. Organisations are normally seen as an important instrument in the
processes of incorporation and as a means of gaining influence on the political decision structures, which can strengthen the ties to the host society and the native/majority society and strengthen the social capital within and across the ethnic groups. Migrant organisations can in this way become influential players in a plural democratic process at both local and national level and potentially have a positive impact on integration outcomes (Cyrus, 2005; Spencer, 2006). Even so, there is a considerable lack of research on the distinct role of immigrant organisations in the integration process. There is research investigating the importance of organisational life for including and empowering under-privileged groups in civil society and developing more inclusive democratic institutions, but the focus on immigrants or ethnic minorities has so far been minor (some of the exceptions, although focusing mainly on political participation, being Brochmann et al., 2002; Christensen & Christensen, 2006; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; 2004; Jacobs & Tillie, 2004; Marques & Santos, 2004; Mikkelsen, 2003a; Moya, 2005; Soininen, 1999; Vermeulen, 2006). Again the included literature will partly overlap with the literature mentioned in the former sections, such as the institutional and political opportunity structure approaches. However, the purpose of this string of literature is to get a firmer understanding of what Faist terms “the crucial meso link” (Faist, 2000a) and not just to focus on the institutions but to reflect upon the role and possibilities of the actors in relation to this on both meso and micro level. Thus, this section can in a sense be situated within the classical sociological dilemma between structure and agency.

This dissertation focuses on immigrant organisations, so I limit myself to speak only of those. The first question that comes up in this regard is to what extent we can label an organisation an immigrant organisation. Do we call organisations ‘immigrant organisations’ because the majority of the members are foreign-born, or because most of its members are descendants of immigrants? Do we label organisations ‘immigrant organisations’ because the inspiration and motivation initially came from immigrants? At what point does an immigrant organisation stop being an immigrant organisation? And should organisations started by newcomers but whose members are mixed be labelled as such; or the other way around, organisations started by natives but whose members are mainly immigrants?11

While there are strong arguments behind the claim that ‘institutions matter’, e.g. by providing the political opportunity structures for immigrant participation on the individual and organisational level, there is no consensus about the importance and level of influence of the immigrant organisations and associations. Togeby has argued that it is the political institu-

11 These issues are discussed intensely in the special issue of JEMS Vol. 31, No. 5, September 2005; edited by Marlou Schrover and Floris Vermeulen.
tions of the host country (and model of inclusion) rather than the cultural traditions that are
decisive for immigrant behaviour and civic engagement (Togeby, 1999; 2003; 2008). Penninx
demonstrated how Turks in Germany and The Netherlands organised differently in accordance with the organisational and corporatist models in the two countries (Penninx, 2004a). But the most often mentioned example is Soysal’s analysis of different Western European incorporation regimes (1994). These models (corporatist, statist and liberal), she sees as providing:

The language, concepts, resources, and mechanisms for the formal understanding and organization of incorporation. Consequently, policies and organizational arrangements concerning the incorporation of new migrant groups are isomorphic with the preeminent models of membership in host politics (ibid: 36).

As an example she identifies the Swedish and Dutch model as grounded in a corporatist pattern where migrant populations are defined by their collective identities, in the sense that both states encourage and support certain ethno-national and/or religious associations that consequently are officially recognised by the state given the possibilities, as collectives, to partake in advisory boards and structures of representation (it should be stressed that both countries have changed their approach towards more individual solutions recently). “Turks in Sweden are organized differently than Turks in France or Switzerland”, she claims (ibid: 85) and further suggests that:

Migrant organizations, in turn, define their goals, strategies, functions, and level of operation in relation to the existing policies and resources of the host state. They advance demands and set agendas vis-à-vis state policy and discourses in order to seize institutional opportunities and further their claims. In that sense, the expression and organization of migrant collective identity are framed by the institutionalized forms of the state’s incorporation regime (ibid: 86).

Both former and later research has come to the same conclusions that the organisational language of the host state will reflect the organisational patterns of immigrants in the given state. This partly explains why we mainly find large scale national organisations in Sweden and a much smaller concentration of nation-wide organisations, but far more minor ethno-cultural associations in Denmark.

However, this has led some scholars to talk about the implicit danger of cooptation, in the sense that organisations only are supported if they pursue the same agenda as the national policies within the area of integration, which seriously limits their independent claims making and autonomy (Hussain, 2002). This has also led to another tendency that limits the influence and real power of the organisations, namely still higher demands of professionalism in regards both to accounting and applying for funds. The consequence has been a much more lean formal democratic and organisational structure as a necessity. Immigrant associations have been
ousted by national NGO’s from the host society with more resources and professional administrations who compete for the same funds and thus basically deal with a problem of representation. Subsequently there will be a higher degree of competition and thus fragmentation among the immigrant organisations in order to achieve support and recognition from the state. This can lead to less autonomy as the cooptation of immigrant representation in the institutional arrangements hosted by the states goes on, as only organisations that support state policies will be represented or heard. We could end up with a situation where cooptation in reality leads to the actual exclusion of ethnic minorities (Hussain, 2002).

Another theoretical scepticism is raised by scholars who argue that corporate representations reinforce essentialist stereotypes. Vertovec recaptures this criticism in the following way:

Particularly through the corporate groups identified in many models of state multiculturalism, there emerges a picture of society as a ‘mosaic’ of several bounded, nameable, individually homogeneous and un-meltable minority uni-cultures which are pinned on to the backdrop of a similarly characterised majority uni-culture (Vertovec, 1999b: 29).

This point of view reflects my own scepticism towards ‘thinking’ in models. I find the results and arguments by Soysal and others very convincing, but would also claim that ethnic groups do not necessarily stick to ethnic claims making. Ethnicity may and does hold immense importance for a large part of the ethnic minorities, but ethnicity is not the only source of identification and ethnic networks may not be the only networks people partake in. Likewise the presence of transnational organisations and claims making could also be hard to explain within the institutional model. Either we would have to take it all the way towards Soysal’s notion of postnational membership or we could reduce it to acts of resistance, as it is hard to imagine any state-sponsored institution of integration putting forth demands of transnational activities as a requirement for receiving funds from the public. By this I mean that the heterogeneity and complexity in immigrant organisation and claims making should be taken into consideration and review the top-down approaches for the possibility that immigrant organisation may also challenge the state institutions and understandings of integration and not adjust according to the given demands at the time (although that might characterise the majority of the immigrant organisations). One example could be the discussions of diversity management, which was initiated along time ago in the private sector (due to a lack of qualified employees – capitalism may not be colour-blind but nor does it necessary follow the state’s reluctance towards ethnic differences) and among some types of immigrant organisations.
Claims of recognition of diversity and diversity as a resource are put forth backed up by narratives of successful immigrants in the top-end of the labour market.

Here the issue is not about the existence of the multicultural society as such, that is taken for granted, but rather the emergence of new political subjects and a new type of pluralism aiming at a redefinition of democracy (the same type of arguments can be found in Mouffe, 1993; Vertovec, 1999b; Yuval-Davis, 1999; 2006). The platform for such claims is frequently organisations and associations, which in that sense links the individual and the organisational (meso) level.

The influence of (or presumed lack of) immigrant organisations

Although there might be consensus about the positive aspects of immigrant organisations in the democratic process, e.g. as concluded provocatively by Fennema & Tillie: “To have undemocratic ethnic organisations is better for the democratic process than to have no organisations at all” (1999: 723; italics in original; see also Layton-Henry, 1990). Other scholars doubt the importance of the ethnic minorities’ channels of influence by means of organisations and associations in terms of outcome and power (Hammer & Bruun, 2000; Hussain, 2002; Mikkelsen, 2001; 2002). Research on both the activities and the structural patterns of such organisations is quite limited, most being detailed qualitative socio-cultural or ethnographic studies (Marques & Santos, 2004; Mørck, 1998; Pedersen & Selmer, 1991; Schwartz, 2002; Vermeulen & Berger, 2007).

Arguably there is a need for more studies focusing on the meso-level conducted through quantitative methods that can help reveal the extent of the organisations, which could be combined with qualitative methods of analysis that can point to the impact and importance of the organisations as well as their motivations, strategies and discursive features. The literature shows the contours of a pattern of a few but resourceful persons (termed political entrepreneurs, gate-keepers or agents of change), who are active in several organisations and who seem to be doing most of the work (interlocks). The literature on resources and mobility can be situated in the politological and sociological traditions looking at social capital (and other forms of capital) political trust and empowerment (e.g. Andersen & Siim, 2004; Faist, 2000b; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Togeby, 2003; Vogel & Triandafyllidou, 2006; Zou, 2002).12 From an electoral perspective Togeby has investigated mobilisation processes among

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12 A large scale research project took place at the University of Oldenburg under the headline POLITIS: Building Europe with New Citizens? An Inquiry into the Civic Participation of Naturalised Citizens and Foreign Residents in 25 Countries, is investigating exactly civic engagement and participation of immigrants in civil society, combining different theoretical and methodological approaches some of which are also included above. See <http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe/index.html>.
the immigrant population, and Mehmet Ümit Necef has looked at political entrepreneurship in Denmark among immigrants and descendants (Necef, 2002; Togeby, 1999; 2003; see also Tillie, 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2002a). Still these studies only account for a very general trend or, in the case of Necef, for the few and very well known politicians with a non-Danish background.

Also here it is beneficial to pay close attention to the immigrant organisations’ role in this development and investigate how organisational activities can have other effects besides indirect influence (Hammer & Bruun, 2000) and also be part of strategies of emancipation, empowerment or politics of identity (Chistoffersen, 2002; Mikkelsen, 2002; 2003a; Mørck, 2001; Tireli, 1999; Yurdakul, 2006).13

The last issue I want to discuss is this section is the different attempts to categorise and make typologies of the organisational landscape. I will comment upon three types of literature dealing with immigrant organisations and associational life, *i.e.* organisational theory, resource mobilisation theory and network theory.

**Typologies, classifications and organisational theory**

When looking at immigrant organisations, *time* is perceived to be a crucial factor. Although many immigrant organisations have proven stable and been able to adjust over time, organisational instability is very common. Many organisations have lived short turbulent lives, have been formed in opposition to other organisations without the required organisational structure, or new ones are built on the ashes of old ones, where the leaders and movers strive after the same organisational goals under new names (Mikkelsen, 2002; 2003a). Layton-Henry has argued that immigrant organisations undergo internal changes and develop differently over time according to the institutional arrangements in the host society (although he does not follow that theoretical framework as such) and influences from the home country (which places him somewhat along the line of Brubaker).

The first phase of immigrant organisations was characterised by young men who wanted to keep connections to the homeland and fellow countrymen and therefore set up social cafés and centres. They also joined professional (labour market) organisations and unions or estab-

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13 The distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ actions is here taken from Bäck & Soininen (1996) and derives from the politological tradition. In the literature indirect actions have traditionally been considered politically relevant, where the political is related to interventions in the policy-formation process. These actions could be claims making over participating in councils and networks to lobby activities. This is also the reason why most studies have concluded that immigrant organisations, at best, have had a marginal influence. However, it is also a very reductive definition of the political, looking mostly at the outcome and less on the practical process of ‘doing organisational work’. The experiences gained by being part of an organisation may serve as a vehicle for empowerment and have emancipatory outcome as well as enhance the pool of social capital.
lished political organisations supported by political and professional organisations in the home country, many of them leftist organisations. Finally the religious institutions in the home country monitored and supported the establishment of religious organisations. The next phase is characterised by a more rooted connection to the new country, grounded in the realisation that their stay might not be temporary. Instead their children and spouses were brought to the new country, and schools, social youth clubs and counselling institutions became part of the organisational landscape. The connection to the host country institutions was strengthened and cooperation formalised. See Figure 2 for Layton-Henry’s depiction of the organisational development.

**Figure 2.1 Typology of immigrant associations by orientation to country of origin and country of residence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation mainly towards:</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Country of residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both country of origin and country of residence</td>
<td>Kinship and village associations</td>
<td>Community advice centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious institutions</td>
<td>Ethnic workers’ associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Branches of home political parties</td>
<td>Professional and business associations e.g. ethnic chambers of commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural associations</td>
<td>Sporting associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community schools e.g. Saturday language schools</td>
<td>Banking institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social clubs</td>
<td>Consultative institutions and advisory councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homeland political organisations</td>
<td>Parent-teacher associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revolutionary opposition groups</td>
<td>Residence or housing associations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trend over time

(Layton-Henry, 1990: 103)

Although this is a very simplified account of the migration and organisation pattern, Mikkelsen acknowledges that we do find such a development of organisational frameworks and integration in several European, including the Nordic countries (Mikkelsen, 2003a: 23-24). But what has happened now almost 20 years later? Now we are facing children of children of original immigrants. How have the organisations changed and what types of new intervening factors can we identify. What started out as transnational organisations – before being termed so – maintaining ties to the homeland while serving the needs of migrants in Western Europe gradually started working with integration issues and became firmly rooted in the new national and institutional setting. Today, research stresses the importance of re-thinking the sustained transnational ties once again.
Several attempts have been made to classify different organisations. In the literature, there are notions of voluntarily organisations (mostly set in relation to civil society) (Gundelach & Torpe, 1997; Fennema & Tille, 2004), interest organisations (seen in relation to the state) (Mikkelsen, 2003a), social movements (operating in a field between the established political system and civil society/communities) (McAdam et al., 1996) or action- and protest groups (operating in the periphery of social movements). Analysing immigrant organisations would include the types just mentioned, but immigrant organisations have their special characteristics (encompassing ethnic, cultural and religious traits), which scholars have tried to conceptualise in a number of ideal-types. Examples are Pedersen & Selmer (1991), who look at Turkish organisations in the Danish municipality of Århus, distinguishing between (a) secular, non-religious or anti-religious groups, (b) national-cultural, and (c) Islamic organisations.

When establishing a database covering immigrant organisation in Denmark 1965-2005 the main types included were ethno-national organisations (consisting of one ethnic group), multinational/multiethnic groups, national associations (central organisation for a specific ethnic group), umbrella organisations (for different ethno-national groups and associations) and solidarity/friendship associations (for both immigrants and Danes). These were specified into homeland associations, ethnic cultural associations, professional associations, religious associations, youth organisations, sports clubs, female associations, ethnic protest movements and grassroots movements and finally political organisations.

Whether these attempts cover the organisational landscape today is hard to tell, as also the authors acknowledge that the different types will always overlap, and the types are nothing more than ideal-types. A Turkish association can be a social space for drinking tea and playing Tavla and celebrating religious holidays and at the same time organise meetings to discuss integration or Turkish EU membership with political guests from Denmark or Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2002a). Several of the organisations that I visited during my fieldwork would have such characteristics. Thus another approach would be to identify the orientation and focus of the association and avoid fixating associations and allow them a more fluid character.

Finally the framework for studying immigrant organisations should be able to identify networks as networks and be aware not to let categories of ethnicity and culture be over-

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14 The database was created for AMID (The Academy for Migration Studies in Denmark) and is used in this research project, but is not generally available. With the latest updates it contains around 770 immigrant organisations (active and no-longer existing) characterized and identified by a large number of variables. However, in another study investigating immigrant organisations in the Nordic countries Mikkelsen, the researcher behind the database, uses the same typology (Mikkelsen, 2003 b).
determining. This is often the case, for instance in the myriad of studies using religion, especially Islam, as the explaining variable when describing immigrant behaviour on an individual and collective level (e.g. the many studies focusing on Islam as a response to marginalisation). Religion (or ethnicity) definitely can be an explaining variable, but it may not be the only one or even important when looking at contemporary Turkish associations in Denmark. Although the ethnic ties may be what got people together in the first place, their organisational interest could be of a completely different nature. Far more studies have been done on marginalised ethnic groups (e.g. studies on delinquency, immigrant ghettos, hip-hop culture and radical Muslim groups) than on the resourceful hypothetical catalysts for social change, which indicates an asymmetry within the research.\textsuperscript{15}

**Shortcomings and future research perspectives**

These different contributions in the studies of citizenship and integration set an analytical path ahead, but also point to a number of pitfalls and shortcomings. It needs not be stated that we should be careful of labelling the different countries with one or another typology or model. But even the studies trying to catch the complexities also fall in the trap of ‘overgeneralisation’. One example could be the notion of the Nordic countries so often mentioned as one entity. Clearly there are similarities between Denmark and Sweden due to welfare state arrangements, but looking at the integration policies shows a remarkable divergence, at least on a macro level, as my analysis will also show, where an important factor is exactly the acquisition of citizenship. In some other countries naturalisation, here among Sweden (and the Southern European countries), is perceived as a means to integration while in Denmark it has come to be regarded as the ‘crowning achievement’ or the token from the state for having integrated satisfactorily. Close attention to the actual content of the different national integration policies and not just reduce the analysis to for instance a question of *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis* systems. Separate attention should be paid to the impact of direct and institutional discrimination on naturalisation and inclusion and participation in general. The impact of national models on organising processes and the benefits and disadvantages of participation in immigrant associations likewise calls for further research.

In continuation of these arguments, we need more knowledge on the different transnational networks and organisations among the ethnic minority groups. But we need to ask not

\textsuperscript{15} Which probably could be partly explained by the fact that it is easier to get public funding for projects dealing with integration problems, particularly of women, children and youth, as the research is supposed to provide solutions to the failure. Also in the media several studies have shown an asymmetry between positive and negative stories; where the latter type is the most dominant (e.g. Bak Jörgensen, 2004; Hervik, 1999; Madsen, 2000; White, 1995).
only *how* and *what* questions (how does such networks affect the cultural and political identity among these groups?) but also *why* such networks have arisen, what are the trajectories among different groups, and finally we need to analyse transnationalism in the perspective of the legalistic structure, regime/model of integration and inclusion and political climate in the different receiving countries. Do Turks as such participate in transnational activities or only some segments? Do Turks in Denmark participate in such networks to the same degree as Turks in Germany? Do we find networks between groups in some nation-states and not others (*e.g.* Turks in Germany and the Netherlands but not among Turks in Sweden and Denmark or Sweden and Germany and so on)? There are multiple answers. My claim is that we need to ‘heterogenise’ the field and also try to move on from a generalising position that characterised the initial literature on transnationalism to a much more detailed and empirically based understanding of transnationalism in practice (as done by Argun, 2003 and Østergaard-Nielsen, 2002a; 2003a; Faist, 2007a; 2007b). The transnational perspective offers the possibility of a multi-levelled approach, and future research should try to follow these ‘flows’ back and forth, *e.g.* how do transnational activities affect the identity formation processes and strategies of integration among the participants? What could and will transnational activities imply for both formal and substantial citizenship? Such a multi-levelled approach could also integrate the national and the European level (and not just the home country and the receiving countries).

Furthermore there is a clear need for acknowledging the complexity of the field. Immigrants obviously are not alike and different groups behave differently, but this almost self-evident statement must also be brought to the analytical level. There is still a strong tendency within the public administration and legislation, but also to some degree in academia, to consider ethnic minorities as *one* group in terms of having similar values and preferences (Hus-sain, 2002). When studying (ethnic) minority groups it is important to distinguish between categories of ethnicity, gender, class, resources, culture, religion and age. One example could be the tendency of young Turkish women to do better in terms of education than young Turkish men. Gender clearly seems to matter.

The inherent danger in not working with different categories and perspectives is the risk of generalising and essentialising or putting forth models that claim to explain all issues regarding immigrants in just a few variables. This point of view was also expressed by Vertovec more than a decade ago:

In both academic and political discourses surrounding the topic of multiculturalism, various ethnic and racial groups are often talked about in sweeping terms without reference to important forms of differentiation between and among them, including differences of historical identities, cultural
practices, modes of organisation, and aspects of power (such as varying degrees of economic success, forms of political engagement, and criteria affecting general social status). Moreover, it is rarely noted that the same ethnic group may have developed rather differently, socio-culturally and organizationally, in light of contrasting local histories and settings (Vertovec, 1994: 259-260).

In the dissertation I engage directly with some of the mentioned shortcomings and thereby contribute to filling out some of the gaps. However, this chapter has addressed a broad range of theoretical issues and called for further reflections and conceptualisations. Answering all of these open questions obviously cannot be done in this dissertation and it is not my ambition. In the following chapter I continue along some of the mentioned discussions. Here I will outline my theoretical and operationalised framework.
Chapter 3
A theoretical, contextual and operationalised framework

Introduction and structure of chapter
This chapter consists of five parts, which together present the operationalised theoretical and methodological framework. Moreover it outlines the context for the forthcoming analysis. During the chapter I use different examples to illustrate the analytical concepts taken from both my case studies but also from a broader European context to avoid redundancy.

Based on the discussions in the first two chapters I build the first part of my theoretical framework on the two-dimensional model of citizenship as proposed by Koopmans & Statham (2000) and revised later in 2005. When investigating integration regimes and notions of citizenship within a broader field of immigration and ethnic relations, two dimensions seem to be paramount. First, the cultural dimension dealing with rights given to cultural groups, degree of cultural openness and tolerance towards and acceptance of difference as well as explicit and implicit cultural criteria for inclusions institutionalized as demands for integration, and second, the formal criteria for individual access to citizenship. Together these two dimensions, traditionally termed ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’, form the grid within which immigrants are both defined and ascribed a position in society. This ‘space’ also frames the possibility structures available for immigrants in terms of mobilisation, self-organisation, identity-construction and claims making. In claiming so, this framework and approach places itself with institutional theory and the theories of political opportunity structures (POS). This approach implies that collective action and organisation are part of a political process that is being shaped by the opportunities and constraints offered by the political environment and structures. This is the reason for focusing on the institutional configurations in terms of cultural and formal criteria for inclusion in the host society. Choosing a comparative research design will, within this framework, indicate which factors are decisive for collective actions and behaviour and identify the specific institutions in the three countries included in the analysis.

An initial comment should be given to this approach, as I include not just the formal structures but also factors like a discursive dimension (DOS) that both explains why the specific institutions have come into being and are shaped the way they are as well as outlines the discursive environment within which the constitution of collective identity and claims making takes place. This means that political space and opportunities to a certain extent also are negotiated. By distinguishing between political and political opportunity structures I do not claim
that political structures are not discursive. Rather I see an advantage in separating the two as they exactly describe two different opportunity spaces. Political opportunity structures refer to institutional context.\(^1\) I follow a much used definition by Tarrow, who understands these as: “consistent – but necessary formal or permanent dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective actions by affecting their expectations for success of failure” (Tarrow, 1994: 85). A defining characteristic of the POS is that they constitute the more stable aspects of opportunities as they are embedded in political institutions.\(^2\) Institutions in other words describe the principles of order that define a society at a particular time (Clemens, 1998). This can be compared to the discursive context that exactly describes the discursive opportunity structures. The discursive opportunity structures include the public discourse and political agenda. These are relatively open to change. Groups and movements can influence the public discourse and participate in agenda setting, they not only appropriate the discursive opportunities produced by others but can also make opportunities (Sainsbury, 2004). Political institutions definitely matter but the cultural setting and discursive context oppositely determine the extent to which political institutions will provide real opportunities for mobilisation (Guigni & Passy, 2004: 77).

The next part of my framework deals with the importance of the welfare state. I agree with Koopman & Statham’s criticism of earlier attempts to classify systems of integration regimes, as having neglected or underestimated the cultural dimension of citizenship, but I also find that the model they propose may be lacking a more explicit socio-economical perspective, and secondly that while cultural imprints/conceptions of nationhood (and indirectly who can be given citizenship) are significant for understanding the given (national) integration policies, it is only one aspect of the nation-state.

Hence I will claim that the welfare state arrangements should also be included in the framework. Such arrangements will influence expectations for integration as well as the actual outcome, as they embody ideas and practices of belonging, identity, exclusion, inclusion, membership, entitlement and identity, and – ending the circle – affecting the understanding of citizenship. The welfare state can provide social rights but also set up barriers to integration, notably labour market integration. Welfare policies tie up with labour market policies and thus belong in the cultural as well as the economical sphere of the model. Welfare policies

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\(^1\) In the literature on political opportunity structures are defined differently, emphasising different aspects (see for instance: Giugni & Passy, 2004; Kriesi \textit{et al.}, 1995; McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1994; see also Bengtsson, 2007 for an overall discussion of the concept).

\(^2\) E.g. the framework for immigrants’ legal situation, their social, cultural and political rights, access to formal and substantial citizenship and naturalisation laws and integration and welfare policies as well as non-policies (expectations and informal claims) (Ireland, 1994).
encompass more than economical instruments and also, according to the specific type of regime, encompass social rights and notions of equity, equality, redistribution and cohesion. Welfare policies, on the one hand, are a driving principle in the development of immigration and integration policies and, on the other hand, are influenced by immigration itself, as immigrants are turned into welfare consumers. In Brochmann & Hagelund’s words:

> The welfare state is both independent and dependent variable in the field of migration: Immigration influences welfare and welfare influences migration. Differences in immigration policies have consequences for welfare policy, just as different welfare regimes have different consequences for immigration policy (2005a: 22; my translation).

In the present framework, the focus is not on the welfare regimes as such, but on the policies intertwining directly with policies on integration and citizenship.

The third part of this chapter further conceptualises transnationalism. Koopmans and Statham’s model is both inclusive and dynamic in the sense that it can encompass developments over time, different actors and different analytical levels, but it does not explicitly deal with transnational developments, nor was it intended to. The overall focus of the model is the nation-state. However, other researchers have tried to combine relationship between the historically evolved international relations among the immigrants, the country of origin, and the country of residence sometimes captured under the heading “transnational political opportunity structures” (TPOS) (Nell, 2004; Ögelman, 2003). The definition has been somewhat reductionist in the sense that transnational engagement is seen solely as the outcome of a structure where the homeland offers little room for discussing ethnic, religious, and other societal issues in combination with a host country that grants considerable associational freedoms but has failed to absorb foreigners into society (Ögelman, 2003: 164). If not reductionist it certainly leaves out the possibility that transnational engagement need not (only) be of a reactionary nature, e.g. as an outcome of discrimination, but also may be part of a constructivist process of democratization or simply point to the fact that the understanding of the nation-state as the sole site for belonging is challenged. Citizenship conceptualized exclusively in relation to the nation-state by disregarding transnational ties and formations has in the words of Faist “long been an anachronism” (Faist, 2000a: 332). Markers of transnationalism overlap partly with the cultural dimension in their model, in the sense that criteria for naturalisation, acceptance of dual citizenship and recognition of cultural differences can also be situated within a transnational framework. Likewise I expect that tightened family reunification rules will have affect the mode of transnational engagement. Thus in the next part of my theoretical framework, I try to operationalise the transnational dimension into analytically answerable
questions. It is expected that the given integration regime, that is the political opportunity structures, will also affect the transnational engagement.

The fourth part of the framework looks at the shortcomings related to the POS approach. This section points back to the former part of the framework as I claim that the opportunity structures are constraining but should also be regarded as a field for negotiation of identity, in the understanding of Kastoryano, and thus incorporate agency. Besides revising the approach itself, the framework is put in relation to the notions of collective identities and in more detail provides a proposal as to how identities are constituted and how this can be investigated in analysis.

Finally I put forth a typology for distinguishing between the different types of organisations at stake and put forth an understanding of how to situate the study of immigrant organisations into the analysis and overall frame, by combining the POS framework with a conceptual clarification on how to study the immigrant organising process within different institutional arenas and institutional levels.

Concluding these initial discussions I outline a theoretical model combining the POS/DOS approach with the study of collective identity and immigrant organising processes (Figure 3.1 below). The bold arrows depict the relationships in focus in this dissertation, and stipulated frames and arrows indicate that these relationships are given minor attention. However, all parts will be discussed within this chapter and all depict relations believed to influence the collective identity construction and organising process of migrant groups in civil society. The relationship between the POS and the DOS and the influence of the market and welfare state model is depicted in the arrows 3 and 4, while the influence on the collective identity construction and organising process is depicted with arrows 1 and 2. This identity construction is contextualised within a frame defined as civil society, as this is the main site for such constructions and organising processes. The contextualisation of civil society also sets the basis for the fifth arrow that deals with the influence of sustained transnational political and social ties and opens up for a discussion of the process and ideal-construct that Faist termed transnationalising civil society, influenced by the aforementioned factors and influences, such as influences from the homeland. Arrow 6 indicates that this process will also be connected to the POS, as the political institutions can create favourable as well as unfavourable conditions for transnational engagement. Arrows 7 and 8 indicate a potential for immigrants’ collective organisations to change the existing structures. Moreover they illustrate the fact that relations between structures and agents are mutually constitutive but defined by particular relations of power. The arrows without numbers do not mean that these relationships
are unimportant but that they will not be dealt with specifically in this dissertation, although their existence is fully acknowledged. Thus, the relations depicted by arrows 1, 5 and 7 are the primary analytical focus in the remainder of the dissertation.

**Figure 3.1 Model for collective identity construction and organising process of migrant groups**

The theoretical components will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter, but first a note of clarification. Throughout the dissertation I use the notion *discourse*. Discourses are here understood in a broader sense, as systematic use of language, spoken and written expressions of ideas, nonverbal communication and visual images. What is crucial is the fact that any discursive utterance is not merely a linguistic but also social practice. Thus any creation of meaning is a social practice that is used in a social context. In this sense I follow the understanding of the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) researchers Fairclough & Wodak when they state that:

Describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-way relationship: the discursive events are shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them (1997: 258).

Discourses are constitutive as well as a constituted. This indicates that discourse is closely related to the issues of power and ideologies. Discourses are framed in macro-contexts, *i.e.* organisations and institutions, and in micro-contexts, *i.e.* at a particular time, at a particular place and with particular participants. This means that the specific individual discourse must
be seen in its macro-context in order to understand the specific meaning of a particular, linguistic, textual or discursive utterance (Titscher et al., 2000: 27). The critical aspect in Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis is exactly to identify one social group’s control over another within the given power relations. Dominance is (re)produced in language and legitimised through this and the objective for this type of analysis is to demonstrate how (Fairclough, 1992). Examining the discursive power relations implies both problematising the given structures and examining the positions from where the discourses are produced. Thus, as Wodak et al. state, it leaves CDA faced with a “twofold task of revealing the relationship between linguistic means, forms and structures and concrete linguistic practice, and making transparent the reciprocal relationship between discursive action and political and institutional structures” (Wodak et al. 1999: 9).3

Hopefully this step by step outline explains what I mean by political, discursive, opportunities and structures.

**Citizenship and integration regimes**

When reviewing the literature on citizenship and nationhood, Koopmans and Statham take up the distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ forms of nationalism and historically guided institutional practices and legal traditions in different countries. In doing so, they acknowledge the attempts to combine the cultural rights dimension of multiculturalism (e.g. Kymlicka) with the formal criteria for access to citizenship (cf. Brubaker). However, they move beyond the ‘usual suspects’, that is the three types of citizenship regimes most often identified in this type of analysis by conceiving citizenship as:

> [A] conceptual and political space, in which different actors and policies can be situated, and developments can be traced over time. The contours of this conceptual space are defined by formal and cultural dimensions of citizenship. Thus conceptualized, the stability of citizenship regimes, and the uniformity with which they cover different political actors, policies, and immigrant groups become issues for empirical investigations, not implicit assumptions tied to the rigidity of a conceptual typology (Koopmans & Statham, 2000: 20).

3 Although this section partly deals with ontological questions I wish to stress that I, in this research design, mainly consider it a method for analysis, rather than a theoretical framework, although the constructivist assumption is an underlying theoretical premise for the research in the dissertation. Surely CDA can be seen both: “as a method for analyzing social practices with particular regard to their discourse moments within the linking of the theoretical and practical concerns and public spheres, where the ways of analyzing ‘operationalise’ – make practical – theoretical constructions of discourse in (late modern) social life, and the analyses contribute to the development and elaboration of these theoretical constructions” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 16). However, recent research within CDA has acknowledged the need to combine the methodology from CDA with theoretical frameworks from the social and political sciences (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1991; Wodak et al., 1999), which this dissertation also is an example of.
Thus, they move away from considering the discursive frame as fixed once and for all, and propose a much more dynamic perspective that can incorporate changes and continuities over time as well as internal differences within the national model itself. The two-dimensional space is reproduced in Figure 3.2:

Figure 3.2 A two-dimensional space for situating conceptions of citizenship

![Figure 3.2](image-url)

The contours of this space are defined by the formal access to citizenship on the one hand and the amount of cultural difference and group rights allowed by citizenship on the other. The vertical axis covers a continuum of conceptions of citizenship that requires ethnic bonds as the basis for the constitution for political community (jus sanguinis) to those that emphasise equal civil rights and distribute citizenship on the basis of territoriality (jus soli). In reality most countries will not have as clear-cut criteria but apply a combination of the two options. On the horizontal axis, the continuum runs from conceptions of citizenship that insist on a single uniform culture shared by all people in society and into which newcomers should assimilate, to cultural pluralist conceptions that seek to retain or stimulate diversity and cultural heterogeneity. Again, it should be obvious that these ideal types are rarely found empirically in their purest form. States allowing and even promoting cultural pluralism have not allowed Shariah-based laws for instance.
The four boxes indicate the four ideal-typical configurations of citizenship derived from this conceptual space. Again it should be emphasised that most national regimes, political actors and policies will be situated somewhere between the boxes, rather than belonging to a single defined ideal-type. The analytical force of this approach that precisely it can accommodate the complexity that reality presents (for their own examples see: Koopman & Statham, 2000: 20-29; Koopmans et al., 2004: 11-16; see also Lister et al., 2007; Togeby, 2003, Vermeulen, 2006).

We easily recognise different policy approaches in the model. Segregationism is defined by the exclusion from the political community of newcomers who do not share the ethnocultural background of the majority in society. This could include the treatment of asylum seekers, who are rarely placed in the normal society and have a very limited number of rights – usually only those given by international institutions and systems of rights. Sometimes people are kept in this status for years, and it has become a vividly discussed topic in several European countries. Segregationism also resembles the guest worker model very closely: It did not provide the workers any political rights or encourage them to naturalise as their stay was thought to be temporary, but neither did the states put any cultural demands on them. Some countries made efforts to stimulate and preserve the guest workers’ cultural heritage and ties to the homeland, which were seen as facilitating their eventual repatriation. The same efforts were made by Sweden, which never applied any guest worker model, but on the contrary used the same instruments in promoting a multicultural ideology, which illustrates that there will be several overlaps between these ideal-types. Both approaches – the segregationist and the multiculturalist – share the aim of retaining cultural distinctness and boundaries and directly or indirectly prevent assimilation. Segregationism can also be an approach taken by immigrant groups who may wish to form their own communities within majority society, where specific groups may run their own schools and civil societal institutions.4

In the lower end of the model, countries with a past as colonial powers are situated. In the postwar period they became targets of postcolonial migration, as it happened in the Netherlands, France and Britain. These countries have facilitated a civic-territorial notion of citizenship.

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4 Currently, such communities seem to be more fiction than fact. Although Brick Lane has signs in Bangladeshi and Kreuzberg in Turkish, most of the housing areas proclaimed to be ethnic ghettos and similar, e.g. Gjellerupparken in Århus, Rinkeby in Stockholm or Rosengård in Malmö, the inhabitants come from a great number of continents, countries and different cultures, which makes the notion of ethnic ghetto seem like a sweeping generalisation. The example demonstrates that the ideal-types can also be used strategically in political discourse and tied up with expectations of integration.
In the *universalist* end of the spectrum France would be the proto-typical example of a regime based on republican values with very little recognition of cultural and religious difference in the public sphere. It is rather easy to obtain political citizenship, although the criteria have been tightened in recent years, but citizenship is coupled with expectations of assimilation into French civic-political values, which rest on the understanding that ‘Frenchmen are made’. As the riots in the French banlieues demonstrated, things might not work out as smoothly as planned. Political membership and integration do not lead to social equity or a feeling of social belonging. With Nicolas Sarkozy winning the French election in 2007, the birth of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development May 18 2007 can arguably be viewed a step in a non-civic direction, although it is too early to say what will be the outcome of this Ministry. Paradoxically France has also faced a dilemma with the attribution of citizenship based on *jus soli*, with the objections from descendants from Maghreb countries to being turned into French citizens against their will and thus losing their identity as Algerians etc. France has also had difficulties dealing with cultural demands of recognition, *e.g.* the *droit a la difference* demanded by Muslim organisation. Not surprisingly the right to difference was advocated by immigrant groups but also supported by the Socialists, who actually were the initiators of these demands. However, such claims have met strong resistance from the political elite and intellectuals who are against moving away from the idea of a single unitary citizenship. Nonetheless, recent years have shown some developments towards recognising cultural groups, notably the Muslim communities as partners in a political dialogue, in order to achieve more successful social integration and basically making the Muslim youth especially respect the republican values. This can be illustrated by the establishment of the CFCM (*Conseil Français du Culte Musulman*) towards the end of 2002. Protestant and Jewish groups have had similar councils for a century. The establishment of CFCM has faced criticism from both the French side and from within the Muslim groups, where critics worry that connections to what is regarded as either fundamentalist groups or having alleged links to terrorist groups, *e.g.* the UIOF (Union of Islamic Organisations of France), will increase the influence of fundamentalist groups in France. No matter what the outcome might be, it is a move in the same direction as countries like Britain or the Netherlands, where Muslim groups have had consultant bodies for years.

The Netherlands is an example of a regime belonging to the *multicultural* side of the conceptual space. Here ethnic, cultural and racial criteria have been the basis for policies and policy instruments. After Rita Verdonk took over the Ministry of Immigration and Integration in 2003, where she served until she was forced to resign in the beginning of 2007, the Dutch
system has implemented various restrictions, most notably the citizenship test, based on demands of Dutch language, politics and culture, the facilitation of an integration program and in general a tougher course towards immigration.

However, these ideal-typical regimes do not tell us anything about the success of integration, no matter which type of integration or variable we look at. A recent study by Koopmans and Ersanilli looked at the relationship between labour market integration and types of integration regimes. A conclusion from the study is that a liberal approach to integration does not secure the position in the labour market, perhaps on the contrary (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2007). “Good intentions sometimes make bad policy”, as Koopmans describes this perceived dilemma (2004; see also Avci, 2006). Obviously labour market integration is only one aspect of the integration processes, no matter how important, and the reasons for lower participation rates could be explained by a number of variables other than the official approach to integration (Vasta, 2007a).

**Implementing the model in the analysis - the analytical framework**

Koopmans and Statham operationalise their conceptual space through two sets of questions addressed to each axis of the model (2005: 31-73). I will follow the same approach when dealing with the Danish, Swedish and German integration regimes but supplement with a set of questions related to the welfare state arrangements. While the following indicators set the frame for the individual integration- and citizenship regime, there are additional indicators that could also affect the overall structure that immigrants are situated within and that cannot be captured by the following dimensions, i.e. the discursive context.

When looking at the vertical axis that deals with the demands for political citizenship they use different indicators. When looking at nationality acquisition I include the following indicators: *Number of years of residence before naturalisation can be requested; welfare and social security dependence as an obstacle to naturalisation; automatic attribution or facilitated naturalisation for the second generation; acceptance of double nationality; privileged access to nationality for co-ethnics; and actual naturalisation rates.*

Of course, these indicators need a qualitative analysis. Strict formal criteria need not be the only reason behind immigrants not obtaining citizenship, simple resistance towards becoming German or Danish can be an explanation in itself, but this is hard to determine based on the above indicators. Reasons could cut across the different dimensions, e.g. lack of dis-

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5 The following section rests on the chapter mentioned in the reference and for the sake of readability I will not give countless references to the same pages. Any supplements and elaborations of their framework that I will introduce will figure explicitly as such.
crimination preventions could explain a lack of belonging to the new home country, if we take it as the premise that the perception of discrimination could lead to a low degree of attachment.

Looking at more indicators such as rates of naturalisation combined with the demands for naturalisation provides a fairly good understanding of the whole frame of formal citizenship. I have elaborated this point to show that the frame presented by Koopmans et al. can only set the overall frame for the analysis and identify the overall structures of the given regime. The expectations and motivations for citizenship and integration from the immigrant part must be dealt with on another analytical level.

Another dimension on this axis regards citizenship rights for foreign nationals, which is operationalised through two indicators: The conditions for expulsion of foreign residents and voting rights for foreign residents. The question of political rights has been a major issue in especially Germany and in general is expected to be a site for mobilisation.

The last aspect in this dimension of citizenship dealing with individual equality is the scope and implementation of antidiscrimination measures. In my analysis this dimension also includes provisions against institutional and structural discrimination. Of course the first step would be to discuss the existence of such a phenomenon so national measurements of such a thing and measures against it will be part of the analysis, as there obviously will be no institutions dealing with structural discrimination if the phenomenon itself is not acknowledged. Here the discursive and political opportunity structures intertwine.

The second dimension or the horizontal axis concerns the differential rights based on group membership. This dimension rests heavily on the historical understanding of nationhood. The indicators employed when operationalising this dimension are taken from actual policies, but it should also be clear that an institutionalised openness to difference, e.g. in the official acceptance and support of Muslim schools can easily be coupled with unwritten but nonetheless very real expectations of assimilation, which makes this dimension hard to capture. The indicators proposed below thus focus on the institution, policies and legal practices. The two poles are ‘pure’ assimilation and ‘pure’ multiculturalism. The first aspects they investigate are the cultural requirements for naturalisation. This aspect is not operationalised in a question, but involves any cultural demands beyond basic knowledge of the national language, which is a basic requirement in most countries, and the criteria taken into considera-

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6 E.g. implementation of basic ICERD provisions in national criminal law (the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination); implementation of basic ICERD provisions in national criminal law; and establishment by the state of antidiscrimination bodies with investigative and/or decision-making powers.
tion will be: *the cultural requirements embedded in citizenship tests; the cultural requirements embedded in national integration courses (prerequisite in order to naturalise); and cultural contents embedded in given loyalty statements (if used)*.

A ‘thicker’ notion of culture has become more and more outspoken in recent years. Deriving from measures taken to prevent terrorism and in general Islamic fundamentalism these cultural requirements and instruments of social control have been introduced in the legislation in many countries recently. Perhaps the most notorious example is the citizenship test launched in Baden-Württemberg that ‘quizzes’ applicants on, among other things, values regarding homosexuality, gender equality, racial discrimination and reasons for 9/11 (International Herald Tribune 14.02.2006). But we also find less ‘caricatured’ introductions of a more ethno-cultural content across the legislation in European countries. It is clear that such tests are associated with an ongoing search for identity and rearticulation of nationhood. In Germany, the discussion has centred on the definition of Germanness, or as it presented in the German debate – the search or definition of a *Leitkultur*. Such a category almost inevitably ends up re-establishing a dichotomy between insiders and outsiders and links up to different understandings of integration. The Conservative Christian Democrat (CDU) Norbert Lammert summarised the outcome of this debate when he stated that: “the German society needs a cultural foundation based on collectively held convictions”, and: “a passport cannot come prior to integration – rather it should be a consequence of a successful integration” (Spiegel Online, 09.05.2006). This discussion will be taken up again in the analysis of the German integration regime in chapter 7, but the issue is found in a broad range of countries.

The next aspect mentioned by Koopmans et al. regards the recognition and acceptance of religious practices outside of public institutions, where they look at three different indicators such as acceptance of ritual slaughtering of animals according to Islamic rite and provisions for Muslim burial. I elaborate this aspect by looking at three further and directly connected indicators (the first being a prerequisite for the second indicator above): *The permission to wear religious symbols in public sphere and recognition of special provisions due to religious needs (such as ‘women only’ swimming pools etc.) and special provisions for bringing in religious preachers and leaders from the homeland*.

Also here there are overlaps between multicultural rights (in regards to religion) and welfare state arrangements. In Denmark it is being discussed if women who wear the Islamic *burka* should be denied social benefit. The burka is said to prevent women from getting a job

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and actually leaves them in a self-imposed position as unavailable for the labour market and thus ineligible for social benefits as availability is a formal criteria (24timer/JP Århus, 07.05.2007). 

A main explanation should perhaps be found outside these indicators of openness to religious diversity and rather at a structural level, here the church-state relation, in the three countries. Sweden separated state and church in 2003, while Denmark maintains the Evangelical Lutheran State Church. Still both countries and Germany provide certain systems or faith-specific rights like the above mentioned, but their overall status in each country may differ. In Denmark the status of recognised belief systems is the official notion; in Germany Körperschaften des Öffentlichen Rechts (KÖR) are granted officially recognised religious corporations with a set of distinct rights given with this status. Such a status also plays a role for the next aspects of this dimension where they look at the cultural rights and provisions in public institutions.

Institutional representation rights in the form of advisory bodies or councils sponsored by the state constitute the next aspect of the cultural rights dimension. Here I look at the form and level of influence and actual power of such organs. Formal representation does not necessarily lead to more actual influence. However, participation in such bodies can probably be a stepping stone to positions within non-ethnic decision making institutions, such as the public administration and political institutions. There is also a danger inherent in such institutions though, as they may indicate that the state has done something to involve and include the ethnic minority groups, but in reality, due to lack of power, they end up as pro forma bodies. Representation in itself cannot be regarded as a ‘good’ unless we look at the actual content, influence and power of such representative bodies.

Finally Koopmans et al. mention instruments of affirmative action in the labour market, where both special provisions within the public sector and special actions within the private sector are taken into consideration. This indicator cuts across some of the other dimensions. Affirmative action may conflict with anti-discrimination practices, as has been the case in Sweden, and it may reinforce the perception of immigrants as victims who need special provisions and thus maintain a division between natives and newcomers.

**Coupling citizenship, integration and welfare state arrangements**

Combined, these indicators constitute what Koopmans et al. term configurations of citizenship and are used to place the individual citizenship and integration regime visualized in Fig-

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8 Obviously it can be discussed why wearing a burka should disqualify the given women from obtaining and keeping a job, but this is not the point here.
As mentioned in the introduction, a number of indicators are missing to cover my understanding of integration. Especially welfare state arrangements intertwining with integration policies and access to citizenship need to be elaborated further. As citizenship and integration basically deal with identity, political instruments that may affect the sense of belonging and social integration are undervalued in the above framework. Requirements for family reunification could be one example. These requirements differ immensely across the European countries and tell something about the cultural self-understanding of the host country and stance on immigration. Family reunification is most often coupled with claims of integration and loyalty statements.

Elaborating further on the welfare state arrangements in relation to integration, the first step is to identify the overall nature of the given welfare state, which the general welfare state literature in the tradition of Esping-Andersen provides plenty of research on. It is obvious that there will be differences, also in relation to integration efforts, according to the model developed in each country. A conservative-corporatist type of welfare state, such as the one conventionally identified in Germany, will provide fewer immediate welfare benefits to newcomers than universalist regimes like the Danish and Swedish. Still the discussions and definitions of how to demarcate the community of legitimate recipients of welfare benefits take place in all countries. The more explicit accusation of newcomers being ‘welfare scroungers’ has perhaps been more outspoken in the systems deriving from universalist principle (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002; Borevi, 2002; Goul Andersen, 1998; Greve, 2007). Even in such a system, it does not follow that everybody has access to the same social benefits, though. Some benefits are still dependent on earnings on the labour market and some on the number of years of residence.

When analysing the actual consumption of welfare benefits it is not certain that newcomers will take advantage of all available economical and social rights as they do not necessarily have any knowledge of these. Following Gary P. Freeman I will draw the same conclusion regarding the welfare state as I drew regarding the nation-state, that it is inevitably exclusivist, in this case in order to protect the privileged citizens (Freeman, 1986). The other extreme position would be the one taken by Soysal, who claims that European states are obliged to grant extensive social rights to resident immigrants due to the codification of the human rights law and the crucial importance of these rights for citizenship (Soysal, 1994).

These two positions put forth alternate hypotheses. If exclusion is the rule, then we would expect states with generous welfare rights for immigrants to restrict access to the country, while states with restricted welfare benefits have less inclination to restrict immigration.
flows. From the other position, Soysal’s rights-based approach, we would expect immigration flows to the generous welfare states to remain constant or even increase (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). However, neither position seems to be convincing on its own. Until very recently, Sweden, which definitely belongs to the generous welfare states, kept relatively open borders, especially for Iraqi refugees, while Denmark, which may be described in a similar vein, has more or less closed its borders.

Freeman links the development of the welfare state with the degree of heterogeneity and level of generalised trust, and thus follows Putnam’s general findings (Freeman, 2006; see also Banting & Kymlicka, 2000). One of the conclusions offered is that ethnic heterogeneity is a very important predictor of society’s level of welfare spending (Freeman, 2006: 9). However, looking at the public social expenditure in terms of net social expenditure, reveals that Denmark, Sweden and Germany remain very close to each other (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002: 6), while number of immigrants and thus degree of heterogeneity is not as close. In the analysis I particularly look at: **Special rights, obligations, and provisions to non-citizens within the welfare system that will/can affect processes of integration and naturalisation.**

What I will expect from the theoretical backdrop, is a scenario where the universal model with a high commitment to having a high employment rate, high labour force participation and an active labour market policy in order to secure a high degree of public welfare and a commitment to equality will inevitably turn integration into a question of labour market participation. In a conservative-corporatist model I would expect integration to be a question of handling migration by opening up for certain newcomers and equipping residing immigrants with the skills needed to fill out ‘holes’ on the labour market, *e.g.* by upgrading language qualifications. As this type of system does not provide the same degree of public welfare, it is rather a question of how to strengthen the national economy by securing the needed workforce than a question of welfare scroungers. But as individual rights and (welfare) security are coupled with the position on the labour market in earning the right to pensions etc., also this type of welfare system leads to labour market participation when talking about integration.

What type of integration is achieved from a focus on labour market participation can be discussed, as can the mismatch between formal qualifications and actual job position. The research points to a ‘welfare trap’ or ‘poverty trap’ that seems to work as a barrier to this kind of labour market integration. In the Scandinavian model integration goes through the welfare

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9 1997 OECD data % GDP spent on health care, pensions, and unemployment: Denmark 22.9, Sweden 25.4, and Germany 24.6 (here quoted from Baldwin-Edwards, 2002: 6; see also Goul Andersen, 1998).
state, as immigrants are first incorporated via the welfare system schemes and the task is later to get them out of these. But due to a combination of a high tax level and high social benefits immigrants gain very little or indeed nothing by getting a job in terms of income. As the Scandinavian welfare state rests on the attribution of ‘one family two incomes’ (compared to a male breadwinner model) the system is perceived as being under pressure, although the actual economical expenses can be discussed (e.g. Ekberg, 2006). Regardless, the outcome is that welfare arrangements end up being decisive for citizenship and integration-related policies. It can be stated almost categorically that it has become harder to obtain residence in especially Denmark, due to an underlying expectation that immigration will be expensive for the welfare state as the newcomers cannot be expected to penetrate the labour market easily.

Although it can be difficult to disentangle the different barriers to integration related to welfare state arrangements, there is an analytical value in trying to do so. While the lack of skills, real or perceived, and political representation can be ascribed to the political dimension, other barriers are harder to understand on their own. Cultural barriers have become more prominent and affect the political decision making, e.g. educational skills achieved abroad are rarely recognised. Another example is perceived problems with special religious needs, e.g. prayer rooms. In Denmark such a provision is discussed vividly at the political level, but very rarely demanded by the religious minorities themselves. Still, it creates a more suspicious and even hostile attitude towards hiring people with immigrant background. Similarly there is an ongoing discussion about who is entitled to welfare benefits; the welfare state becomes culturalised and the outcome is, for instance, limited social rights to newcomers if they do not adjust to the value and lifestyle of the majority (Geddes, 2003).

Thus, we would expect universalist welfare approaches in general to provide non-citizens with the same social rights as the majority population (asylum seekers excepted), and this is to a large degree true. However, we also find examples of the opposite, such as the so-called introductory benefit introduced in Denmark in 1998, but revised already the year after, due to successful criticism raised by different NGO’s and the UNCHR (Klitgaard-Holm, 2007). Although this specific benefit has been modified so it now includes all citizens who have not resided legally in the country for a period of seven coherent years, in practice it mainly affects immigrants and a very limited number of Danish citizens. Here the discursive background perhaps seems to be the most interesting part of this discussion, and also the hardest to grasp analytically, as it deals with assumptions and discourses outside the legal texts themselves. Among the most recent political developments in this direction in Denmark
are the so-called ‘300 hours of paid work’ and sanctions that allow the state to cut back on child benefits in families if the children do not attend school regularly.

The conclusion on this discussion is that the political opportunity structures or institutional channelling might not be as easily identifiable as Koopmans et al. portray them, but will always be set within a discursive context as well, which makes certain political trajectories more likely than others due to political preference. Likewise external conditions such as economic growth or recession can interfere with the political initiatives most likely to be taken. Entzinger claims that “public investment in integration will be accepted more readily in times of prosperity” (Entzinger, 2000: 114), but as the Danish case illustrates this may not necessarily be the case.

Subsequently this analysis will examine the (particular) welfare state (arrangement) as a cultural system of openness and closure and inclusion and exclusion that ties up with integration by setting ideals, expectations and a framework for participation. Welfare arrangements further tie up with the migration process by being open to certain types of immigrants and closed to others.

**Conceptualising transnationalism**

One of the difficulties in analysing transnational engagement and behaviour is that it covers a huge range of markers. In this sense issues like dual citizenship, transnational family ties, patterns of marriages, e-communities, popular cultural exchanges, kinship groups and village-based loyalties, hometown associations (such as the Henşeleri’s), business networks, foreign investment schemes and the flow of remittances and transnational political formations and interest groups would all belong in the transnational framework. Transnational engagement and loyalty may also be latent. For example, when Istanbul’s football pride Fenerbahçe in 2006 played against the less known Danish football club FC Randers in the UEFA Cup, it suddenly turned into a match between Turkey and Denmark/Europe with Turks coming to Denmark from all over Scandinavia and Northern Germany to watch the game, not dressed as supporters of Fenerbahçe, but as Turks with Turkish flags everywhere (see for instance Haber 09.2006).

In this framework I take transnationalism to be both an independent and a dependent variable as it will be affected by the political opportunity structures in the settlement countries as well as by the Turkish state, but simultaneously can be a site for challenging and in the
long run changing such structures. By referring to site I understand transnationalism to be both a physical and mental space – a spatiality that runs close to Faist’s conceptualisation of transnational social spaces, which consist of:

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\text{[P]entagonic relationships between the government of the immigration state, civil society organisations in the country of immigration, the rulers of the country of emigration (sometimes viewed as an external homeland), civil society groups in the emigration state, and the transnational group-migrants and/or refugee groups, or national, religious, and ethnic minorities (Faist, 2000a: 200).}
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In order to speak of either sustained transnational formations, political or social ties or social spaces certain prerequisites need be in place, namely means of long-distance communication and transportation. People need not physically cross borders to engage in transnational activities, but the activities do have to take place in minimum two countries. The research literature is mainly interested in the political dimension of transnationalism, and my work is no exception, but it should also be acknowledged that the perhaps largest part of transnational activities might be taking place within an economic and cultural dimension, e.g. transnational businesses, consumption of food, music etc. (e.g. Ehrkamp, 2005). This is a consequence of increasing internationalisation and globalisation that open up markets and means of communication and transportation, but while global processes are detached from the nation-state, transnational processes are centred in the nation-states involving actors from both the state and civil society (Kastoryano, 1998).

The contextual difference is also of great importance in explaining transnational differences. Differences in market conditions, size of immigrant population, discursive opportunity structures in the given country will affect the presence and construction of transnational affiliations, ties and identities. The size of the Turkish minority in Germany has created a completely different infrastructure in terms of travel options and communication compared to Sweden with a much smaller Turkish minority group. The Turks in Sweden on the other hand provide a strong example of a migration network (or chain migration) as almost 30,000 out of 35,000 migrants come from the small area of Kulu in central Anatolia. Obviously this situation has created some special and case-specific ties. Another example is the rather favourable conditions for Kurdish identity politics in Denmark and Sweden, which for instance allows the Kurds to broadcast satellite TV (Rojhelat TV/ ROJ-TV) from Denmark.

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10 In line with how the welfare state is related to the integration and citizenship regimes (cf. Brochmann & Hagelund, 2005a).
11 These can easily be made objects of analysis as the ‘multisited ethnographical approach’ developed by George Marcus claims by looking at how culture is embedded in macro-constructions of a global social order (Marcus, 1995).
Taking the above as the backdrop for the further discussion, I propose four main clarifications of transnationalism, which will be further specified.

First, I include a quite common differentiation between narrow and broad forms of transnationalism. I should specify that I mainly look at political transnationalism and transnational identity constructions and therefore leave out the discussion of cultural and socio-economic forms for now. Narrow transnationalism refers to institutionalised and continuous participation in transnational activities and organisations, while broad transnationalism refers to only occasional participation in transnational linkages (Itzigsohn & Giorguli Saucedo, 2002: 770). This should be understood as a continuum of practices where narrow engagement, in terms of political practice, would be actual membership of parties or hometown organisations while broad refers to occasional participations in meetings, cultural or protest events (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a).

The second clarification regards the question on how to identify transnationalism. As mentioned, the consequences of locating transnationalism within the opportunity structures indicate that the state(s) to some degree can also facilitate transnationalism, directly and indirectly. Several scholars within the field have pointed to the common assumption that a closed exclusivist structure may be the incentive for transnational rather than national engagement, such as in the case of Germany, while others claim that an open inclusive structure building on multicultural principles and providing more rights to cultural, ethnic and religious minorities may be beneficial for transnational formations and practices (Schifflauer, 1999; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a).

One explanation need not disqualify the other as both could be valid in different contexts. Even if it accepted that the state can, directly or indirectly, promote, facilitate and impede transnational engagement it can furthermore be very difficult to separate policies of multiculturalism from signs of transnationalism. An ATM in Holland gives you an option of six different languages, including Turkish, in Denmark only four options and in NYC no less than 10. But is that a sign of multiculturalism or of transnationalism? In the same way mother tongue education could be seen as token of a multicultural policy (or on the contrary assimilatory/segregationist) but could easily be imagined to stimulate transnational linkages as well. Research and analyses of transnationalism often lack concretely defined measurements of transnationalism. Thus the second clarification of transnationalism in this framework is the investigation on how transnationalism is accommodated within three different analytical dimensions, the first being the established political channels: Which parts of the integration and citizenship policy are stimulating or impeding for transnational engagement?
Such policies could be special provisions for religious figures from the sending countries or restrictions in regards to family reunification or acceptance of dual citizenship. However, it should also be stressed that transnationalism is not only for the state to decide. The state can stipulate political and social behaviour but cannot control people’s sense of belonging as such. When speaking of attitudes towards multiculturalism we can distinguish between formal and de facto responses, but the same distinction does not apply to transnationalism. Multiculturalism can be promoted and controlled while this cannot be done to the same degree when speaking of transnationalism. Multiculturalism can, so to speak, be retained within one nation-state while this is not possible for transnational engagement. The next part looks at the dimension of the homeland and investigates: How the sending country stimulates transnational linkages in regards to special rights for former and current non-resident citizens and at differential treatments/provisions towards different (minority) groups?

Together these dimensions form the transnational political opportunity structures, for example the Turkish pink card. Another example is special economic options available to non-resident nationals like in India where non-resident Indians (NRI’s) are given tax deductions if they invest in India. Other examples are low-cost channelling of remittances or official representation abroad, for instance symbolised by number and size of consulates and embassies. Thus, the Turkish representation in Germany is the largest of its kind globally (leaving out American engagement in Iraq) and the budget for the Directory of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, is second only to Turkey’s military expenditures in the fiscal budget.

The last dimension involves the non-institutionalised political context in the receiving country, which is harder to operationalise into a single analytical question. Bousetta terms this the ‘infra-political sphere of civil society’ (2001). The infra-political sphere makes room for a much more fragmented and opaque mode of political operation. It focuses on the internal struggles and variations to gain control at community level in civil society without necessarily having reference to the broader established political system. Within the infra-political sphere there is great variety of competing networks and identities that will be lost if we only concentrate on claims making at the public political level (see also Bengtsson, 2007). The internal dispute between the Assyrian and Syriac communities in Sweden (to be discussed later) is one such example, but also generational conflicts could be lost in the analysis if not incorporated in this sphere.

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12 The Turkish state introduced the ‘pink card’ in 1997, which provides Turkish ex-citizens with a set of rights, incl. entitlement to ownership of land and property, inheritance rules, military service and economical rights and possibilities in general (to be elaborated in Chapter 10).
The third clarification is an understanding of transnationalism as a site of political engagement. This understanding takes it departure point from Soysal, Vertovec and others, in the sense that it is presumed that transnationalism can be perceived as a dialectic between local, national and international questions. Here I am mainly concerned with sustained political ties. This type of activity has been actualised through new and better means of communication technology, which has made mobilisation and enhancement of political participation and organisation possible (Cohen & Vertovec, 1999; Soysal, 1994; Vertovec, 1999b). This form of political engagement implies a dual or multiple political agenda that due its transnational nature exactly is taking place in multiple settings.

The fourth and final clarification is an understanding of transnationalism as a mode of belonging and as a base for collective identity. This would indicate viewing transnationalism as a special type of consciousness among migrants, a way of self-understanding emphasising ‘humanhood’ and participation in universalist and democratic projects (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a: 15). Several researchers have dealt with this aspect and given it different names, e.g. cosmopolitanism, transpositionality and nested citizenship (e.g. Faist, 2000a; forthcoming) and have tried to conceptualise the possible outcome of such practices, e.g. civic citizenship or multilayered citizenship (Kastoryano, 1998; Yuval-Davis, 1999). On an analytical level we find different studies showing that a significant percentage of Turks say that they are neither Kurdish, Turkish, or German (or other nationalities) but European, cosmopolitans or simply human beings (Faist, 2000a: 225; Kaya, 2004; Kaya & Kentel, 2005). One of my informants described her identity as an ‘identity pyramid’ where she first and foremost considered herself as human and woman, next as citizen and further down in the hierarchy came ethnic and religious terms.

Such a collective identity construction can refer to roles, groups and organisation and can lead to political practices. I suggest moving beyond equating transnational identity with the aforementioned forms of collective affiliation and instead try to locate what I will understand as genuine transnationalism. This I perceive as an identity not only transgressing nation-state identity and not derived from other types of identity, but one that must be understood on its own terms. This form of self-identification was very common among the informants interviewed for my dissertation, who through a deconstructivist strategy tried to position themselves inside and outside the nation-state at the same time. Yet whether Castles’ words: “It is possible that transnational affiliations and consciousness will become the predominant form of migrant belonging in their future” (Castles, 2002: 1158) remains to be seen.
Summing up the clarifications of transnationalism within the larger POS framework has provided the conceptual tools to further investigate how transnationalism interacts in civil society and how immigrant organisations by means of transnational strategies potentially could strengthen democratic voices and challenge the pre-given positions of immigrants within the given integration and citizenship regime.

**Shortcomings in the political opportunity structure approach**

Some of the problems related to the POS approach have already been partly discussed; however, the criticism needs to be systematised in more detail. In the previous description, political opportunity structures refer to the institutional context, but as mentioned they also have a discursive dimension that shapes the identification of minority identities and makes access to the established political channels and political agenda more or less obtainable and successful. The discursive opportunities include the likelihood to gain visibility in the mass media, to cooperate with other collective actors, and to achieve legitimacy in public discourse (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004; see also Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson & Meyer, 1996; McCarthy et al., 1996; Meyer, 2004).

One example of the interplay between the political and discursive dimension is the case and rise (and fall) of the organisation Democratic Muslims in Denmark.¹³ It was established in the aftermath of the caricature crisis and coupled the notion of a secular (Muslim) religiosity with substantial democracy – in the Danish case meaning a division between the role of religion in private/public and most notably a rejection of the *shariah* system. Democratic Muslims was supported financially by a number of prominent (non-Muslim) business people and had easy access to the media. However, the flipside of the story was the dispute that arose within the field of religious organisations and NGOs perceiving themselves as full-fledged democrats as well. These other actors had in fact had been raising the same topics, self-understandings, and claims for some years, but suddenly they became positioned as part of the out-group, ‘them’, and indirectly part of the problem. It was implicitly claimed that Muslims who were not members of Democratic Muslims must be non-democratic as they did not take a one-sided stance against *shariah* for instance (Engelbreth Larsen, 2006). Even the organisational name itself already existed in the shape of another organisation established in 1995. As the other organisations did not have the same support they faced hard times in that period. The success of Democratic Muslims also became the reason for its fall, as it did not have time to build up the administration of the organisation in the same pace as the newborn interest and

¹³ <http://www.demokratiskemuslimer.dk/>
thus could not accommodate all the new members. Although the rumours of its death may be exaggerated, it no longer holds the same position in the ‘mediascape’ (cf. Appadurai), probably because the initiator, the Syrian-born member of the Danish Parliament Naser Khader, left the organisation. The organisation has now chosen a new leader and is in the midst of rebuilding its internal structure.\textsuperscript{14} In my interviews I have spoken with Turkish members of the organisation and will get back to this case, but here I point to its role as an illustrative case for immigrant collective organisation in relation to both the political and discursive opportunity structures At the time, that is during and immediately after the caricature crisis, it was very hard to gain access to the media and political channels without positioning oneself as first and foremost democrat, and new organisations integrated this notion into their collective name. Consequently the political opportunity structures must be complemented by the discursive dimension as well.

 Returning to the discussion of structures these encompass both political and discursive aspects or, in short, the political power relations (Bengtsson, 2007). However, as Bengtsson notes, it is difficult to tell how Tarrow’s narrow definition (focusing very much on the political sphere) can include deeper social structures like class, gender and ethnicity (ibid.). Koopmans \textit{et al.} take a somewhat similar position by moving beyond the strictly political and also include discourse and culture into the analysis. I will in continuation argue that constructions of gender, class and ethnicity are essential for understanding immigrants’ incentives to mobilisation and organising processes in general. Gaining access to the political channels and having influence on political issues need not be the only driving forces for immigrant organisational participation. Focusing too narrowly on the political aspects risks leaving out other motivations and dynamics for participation, and therefore it is important to include the cultural aspects.

 Looking in more detail at the shortcomings of the POS approach the first noticeable weakness has to do with the inherent methodology. When applied to analysis, this approach mostly bases the analysis on policy documents and legislative texts. Subsequently, structures are identified according to the official policy. But policies may be implemented in ways not expected or even imagined by the policy makers (see below). Hence, there may be an immense variance in the way a legal arrangement is created at the governmental level, to its final

\textsuperscript{14} The caricature crisis had another interesting spin-off. In the aftermath even immigrant anti-Islamic parties such as the DPP recognised that there could be and indeed were differences among Muslims, which indirectly created a somewhat less hostile tone towards the democratic minded Muslims, perceived to be ‘good’. The case is an illustrative example of what Anthony Giddens has described as ‘the dialectic of power’ or ‘dialectic of social control’ where conflicts and struggles can have integrative effects, and even can be necessary to bring about social change (Giddens, 1985).
form at for instance a municipal level. Thus, there may be differences between *discourse* and *practice* or *intentions* and *political outcome* (the last distinction is taken from Borevi, 2002). One way of overcoming this problem would be to investigate differences in the national and the local political opportunity structure. That said, I think Soysal addresses this dilemma well in her argument for the focus on the discursive level or on the policy framework (Soysal, 1994: 10):

> Clearly, the degree to which policies are implemented and rights are exercised has relevance to how migrants experience their membership in host polities. However, since my main interest in this project is to capture the wider changes in the institution of citizenship itself, my analysis is not designed to address the consequences of implementation.

Taking this argument one step further yet, I will argue that discourses not only reflect reality but also shape it (cf. Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). This relationship is crucial for political life also. As the Norwegian researchers Brekke & Borchgrevink write: “Perceptions of reality are put into words, they form perceptions of reality and elicit ideas of how to change it. Political measures are interventions aimed at changing the social reality” (2007: 15).

In the present framework and forthcoming analysis I also maintain the national level as my main priority but acknowledge that there may be differences in local level governance. If such a difference has an importance, it is expected to come up in the differences in immigrant organising processes both within and across the countries. An obvious example of these differences is the practice and development of integration policies in Berlin compared to the Bundestag trajectory – although the latter recently has moved in a direction resembling the (somewhat multiculturalist) approach taken in Berlin.

Secondly, it can also be difficult to identify the decisive structures as they can be both formal and informal and function on different levels. Part of the criticism against the POS approach asks whether the POS can be seen as a single independent analytic variable or rather could be considered as the amalgamation of several distinct variables captured under a single heading (Bousetta, 2000; see also Gamson & Meyer, 1996). It can easily end up as a model that explains everything and thus nothing. Any researcher who has dealt with national integration regimes will also know that national legislation may be interpreted differently at different levels, *e.g.* in the municipalities. Research actually shows that although there can be substantial differences between two national approaches the outcome at the practical level may lead to more or less the same results and problems in the given national context (*e.g.* Hedetoft, 2006d). One of the questions arising is: the political opportunity for what? (Meyer, 2004), and without doubt it requires a focused perspective to get around this problem. This can be undertaken by looking at how the immigrant organisations relate to and navigate within these struc-
tures at different levels. In the final section of this chapter I introduce an additional model dealing more specifically with the institutional levels and arenas (Marques & Santos, 2004), which I will combine with the general POS/DOS framework and study of immigrant organising processes. This allows me to distinguish between national and local levels and general and particular levels.

This point of criticism relates to a third critique, that the POS approach may be said to contain a latent deterministic focus by indirectly claiming that all ethnic/immigrant mobilisation is POS-driven. This has to do with the very narrow focus on the established political channels that somehow declare the failed attempts to turn immigrant organisations into politically effective social movements lost in this framework. The internal struggles, conflicts and reconfigurations of the immigrant organisations should not be neglected though. It is tantamount to include this complexity and look at the competitors and the ecological variation within the infra-political sphere (Bousetta, 2001, Vermeulen, 2006). Related to this critique the emphasis on the political in a narrow sense intrudes. There may be multiple reasons for joining an association; political goals possibly being only one. As Moya argues in his outline of immigrant organisations from a long historical perspective: “the priorities of scholars (and of the vocal political, or politicised, immigrant elites) do not seem to coincide with those of the majority of immigrants who continue to rank sociability and recreation above politics and mobilisation” (Moya, 2005: 857). The POS perspective must be able to accommodate that organisations have multiple functions and look at both ideological and interest organisations (Bengtsson, 2007). Subsequently attention should be paid to general organising processes and collective actions and not only to its political success. Likewise may outcomes be both direct and indirect.

We should not dismiss the immigrant organisations of agency; although claims taken to national level are not achieved, the claims making itself still serves an important purpose in the self-identification and (attainment of) substantial citizenship. The interplay between result and process in this sense is of crucial importance for understanding the dynamics with the immigrant organising processes and the internal processes of democratisation and empowerment. The POS approaches often become too state-centric and rely on national models of collective identity, but an important part of the analysis is exactly to investigate how these fixed representations are challenged and understand the capacity of immigrant actors to change the existing political opportunity structures. The use of the notion structures indicates, as Koopmans et al. also stress, that these are not easy to change and would indeed render the concept
useless if it was the case (Koopmans et al., 2005: 22). Here the particular power relations must be taken into account (cf. Fairclough).

The case of Democratic Muslims provides a good argument for this claim. Indeed, when investigating the rhetoric and claims making of immigrant organisations it can be argued that the ‘internal’ demarcation and self-identification in opposition to other (competing) immigrant organisations are more outspoken and visible than claims directed at the established political system. The discursive dispute between the TBB and the TGB in Berlin is one such example, as is the criticism raised by the Alevi organisation against the Fethullah Gülen movement (DABF, 14.04.2007).

Concluding I will argue that if we seek to understand the possibilities for structural changes we need to refine the analytical scope and look at how immigrants collectively and individually act on different levels (local, national) both within the established political institution but also at the non-institutionalised processes of political organisation and formation (Bousetta, 2001: 17-18) and at transnational organisation and formation. Exactly the transnational social and political ties can provide new and non-national sites and channels for identity processes and claims making.

The theoretical framework revisited and the making of collective identities

In the framework developed for this dissertation the distinction between the political and discursive dimension are taken to be of outmost importance when understanding the dynamics within immigrant collective formation, as it provides a way to include the organisation at grass-root level and outside as well as within the established political system. Taking the POS and DOS as the analytical departure point, the aim is, firstly, to identify the actual integration regime and political actors in the three countries, that is disentangling the general opportunity structures from the domain-specific; secondly to apply the model as a conceptual system of coordinates that the immigrant organisations can also be placed within. This is reflected in the interviews conducted with the different organisations, where I have operationalised the different indicators into specific questions (see Appendix B).

When Koopmans et al. developed this approach, they mainly applied quantitative data to the model or more precisely they ‘quantified’ the data (articles, legislative texts etc.) to be able to derive numerically quantitative coordinates in order to compare different national systems. In my operationalisation of this approach I mainly work with qualitative data and methodologically apply a combination of content and discourse analysis to derive the information needed to make sense of the proposed framework.
Besides investigating the alleged influence of the POS and DOS on immigrant collective organisation, the ambition is to end up with an understanding of how collective identity is constructed and maintained in discourse within such a framework. Returning to Kastoryano, to understand how specific social and collective identities are negotiated within given structural constraint. Within this framework collective identities can from the perspective of the state be understood as appointed subject positions that aim to categorise, in this case, newcomers to preserve social order. Tilly calls this type of identity "corporate identity forms", which refers to being officially recognised and obtaining special rights and privileges (Tilly, 2002). These may conflict with self-prescribed collective identities, which, via different strategies, can seek to challenge the ascribed identities and most optimistically change and transform the social order. Once again it should be emphasised that we are talking about structures, which obviously indicates that such structural changes are not easily achieved. Nonetheless the migrant organising process will seek both to fit into the pre-given social order but also to put forth new positions and social formations. These collective identities are partly based on the existing literature and partly derived from the analysis itself.

When speaking of identity, I always understand it to be multiple. All identities are social constructs that need to be articulated to hold any meaning. Conceptualising identity as taking place in an open setting that is both contingent and open for changes provides a strong analytical departure point that can investigate the positions in which people position themselves and the discourses drawn in to support these (e.g. Bernstein, 2005; Davies & Harré, 1990; Hobson et al., 2007; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).

From this perspective it also follows that identities can be in conflict, and that specific identities are prioritised on specific occasions. Tilly distinguishes between "detached" identities, i.e. identities not experienced on a daily basis, and "embedded" identities, referring to identities invoked in everyday practices (Tilly, 2002). One is at the same time part of an ethnic group, member of a political party, male or female, belongs to a religious denomination, and so on. However, it is crucial not to overstate the openness and access to identity constructions. Although each identity formation is part of a negotiation, not all actors have the same amount of power to make their identity claims legitimate. Identities can be constrained and repressed by majority society or the social settings one is part of. Hence, my understanding of identity couples the social constructivist perspective with an institutional approach, where I put emphasis on the structures in which social action of individuals takes place by foregrounding the aspect of power relations.
I adhere to the ontological perspective that identities are constructed and multiple. In the analysis I operationalise this position to look mainly at specific articulations of identity. I leave the ‘door’ open for new types and interpretations but focus on a specific set of identities and on how they interact. In all cases these particular identities are simultaneously embedded in deeper structures such as gender, class and sexuality. These deeper categories intersect the particular categories are given special attention in the analysis when it is necessary. From the literature I expect to find at least four main types of identity and further two more which are derived from the empirical expectations:

First, migrants will be ascribed (and can identify themselves along) the official categories offered by the state policies, be it foreigners, migrants, asylum seekers, or religious or national minorities – corporate forms of identity (cf. Tilly). These can be bound directly to legislation and policies but can also be of a more referential nature that nonetheless will hold specific connotations that differ from context to context.

Secondly, migrants may identify themselves collectively along their religion, e.g. Jews or Muslim (sometimes the Jewish identity is claimed to be a collective ethno-cultural identity on its own, as categories of ethnicity and religion will be indistinguishable). Only a few countries facilitate and recognise such types of identity, although the Dutch pillarization system gives recognition, special rights and privileges to religious minorities. Likewise openings in the French state approach towards Muslims could point to a partial recognition based on religious claims making and identity.

Thirdly, immigrants may identify with a racial group, as Blacks or Asians. This is not an identity offered by the three countries included in my design, but in Britain racial categorization forms the basis of race relations and equal opportunities politics (Koopmans et al., 2005: 114-115).

Fourthly, immigrants may identify with their ethnicity or nationality of origin, e.g. as Turks, Kurds, Lebanese or other (or with a combined ethno-national identity). This is a very common identification, ascribed by state policies, as would be the case in Germany, and by immigrants themselves. Several factors and relationships may influence the endurance of this type of collective identity, such as access to citizenship and criteria for naturalisation.

A fifth position places itself beyond ascribed categories and emphasises notions like ‘world-citizen’ and/or ‘diversity’ – in short a type of collective identity putting more or less weight on national belonging and instead claming a universalist position through a deconstructive strategy, problematising the necessity of national identities etc.
The final and sixth type is a heuristic ideal-type, which I will term ‘transnational identity’. It should not be confused with hyphenated identities (*e.g.* Danish-Turkish) but is a position claimed through engagement and a consciousness of belonging both in the host country and home country (and in principle in any community transgressing national borders, *e.g.* religious or ethno-cultural communities). It comes close to a diasporic identity (see Cohen & Vertovec, 1999 for an overview), but in my conceptualisation it will rather describe identity positions being constituted in more than one national setting, more than being part of an ‘imaginary homeland’ or ‘long-distance nationalism’ narrative (as in Anderson, 1992). Although I call this heuristic I also see it as an identity that could turn out to be crucial for understanding the identity constructions taking place among the Turkish organisations in the three countries at stake. It combines civic and ethnic traits within a single identity.

The fifth and sixth type will seldom be offered by the host state, but can be seen as identities of challenge and struggle, although such a position can live in perfect harmony with any national identity also. This is not necessarily an identity of resistance due to deprivation or lack of power but could on the contrary be the outcome of a process of empowerment. Among my empirical material and within my interviews Alevi identification illustrates the latter position.

These examples demonstrate that although the state may hold the hegemony to both construct and distribute categories, we cannot talk about deterministic interpellation in an Althusserian sense, but rather as discursive interpellation in the understanding of Laclau & Mouffe (1985: 115), as these subject positions can be, if not rejected, then at least challenged, depending on the degree of individual and collective resources, ability and penetration power to the established political and institutional channels. Returning briefly to Bourdieu, he argues that the disposition to social transformation and social change is not easily achieved, but neither is the urge. The concept of *habitus* explains how the *doxa* becomes internalised and embedded through everyday social practices and life-long socialisation (Bourdieu, 1977). Collective behaviour is driven by dispositions and is dependent on resources and amount and type of capital (in the understanding of both Bourdieu and Putnam) that the individuals can compile collectively. Furthermore this perspective opens up for a practice-based conceptualisation of citizenship. Citizenship not only regards membership, rights and inclusion but can also be seen as practice. Recognition struggles and identity politics are expressions of citizenship practice, *i.e.* ‘rights must be taken’. They are about collective identity construction and agency situated within internal power relations and political opportunity structures (Hobson *et al.*, 2007).
The previous discussions of collective identity furthermore point to the fact that any collective identity construction will have its own internal dynamics and will be realized through different strategies. These strategies can again be partly derived from the existing literature. I take the set-off from Statham, who presents four different strategies that can be seen as instrumental in constructing collective identity and supplement with further two types (Statham, 1999: 604-605): assimilative strategies: the self-identifications emphasise the majority group dimension of membership in the political community, embedded in state institutions and in the state’s integration policies with less importance put on minority group self-identities; dissociative strategies: self-categorisation of minorities are made in terms of minority group membership and not in terms of majority group labelling, embodied in the categories of the state integration policies; acculturative strategies: self-categorisation as a mixture of assimilative and dissociative dimensions. An intermediary position between ascribed official categorizations for membership and autonomous self-identifications on the basis of minority status; marginal strategies: claims making and self-categorisation reflect neither state categorisation for minorities nor self-identification as a minority group; instead it calls for identification as transnational with interests beyond categorisation within the receiving state15; deconstructivist strategies: somewhat resembling the marginal strategies, but not necessarily by stressing membership of transnational communities but by letting go of constraining categorisations as such, and instead turning towards mainstream categories or universalist positions, e.g. one of my Danish informants, who turned away from an ascribed position as Danish-Turkish Muslim (she is a local political figure with a well-known background) towards describing herself as a young woman from Århus16; and diffusional strategies: actions undertaken to transfer ideas from one setting to another.

Identity is constructed by strategically selecting and adapting organisational forms and discourses across different localities. Hereby both organisational structures and collective identities can be strengthened. Experiences from one setting are transplanted to another etc.

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15 The notion marginal holds connotations of marginalisation, which makes it important to stress that this strategy has nothing to do with socio-economical status or deprivation, but has to do with relationship to the majority society, and thus describes a multilevelled or multidimensional position (both within and beyond the borders of the nation-state) but not a powerless position. Neither does it necessary lead to completely defensive or reactive identity positions.

16 Both the fifth and sixth type of strategy resemble Saskia Sassen’s ‘repositioning of citizenship’, which is a politics of membership that is simultaneously localised and transnational. She locates the possibility for such a type of membership in the challenges and destabilizing effects to the nation-state and claims that “these dynamics are producing operational and rhetorical openings for the emergence of new types of political subjects and new spatialities for politics” (Sassen, 2002: 5).
Claims making like the dynamics of collective identities also depends on strategies of realisation and different repertoires of actions. The literature on social movement organisation (SMO) has been dealing with these questions for years (for a thorough overview see Benford & Snow, 2000; see also McCarthy et al., 1996; Meyer, 2004; Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Incorporating some of these methodological tools from the SMO framework within the POS/DOS framework will make it possible to reach an understanding of the dynamics of collective identity formation and furthermore to come closer to understanding why and how also transnational strategies are diffused. The latter part seeks to answer how ideas, modes of adaptation, collective action frames, strategies and practices spread from one movement to another, from one national context to another or from one position and societal level to another. Claims making is the process whereby an actor articulates and presents a claim verbally. Claims are given a specific content when framed in particular ways. The concept of framing is derived from Goffman’s frame analytical perspective.

Framing “denotes an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 614). In other words, frames can be regarded as discourses, which will be the approach taken in my framework. Like discourses they describe social reality although the notion of frames implies a less constructivist perspective than the notion of discourse. Claims are typically backed up by frames. Frames provide a core understanding of a problematic condition or situation; identifies the actors at stake (who is to blame basically) and calls for specific action. The literature often refers to diagnostic framing (identification of the problem), prognostic framing (solutions and strategies) and motivational framing (agency and calls for action) (ibid: 615). Regarding the first type several analyses have shown that ‘injustice frames’ are a very common mode of interpretation. The field of integration has not been investigated within this perspective, but I have strong expectations that this will be a very common frame employed here also.

Integration and citizenship essentially is about membership and inclusiveness and therefore will deal with both in- and out-groups. Likewise I will expect the emerging transnational identities to employ such frames as some of the most well-known groups. For example, the Kurds work with issues of exclusion and lack of rights and recognition. Adapting organisational structures across ethnic, national and religious groups on the other hand is part of a motivational framing set in discursive and strategic processes. What is the problem?; how is reality presented?; and how is support mobilised?; and similar questions.

Finally strategies are bound to actions and within my research perspective help explain how agency is coupled to struggle and how identity is part of a process of negotiation. The
types of activities differ between confrontational (and either illegal or legal) or participatory within established political channels (either as independent actors or as represented through mainstream organisations) (these categories are inspired by Ireland, 1994 and Østergaard-Nielsen, 2002b). Finally I include transnational activities that take place inside or outside the political institutions.

Table 3.1 Schematisation of the different analytical tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Racial</th>
<th>Ethno-national</th>
<th>Cosmopolitan</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>Assimilative</td>
<td>Dissociative</td>
<td>Accultarative</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Deconstructivist</td>
<td>Diffusional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frames</td>
<td>Diagnostic</td>
<td>Prognostic</td>
<td>Motivational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Confrontational and illegal</td>
<td>Confrontational and legal</td>
<td>Independent Institutional participation</td>
<td>Institutional participation within mainstream institutions</td>
<td>Transnational activities outside</td>
<td>Transnational activities inside</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the analysis I will outline how social phenomena are framed and analyse the different strategies employed when constructing collective identities. Especially when focusing on transnational social formations this methodological perspective can show how the organising processes cross-nationally are connected and interdependent in terms of adaptation of organisational structures and diffusion. Including the notions of strategy, frame and activities delimit the essentialist reading of the POS approach by focusing on the agency and dynamics taking place within the structure.

**Migrant collective organising processes**

In this study I focus on the orientation and claims making of immigrant organisation. An organisation is considered an immigrant organisation: if the mission of the organisation is to
initiate changes directed at immigrant minority groups or to provide services or collective
goods for an ethnic or ethno-religious group; if the organisation has members and/or initiators
of the same ethnic group towards which its services and mission statement are directed; if at
least half the members of an organisation are from one single ethnic group other than the na-
tive majority, no matter the mission statement and initiators.

Organisational theory stresses how organisations are diverse phenomena, which rely on
a certain organisational structure with different structures of resource channelling and operate
following different logics.17

Immigrant organisations are no different than non-immigrant organisations, so a large
diversity will be expected in terms of professionalism, hierarchical vs. flat structures, degree
of voluntarism, types of funding, open vs. closed structures, size in terms of paying members
vs. the actual number of people ‘pulling the load’, physical presence vs. mainly Internet pres-
ence. Obviously this is a part of the analysis where convergence and adaptation due to institu-
tional limitations and demands are expected to show up. The demands required in terms of
accountancy and transparency, democratic structure and a pro-integration agenda are expected
to be present in most organisations nowadays, at least in organisations applying for funding or
co-working with state institutions, but even in so-called fundamentalist organisations there is
a high degree of convergence in terms of organisational structure.

Investigating the dynamics within the group as the resource mobilisation framework
does imply an explicit perspective on the processes of organisation and the creation of collect-
ive identity. As such it is closely related to the institutional theories in stressing the impor-
tance of the opportunity structures but moves somewhat beyond this framework when empha-
sising the role of social networks in the mobilisation processes (looking at the composition of
social networks, strong vs. weak networks, density, barriers to entry and rights of exit, interre-
lation between networks, investigating social trust and trust-enduring and trust-establishing
adaptation) and not least including the intervening factors of internationalisation and transna-
tionalism (Fennema, 2004; McAdam et al., 1996, McCarthy & Zald, 1977, Tarrow, 2005).

The flipside of the resource mobilisation approach is the perhaps too narrow focus on re-
sources and most notably on financial resources. Time and labour may be more demanding

17 Lofland has put forth eight frequently asked analytical questions to the organisation within this framework; (1)
ideology and interest: when the organisation was established and have they changed over time; (2) how is the
organisation organised in terms of distribution of power, influence and resources; (3) what economic, political,
religious or other interests were the driving force behind the establishment; (4) why do people join the organisa-
tion and under which conditions; (5) what are the strategies and objectives of the organisation; (6) who are the
partners and which alliances and coalitions are part of the strategies; (7) how is the response to the organisation
from its opponents and within the media coverage; and (8) what kind of influence does the organisation have on
its members (Lofland, 1996).
factors than a steady inflow of money, hence the aspect of voluntarism should not be underestimated. Neither should inter-generational conflicts be neglected.

The previous discussion and outline point to the characteristics of immigrant organisations, the next step is a typology of the different organisations at stake. Here I differentiate between organisation types, orientations and aims/purposes.

Regarding *types* I distinguish between: (1) ethno-cultural/national organisations, (2) religious associations/organisations, (3) political organisations, (4) educational organisations, (5) business/chamber of commerce-like associations, (6) leisure/sport associations, (7) interest (e.g. anti-racist) organisations, and (8) mainstream organisations and political parties (in this case non-immigrant organisations and parties but with immigrant members). The different types can be multiethnic and could serve the purpose of being umbrella organisation for groups of organisations/associations with the same interests. The different types can and will often be connected to other and related organisations and identifying networks and interlocutors will be a device used in the analysis. Studying interlocks tells us something about interconnectedness both to host society institutions and other organisations, mainstream as well as immigrant (Fennema, 2004; Mizruchi, 1996; Vermeulen & Berger, 2007). I regard the density of interlocks as a marker of incorporation but at the same time I also expect the national opportunity structures to promote given interlocks. I distinguish between horizontal networks, that is the type of network and linkage between the immigrant organisation and other organisations in civil society and vertical networks. The latter is the type of network the immigrant organisation has with government authorities, special advisory boards etc. and the political elite.

The proposed types of organisations should obviously be regarded as ideal-types and heuristic devices, as there can be overlaps. I do not propose or identify a transnational organisation type as such, but all the proposed types can have a transnational dimension. Whether such a dimension is present depends on the *orientation* of the organisation/association (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a: 21). Until very recently the term ‘identity politics’ was employed to cover all ethnic activism and claims making (Bernstein, 2005). Although immigrant claims making deals with identity politics it is still a sweeping generalisation and I therefore introduce a more nuanced typology. I distinguish between *immigrant politics, homeland politics, and diaspora politics*. *Immigrant politics* are political activities undertaken to better the situation in the receiving country, such as obtaining social, political, cultural or economical rights.

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18 A number of studies have sought to describe the overall landscape of immigrant organisations in different national settings (e.g. Fennema & Tillie, 1999; 2004; Vermeulen, 2006).
fighting discrimination and racism. Politics of integration belongs to this form of orientation as well. Homeland politics are activities and claims raised towards homeland domestic and foreign politics. Diaspora politics denote a kind of homeland politics confined to groups who are barred from participation in the political system of their homeland, who can be targeted at gaining representation, recognition or claiming land rights etc.

The orientation runs close to the aim and purpose of the organisation where we again can distinguish between different types (see Odmalm, 2004). Migrant organisation may serve as a link between the sending country and the receiving country and can provide advisory services for future migrants. Secondly, the organisation may serve as a supplement to the state in terms of adaptation and integration, and can facilitate integration by supporting school activities, extend social capital, form networks, create job opportunities and enhance labour market participation, provide information about the host country in the native language. Thirdly, immigrant organisations may engage in identity politics, which basically could be the claim for recognition, a site for collective identity such as sharing cultural traditions, and can serve as a contact point between ethnic communities in different settlement countries. They may also serve as a unified voice for a particular ethnic group in relation to the host society.

Such devices allow us to identify the degree of diversity between the organisations and to understand how and why different strategies are used in different national and political settings. Immigrant organisations may arise through bottom-up mobilisation, independently and in harmony or conflict with established (political system) or they can be activated from above, via state funding and from state-identified needs or by existing immigrant organisations. Local associations may grow to become national organisations or vice versa. Actors who played a passive role in one context may be the mobilising part in another (Marques & Santos, 2004). Mobilisation and organising processes take place at different levels and though different channels. Marques and Santos propose a ‘top-bottom’ typology that can overcome one of the problems related to the POS approach, that is, identify exactly which opportunity structures function at different levels and can be decisive for the organising process. The top is defined as the institutional framework of the society, in this case the integration and citizenship regime, while the bottom level is defined as the immigrant and ethnic communities and their organisations (ibid: 112).
They translate this typology into a continuum of institutional arenas as illustrated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOTTOM</th>
<th>ACTIVATION</th>
<th>TOP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant/ethnic minority groups</td>
<td>Immigrant/ethnic minority associations</td>
<td>Organisation of the civil society at large</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The axis depicts a continuum of degrees of access to, or participation in, civil society, ranging from the self-perception as a minority group, to particularistic (ethnic) organisations, through ethnically non-particularistic mainstream organisations (but that may express other types of particularisms, e.g. class) to the established political decision making system of the host society (ibid: 113). But they argue further that a second hierarchical dimension should be added, concerning the level of incorporation and participation. This will add further meaning to the concepts of top and bottom, activation and mobilisation and furthermore open up for understanding internal differences and links between immigrant organisations, which can be followed for instance from local to national level though different paths of mobilisation. Thus, another axis is proposed that depicts the institutional levels (ibid: 120):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOTTOM</th>
<th>ACTIVATION</th>
<th>TOP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combining the two axes creates a two-dimensional space for participation charting both the actors and institutions and webs of relationships amongst them. I have simplified the space and depict it in the following way (ibid: 121):
Table 3.3: Institutional arenas and institutional levels: a two-dimensional participation space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARENAS</th>
<th>ARENAS</th>
<th>ARENAS</th>
<th>ARENAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigrant groups</td>
<td>Immigrant associations</td>
<td>Civil society organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational/Transnational</td>
<td>Transnational networks</td>
<td>International federations</td>
<td>Political parties in sending countries; International religious organisations; International NGO’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Immigrant communities and networks</td>
<td>Immigrant associations and federations; immigrant press; Immigrant entrepreneurial associations; religious organisations</td>
<td>Political organisations human rights anti-racist, etc organisations entrepreneurial associations; trade unions; press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>Immigrant communities</td>
<td>Immigrant associations</td>
<td>Voluntary associations Entrepreneurial Associations; School Associations; Parents associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Immigrant communities</td>
<td>Immigrant associations</td>
<td>Residents’ associations; voluntary associations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This two-dimensional space makes it possible to map the political institutions and opportunity structures hierarchically. By doing so it deals with one of the shortcomings in the national models of citizenship, by focusing on the articulation between the local and the national level. As mentioned, national policies may be altered or modified at local level and in that sense diminish the actual differences. That said, there are also limitations to the role and power of local authorities, for instance with regards to access to citizenship. But as is seen with the case of Germany, regional authorities have different interpretations and implementations of the national policy.

International federations will most likely seek influence at a transnational level rather than in the local municipality, and local immigrant associations will of course be facing the
same limitations and constraints as national large-scale organisations but may work cooperate
closer with the local municipal institutions rather than orient themselves towards a national
political level. A shortcoming in this conceptual space is that the possibility that organisations
can work on different levels is not included. Organisations may have different aims for differ-
ent levels. I found that the Alevi organisation has a national agenda that for instance strives to
gain recognition as an independent belief system which should be appointed distinct rights,
and at the same time has local affiliations working with local integration tasks, such as study
help groups and lectures on Alevi culture and traditions. On a transnational level, the organi-
sations from different countries put pressure on the Turkish government and create a united
opposition for the coming elections to better the conditions and gain recognition for Alevis in
Turkey. The construction of an Alevi collective identity is taking place at all levels, but by
different means and channels.

The purpose of introducing the conceptual space is to refine the different levels and ac-
tors within the institutional dimensions identified through the POS approach. The conceptual
space will be employed as a mental analytical tool, which means that I will not plot in all ex-
isting institutions and immigrant organisations but will let this grid systematise the forthcom-
ing analysis. I will, however, present examples on how various organisations interlock in re-
spectively Denmark, Sweden and Germany (Chapter 8) and later on how local, national, in-
ternational and transnational organisations are connected (Chapter 10).
Chapter 4
Methodological Reflections

Introduction
Having gone through the state of the art and outlined my theoretical and analytical framework I now turn towards elaborating the research design in more detail. As outlined in Chapter 1 I follow a structure where I first present thick descriptions of the three cases focusing on the institutional and structural framework (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). The same approach is followed in Chapter 8 but is coupled with a more systematic comparative perspective. Chapter 9 and 10 continue this approach and offer a systematic comparative approach. In the present chapter I will discuss both the choice of cases and the comparative approach.

The theoretical and methodological construction of a comparative research design calls for an explicit methodology as far as choosing the units of comparison, the generation of data, and not least the objective of the comparison. This is an open process that is refined continually throughout the research process. The point being that the research design will be the product of a movement back and forth between theory and empirical material or analysis and data collection. Research questions are likely to lead to new knowledge, which again may lead to new research questions. Thus a dynamic research design needs to express what Glaser has described as ‘a theoretical sensitivity’ (Glaser, 1978). In this case, the initial analyses opened up for new questions that brought more dimensions and density into the analysis. One example is the continuous refinement of the interview guide, which was revised during the year most interviews were conducted. Of course the main structure remained unaltered to be able to compare the answers given, but the specific social and political context that the interviews were framed within also influenced the collection of data. The research design chosen for this dissertation has a deductive point of departure but also resembles the abductive research process where the analysis of the empirical material is allowed to move in ways not predicted or expected by the theoretical framework by generating new questions that are pursued afterwards.

The revision of the framework not only changes the analytical outcomes of the empirical data but also affects the theoretical framework. One example is my findings from the Alevi and Assyrian minority groups within the Turkish community that pointed to a theoretical refinement of the conceptualisation of transnational social formations, which again was applied to the material in general.
The research process consists of three basic elements, namely knowledge claims, strategies of inquiry, and methods leading to approaches and the design process. The knowledge claims state the pre-understandings and assumptions about how the research can uncover new knowledge and of what kind. But moreover it also frames the starting point and perspective of the researcher himself/herself. These claims can be conceptualised in different terms, e.g. paradigms, epistemologies and ontologies, or more broadly be conceived as research methodologies (Creswell, 2003). Creswell points to four different schools of thought in regards to knowledge claims (ibid: 6): postpositivism, constructivism, advocacy/ participatory, and pragmatism. The main elements of each position and its application in practice are presented in Table 4.1:

Table 4.1 Different Schools of Thought

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Knowledge Claim Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Postpositivism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determinism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reductionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical observation and measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple participant meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and historical construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advocacy/Participatory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment issue-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pragmatism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences of actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-centered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real-world practice oriented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Creswell, 2003: 6)

These traditions are commonly linked to more or less specific strategies of inquiry translated into practice by the means of a specific method on how to collect and analyse data. Furthermore, the different positions are presented here as ideal-types and very often a research project combines more positions, not just in regards to methods but also epistemologically. Even ‘hard’ quantitative data demands a qualitative understanding and can from another perspective be regarded as social constructs, e.g. the concept of ‘money’ rests on a common social accept of the same symbol (Riis, 2001; Stone, 1997).

Postpositive knowledge claims builds on the heritage of positivism, which has gone from the search for an absolute truth to the recognition that we cannot be positive about our claims of knowledge when studying social action and human behaviour. Postpositivist approaches however still try to identify the causes that determine effects and outcomes. It is done by testing hypotheses, but from an anti-foundational position implying that truth can never be found and that evidence found in research is always imperfect and fallible. Thus,
hypotheses are not ‘proved’ but instead indicate a failure to reject (Phillips & Burbules, 2000: 14-25). Phillips & Burbules (2000) describe how, through the postpositivistic lens, scientists engage in the process of “making knowledge claims and then refining or abandoning some of them for claims that are more strongly warranted” (ibid: 31).

The socially constructed knowledge claims assume that individuals seek understanding of the world and social setting in which they live. In this perspective meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are interpreting. Context becomes extremely important as we are all put in a setting bestowed upon us by culture and history. Furthermore, emphasis is placed on processes of interaction as individuals are always formed through relationship and interaction with others, hence socially constructed (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 2001; Fairclough, 1992; Creswell, 2003: 8-9).

The advocacy/participatory approach can be seen as an attempt to struggle free of systemic laws. Drawing on works by Marx, Adorno, Habermas, Laclau, Freire and others the researchers pursuing this approach have focused on social injustice and advocated an action agenda to help (and liberate) marginalised groups; the presumption being that research needs to be intertwined with politics and a political agenda. Thus, the implication for research undertaken within this perspective is that it should address social change and target issues like power, inequality, domination, suppression, dominance and marginalisation.

The last school of thought, the pragmatic knowledge claims, seeks first and foremost to provide solutions to a given problem. Knowledge claims arise out of actions, situations and consequences rather than from antecedent conditions as the postpositivists would argue. Researchers should not feel constrained by one method but apply mixed methods when engaging in research if it can help to provide knowledge. Research takes place in a given social, political, cultural and historical contexts, which should be acknowledged.

The different approaches will most often employ specific methods in accordance with the epistemological assumptions made by the individual approaches just outlined. Viewing my own research design in this perspective, it seems evident that my research design bridges between more of these approaches. The reason is that my research project places itself in the intersection of social sciences and humanities and includes different types of data as well as methodological approaches. My research questions cannot be answered sufficiently within one approach. Only working with quantitative data would leave out a more substantial and qualitative understanding of the individual organisation within the broader framework. Furthermore different entities are crucial for different parts of the analysis. Institutions are central for the first part of the analysis, while the organisation is the central unit for analysis in the
following part. Organisations do not arise in a vacuum, thus both internal and external relations and organising processes are part of this analysis.

The institutional framework of political opportunity structures operationalised in specific variables and questions rests on the postpositivist framework although the data employed are mainly qualitative. The last two decades the concept of path dependency has gained prominence in studies of institutions. Basically the argument is that once a path has been taken at a given branching point in history it will affect the future trajectory and eliminate other possible actions. The path dependency literature can end up depriving the actors of agency and being extremely structuralistic.

The approach I wish to pursue in investigating the impact of the institutions on the immigrant organising process in civil society takes a more constructivist stance as the focus is on processes of identity constructions and data are generated through qualitative interviews and archive material. However, the method employed for analysis is taken from the critical discourse analysis, which aims at identifying one social group’s control and dominance over others within the given power relations and thus positions the research design within both the social constructivist and the advocacy/participatory. Having an ideal of problematising the ‘facile gestures’ and making the objects subjects in the investigation, in the spirit of Diken and Foucault, also positions the research project within the latter research position (cf. Chapter 1). Finally, I will argue that bridging over different research positions, employing different methods and including diverse empirical material basically is a pragmatist position.

The methodological reasoning behind this choice is that different methods have advantage at different levels of the analysis. Bringing in research questions addressed to macro-, meso- and micro-level makes it reasonable to employ methods suited to each level, essentially employing a form of method triangulation. Already in 1959 C. Wright Mills argued in *The Sociological Imagination* that sociology should aim at combining societal issues (dilemmas and structural problems) with actual troubles (and the strategies used by individuals and social groups to overcome such structural conditioned problems), which is an ambition of combining macro- and micro-level analyses (Andersen & Larsen, 1995). The triangulation pursued in this research design, through different theoretical perspectives, diverse data material and different methods of analysis, aims at transgressing the opposition between ‘interpretivist’ and ‘structuralist’ perspectives by following a “constructivist structuralism” or “structuralist constructivism” in Bourdiues terms (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 11), which is “a way of seeing and researching social life as both constrained by social structures, and an active process of production which transforms social structures” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 1). In
this type of analysis focus is placed on the relationships between the social structures and social life – institutions and immigrant organising processes. The individual and collective organisations are framed within a structural setting with specific possibilities and power relations. Furthermore collective identities and networks are created and transformed due to interaction with the institutions and other collective organisations which basically stresses the relational aspect inherent in the structuralist constructivism perspective. Taking the clue from the CDA and discourse theory such identities are always contingent and always located within a social context.

The epistemological discussion ends here while the following sections will explore and provide the arguments behind the specific problems involved in the research design. First, the research strategy and the rationale for the comparative research design are discussed. Second, the selection of countries and reference group is discussed. This will be followed by a discussion centred on the data generation and types of data. Finally the chapter discusses the issues of data analysis and questions of validity, reliability and generalisation.

Research strategy - a cross-national study

The dissertation is based on a comparative study of the interplay between integration regimes, citizenship models and the negotiation of identity in three European countries.

My choice of a comparative perspective is derived partly from former research findings. It leads to questions on how we can explain differences in the trajectories of integration among different minority groups. To answer those we have to ask which cases are comparable to begin with. Looking to the political theory and comparative politics specifically the now classical distinction between “most similar and most different designs” as advanced by Przeworski and Teune (1970) still seems to be useful. It can be applied both to quantitative and qualitative work. The degree of generalisability depends not only on the number of cases but also on their similarities and differences (della Porta, 2002: 302).

A most similar system design compares similar cases on the assumption that the more similar the cases are, the more chances there ought to be to isolate the variables responsible for the difference between them. Thus, the factors assumed to be common to the cases are regarded as irrelevant to explaining some observed differences. The opposite research design – the most different system design, on the other hand, compares cases as contrasting as possible in order to show how robust the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is (Guy Peters, 1998). Of course the most similar and most different research design must be seen for what they are, *i.e.* ideal types. Often circumstances make it difficult to im-
plement the strategies in practice, but whether to compare cases that are apparently similar or choose to select the cases that appear to be most different the question still arises whether it makes sense to compare the cases, and what would be gained from it.

Relating this discussion to the field of integration, immigration and ethnic relations, innumerable research projects have looked at different immigrant groups in different countries supported by a great variety of theories.¹ Penninx has categorised such comparative studies into studies that (a) compare the integration processes of different immigrant groups in the same institutional or policy context of a nation (or city) (e.g. Penninx et al., 2004); and (b) studies that take a cross-national perspective by looking at the integration of the same minority group in different national contexts (e.g. Kaya & Kentel, 2005; Vermeulen, 2006) (Penninx, 2004a. 16-17).

The first type of studies explains differences in the integration process primarily in the characteristics of the immigrant groups, as the context in which they are being integrated is the same for all. The second type of comparative studies does the opposite. Such studies also find differences in outcomes, but locate the explanation in the differential functioning of the context in which the immigrant group is living. It is this kind of approach that for instance enables Togeby to conclude that “institutions matter” (Togeby, 2003). However, as noted by several scholars the level of the nation-state might not be the last stop for the process of integration, but could and has already proved to be a bit too simplistic to make a satisfactory analysis. One trend has been to focus on the ‘lower-than-nation-state’ levels, i.e. regions, cities and municipalities, on differences in local policies and reactions or local political constellations within the same national context as well (e.g. Alexander, 2004). Including the discussion of transnationalism, another trend is to look at the influence from the European level and now perhaps also global level as mentioned.²

¹ Selected references that have served as inspiration for my own research, e.g. Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, 2000; Baumann & Sunier, 1995; Brubaker, 1992; Hansen & Weil, 2001; Johansson, 2005; Kastoryano, 1998; Kondo, 2001; Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Koopmans et al., 2005; Mikkelsen, 2003a; Penninx, 2004a; Penninx et al., 2004; Soysal, 1994; Tireli, 1999; Togeby, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001b; 2003a.
² Here I focus solely on the literature treating questions of immigration and integration in Europe. Of course one could also investigate the impact and influence of global super powers like the US, the role of the sending countries or look more into global transformations as such (e.g. Al-Ali & Koser, 2002, Hedetoft, 2003; Robertson 1992).
Selecting cases - why Denmark, Sweden and Germany?
The design in the dissertation looks at the same immigrant group (Turks) in a cross-national context and at the cases of Denmark, Sweden and The Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter Germany).³

The analysis provides the possibility to investigate, first, how the field-specific discursive and political opportunity structures differ in three countries (Chapters 5 to 7) with rather similar socio-economic backgrounds and, secondly, the role of the given integration regime in migrant organising processes and identity constructions. The comparison thus allows us to analyse how the same determining factors can have different outcomes in different political contexts.

The countries in general have gone through the same short- and long-run economical trends, were affected and motivated by similar labour market conditions. All three opened for a large number of guest workers from the postwar years and onwards, but none of them has been immigration countries as such. In neither country did the state expect the immigrants to obtain permanent residency. No matter the official policy, one can claim that all three countries are de facto multicultural societies.

Figure 4.1 summarises the main characteristics of the three countries that are expected to influence the comparison and thereby the forthcoming analysis:

³ Germany offers special analytical challenges in terms of comparison with Denmark and Sweden, as it is a federal state divided into 16 states (länder). The states are responsible for integration issues and can even make distinctive demands in regards to citizenship. It is therefore a huge task to encompass all states in the analysis, so I focus on the policy changes at federal level and look more intensively at the state of Berlin, as my fieldwork took place primarily in Berlin. It also involved German Turks abroad, but they were spokespersons for national interest organisations. The local context has been downplayed, and their relation to the national policies foregrounded. Berlin’s non-German population adds up to nearly 14 pct. of which the Turks constitute the largest group. Recently there has been some groundbreaking studies on the city as a site for integration, derived from the argumentation that the repeated cross-national studies do not offer new knowledge (e.g. Penninx et al. 2004; Baumann, 1996 and Fennema & Tillie, 1999; 2004 somewhat preceded this line of work: see Favell, 2001 for a discussion on this perspective). Berlin could then be characterised as a city state. However, I both agree and disagree. Clearly there is a problem if national stereotypical models are being reproduced all over again (e.g. the often too rigid civic-ethnic classifications), but if it is made clear what the research project set out to investigate, in my case the interaction of immigrant organisations in the integration processes situated in distinct discursive and political opportunity structures, I will claim there is still a lot to be learned from a cross-national approach. However, the cross-city approaches have shown that the local cannot be neglected and that the relationship between national and local policies is far too complex to be compressed in a single national model (see Penninx & Martiniello, 2004). The German case will be discussed further in chapter 7.
Despite the similarities the three countries have organised their society, policies and organisational and institutional structures differently. I will argue that in relation to a number of background variables Denmark and Sweden would be characterised as most similar (most notably in regards to welfare state model, but also in regards to being small open economies, having a consensus-based democracy and having rather homogeneous populations in regards to culture and religion) while Denmark and Germany can be said to be most different according to background variables (again most notably the welfare state model but also according to political composition and historical, religious and cultural patterns). While Denmark and Sweden both adhere to a universal welfare model (with some or considerable differences though, *e.g.* Hedetoft, 2006a; 2006c; Kauuto *et al.*, 2001), Germany can be characterised as a conservative-
corporatist (also termed Central-European/selective) welfare model (Esping-Andersen, 1990, Greve, 2007).

Towards convergence or difference?
The specific organisation of society, which Favell has termed ‘philosophies of integration’ (1998), has direct effects on the policies and instruments developed in regards to immigration and integration. However, many researchers point out that the picture is more blurred and if there is a trend, it is the increasing convergence rather than divergence that characterises the European nations’ immigration and integration policies (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Favell, 2001; Joppke, 2007). But is the convergence between Denmark, Sweden and Germany really that profound? If we look at the policies, Sweden initiated an officially formulated multicultural ideology in 1975, has since been labelled multiculturalist *per se* and does not seem to be changing this approach (despite a change in terminology). Germany is usually defined as very exclusivist and offers few rights to foreigners, but has changed its course with the reform of the citizenship law initiated by the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland* (SPD) and *Bündnis90/Die Grüne* in 1998-9 and the changes at federal level when entering the new millennium, initiated with, at least the discussions of, the recommendations from the Süßmuth Commission in 2001. Even though some länder seem to uphold the old system (*e.g.* the proposal of the citizenship test in Baden-Württemberg) the development moves towards a more inclusivist regime. In contrast, Denmark, known as a proverbially liberal country, which like Sweden introduced political rights for immigrants with permanent residence already in 1981 (Sweden in 1975), changed its direction from the late 1990s and onwards, moving towards stricter laws and a much more reluctant attitude towards immigrants, and unlike Sweden literally not embracing diversity.

Looking at recent reports interesting results show up that point to at least a divergence in outcome of the integration and immigration policies. Sweden has more immigrants with a higher education than for instance immigration countries like Canada and Australia, which could point to a higher level of inclusion in the education system or a higher degree of recognition of higher educations obtained outside Sweden (OECD, 2005). Looking at the results from Migration Policy Group (MGP), which compares the EU15 countries’ integration policies with the proposal and recommendation from EU, Sweden and Holland are ranked second after Belgium, while Denmark is ranked last (Migration Policy Group, 2005). EUMC shows that the Swedish population has the most positive and inclusive opinion of immigrants and *World Value Survey* shows that the Swedish population was ranked most positive towards
immigration and ethnic diversity of 66 comparable countries. Recently the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) published its report and key findings looking at best practices in six different strands by asking 140 questions about the integration regime in 28 countries (Mipex, 2008). Although there are large labour market discrepancies between native born and immigrants in both Denmark and Sweden, the international reports also show that this discrepancy in all aspects is higher in Denmark (OECD, 2005). In March 2007 the OECD published a new country report about labour market integration for Denmark, and once again Denmark in almost all aspects seems to fare worse (OECD, 2007; see also Liebig, 2007b). Thus, it is worth scrutinizing these differences further instead of buying into the claim of increased convergence.4

In conclusion, it should be added that each of the three countries qualify as interesting cases for individual analysis. Germany has way too often been labelled as exclusivist or based on ethno-cultural membership without acknowledging that the policies have changed profoundly and that Germany now on a federal level has created a policy that comes very close to the suggestion and recommendation for a common integration policy in the EU.

Why Turks?
I delimit my empirical perspective to the Turkish minorities in the three countries. Turkish migrants constitute the largest foreign population in Europe numbering more than four millions.5 Most of the Turks live in Germany where they constitute 70 pct. of all Turks living in Europe.6 The Turks in the Netherlands follow Germany with 9 pct., France 8.7 pct. and Austria 4.4 pct. which together host close to 93 pct. of the Turks living in Europe. In Germany the number of Turkish citizens and naturalised Germans with Turkish background number 2.6 million and make up about 3 pct. of the population and one quarter of the non-ethnic Germans in the country. In Denmark the Turks amount to close to 56,000 immigrants and descendants,

4 These numbers should be read carefully though. For instance, MGP’s analysis compares EU recommendations with existing policies in the EU15 countries. Thereby they tend to focus on idealistic goals and somewhat neglect existing problems. Likewise the employment rates for immigrants with a higher education is higher in Sweden compared to Denmark, as the OECD report demonstrates, but the report does not investigate the type of job taken by immigrants, e.g. parallel business sectors with academics working in restaurants, driving taxis etc., which would make them self-sufficient but perhaps not point to social integration, equal possibilities and basically equal citizenship. Nonetheless both contribute to the overall pattern that Sweden at least from a generalized perspective has had more success including its newcomers in society and create public acceptance of a pluralistic, inclusive society. It is enigmatic as the Danish economy at the same time, due to its very flexible labour market policies, known as the flexicurity model, several times has been singled out as a country very well prepared and suited to accommodate and facilitate the (economical) challenges and benefits of increased globalisation (e.g. The New Republic, 01.15.07; Ugebrevet A4 2005a).

5 Assyrian and Syriac communities are not all included in this estimate, only the ones originating from Turkey.
6 Thomas Faist has argued that the reason for this distribution could be found in the importance of networks. Basically the Turks have gone to places where other Turks were already living, which is a basic prerequisite of chain migration (Faist, 2000a).
which count for 12 pct. of all foreigners (Udlændingeservice, 2007). The second largest group of foreigners (immigrants, refugees and descendants) is Iraqis closely followed by Germans, but the Turks are more than twice the size of these groups (Udlændingeservice, 2007). In Sweden they constitute a minor immigrant group, numbering 37,100 (in 2006), which is only half the number of Iraqis in the country. Besides immigrants from the Nordic countries, immigrants and later refugees from former Yugoslavia are by far the largest group with more than 135,000 persons. Thus, the Turks ‘only’ account for 3 pct. of the total foreign-born population. Descendants are not part of these statistics though (Statistiska centralbyrån, 2008).

Obviously, the difference in ‘numbers’ is not without importance – the ‘numbers game’ is still going on among policy makers and in the public discourse. One example is the population growth estimates done in many countries, giving estimates for the population development for up to 70 years. At best such calculations can be more or less qualified ‘guessimates’, but as stated definitely not ‘innocent’ or even factual, but part of a specific political discourse. Instead of reproducing this discourse and seeking to answer when ‘enough is enough’ I wish to reflect upon the implications and consequences of the actual number of Turks in the three countries. The opportunity structures and institutional changes mirror the (majority) opinion of the Turkish group and the scope of the perceived problem in the chosen countries. As experience shows, the presence of foreign minorities has led to discussions of social cohesion and perceived threats to homogeneity. Thus, it follows that countries with a large Turkish population, like Denmark (proportionally) and Germany (proportionally and numerically), will have a more outspoken response to their Turkish residents than Sweden, which has fewer Turks among its group of foreigners. Subsequently, I will argue that, the dif-

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7 The group of especially refugees is increasing rapidly though. Sweden is the favourite destination for Iraqi asylum-seekers. The Iraqi community currently numbers more than 70,000 but already this year some 5,000 have sought asylum. One explanation for this inflow could be given with Faist’s argumentation on the importance of networks; the other reason is that it is easier for Iraqis not eligible for Convention Status to obtain resident permits on humanitarian grounds than in any other EU member state (Migration News Sheet, November 2006).

8 Stone’s description of the use of numbers in political decision making sums up the discussion very accurately: “Every number is an assertion about similarities and differences. No number is innocent, for it is impossible to count without making judgements about categorization. Every number is a political claim about ‘where to draw the line.’ Projections, correlations, simulations, and every other fancy manipulation of numbers all rest on the decisions about ‘counting as’ embodied in their numbers, so they, too, are claims about similarities and differences. And similarities and differences are the ultimate basis for decisions in public policy.” (Stone, 1997: 167).

9 The example in mind is the calculation made based on the so-called Danish DREAM database, which looks at an estimated number of immigrants and descendants in Denmark in the year 2080 <http://www.dreammodel.dk/>. The estimates have been criticised for holding the immigrant part of the population constant in regards to (upward) mobility and in relation to that the number of children per family etc. From a critical perspective, this may have severe consequences for the immigrant population as the estimates will be linked to estimated costs for society, which can legitimise stricter integration and immigration laws. Thus, estimates can lead to very real political outcomes even though nobody will ever know whether they would have held true or not.
ference in numbers from an analytical perspective, will have a direct effect upon the discourse, measures and instruments used in the national integration regime when dealing with its Turkish population.

It also follows that perceived social problems, such as the notion of so-called parallel societies, will often be associated with the Turkish communities in Germany (e.g. Kreuzberg and Neukölln in Berlin or the Altona and Wilhelmsburg districts in Hamburg) while the discussion in Denmark is more focused on the specific (most often urban) housing site (e.g. Gellerupparken in Århus or Volsmose in Odense – the same can be said to be the case in Sweden, e.g. Rosengård in Malmö and Rinkeby close to Stockholm) and not associated with a specific ethnic group. Obviously a larger proportion of Turks living in the country will provide the possibility for larger, especially distinct urban, concentrations of Turks living within the same area and thus sets the limit for when an urban location is regarded as a site of segregation, but it does not follow from that it also is a social problem in reality. It only points to the fact that larger visibility will be perceived differently by the majority society and indirectly fosters the aforementioned discourses of parallel societies or ‘ghettoisation’ (the notion used in Denmark).

Moreover the difference in numbers also opens for more (analytical) dividing lines and differentiations within the Turkish communities and their organisational structures. While Sweden ‘only’ has a few (but larger) Turkish/Kurdish organisations working on a national level (e.g. Tyrkiska Riksförbundet and Kurdiska Riksförbundet), the opposite is the case in Germany where several umbrella organisations work on a national level representing several hundred Turkish associations and organisations. The number of Turks will also affect the claims making, influence and the power of these stakeholders. In Germany large organisations such as the TGD (Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland) has, according to itself, had a rather profound influence on recent policy making and changes in Berlin (interview with Safter Çınar).

10 The different national trajectories have affected the discussions regarding segregation and the existence of parallel societies or so-called ethnic colonies. While Germany did not pursue political integration of the guest workers, the social and systemic integration seemed to follow its own logic with people creating both a labour market and social life for themselves. Only in the mid 1990s did the discussion arise about the dangers of parallel societies (most notably with the articles and reports by Wilhelm Heitmeyer and his research team: Heitmeyer 1996; Heitmeyer et al. 1997). However, the impact of parallel societies or even their existence is still very much disputed, and besides the findings of the Heitmeyer research team, most recent research seems to present a much more nuanced and complex description of ethnic segregation from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective (e.g. Halm & Sauer, 2006; Salentin, 2004; Schönwälder, 2006). In Denmark and Sweden the discussions of segregation and parallel societies began even later and not surprisingly build primarily on the German experiences.
Acknowledging differences
There are differences and similarities between the Turkish populations within the three countries, which make it interesting to compare this group on a cross-national level. They arrived in the three countries as migrants with more or less similar socio-economic backgrounds, later as refugees and finally via family reunifications which makes it easier to compare at a cross-national level. It should be stressed that they are not representative of other immigrant groups. An initial conceptual clarification is also needed.

When referring to Turks I regard the contextual term Turks as a general category of people within/from Turkey, which includes Kurds, Alevi and other regional self-identifications such as Circassians, Laz and Assyrians. Likewise I include persons born in the host country with Turkish parents. Of course this can be regarded as highly generalising or even essentialising as most of my respondents have taken Danish, Swedish or German citizenship, although many of them also hold Turkish citizenship and thus have a dual citizenship.

As one of the key concepts in this dissertation is heterogeneity, reconstructing essentialism obviously is not the intention. Rather the category Turk expresses the most common self-identification among my respondents – when people identify themselves as Kurdish or Alevi it will be mentioned and these collective identities will be analysed independently in the dissertation. Moreover many of my informants mentioned friends or family (typically brothers) who stated that they would never call themselves Danes or Germans, but preferred to be called Turks although they knew that they probably not would be accepted as such when and if they went to Turkey. Thus the term is used from a pragmatic perspective to make the text more readable instead of making all possible reservations every time members from the different Turkish and Kurdish communities are mentioned. Furthermore special attention to developments happening over time across generations will be included, although the term second-generation immigrants more than the national/ethnic identity marker holds the subject in a fixed position as forever related to the category ‘migrant’ it is still a category employed by immigrants themselves. Likewise gender is expected to influence the construction of identity.

11 Under Ottoman rule 72 recognised ethnic groups lived in the empire (Argun, 2003: 57). Although this number has diminished in modern day Turkey, the composition, though not officially recognised by the Turkish state, of ethnic groups is far more complex than the Turks-Kurds distinction gives the impression of.
12 The linguist Nienke Willemsen Larsen accurately points to the problems related to the notion second-generation immigrant (in a Danish context): “A dichotomy has been established between first-generation immigrants and Danes, where second-generation immigrants are put forth as a sort of mediating category that does not fully belong in either camp. The fact that it apparently is still important, in spite of the fluid or open affiliation of the category, to stress their [the immigrants’] difference can be seen in the choice of letting immigrant serve as root
Another option could be to use the notion of hyphenated identities (e.g. Danish-Turks, Swedish-Turks), which has become rather prominent in research literature (e.g. Kaya, 2001, Mørck, 1998), however, this is not an identification used by my respondents, which for my case is the underlying reason for not using this term. Secondly, the term often implies the meeting of two different cultural wholes (German and Turkish), which in worst case essentialises the cultural background and does not open up for hybridisation or reflect the transnational and transcultural nature of the people at stake (Çaglar, 1997; Şenocak, 2000; Stolcke, 1995).

... And why differences actually matters
Ethnic boundaries are only one division however. There are several other divisions within the Turkish minority group; ethno-political between Turks and Kurds; political between nationalistic right-wing and left-wing groups; religious between Sunnis and Alevi and between a secular Turkish state and religious communities abroad (e.g. Diyanet vis-à-vis Milli Görus). The Turks have settled in the three countries for now three generations, which provides the possibility to investigate changes over time and to compare them within the specific national conditions. Furthermore there is a variety of party political fractions that also are active outside Turkey, which opens up for the transnational perspective. Finally the ongoing discussions and speculations about possible Turkish membership of the EU provides an interesting backdrop that can have consequences for both the self-understanding among the Turkish communities in Europe and can have an effect on transnational activities as well as the organisational form.

One example is the recent establishment of Europäisch-türkische Zivilplatform (ATP), as pointed to by Yurdakul, which was founded by various leading Turkish immigrant organisations in Europe. It aims at providing political recognition for Turkish immigrants at a European level and is thus an illustration of a transnational network with claims both raised and directed at both a national and a European level. Moreover it is interesting that it unites organisations such as the Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (TGD) and the Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB), which in Berlin have conflicting perceptions of integration/assimilation, citizenship and the like and stress radical different solutions, but at the transnational level they seem to be able to find common goals (Yurdakul, 2006).
**Data generation process and types of data**

The next sections will discuss the collection of data and the selection of key informants. In the present design the reference population is the Turkish minority group, which has been discussed previously. Thus the next sections will discuss in more detail how to choose within this group. This discussion has to do with criteria of validity and reliability, which is important to any research design, but often qualitative methods are criticised for lacking reliability, which makes this discussion even more crucial.

**Identifying the organisations**

Formulating a definition for immigrant organisations is a difficult task. As outlined in chapter 3, I will focus on organisations established by and for immigrants, but also look at mainstream political parties and organisations where persons with a Turkish background are profiled, as they can be said to serve as gatekeepers for the Turkish communities. Furthermore, these persons, more often than not, had a background in immigrant organisations before entering the party political scene or similar and thus became interlocks between different organisations. However, these informants will be discussed in more detail in the following section. This section concentrates on the organisational level.

The three countries gave different difficulties in finding not just the Turkish organisations but also the relevant ones. In Denmark different sources were used to find information. The research literature available was rather outdated, some of it almost 20 years old, which is a very long time considering that immigrant organisations very often live short and turbulent lives. Indeed in the time-span of this study some of my initial selected organisations ceased to exist or were transformed into new organisations. Obviously, it is not a valid criterion only to look at the long-lived organisations as they are not necessarily the most interesting ones. I also find it necessary to distinguish between active and passive organisations. Some organisations may cease activities for different reasons for a shorter or longer period without being formally dissolved. A very helpful and inclusive source was the database constructed by Mikkelsen that holds information of almost 800 immigrant organisations, both living and dead organisations. Each entry is listed with a number of variables such as purpose, type, ethnic belonging, support given, factual information etc. The database helped me to identify the Turkish and Kurdish organisations as such. Most of these organisations were already known to me, as were many of the gate-keepers, but also organisations unfamiliar to me were identified. Later I did an intensive search in the Danish newspaper database Infomedia for articles containing information about the chosen organisations and spokespersons as well as articles and letters to the editor etc. This triggered a snowballing effect in gathering data as some arti-
cles were written together with other organisations or mentioned other organisations, which were then added to the search. Different sites on the Internet also provide information on the landscape of organisations as does the information page hosted by the Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs.¹³

For the case of Sweden, again the research literature served as the point of departure by providing names of organisations etc. However, the Swedish state has a very corporatist structure, which has encouraged, or forced some would say, immigrants to organise along ethnic groups in national federations, which are then supported financially by the state. These lists are obtainable (SFS 2000:216). The national federations typically consist of a number of local organisation and some main regional offices, which lead to more sub-organisations. Part of the action against discrimination is undertaken by immigrant bureaus which spawn another type of organisations, some also rooted in the Turkish community. Like in Denmark the different organisations and spokespersons were searched for in Swedish newspapers, which produced further information. Again, Internet portals linking to different Swedish immigrant organisations also added to the material.¹⁴ As a general comment it can be argued that the landscape of immigrant organisations in Sweden is much more structured than in Denmark. Most of the national federations would have a youth sub-organisation and a woman sub-organisation. Many of the organisations would also be part of the larger umbrella organisations working on a national level with issues of integration and immigration, SIOS being one example. Finally some organisations publish their own magazines, which also led to more information about members, aims and internal organisations, examples being HUJÅDÅ published by The Assyrian Federation in Sweden and EuroTurk published by the Turkish Youth Federation.

The same level of organisation characterises Germany, although on completely different conditions in regards to intervention and support by the state. Also here the research literature provides a starting point. In the case of Germany there actually is an abundance of literature (although not with the same research problem or theoretical perspective as the present research project) due to the large Turkish minority in the country.¹⁵

Research institutes focusing specifically on the Turkish minority, such as the Zentrum für Türkeistudien affiliated with the University of Duisburg-Essen, providing census data and

¹⁵ Much of this literature has already been mentioned, but historiographic accounts like Türkische Immigrantenorganisationen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Özcan, 1989) and Migration ohne Ende – Vom Gastarbeiter zum Eurotürken (Abadan-Unat, 2005) especially deserve mention.
sociological analyses on the Turks living in Germany likewise produce valuable knowledge. Although the German state does not support immigrant organisations to the same degree as in Denmark and Sweden, recent years have shown some changes as far as including immigrants collectively in the decision making processes. Most of my field work and data collection took place in Berlin where the responsible agency is Der Beauftragte des Berliner Senats für Integration und Migration, which holds lists of organisations partaking in hearings and integration related issues. The organisations’ websites provided plenty of information that was extremely professional and pointed to other organisations, national federations etc. Generally it was easier to get an overview of the Turkish organisations in Germany as more literature deals with the topic. Paradoxically that also made it harder to choose whom to talk to later on, as it would not be possible to cover all organisations. Also here I followed up on organisational activities in newspapers and cyberspace. Of course there also were certain barriers, *e.g.* language, which I will get back to in the next section. Generally I have tried to include the main actors partaking in decision-making processes and newspaper discussions, the largest minority groups such as Kurdish and Alevi groups as well as religious-conservative groups. Whether visibility and penetration power equals the expected level of importance or not is an open question, though.

The organisations are described in Appendix A and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. Furthermore, the organisational networks and interlocks are analysed and present a general overview of the organisations included in the analysis in the three countries. The outcome of this approach is not a larger degree of representativity, as the organisations do not represent the Turkish minority groups in any formal sense, but rather a more subtle understanding of how different minority groups within the overall Turkish minority organise themselves under the same structural conditions (see Fennema & Tillie; 1999 and especially Vermueelen, 2006).

Hence, this dissertation will present elaborate descriptions of chosen individual organisations and only sketchy an overall perspective. Nor will I present fully adequate longitudinal analyses of individual organisational histories, but rather present a synchronic analysis of the organisations at a given point of time, *i.e.* the present and recent years. This is a deliberate choice as it would be an insurmountable task to take in both perspectives satisfactorily. Another consequence is that the groups included in one national setting may not be included in another. One example is the (Turkish-) Assyrian minority organisations in Sweden and Germany, which do not exist in Denmark and therefore are not part of the Danish case. The national differences will also be transcended when dealing with the transnational developments.
Here I find that minority groups of a minor size (as the Alevis in Sweden) cooperate with the larger Alevi organisations in Europe, for instance, which indicates that the actual size of the community may be less important than the religious, ethnic or political background (and indirectly position in society).

**Selection of key informants**

I conducted interviews in all the three countries; however, more informants were selected in Denmark than in Sweden and Germany. There are two reasons for this: First, the Danish case offers privileged access to material as I am Danish; the case is less analysed in the literature so I cannot back up my own findings with the existing literature to the same extent as with the other two cases. The second reason is more pragmatic as it turned out to be more difficult to arrange the same amount of interviews in Sweden and Germany within the time span of the dissertation. I was forced to rely more on other types of data sources, e.g. secondary sources, and to back up my findings with the existing literature in these cases. Especially in Germany the old anthropological joke – ‘how many people does the ordinary household of an Amazon tribe consist of? Four and an anthropologist’ – came to mind, as the members and obviously even more so the spokespersons were constantly asked for interviews by PhD students, university students, policy makers etc., which sometimes took a lot of persuasion and communication to set up (yet another) interview. However, the positive side of the story is that people then generally were well-reflected, used to talking and it was usually quite easy to track down these persons in the media and thus get access to secondary sources, such as newspaper interviews, press releases etc. (more on key informants later). Moreover the high level of reflection can also help vouch for the quality of the data as the information given proved highly consistent.

The method applied is a combination of the semi-structured and discursive interviews, which I shall return to later. First it should be stated that the process of selecting informants includes both intended and unintended choices. The list of informants created initially had to be revised as some persons were unavailable or other persons were pointed to or suggested instead (the full lists of interviews are listed in Appendix B). This is a basic characteristic of the qualitative research project as it deals with persons who first and foremost are human beings that may not follow the design put down in the research project. Conducting field work away from home also contains elements of uncertainties as cancelled meetings and interviews can be difficult to reschedule. Some I succeeded in conducting through telephone later, but such an approach also has its defaults as communication via the phone does not have the same
level of intimacy that helps produce trust. Establishing trust is an important exercise for getting the information needed and basically for keeping the informant talking. Also the language barrier can be harder to transgress when having a dialogue on the phone as the body language etc. is lost.

The outcome of these efforts is nevertheless a corpus with more formal interviews being conducted in Denmark than in Germany, and Sweden somewhere in the middle. The solution was to rely more on the written output from the organisations and secondary sources such as newspapers in addition to the academic literature. Moreover I ended up engaging in a large number of informal interviews, which contributed valuable information although it is more difficult to refer directly to such conversations. In conclusion, I am aware that the selection of interviews unfortunately does not live up to my initial ideals set out below, but I still feel that the combination of material has overcome this specific shortcoming and that the analysis I conduct on the German case ends up being valid.

The interviews provide a very important and highly unique part of the empirical material but are not the only source. Other types of data will be discussed later on. Initially I made a provisional listing of key informants based on the different existing organisations and further searches in newspaper databases and on the Internet for the persons involved in organisational activities. In Denmark I started out with 15 names/organisations and in Sweden and Germany 8-10. The organisations were contacted or in some cases the persons evoking my interest were contacted directly. Most of these contacts responded positively, but some also had to be dismissed, e.g. the largest Kurdish organisation in Denmark, which never returned any of my phone calls or emails. The persons targeted generally acted as spokespersons for the organisations. Such persons can be hard to interview as they tend to provide very factual information or deliver a well-formatted political discourse that easily could be provided by archive data from the organisations. Interviewing the person within the organisation (that is the ordinary member) compared to the person as the organisation (that is the representative and/or the founder) also delivered information on interlocks between different organisations, both past and present, as many key informants were or had been members in several organisations. This was indeed a crucial part of understanding the variation among the organisations and the internal aims and motivations of the organisation.

Another group of respondents were regular members of the organisation and did not necessarily hold any formal position of trust. However, these informants gave valuable information on both the organisation as such, but more importantly why people choose to engage
in organisational activities and what motivates them. They also reflected upon the value of such engagement and thus helped answer an important part of the research questions.

A third group of informants were persons with a Turkish background engaged in mainstream organisations and political parties. Some were also members of immigrant organisations, and in almost every single case they had a background in specific immigrant organisations. Some had ceased with activities in immigrant organisations after being elected to parliament or a specific position of trust, not to mix up the roles (this fact will be discussed in the analysis). These informants provided information from outside the immigrant organisations about integration and diversity policy making. Very often they were engaged with the exact same questions as in the immigrant organisations, for instance within the political system. As such they both act as interlocks between immigrant communities and the established political system, and provided interesting knowledge on how the same problem is discussed differently within the two spheres of society. They can be seen as the concrete expression on the level of influence of immigrants within the established system. Referring to these informants in the interviews with immigrant organisations also gave information on how they were considered within the organisations and how their influence was sought utilized. When asked to participate in the research project, informants holding multiple positions were given the choice to speak out from whichever position they wanted to.

While the first groups mentioned were part of a targeted selection, a fourth group was also included, namely persons belonging to all the aforementioned groups but who came to my attention via a snowball approach. ‘Snowballing’ (also termed chain referral sampling or network sampling) is the chain of contacts reached when one informant nominates another person who could be of interest to the project and so on and so forth. The approach can be pursued more or less actively, in the sense that it means following leads informants come up with spontaneously compared to asking each informant to nominate candidates for future interviews. In this research design the first form was used. The approach helps identify the most important gatekeepers (as some persons will be mentioned by several informants), reach persons unfamiliar to the researcher and gain expertise in a field that may be new to him or her. It also helped me gain access to and set up an appointment with a person who had not responded to earlier attempts of contact, as trust was gained through the other participating persons. Snowballing as an approach also has its shortcoming in the inherent danger that new contacts may be from the same network and may even lead the research astray, if one not is careful to include alternative dimensions and angles. One is very unlikely to be pointed to high-positioned Kemalists if following the names and contacts given by Kurdish interest groups for
instance. Hence, snowballing may narrow down the variety of informants and affect both the validity and especially the reliability of the project. However, combined with a targeted selection of informants I consider it to be a very strong method of getting to know the main actors and contours of the chosen field, and the implementation of this approach without any doubt enriched the data collected for the present project.

While I sought to include persons from different ethnic, religious and political groups and fractions, I did less to incorporate other parameters. Most of the interviewees were people living in the largest cities in the country, with a few exceptions: the Alevi have their head office in a provincial city in Denmark and the Assyrians similarly in Sweden. An equal gender distribution was also an initial ambition, but due to pragmatic reasons on availability etc. the distribution did not come out that way. In Denmark and Germany males are overrepresented, while the opposite is the case in Sweden. I believe that categories intersect and will hold importance, but the main criterion in the selection of informants has been civic and organisational engagement, which has put other criteria, among them gender, in the background.

As I mainly deal with the resourceful and participating some categories obviously become more interesting than others, e.g. social class. However, all such discussions will be part of the analysis and here I can conclude that the informants included came close to a saturation of knowledge in regards to the original research questions, which fulfils one important criterion in the qualitative research process (Kvale, 1994; Lund Thomsen, 2005).

Besides the key-informants from the immigrant organisations and persons with Turkish background in mainstream organisations, I also talked to and conducted interviews with NGOs, researchers and journalists, political institutions and national specialised agencies and institutions with affiliation to politics of integration. However, most were informal and not steered by an interview guide, but more driven as a question and answer session.

Besides the key-informants and non-ethnic respondents I came in contact with a very large number of persons within the Turkish communities. Sometimes other persons were present at the interview location or at festivities, seminars or political meetings. Without being interviewed formally they still contributed with information to this research project by providing written documents, helping to clarify specific questions, gave contextual information or other types of often invaluable knowledge. Meeting familiar faces in different settings helped break the ice and to create a friendly atmosphere at future meetings. I learned a lot about distinguishing Turks from Kurds from Alevi and even common sense Turkish knowledge about the gender of given persons was picked up on such occasions preventing embarrassing encounters at the next interview. Such everyday conversation should probably not be underesti-
mated although the concrete outcome is very hard to define. Finally I participated in migrants’
associational, political, cultural, and social activities on several occasions.

The interviews, how and timing
The interviews were conducted between early summer 2006 and august 2007, the German
interviews in December 2006 and March/April 2008, and the Swedish interviews primarily in
May and June 2007.

Describing the research process can very easily become a rephrasing of a standard text-
book exercise, but still I find it necessary to elaborate upon the approach undertaken in this
study also. Generally I applied a combination of semi-structured and discursive interviews
(Flick et al., 1991; Flick 1998; Fontana & Frey, 1998; Kvale, 1994) and applied an interview
guide for the interviews, but in a rather loose sense, that encouraged the informants to provide
open answers (Appendix C). The interview guide is constructed along the ideals of the semi-
structured interview (sometimes termed connivance interview), but in some cases the inter-
views is taken towards the discursive interview, i.e. a type of interview where the informant is
regarded not just as an expert on his/her own life but also on the topics discussed, which adds
to a communicative understanding of the interpretations that the informant makes use of and
makes the interviewer a partner in a dialogue (Flick et al., 1991). The interview guide is made
in accordance with the research questions and underlying theoretical framework.

Conducting interviews in three different national settings of course made language an
issue. The interviews conducted in Denmark were all done in Danish. In Germany a combina-
tion of English and German was used. However, while my German is sufficient for reading
academic literature and newspapers, it turned out to be less sufficient for oral discussions, so
whenever possible I aimed for English as used language. It cannot be dismissed that conduct-
ing the interviews in Turkish or German would have given a more dynamic and smooth proc-
есс, however all research projects are likely to contain one or more pragmatic solutions and
furthermore the target group was well-educated and used to speaking English. The aid of an
interpreter was offered but all informants except one declined that offer. The Swedish case
ended up with different combinations as some interviews were conducted in ‘Scandinavian’, a
few in English, and more with me asking the questions in English and the informant answer-
ing in Swedish. In all countries I let the informant choose the language most suitable to them.

Before the actual interview all informants had been informed about the research project
and how the interview would later be included in the analysis. Most interviews were recorded
digitally (although some recordings were later lost due to problems with the digital recorder
not noticed at the time) and all informants were offered to listen to the recordings afterwards. All informants were offered anonymity, but with a few exceptions all declined that offer as they were already public figures or the interviews in their opinions did not contain any damaging information. The request of anonymity has naturally been respected in the actual cases. The offer itself also has a reassuring effect on the informants as they feel comfortable that the information offered will be treated confidentially. Furthermore, agreements were made with all informants about following up on uncertainties or new questions raised in the interviews and on several occasions this was actually done later on in the process after having listened to the interviews. The interviews were conducted at different locations, in semi-private settings, at the organisations’ premises or at public places in the city. The interviews ran from half an hour to more than two hours with interviews roughly an hour long being the most typical.

Originally I planned to transcribe every interview as I aimed at working very close with the text in the analysis. Due to a shift in methodological approach and pragmatic reasons I ended up transcribing only sections of each interview (elaborated below). In a few cases the informant asked to read a full transcript of the interview, and in these cases the interview was transcribed and subsequently translated into English as the dissertation is written in English. All later translations were also done by me and includes pauses and breaks but are otherwise not transcribed and translated verbatim. The consequence is that the interview fragments will be easier to read, which is prioritised over verbatim reproductions as the interviews serve to illustrate points and arguments. In contrast, pauses and breaks are maintained as they inform the reader of the linguistic dynamics in the interview.

Other data sources
The interviews provide an important part of the overall corpus that is suited for answering questions at meso and micro level, but they are not sufficient for answering the research questions posed at a macro level when identifying and describing the political opportunity structures. Hence, I need to include other types of data as well.

Census and administrative data are used to provide factual and contextual background, such as population data and employment/unemployment data. These were obtained by national institutional sources: Statistics Denmark, Statistics Sweden, Federal Statistical Office, and Turkish Statistical Institute, from national ministries of integration and ministries of the interior or national/regional agencies like Integrationsverket and Der Beauftragte für Integration und Migration and international sources like OECD and Migration Policy Institute.
Furthermore I collected systematic data on state policies, regulations and laws; government documents such as programmes and strategy papers; statistical reports and evaluations; documents from the national integration institutions and agencies; policy and research papers participating in events and conferences organized by policy and decision makers. Several important political events and changes occurred in the relatively short time span this dissertation was written within. For example, a German Federal election in 2005, a Swedish election in 2006, a Turkish general election in 2007, ongoing EU negotiations with Turkey, the closure of national agencies such as Integrationsverket and other profound political changes all affected the topic for this project and contributed to the material in the form of newspaper articles etc. A focus on political institutions in my opinion demands that developments in the political landscape are followed closely.

Archive material was collected from the immigrant organisations such as statements, brochures, reports and websites. The web as such has become the primary site of struggle for many of these organisations and thus has replaced many of the prior strategies used for claims making. Many organisations only publish their statements on the Internet or through other digitally based media and can to some degree be said to exist only on the Internet. Cyberspace has in many ways become the site for transnational public spheres comprising numerous sites and Usenet groups. The impact or long-term effects of this development are still to be known though. The Internet can either be a site for digitalised information normally obtained by newspapers etc or it can demonstrate the potential to create mass participation.

**Analysis of the data**

The method chosen for the analysis is a combination of content and discourse analysis but also draws on more general analytical procedures within qualitative data analysis. I do not seek to leave out theoretical pre-understandings but on the contrary seek to interpret the data within the theoretical framework outlined in the previous chapter. This framework will guide the analysis and lay out the structure for the analysis. This of course can strengthen the overall structure and findings but also contains the risk that deviating findings are not given the attention they deserve. Working with a comparative design including three national cases and a highly diverse minority group is not possible if the analysis is not controlled; hence the departure point is more deductive rather than for instance choosing a ground theory approach (*e.g.* Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The ambition is to identify similarities, patterns and structures in the material. That said I do not leave out deviations and differences either as the analysis will show. Subsequently, I actively pursue the adductive perspective mentioned in the introduction.
to this chapter. These steps have already been outlined so here I concentrate on how I deal with the empirical data. That much said I do seek to meet the data and the analysis with an open mind and maintain sensitivity towards the data as claimed in the beginning of this chapter.

All interviews were listened through twice or thrice and the content was structured so I would be able to find the passages needed in each interview. Without full transcriptions some details will definitely be lost. However, the analysis of the interviews began already in during the interviews, thus interpretation is not only dependent on the process of transcription but also goes back to the theoretical pre-understanding, which itself has structured the interview guide. Analysing qualitative data is an ongoing process involving continual reflection and asking analytical questions to the material. In the analysis I follow a number of analytical steps: organising and preparing the data; obtaining a general sense of the data; structuring the discourses and themes; and reaching an understanding and coming to conclusions.

The first step involves listening through and learning the overall content of the interviews and the other sources of material, down to the most basic task of building an archive. The next step is obtaining a general sense of the data: identify patterns; judge the credibility of the data, find gaps and flaws in the data and so on. This step is more demanding and deeper into the analysis involving an overview of the data to be able to identify and describe the discursive patterns. This part of the analysis seeks to order the corpus within theoretical categories and label these categories with analytical terms or in vivo terms (terms in the actual language of the informant). Structuring the data is a very concrete task that consists of making margin notes, identifying narratives and working towards finding the patterns. Also this is an ongoing process that requires going back and forth in the material as the list of categories is increased and/or reduced. The third step is what can be written in the forthcoming chapters. Here the earlier efforts are discussed within the theoretical framework and the level of complexity is intensified. The content is analysed across different cases and the framework leads the analysis rather than the material. Pursuing a critical discourse analytical approach implies that the analysis will seek to specify the social and hegemonic relations and structures that constitute the matrix of this specific social and discursive practice (Fairclough, 1992: 237-238). Hence, the focus will inevitably be put on social relations and social identities. The final stage is to arrive at a conclusion and general conclusions.
Aspects of reliability, validity and generalisation

Qualitative research can help us understand situations that could otherwise be incomprehensible, but to reach that point the reader must be persuaded that the research findings are worth paying attention to (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The question is how we can reach that point. The concepts of reliability and validity do not hold the same meaning as in quantitative research; it is so to say harder to control the findings. Oppositely it can be claimed that qualitative data reflect the empirical world to a higher degree than quantitative data. The answer lies in delivering findings that are trustworthy and consistent and in making the process transparent for the reader.

Overall I will say that validity does not carry the same connotations in qualitative research as it does in quantitative research. In general validity is regarded as the strength of qualitative research, where issues as accuracy, credibility, consistency and trustworthiness replace the positivist understanding of validity (and reliability) (Golafshani, 2003). In this perspective validity is a matter of whether the applied method investigates what is intended and whether it will lead to convincing and valid results (Kvale, 1994; Lund Thomsen, 2005). Obviously this is also the aim for qualitative research, but I will turn to alternatives to validity, one such strategy being triangulation of data sources. By comparing the data with data collected for other studies (as well as the results) I can build up a coherent justification for themes and categories included in the analysis (Creswell, 2003: 196). Patterns found in one study can be compared with patterns found in another study, which is also known as plural comparison (De Vaus, 2002). Triangulation becomes a “validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study” (Creswell & Miller, 2000: 126). In general I have compared my findings with the existing literature and secondary sources, which is one criterion for triangulation. In the present research design Germany was included for several reasons already discussed but another reason, in terms of methodological choices, is that Germany as a case has been included in several research projects, resembling the overall theoretical framework in this dissertation. This made it possible to compare my own findings in Germany with other studies and to compare the German results with the Danish and Swedish ones.

An often presented argument, to which I also subscribe, is the claim that reliability in qualitative methods is judged by making the research process transparent to justify the implicit and explicit choices made by the researcher throughout the research process. Applying a consistent structure also helps to ensure reliability. Asking the same questions to the different cases also helps to identify consistent patterns and reveal differences (Golafshani, 2003).
Overall, however, measures of reliability and generalisation are of less importance in the qualitative inquiry. Not least within the constructivist paradigm where knowledge is regarded as socially constructed and may change depending on the circumstances, i.e. context dependent.

Going further into the discussion of generalisation within qualitative research produces some of the same conclusions. The core of the discussion is whether or not small samples can be made subjects of generalisation where the argument often goes that it cannot. However, from a qualitative perspective this is a flawed argument that is based on a positivist way of thinking. A type of generalisation often pointed to is analytical generalisation, which is based on trustworthiness and “a well-considered judgment of the degree to which the results can be of guidance to a similar situation” (Lund Thomsen, 2005: 103). Analytical generalisation is based on similarities and differences between cases and depends upon the relevance and value of the compared elements and descriptions.

I have tried to meet these standards throughout the dissertation, not just in the actual writing but also in preceding process spanning more than three years of work. In this chapter I have laid out the reflections behind my methodological choices and presented the research strategy pursued. I have argued for the strength but also pointed to the limitations of my research design, of both the intended and unintended factors that I had not foreseen. The appendix following the conclusion contains all information needed for the reader to pursue the same empirical data, which is a basic prerequisite for other researchers to pursue the same approach and hopefully reach some of the same conclusions, although any qualitative approach rests on interpretation. Throughout the dissertation I have furthermore discussed my findings, thoughts and reflections with colleagues and people in general taking interest in the subject and thereby have made my analyses and interpretations part of an ongoing research dialogue – what Kvale has defined as communicative validity.
Chapter 5
The case of Denmark - a self-contradictory ethnic model of civic integration?

Immigration to Denmark
Until the end of the 1970s, Denmark had an extremely homogeneous population. Traditionally Denmark never considered itself as a country of immigration, due to, at least until recently, rather moderate immigration flows, being a ‘small’ country and having a strong sense of national identity (Hedetoft, 2006a). Still today Denmark has a high degree of cultural homogeneity and social trust that has played an important role in developing the Danish welfare state. Historians have provided different explanations on how Danish national identity developed over time and how a specific political culture gained hegemony (Østergård, 1992). Such constructions also affect the dominant perceptions of Danishness today and are an inherent part of the national political steps taken to incorporate newcomers.

The most recent wave of labour immigration began rather late compared to other West European countries. The Danish guest worker programme ran for a few years between the late 1960s and 1973 where about 15,000 work migrants from mainly Turkey, Pakistan, Morocco, and Yugoslavia entered the country. However, in the preceding centuries several other flows of migrants had entered the country as well. Dutch farmers moved to Amager in the 16th century, Jews came on an invitation from King Christian IV in the 17th century, and from the 17th to the 19th century groups of Germans came to work in the Danish agricultural sector (Togeby, 2003). Even though some of these groups arrived as seasonal workers many ended up staying and have influenced Denmark culturally and economically. But when speaking of immigrants I focus on the recent decades.

Newcomers in a broader sense can be divided into three groups: immigrants, refugees/asylum seekers and family reunified. The actual guest worker programme only existed for two months in the autumn of 1973 where 2,485 and 2,000 persons were given work permits, while the previous years had been without any regulation and control (ibid). In November 1973 the agreement was suspended due to the economic recession following the first oil crisis. Although the official stop for immigration has been upheld since then (with some exceptions), several people have been given access to the country mainly via family reunification. The guest workers brought their families to the country, and later their children have to different degree maintained the ties to the home country by finding spouses from back home.
The rules for reunification have been tightened considerably over the years, but nonetheless people still arrive legally from the traditional guest worker countries.

In the 1980s Denmark accepted a number of refugees from the Middle East and Sri Lanka, but in 1983 the Aliens Act (the immigration law) was amended and replaced by *Udlændingeloven af 8. juni 1983* [The Aliens Act of June 8 1983]. The act was at the time one of the most liberal laws of its kind in Europe and went beyond the protection given by the amendment of the Geneva Convention with the *United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* from 1951 (see also Betænkning nr. 968/1982).

After nearly a decade with low numbers of asylum seekers, numbers increased due to the conflict in Yugoslavia in 1992, which made the Parliament pass the so-called ‘Yugoslavia-law’ the same year that opened up for accepting refugees from the former Yugoslavian countries.\(^1\) Like the guest workers the Yugoslavians’ stay was thought to be temporary, but the ongoing dispute in the Balkans and bleak perspectives for returning caused Parliament to give permanent residence permit to around 18,000 people. In the 1990s and onwards Denmark accepted asylum seekers from Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. However, access to Denmark is limited and the country has one of the strictest immigration laws in Western Europe and accepts a limited number of refugees compared to other European countries (*e.g.* Migration News Sheet, December 2006).

Denmark joined the European Community in 1973, which has created an inflow of migrants from the other member countries, recently increasing with the enlargement of the 10 new member states, although limited access of this type of migration has been implemented in the requirement of work permits. While the percentage of non-Western immigrants and their descendants made up 1 pct. in the 1980s the same group in 2005 constituted 6 pct. (Udlændingeservice, 2007). Consequently, I will argue that although the Danish state would want to uphold a political-cultural norm of not being a country of immigration it cannot be supported demographically, as the population has become increasingly more multi-ethnic over the years.

**Danish immigration and integration policies until 2001 - the political and discursive setting**

The Danish immigration policy reflects a tendency that can be traced in other European countries as well. The initial response to the labour migrants, in terms of integration, was to do nothing at all. Nobody, including the migrants themselves, expected them to reside permanently in Denmark, thus no steps where taken in regards to integration (Klitgaard-Holm, 2007). The involved actors and institutions were primarily equivalent to the present Ministry

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\(^1\) The law was suspended in 2002 (Lov nr. 1044 af 17. december 2002).
for Employment, The National Directorate of Labour and local labour market agencies, rather than specialised immigration agencies. However, the official stop for migration also paved the way for a long-term immigration policy when parties on the left started talking about equal opportunities on the labour market for all nationalities and that people should be allowed to preserve their cultural background (ibid: 145-146). As history showed, the labour migrants did not return home nor have they repatriated to any large degree later on. On the contrary they have used the right to be united with their families, which has created the need for a proactive policy of immigration and strategy of incorporation.

The concept of integration was part of the political agenda in the early 1980s, first discussed by the Social Democratic government and later taken over by the liberal/conservative government with their political immigration account from 1983 where it is stated that: “the integration of immigrants in the Danish society is the main purpose of the politics of immigration” (Redegørelse af 12.4.1983).

The increasing complexity of the ‘immigration issue’ also created the need for more subtle definitions in order to undertake targeted actions towards specific groups. Thus, in 1991 Statistics Denmark introduced (inspired by Norway) a distinction between immigrants and descendants. The reasoning was that it was necessary to have more refined categories in order to ascertain how many people with a foreign background are incorporated in Danish society. It can also be argued that the distinction essentialises the ‘otherness’ of the immigrants, as people born in country are kept in a status as ‘not quite Danes’.

Until January 1 1999 the immigration law was decentralist, organised with The Danish Refugee Council as the main actor, as it was responsible for housing and introduction to the Danish society after the refugees had received residence permit. People arriving via family reunification were not part of this program. Integration became a core concept in these years, both in political considerations and publications and in the public discourse. The White Book Integration from 1997 presented a number of suggestions for coherent integration legislation (Betænkning nr. 1337/1997). The preceding work and discussions included various NGOs and immigrant organisations active at the time. However, when Thorkild Simonsen from the Social Democrats was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs the report was put to rest and instead the Danish Act of Integration was introduced and implemented January 1 1999.

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2 The description of the immigration and integration policies for the last decades will be rather brief, but see Klitgaard-Holm (2007) for a more thorough and substantial analysis of the political responses to immigration and integration in this period.
Although it included some of the suggestions from Integration, it generally initiates a ‘tougher’ line in regards to integration. One of the most criticized components was the so-called ‘introductory benefit’ (cf. Chapter 3). Several NGOs criticised the law, claiming that the law violated article 23 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Whether their claims were successful is difficult to tell as the government gave alternate explanations, but the fact is that the law was amended already the following year and that particular component was removed.

Looking more closely at the content of the law its foundation is a formal and substantial citizenship perspective (Lov nr. 474 af 1. juli 1998: §1). The act aims at securing equal treatment and equal opportunities for all. However, as just discussed, the law did not provide equal treatment as immigrants received lower public payments than native Danes. Second, immigrants (like Danes) had to be financially self-supporting. This is actually stated in the Danish Constitution, but moreover it is part of a workfare discourse that has been dominant in Denmark since the early 1990s, e.g. the Youth Allowance Programme from 1990 and the national labour market reform in 1993 (Torfing, 2004). The most recent policy programme from 2003 ‘More people in jobs’ (Flere i arbejde) lies in continuation of these earlier programmes. Third, the act pursues a somewhat assimilatory ideal, by demanding respect for and acceptance of Danish core values. These values were first and foremost cultural and not pinpointed as democratic, as for instance was the case in Sweden (Klitgaard-Holm, 2007).

Defining such values has been part of the public discourse ever since and the discursive framework of the law presents an understanding closer to assimilation than to integration, although parts of both types of definitions can be found within the law (e.g. Ejrnæs, 2001). These purposes are also reflected in later documents and mission statements as well as in the independently formed committee Tænketanken, which published a report entitled Udlændinges integration i det danske samfund [The integration of foreigners in the Danish Society] in 2001, introducing seven criteria for so-called good integration. They did not deviate significantly from the government’s understanding and include education, employment, and self-sufficiency – all of which it is hard to disagree with. However, it is important to notice that this understanding rests on a principle of ‘human capital’, which briefly described are the resources people may have in terms of education, experience, and knowledge. This economic approach has become the dominant discursive frame in recent years and the perceived prob-

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3 The economic hard-line trajectory was initiated by the Social Democrats, who in 1993 introduced programmes to reduce unemployment, which had passed 13 pct., and increasing economic growth. This approach led to cutbacks in social benefits. Subsequently, the political-economic dimension should not be left out.
lems with descendants, again in terms of level of education and employment, language skills etc. have only strengthened this tendency (Emerek, 2003).

Concluding this section, I will claim that the Danish immigration policy in the mid-1980s developed from being a labour market-regulative policy influenced by economic contours to focus on aspects of primarily socio-economic integration. Key terms are self-sufficiency and autonomy. But the focus on socio-economic integration inevitably shifts the burden towards the individual immigrant, where integration first and foremost becomes the responsibility of the individual. This has been a convergent trend all over Europe although the privatisation of responsibility is forced more or less to extremes in the different countries.

**Political and discursive opportunity structures**

The next section investigates the indicators of citizenship outlined in Chapter 3. As the political and discursive opportunity structures are much harder to disentangle in reality than in theory, the analysis will be less schematic than the framework presented in the previous chapter, although the different indicators discussed will be dealt with. The specific institutions are summarised and framed within the participation space in Appendix D.

**Formal citizenship and nationality acquisition**

Danish citizenship is based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* but also has elements of *jus soli*. Children with one or both parents having Danish citizenship will automatically be granted Danish citizenship at birth if the parents are married. If not and only the father is Danish, the child will only be granted citizenship if it is born in Denmark. Special and more favourable conditions (naturalisation by declaration⁴) exist for persons with Finish, Icelandic, Norwegian, or Swedish nationality (Lovbekendtgørelse nr. 113 af 20. februar 2003, med de ændringer, der følger af lov nr. 311 af 5. maj 2004).

Danish law does not allow for multiple citizenship (with some exceptions such as persons with refugee status, persons from countries where it is impossible to be released from national citizenship etc. (see *Cirkulærskrivelse om naturalisation*). Acquisition through naturalisation is a lengthy process that in some cases can take up to three years, but in principle it is expected to take between 12 to 16 months and is acquired on a yearly basis when the parliament passes the proposition.

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⁴ Naturalisation by declaration was an option open to all people born in Denmark by parents fulfilling the criteria listed above no matter nationality, but the conditions for naturalisation have been tightened considerably in recent years, basically dismissing the elements adhering to the principle of *jus soli* (see Ersbøll, 2005; Galal, 2001; Yarar, 2001).
The applicant has to sign a statement of faith and loyalty, revoke existing national citizenship, sign a statement that he/she has not violated Chapter 12 and 13 of the Danish Penal Code (offences against the independence and safety of the state and offences against the constitution and the supreme authorities of the state – basically anti-terrorism measures). The inclusion of these chapters of the Danish Penal Code is recent. The law was amended in 2005 and basic conditions now include a minimum of nine years’ continuous residence on Danish soil, permanent residence permit, economic self-sufficiency in four out of five years, meaning that the applicant cannot have received social benefits from the state, no debts to public authorities, no criminal record (or subject to quarantine), fluency in Danish, demonstrated knowledge of Danish culture, history and social conditions (Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration, 2005). The latter is a multiple choice test consisting of 40 questions of which 28 has to be answered correctly in order to pass (Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration, 2007a). Citizenship tests have now been introduced in several countries, building on Dutch experiences. It can be read as a discourse of culturalism, in the sense that a specific national identity and national culture are seen as the core of citizenship compared to regarding citizenship as a political right.

The linkage between citizenship and integration becomes evident when the requirements for naturalisation are further scrutinised. One of the requirements for naturalisation is a permanent residence permit, which is granted according to many of the same criteria, including a so-called ‘exam of integration’. This consists of full-time employment for two years out of the seven years required before one can apply; completing an introduction programme in addition to a Danish language test. The seven year requirement may be lowered if the applicant has taken special steps towards integration, such as taking an education or being active in associational life. Failing the exam will both lead to a rejection of permanent residence permit and only entitle the immigrant to the lower social benefit; ‘start allowance’. People entering the country via family reunification will as a rule be supported solely by their spouse and will not be entitled to social benefits before passing the integration exam (Regeringen, 2006). Subsequently, integration is first and foremost a question of labour market integration, which is promoted by a combination of language skills and economic sanctions.

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5 The Penal Code can be found on the webpage of the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET), where it very conveniently is posted in Danish, English, and Arabic <http://www.pet.dk/English/Operational_tasks/Legal_basis/Penal_code.aspx>.

6 The start allowance is approximately 65 pct. of the normal welfare benefit.

7 The term "reunification" is not quite accurate as most spouses are brought to the country in connection with family formation rather than reunifications, but to keep things simple I stick to the term ‘reunification’ throughout the text.
Between 1995 and 2007, more than 60,000 foreigners successfully applied for naturalisation, with drops some years, most notably 2003, due to the aforementioned regulations in law after the present Liberal/Conservative Government took power in 2001.

Table 5.1 Number of naturalisations in the years 1995-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Naturalisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>9,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Udlændingestats, 2007: 33).8

The actual naturalisation rates (Table 5.1) obviously need to be discussed in its context. Restrictions in the citizenship law have a discursive context and are part of an ideological and political struggle, where naturalisation can be either encouraged or discouraged and furthermore will be framed in a particular understanding of which type of society the state and political power wish to uphold or strive towards. This discussion belongs to the horizontal axis of the citizenship model.

Political rights and institutions

Still with the inherent cultural content of Danish legislation, non-national citizens enjoy a large range of political and social rights due to the egalitarian and universalistic welfare state. Thus, in terms of access to education, health care, unemployment benefits, pension etc. foreigners with a permanent residence permit enjoy the same rights as Danish citizens, while people without such a status have reduced rights, especially in regards to social benefits. In terms of political rights, foreigners (over 18 years) are eligible to vote in local and regional elections after having resided three years legally in the country. The three year period does not apply to EU- and Nordic citizens. Only persons holding Danish citizenship may vote at parliamentary elections. The same criteria apply to the right to stand for election.

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8 The number for 2007/08 was released in April 2008 and confirms the declining rate of naturalisations as the total accounts to 2,114 persons (Ny i Danmark: Ugens tal, 21.04.2008).
The Danish election system has been extremely conducive to mobilising ethnic minorities, to a degree not seen in other European countries (cf. Chapter 1). The system has three major characteristics: one, it is a proportional system based on open and semi-open party lists; second, the selection of candidates from the party list is heavily influenced by the number of personal votes; and third, it is very transparent, which makes it easy to understand and use. Togeby has analysed the effects of this particular system over years (1999; 2004; 2008) and has made substantial findings that indirectly characterise the opportunity structure. She has shown that the impact of personal votes could get a candidate elected to the local council with as little as 0.1 pct. of the registered votes if the candidate stands for one of the large parties (Togeby, 2008). Her analysis also shows that ‘pure’ immigrant parties rarely, if ever, have any success. By standing on the list of a larger party several candidates with immigrant background have in Togeby’s terms ‘jumped the list’ by getting a much larger number of personal votes than candidates standing higher on the list, but only allocated their share of the votes for the party list itself (ibid.). The success lies in the ability to mobilise the support base to cast personal votes instead of votes only for the list.

The argument has then been that people with a specific ethnic background would be more inclined to vote for candidates with the same background. Some of the informants involved in party politics rejected this or said that personal skills and resources were the primary explanation. Nonetheless the mobilisation of the ethnic minorities does provide a strong explanation. I will get back to the effects and consequences of this arrangement in Chapter 8, but will argue that the exceptional impact only goes as far as local municipal elections where immigrants actually are overrepresented in a number of large cities with a high density of immigrants. Secondly, the success can also be explained as the failure to advance to elite positions in the society which opens the (only) door to ethnic political entrepreneurship (Necef, 2002).

Preventions of discrimination
The final sets of indicators related to the vertical axis of the citizenship model deal with the scope and implementation of anti-discrimination rights. Discrimination against immigrants takes various forms. One is the direct form of discrimination foreigners can meet when denied access to a night club or when people shout at them on the street. The other kind lies inert in the societal institutions and is not as visible as the former type but perhaps even more suppressive. The Danish state has taken steps against discrimination and differential treatment due to religion, ethnicity and race. The most fundamental of these rights are found in §70 and...
71 in the Constitution. In addition, various other laws have been implemented aiming at securing equal treatment in different spheres (Lov nr. 374 af 28. maj 2003; Lovbekendtgørelse nr. 31 af 12. januar 2005; Lovbekendtgørelse nr. 626 af 29. september 1987). The Criminal Code has a specific article granting protection against racism by making racist utterances and behaviour punishable by law (LBK nr 909 af 27/09/2005).

Denmark has signed and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) from 1950. Denmark has not signed Protocol No. 12 about discrimination, which entered into force April 1 2005, but neither have France, Poland, Sweden, and others. The UN Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) was passed by parliament in 1971 alongside the national Act on Racial Discrimination. The Act on the prohibition of Differential Treatment on the Labour Market was passed in 1995, which means that until 1996 no preventions against differential treatment in the labour market existed.

Measures against discrimination and racism also include different equality bodies. The Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights (DCISM) was established in 2003 replacing the former Danish Centre on Human Rights by demand of the government’s supporting party, the Danish People’s Party. The Documentation and Advisory Centre on Racial Discrimination (DCR) assists individual victims of racial or religious discrimination; it cannot take cases to court but only advise victims to seek free legal aid. The Complaints Committee for Ethnic Equal Treatment established under DCISM can also assist individuals who feel discriminated against. Often DCR will appoint a person to the committee. After receiving a complaint, the Complaints Committee can initiate independent investigations of differential treatment, publish reports and make recommendations, but neither can take cases to court. In conclusion, we must say that although different laws have been established, the control mechanisms for securing equity are not prioritised. Both DCR and especially the Complaints Committee lack substantial power to take cases to court and in that sense do not carry any more power than ordinary NGOs.

While national reports have shown that direct discrimination and racism are declining (e.g. Catinét, 2005), international reports such as the Eurobarometer demonstrate that 89 pct. of people belonging to minority groups in Denmark feel that they have less chance of obtaining a job or promotion than the rest of the population (Eurobarometer, 2003). Thus the problems relating to discrimination seem more to spring from structural discrimination, either di-

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9 The different equality bodies can be found at: <http://www.klagekomite.dk/?AFD=1>; <http://www.drcenter.dk/>; <http://www.dcism.dk/sw36942.asp>.

10 This argument has also been raised by international organisations such as ECRI and EUMC, but the government has refuted the accusations.
rect or indirect. The lack of power of the equality bodies illustrates that is not regarded as an important area by the government. The output in form of policy papers suggests likewise. The most recent integration plans deal only superficially with the topic. The only document focusing especially on this problem is *Handlingsplan til fremme af ligebehandling og mangfoldighed og til bekæmpelse af racisme* [Action plan to promote equal treatment and diversity and to fight racism] from 2003, covering a mere 26 pages and only in rather vague terms suggests political solutions and concrete actions. The plan incorporates the absolute minimum criteria for a national action plan suggested at the UN world conference against racism in Durban in 2001 where Denmark also participated. Another reason for the sparse content could be that the government itself comes close to indirect structural discrimination in its practice of integration and legislation. Political initiatives like the 300-hours rule and start allowance (also covering Danish citizens who have lived abroad more than seven out of eight years) in reality only affect ethnic minority groups, which thus cannot live on par with the majority. The Nationality Act, Integration Act and Alien’ Act restrict the ability of members of minority groups to acquire national citizenship and thus gain access to the same social protection as the rest of society.

A final example is the so-called 24-year rule for marriage implemented to prevent forced marriages and enhance the level of education and labour market position before marriage (the presumption and experience being that women with immigrant background leave the labour market when they marry young). Anyone wishing to bring in a spouse who is not an EU citizen or from the European Economic Area must meet a number of requirements. For example, if the person applying for spousal reunification has not been a Danish citizen for 28 years, his/her spouse’s must have stronger aggregate with Denmark than the applicant’s ties with his/her spouse’s country; the applicant must not have been on social welfare one year prior to the application; must provide a bank deposit of approximately 7,000€, which will be frozen if the applicant looses the job within the first seven years of spousal reunification.

Again this rule covers all citizens in the country but was directly targeted towards ethnic minority groups. Also this rule has faced a lot of criticism but on a political level it is regarded as a success, and other European countries, e.g. the Netherlands, are considering similar steps.\footnote{Quite paradoxically the government-funded DCR offers ‘solutions’ to people who are trapped in the system and who do not have the right to bring their spouse to Denmark. The solution is to move to Sweden or the Slesvig region in Germany. Moving to Sweden has been extremely popular, to a degree that the Øresund bridge has been nicknamed the ‘love bridge’. The Swedish authorities estimated that in 2004 more than 1,000 ‘Danish’ couples were living in Malmö as an effect of the 24-year rule.}
The actual instruments for preventing discrimination still have problems preventing discrimination. Investigations by journalists have demonstrated the presence of discrimination despite the existing legal framework for preventing such practices (Bonde Pedersen, 2001). Between 1993 and 2004 journalists on different occasions took up the same story and made phone calls to labour market agencies claiming to be employers needing labour force, but only interested in ‘Danès’. In 2004, 14 out of 23 of those asked were ready to dismiss persons from an ethnic minority background (Beskæftigelsesministeriets pressemeddelelser, 2004; see also: Ekstra Bladet, 08.12.99; 09.12.99; Dags Dato, 21.05.00). Minister of Labour at the time, Jytte Andersen, promised to deal with the problem in 1993, her successor Ove Hygum in 2000 and most recent Minister of Employment Claus Hjort Fredriksen in 2004. Yet the problem persists.\footnote{12 Other examples of discriminatory practices are found in the law enforcement authorities and the legal system. It has been shown that individuals with immigrant background have a higher risk of being arrested without cause; more often are held in custody without later sentencing; and more often are acquitted after having been charged (Holmberg & Kyvsgaard, 2003).}

No matter the existing legislation it is hard to imagine countries where discrimination does not occur (see for instance the comparative reports from RAXEN, 2005; ENAR, 2005; and EUMC, 2002 in general) and attention must be turned to the political responses and the political climate in the given national context. While for instance Sweden has discussed the problem of structural discrimination openly (without coming to definite political solutions) it is downplayed in the Danish political debate and more or less regarded as a theoretical possibility only. An illustration is the statement from Regeringens vision og strategi for bedre integration (Regeringen, 2003: 16):

\begin{quote}
The causes behind differential treatment can be many. Sometimes it might happen unknowingly – e.g. as a result of habitual thinking in the companies, when they seek new employees. Other times it is a sign of outspoken and direct hostility. A hostility that among other things might be caused by many years’ mistaken immigration- and integration policies but which nonetheless is unacceptable.
\end{quote}

There are no affirmative indications, on the contrary an exclusion of liability and denial of responsibility.

Subsequently, the Danish approach can be defined as a reluctant approach towards combating discrimination and racism rather than the pro-active approach towards implementing the existing legislation. Moreover the Danish approach to antidiscrimination is fused with a discourse of civic integration containing ideas of the type that the immigrants and ethnic minorities have not assumed responsibility for integrating and that the Danish state has been too generous and has not placed demands on the newcomers (Vasta, 2007b). If foreigners, \textit{i.e.} immigrants, indeed had become more like the Danes, the problems would not exist. Thus
Worley’s characterisation of the British model of integration as “a discourse of integration, within a framework of assimilation” also rings true in Denmark (Worley, 2005: 489).13

The cultural dimension of citizenship - from integration to social cohesion

The right to citizenship has been one of the core components in the so-called kulturkamp (‘cultural struggle’)14 that discusses how Denmark should develop (or remain) in the future. The backdrop for such discussions connects to the understanding of whether the country should be perceived as multicultural/multiethnic or not.

Although pluralism has never been a self-prescribed position for Denmark it is hard to refute that Denmark should not be a multiethnic society. In 1997, DPP proposed a general election to clarify whether Denmark should develop towards a multiethnic society (1997-1998, L58, see Klitgaard-Holm, 2007: 174-181). In 2008 the debate reappeared when the Minister of Education accepted teaching materials claiming that Denmark is a multiethnic country. The attempted damage control pursued by the Prime Minister was fascinating as he turned to the argument that ‘Denmark is part of a global world, the global world is multiethnic and in this context Denmark is surely multiethnic’. He avoided saying anything about the immediate context however.

This discussion not only belongs to the right-wingers, also many of the other parties rejected the idea of the multicultural society. As in other countries the preferred term is integration, e.g. the new Liberal/Conservative government established a Ministry for integration in 2001, removing the tasks from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Social Affairs. However, the definition and essentially the meaning of the term are less clear.

Multiculturalism elicits a need for equality and cultural recognition, but while diversity in recent years has been accepted and even presented as a resource it is paradoxically coupled with demands for cultural assimilation (Vasta, 2007a). Subsequently, there has been a shift

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13 The quotation was originally referred to by Vasta (2007a).
14 The cultural struggle has been defined and led by protagonists like Søren Krarup and Jesper Langballe (DPP) since the mid-90s but became part of the mainstream political discourse when the Liberal/Conservative government gained power in 2001 and perhaps already before. Søren Krarup and others saw this change of government as the turning point and the final defeat over the ideology of ‘kulturradikalisme’ (cultural radicalism) that had characterised Danish culture and political life since Georg Brandes thoughts from the 1870s to its revival in the 1930s. ‘Systemskiftet’ (change of system with a capital S) has been their chosen term for this change of power. The opposite of kulturradikalisme is a return to historical Danishness based on a thick notion of culture, which should be protected and preserved. It is not a discourse articulated only by the DPP but can be identified from the middle to the right along the political spectre and also the former government spoke of the need to impress Danish values on immigrants etc. As such it is not a unique Danish discourse but one that can be found in several other countries (although with different historical explanations and contributors). Recently the political debate has centred on the notion of ‘værdikamp’ (struggle of values), which seems to be the preferred notion of the present government and which is a perhaps slightly less culturalised discourse focusing on ‘Western’ ideals of democracy and freedom. Moreover it is no longer regarded only as a Danish struggle but as a global struggle where the main opponent is the fundamental Muslims.
away from multiculturalism to a demand for integration and in recent terms social cohesion in both policy and the public discourse. While the diversity and cultural differences of the immigrants should be respected it is the immigrants who have to adjust to Danish values, culture and way of life. These values are very general concepts as democracy, freedom, equity, and respect for human rights – basic values of liberal democracies. These are political values and not substantive ethical values but they are framed as something particularly Danish, e.g. in the New Year Address already mentioned. These ‘core values’ are rarely defined in any way but expressed in very abstract tropes as ‘diversity’, ‘responsibility’, and, ‘personal liberty’. In the strategy paper *Regeringens vision og strategi for bedre integration* [The Government’s vision and strategy for better integration] from 2003 these values are defined in the following way:

In the following, “values” will appear quite often. What is meant is the fundamental liberal-mindedness that originates from a respect for human beings and the individual person’s distinctive character. And furthermore our concept of democracy that holds much more meaning than majority rule […] These values must be learned by newly arrived foreigners, and it must be demanded that that the values are accepted (ibid: 4).

In the most recent agreement on integration *En ny chance til alle* [A new chance for everyone] from 2005 the values are somewhat elaborated with ‘the right to equity between genders’ and ‘the notion of the freedom of the individual human being’. Although diversity is acknowledged the idea of diversity is not framed in a multicultural setting where all cultural traditions and norms have equal worth. Instead diversity is framed within a hierarchically constructed culturalistic discourse, where the minority must adapt to and show respect for the culture of the majority:

The fundamental point of view is that foreigners arriving here to live must learn about us and our – often very different – viewpoints. And they must respect the society they are going to partake in. It is simply the basic condition for integration to succeed. But we who belong to the majority, as a matter of course must try to make an effort to understand other cultures and other ways of viewing life […] Tolerance and liberal-mindedness is not equal to indifference, but willingness to meet other cultures and other viewpoints with an open mind (ibid: 4).

However, there is a marked difference between demanding that foreigners *must* learn the majority society’s way of life, which is a normative demand, compared to mentioning that the majority should try to understand the cultural background of foreigners. Such statements lie closer to assimilation than to integration and even further from multiculturalism.

The keyword in recent years has been ‘social cohesion’ and derived from this the assertion that too much diversity will undermine social cohesion. As the ongoing discussion about free expression shows, dealing with cultural questions has become a question of drawing the

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15 Also this is a convergent trend across Europe, *e.g.* statements by former Home Secretary David Blunkett turning human rights into something particularly British (Yuval-Davies, 2006) or the in analysis of the policy changes in Netherlands (Vasta, 2007b).
limits for how much culture can be accepted. In such a discursive framework integration and cohesion point to an understanding of wanting to maintain a specific social order (by means of state-centred social control). There are numerous examples of this, e.g. “we must settle with inconsistency in all its forms”, “we should not apologize repressive family patterns by culture” and “the fundamental values on which the Danish society rests must be respected. The realisation of personal potential may not be set above these values. If these fundamental values are violated, society must act consistently and immediately” (Regeringen, 2005: 6). Thus, cultural differences are a crucial part of the discourse of integration on a discursive level. Cultural ‘luggage’ is most often regarded as limiting integration and serves as an explanatory power when evaluating the process of integration, e.g. “A still increasing part of the population is raised in cultural traditions and norms that differ from those that are prevailing in the Danish society” (ibid.).

Returning to the formal criteria for acquisition of citizenship, political citizenship is not regarded as a means for integration due to the aim of cultural homogeneity and cohesion, but rather as the crowning of affairs. Only when foreigners have become sufficiently Danish, by means of language, knowledge on Denmark, law-abiding, and socio-economic position, have shown a ‘will to integrate’ (in terms of acculturation) are people welcomed as Danish citizens. The former Minister of Integration Rikke Hvilshøj stated that:

Citizenship is only important for the colour of your passport and whether you can vote at the parliamentary election. In all other aspects one can be an active part of the Danish society, receive public services and vote at the municipal election. I only consider it fair that demands are made to those who wish to obtain Danish citizenship (Ugebrevet A4, 2005b).

Consequently, the political and cultural criteria for acquisition of citizenship are interrelated and cannot be separated as permanent residence is a condition for citizenship and cultural requirements are embedded in the integration exam, which again is a condition for receiving permanent residence and so on. Thus, answering whether Denmark is a multicultural society is not just a philosophical dispute but can also be investigated by looking at the concrete policies. The content of the integration contract, integration exam and the declaration of active co-citizenship are illustrative in this regard.16

The search for a ‘lead culture’ and defining what is ‘Danish’ has been an enduring challenge in the recent years. Some of these efforts have already been dealt with in the previous

sections, but I could add the creation of the cultural canon subdivided into national canons for literature, music, architecture, movies, stage arts etc., and recently a canon for sport results was added to the ongoing endeavours of defining Danish identity and successes.

The citizenship test recently introduced is loaded with thick cultural descriptions of Danishness and Danish culture. All people having applied for citizenship since December 12 2005 must pass the test, which is divided into 11 categories of questions (Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration, 2007). Some concern specific parts of the legislation, e.g. ‘rights and duties’, ‘the court system’, ‘tasks for the municipalities and regions’ while others have an explicit cultural content, e.g. ‘culture and traditions’. The questions reflect a very stereotypical picture of Danish society, with loads of questions going way back in history, e.g. questions on writers living in the 12th and 18th century or chosen means of transportation for the Vikings, others asking about Danish actors and moviemakers, but very few or none about Danish society under the influence of globalisation and international migration – all in all a very static image of Denmark.

The same goes for the integration tests, but the perhaps best example is the recently amendment of the Aliens Act and Act of active social policy and the agreement on future immigration with the integration exam, test in Danish and Danish society and culture, and immigration test as a condition for family reunification (Finansministeriet, 2006). The agreement was only enacted in April 2007 and some of the components are still being developed. The test is introduced and made compulsory in order to “strengthen the individual foreigner’s possibilities for successful and rapid integration in Denmark” (Press release from the Ministry of Integration 21.06.2007; see Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration, 2007b). It requires that the foreigner has obtained sufficient knowledge of Danish norms, values and fundamental rights. Children, refugees and citizens of EU and EEA need not take the test, but all other groups do. Also ‘religious preachers’ who have a special status in Danish rules are subjected to the test. Indeed the press release stresses that: “All other foreigners no matter educational background and despite arriving from Western countries whose culture is closely related to the Danish society or coming from countries that differ significant, must be able to prepare for and complete the test” (ibid.).

While targeted selection is a clear-cut economic goal as stressed in the agreement text: “The foreigner policy should concurrently contribute to the goal that Denmark is better positioned in the competition of highly skilled international labour forces” (Finansministeriet, 2006: 97; see also Regeringen, 2007), the cultural dimension and preservation of national cohesion is the other goal. The test is completed by watching a movie and answering 100 ques-
tions. In addition to this the applicant must complete a test in Danish demanding that he/she can read easy understandable texts and make everyday conversation. The applicant has to obtain these skills by her/his own means in the home country and take the test at a Danish representation abroad. However, students at language schools in Denmark normally use about 250 hours in the guidance of a teacher to be able to pass this level and it is easy to imagine the difficulties of even obtaining material for preparing such a test given the countries most applicants traditionally come from. The estimated fee of the test is 350€, but this is not decided yet.

Returning to the discussion on cultural requirements for citizenship, the recent political initiatives point towards a culturally more exclusivist system of incorporation where the main opponent is the Islamic world and Muslim culture (due to 9/11, the caricature crisis, involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, etc.). Many of the initiatives seem to span broadly but the groups most affected are without any doubt people from the Muslim world. The restrictions for religious preachers, for instance, is the culmination of an ongoing political dispute whether Denmark should accept Mullahs coming in from the Middle East and incite religious hatred etc. as it has been claimed. The reassertion of so-called core values is seen as necessary to uphold social cohesion, which is otherwise threatened. Movie projects and tests as mentioned above belong in a frame of assimilation, where the premise is that if a person wants to live in Denmark he/she must integrate in the directed way and understand that: “Denmark has many possibilities, if one is prepared to make an effort and take responsibility for ones life in Denmark” (Press release from the Ministry of Integration, 21.06.2007).

The analysis and discussion show that religious minorities on the one hand enjoy quite substantial rights, which can be taken as indicators of accommodation of diversity and signs of a multicultural incorporation approach, but simultaneously there is a reluctance and direct opposition towards giving diversity too much room.

The same movement away from multicultural policies can be detected in language policies. Before 2002 it was compulsory for the municipalities to offer mother tongue education if a specific number of bilingual speakers lived in a municipality, but with the fiscal agreement in 2002 the demand was removed and it is now voluntarily for municipalities (with some exceptions for EU/EEA countries). The majority of experts in the field and linguists all have argued for the benefit of such education when learning other languages, in this case Danish, as has the government’s own think tank on integration, which makes the removal seem like an
ideological decision rather than for the learning benefit of the children. After the change was introduced, only four municipalities now offer mother tongue education free of cost, and five others do so by user charge.

**Structures to accommodate religious rights**

Turning attention more specifically to religious rights, religious minority groups in Denmark actually have substantial rights in regards to religious practice. Halal and kosher butchering for Muslims and Jews have been allowed since 1808. The citizens’ religious affiliation has not been registered since 1921, which indirectly points to a substantial freedom of religion. However, although the right to choose one’s own religion is equal for all the rights of religious systems are not equal. The Lutheran Christian Church has a special status in Denmark as the official State Church; furthermore the head of state must belong to the church (The Danish Constitution §4, §6).

Other belief systems can seek to become ‘officially recognised belief systems’, which involves the right to marry and tax deduction among other things, but so far the only non-Christian belief system granted this status is the Mosaic belief system in Denmark. The reason is not direct discrimination but that the applicant belief system must conform to specific criteria involving a hierarchical structure etc. This has created problems for many denominations, e.g. Muslims and Hindus, who could not meet such criteria. In 1999 the Ministry of Church Affairs made a new set of guidelines making it possible to apply for special status as recognised belief system with a limited set of rights, but among these the right to perform marriages and create burial grounds. Both the Muslim and Hindu religions have now acquired this status.

**Minority participation and programmes of affirmative actions**

The last indicators of citizenship investigate the inclusion of immigrants on a collective level and affirmative actions.

Before I look at the inclusion of advisory bodies and the like I will turn to the general framework for participation on a collective level and the political intention behind this. The government repeatedly asserts that immigrants should participate in the societal institutions (e.g. school boards, sports club and associations in general) as well establish ‘their own’ organisations (Regeringens ministerudvalg vedrørende integration og utilpassede unge, 2000). The government regards integration as participating on equal footing in all aspects of society.

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17 DPP recently even suggested prohibiting the use of mother tongue in the private sphere in families where both parents were non-Danish speakers (Politiken 12.08.07). No other parties supported this proposal, which would have been an extreme encroachment on the personal freedom and a very illiberal means to secure liberal values.
This is also pointed out in the application scheme for permanent residence permit and the declaration on active citizenship from 2006 where partaking in organisational life is one of the factors that can reduce the number of years needed in the country to obtain permanent residence. Pursuing integration by civic participation has also been prioritised in the funds available for integration enhancing projects in 2007.

The question I will discuss later on is how the structures have affected collective organising processes and immigrant identity construction, but here I initially look at the formal channels. In relation to this I will argue that there has been a strong focus on individual inclusion as the Danish state has never encouraged immigrants to organise along ethnic or religious lines, which is perhaps best illustrated by the Dutch system of pillarization. Nor is there any juridical and political allowance for minority rights based on a minority status. This provides a strong explanation of the organising processes taking place. While many immigrant organisations take the name of the home country, we do not find collective national associations (as is the case in Sweden for instance). While there is a strong tradition for corporation across organisations, strong umbrella organisations are absent and the state has not encouraged immigrants to pursue such. Lately, however, the government has tried to push democratic-minded Muslims to raise their voice collectively and has invited specific Muslim organisations and spokespersons to talks about integration and religious radicalism. In general, the government and relevant ministries have a weak tradition for including immigrant organisations in decision making processes. Since 1998 this has solely been done in the forum of Rådet for etniske minoriteter (REM) [Council for ethnic minorities] and on the odd occasions when the Prime Minister has invited selected persons to a ‘summit’ or at the yearly ‘Integration day’ hosted by the Ministry of Integration.

The Danish state has a wide ranging system for supporting voluntarily organisations (e.g. the PUF fund, the Danish Youth Council (DUF), the 10 pct. fund, the education fund and the initiative support – directed by different public institutions18) of which two types are central, namely the §18-funding administrated by the local authorities (but allocated from the Ministry of Welfare) to start up and run organisations on a daily basis supporting costs for rent etc. (L 38).19 Minimum criteria of 50 members and existence for one year plus must be

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18 <http://social.dk/ministeriets_omraader/det-frivillige danmark/projekter_og_projektstoette.html>. The new Welfare Ministry was established after the election in 2007 and takes over the responsibility of voluntary work from the Ministry of Social Affairs.

19 The law was revised in 2005 and the paragraph regarding subsidisation of organisations was changed from §115 to §18 (see also Socialministeriet, 2006).
fulfilled. Most of the long-running ethno-national organisations studied in this dissertation were supported while the recently established diversity organisations were not.

The other important funding possibility is the funds controlled by the Ministry of Integration. These funds are exclusively reserved for projects dealing with integration, subdivided into seven groups that all in all had 162 million DKK (21.5 million €) for allocation in 2007. At the same time the government cut back funding for NGOs working with ethnic equality and antidiscrimination more broadly. Focus seems especially to be on projects that can guide the immigrants into the labour market.20

Both types of funding require a high degree of professionalism and a specific organisational structure. Mikkelsen writes in his study of Danish immigrant organisations that 94 pct. had set up an executive board, and 95 pct. had regulations although half of the organisations had less than 100 members (Mikkelsen, 2003a: 124). The demands of professionalism have created a situation where immigrant organisations, Danish organisations and labour market institutions, labour unions and political institutions compete for the same funds.21 Very few of the immigrant organisations have any funds for salary, which makes it a difficult and demanding task to go through the application process and afterwards evaluation process. Looking more specifically at the recipients of funding from 2006, very few immigrant organisations were among these, the majority of recipients being municipal organisations, Danish NGOs, employment agencies, and private consulting firms (Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration, 2006). The ethnic applicants granted money are for the most part well-recognised actors in the field, the point being that is easier to get an application through once you are known by the system.

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21 An example is the latest guidelines for applying for funding from the Danish Ministry of Integration. The criteria in applying for funds from the ‘Integration pool’ are: (a) that the project is realisable, that the underlying strategy is clearly described and supported by the co-financing part, (b) that the project brings in new ideas, (c) that it is assessed that the expected results will have a general applicability, (d) that there is co-financing partner/institution and (e), that the project is targeted towards a larger group. Further it is stated that the application must set up clear and measurable criteria of success and that both the project and the evaluation measures for success criteria are elaborated in the application. The webpage links to a document in Danish only, entitled Effektmåling i Integrationsministeriets puljestyring [Effect Evaluation in The Ministry of Integration’s Pool Governance] that discusses different approaches to organisational and management theory as well as effect measurements, path dependencies etc. It is highly doubtful that non-skilled or even educated persons will be able to fulfil such criteria or as a minimum will require the involvement of skilled professionals in designing the application, which, at least this is my claim, could lead to an even higher distribution of funds to Danish NGOs on behalf of local initiatives taken by the immigrant organisations themselves. <http://www.nyidanmark.dk/dadk/Integration/puljer/puljebeskrivelser/styrkelse_af_integrationsindsatsen.htm>; <http://www.nyidanmark.dk/resources.ashx/Resources/Publikationer/Vejledninger/2007/effekt_vejledning.pdf>.
Programmes of affirmative action are a tool for including socio-politically marginalised groups in majority society. Such policies have not gained ground in Danish legislation in any formal sense although it has been discussed politically. According to the political objectives from the entire political spectrum, the percentage of jobs in the public sphere should equal the percentage of ‘foreigners’ residing in the country. Consequently, job adverts often encourage applicants of non-Danish ethnic background to apply for the job, but this is no different from the approach to disabled and gender representation. Affirmative action contradicts the egalitarian perspective, which lies inert in the Danish welfares state, and this could be the reason such programmes are not pursued proactively. Despite the good intentions of equity, the reality is that ethnic minority groups are less represented within both the public sphere and in the political administration.

**Political incorporation - the integration councils**

The Integration Act from 1998 introduced establishment of integration councils, which as the name indicates are consultative bodies between the state/municipalities and the immigrant communities. These are councils located in the municipality, and at first they were mandatory but since 2004 it is optional for the municipality to establish integration council. Almost 70 pct. of the integration councils are funded by the city council. The Danish state implemented a structural reform January 1 2007 merging smaller municipalities, but prior to this only 63 out of 271 municipalities had established such councils. After the reform 48 out of 98 municipalities either have a council or are in the process of establishing one (REM, 2006a). 22 municipalities held direct elections for councils, but most municipalities have appointed the members themselves or have asked the local immigrant organisations to appoint members or have simply picked members themselves (ibid.).

There is a sort of paradox in the composition of these councils as many municipalities have sought to fill the seats along ethnic lines, probably to make sure that the different ethnic groups were equally represented, instead of opening the seats for persons interested in minority issues and with possible experience within the field. The result is that most councils have a poor attendance rate as a large share of members do not show up, which has led critics to state that the councils in reality lack substantial influence. However, the municipalities do not carry

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22 The municipality is obliged to offer administrative services to the integration council. The Integration Act from 1999 contains in § 42 the decision to initiate these councils. If more than 50 persons above the age of 18 request so the Board of the municipality is obliged to form the council, or the municipality can do it of its own will. The local councils elect representatives to the national Council for Ethnic Minorities in connection with local elections. Members of the councils of integration need not have immigrant background, but electives for the national council do.
the blame entirely, because no matter the method of representation chosen, the result is a rather low percentage of votes for the councils (REM, 2006c).

Regarding representation, 266 out 517 members of 40 councils had an ethnic minority background, which obviously raises a question of representation of minority groups in issues of minority politics. However, again it can be argued that it is the skills, resources and interest that are important rather than ethnic heritage.

It is up to the individual municipality to decide if the local council should be given a formal right of consultation. An evaluation from 2004 shows that only half of the councils had a formal right of consultation or other formal competences (REM, 2004). However, even when given such a right it may not lead anywhere. In a Handbook for Integration Councils the council writes that: “It is a definitive fact with a formal right of consultation that it cannot be mistaken for substantial basis for decision. One thing is that the integration council achieves the right to be heard, another thing is whether the council’s suggestion is taken into account” (REM, 2006b: 20). It is doubtful that their influence will increase in the near future though. When faced with this criticism, now former Minister of Integration Rikke Hvilshøj replied: “With the establishment of the integration councils, they [the ethnic minorities] have been given a platform, and the next step is that they themselves come up with specific proposals and are able to demonstrate that they want to realise them” (quoted from REM, 2006a: 22).

However, actual influence on the decision making processes need not be the only goal; as the council stresses it basically has to do with legitimation. If the minorities (and citizens in general) are not included in the process they most often will not like the outcome a member is quoted for saying. Obviously, we can question the power of the council then and whether it is a bad or good institution, but it should also be acknowledged as a political right and opportunity structure beyond what other types of minorities can expect.

The local integration councils elect a member to the committee of representatives which is the institution responsible for electing the members for the national council of ethnic minorities. The national Council for ethnic minorities (REM) consists of 14 members. REM has gained a formal right to be heard on issues pertaining to ethnic minorities and responded to 13 public hearings in 2006 (REM, 2006d). Nonetheless it is very hard to judge the council’s degree of influence on political decision making. At best it seems to be minimal, but it serves other purposes with more success. REM was granted a substantial amount of money in 2007 for year long projects on voluntarily work and diversity and to host a number of conferences. Much of the efforts still relate to creating a higher visibility for the council, which in the long term could have beneficial effects for their political influence as well. In 2006 the council
managed to set up regular meetings with the Minister of Integration, where REM sets the agenda and has its say on various issues. Besides internal activities and cooperation with the Ministry of Integration, members of REM have positions in 22 different committees and working task groups (REM, 2006a).

The Danish state has a long tradition of involving citizens via organisations and associations, which normally is described as corporatism (Schmitter, 1974; see also Lindvall & Sebring, 2005). The incorporation of immigrants at the collective level points towards the same tradition and as already claimed places ethnic minorities in a better position than many other minority groups without special institutions to speak their cause. That said, the actual influence on the political decision making seems to be rather minimal, and there seems to be two explanations: one being that we are simply dealing with bad institutions that still can be improved or, secondly, that the state has no wish to give the immigrant minority group more influence beyond advisory council (Hammer & Bruun, 2000; Togeby, 2003: 148-154).

**Welfare state arrangements revisited**

Although Denmark and Sweden more or less adhere to the same type of welfare model, some studies see Denmark a ‘worst case’ when looking at the results from the impact of immigration on welfare state support (Goul Andersen, 2006). Goul Andersen points to four reasons: the first is found in the Scandinavian welfare model itself, where “social rights are based mainly on citizenship/residence rather than on contribution. To a (somewhat) larger degree, and more visibly than in other welfare states, this leaves the responsibility for social security with the taxpayers” (ibid: 2). Secondly, immigrants have not been very successful on the Danish labour market – and somewhat less than in most other European welfare states. Thirdly, Denmark has as mentioned been an ethnically extremely homogeneous country; and fourthly it has experienced an unusually strong political mobilisation on the issue of immigration and ethnic conflict since the 1980s.

Welfare policies are entangled with integration and immigration policies. In a sentence I would say that the Danish approach increasingly is integration as providing *access* to the welfare state and full social benefits rather than integration through the welfare system. The Danish welfare system definitely is managed in way that makes it difficult to get out once you become dependent on it, due to high social benefits compared to the earnings from a low-

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23 Schmitter defines corporatism as: “a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports” (Schmitter, 1974: 93).
skilled job. The recent sanctions and cut-backs are launched to prevent newcomers from ending up in this situation and to turn around the situation for those already in the system, the start allowance being one example.

This raises some concerns in regards to integration and citizenship. From a normative perspective, increasing access to the labour market is without doubt beneficiary for both the immigrant and the state, however the aggressive neoliberal approach can also damage social integration, as suggested by Hamburger’s model of integration (cf. Chapter 2), and indirectly increase marginalisation. In a citizenship perspective such welfare preventions also disturb the access to citizenship via naturalisation, as having received social benefits closes access to citizenship. In this way welfare policy interferes with integration and citizenship policies. Due to the economic boom, the much talked about crisis of the welfare state, has not affected Denmark in the same way as some other countries. Although immigrants and descendants have a lower rate of labour market participation, the gap is diminishing (differently for different groups), so the basis for the universalist welfare state is to a large degree sustained. Nonetheless the Danish approach is moving toward a two-tier welfare state system.

Another key feature of the Danish welfare model has been the focus on education and improvement of skills (life-long learning etc.). The high tax level makes it possible to offer ‘free’ education for everybody. Education has traditionally been regarded as an instrument to secure equality and minimise the gaps between social classes. The educational level is increasing for especially female descendants (although with large variation among groups and genders) and in the very recent years the focus on education is tied up with an aim of acknowledging diversity, with different strategies targeted at potential employers, but even more so towards the ethnic groups, fellow peers and kin, e.g. in different versions of ‘role models’. Diversity is not just ‘embraced’ though, and increasingly cultural issues enter the welfare policies also. Examples being the mentioned discussion of whether women wearing the hijab or burka should receive social benefits or not (cf. Chapter 3), but also far more hypothetical discussions on special needs for prayer rooms, Ramadan vacations etc. are discussed within a welfare frame on who is eligible for support and not. In conclusion, I will claim the welfare policies have an impact also on citizenship rights and that the tendency in

24 <http://www.rollemodeller.dk/> and <http://www.brugforalleunge.dk/bfau/>. See also the campaign Arbejdspelads til nye danskere [Jobs for new Danes]. It is a campaign based on an affirmative action programme improving human resources among immigrants, which then makes them more interesting for the involved employers by offering language courses and apprenticeships <http://www.nyidanmark.dk/dk/Integration/beskaeftigelse/arbejdspels_til_nye_danskere/>.
Denmark is somewhat convergent to the tendency in Europe where we find an “attenuation or demise of established social rights” (Schierup et al., 2006: 249).

**The Danish case – a self-contradictory ethnic model of civic integration?**

Based on the previous analysis I will characterise the Danish incorporation system as a system that in recent years has been rather generous and has provided formal political, social, and civic rights alongside an actual demand and expectation of acculturation and indirectly assimilation. Immigrants have been able to express themselves within in a framework accepting diversity and special needs in the sense that no actions or preventions have been taken against such demands. The municipalities, city councils and more generally public institutions had been left the task of defining the limits themselves. But somewhat new winds have been blowing not just in Denmark but across Europe and both the legislation, integration approaches and the public discourse are moving away from the framework of multiculturalism whether it existed on an informal level, as in Denmark, or a formalised, as in the Netherlands.

Whereas the Danish approach earlier stressed integration, humanitarianism and tolerance key concepts are now core values and social cohesion enacted in a framework coupling assimilation with obviously cultural but also economical concerns. Of course the proclaimed novelty should not be exaggerated. The approach is still defined by the state as integration, but while integration *can* mean a two-way process of adaptation involving changes for both the newcomers and the members of the majority society, the Danish approach has laid the path for a one-way process through which immigrants become part of the receiving society by accommodating to the prescribed way of life. This is a convergent trend in Europe, very often involving intense focus on language acquisition and integration courses and in general a targeted selection of who gains access. There is an inherent self-contradiction in this approach, as the so-called core values that secure social – and what follows from this national – cohesion (Worley, 2005), all located within Rawlsian political liberalism, are pursued by illiberal means. Discursive changes have a social context and the backdrop behind these very recent changes can be located in various settings. The ‘clash of civilisation’ discourse and real or perceived threat from Muslim terrorism certainly play its part. As does the ongoing discussions on the future and possible shrinking of the welfare state. Is it possible to maintain a universalist egalitarian system of redistribution today?

Finally a discourse of globalisation, competitiveness and economy has been fused with expectations of integration. Europe is in dire need of highly skilled labour due to the combina-
tion of dropping fertility rates and increased global competition. Summarising this reconfigura-
tion within the framework of Danish policies, I will point to a discourse consisting of four central themes (see also Bak Jørgensen, 2006):

I. The immigrants already present in the country must be integrated before new im-
migrants can arrive

II. Self-sufficiency and autonomy (i.e. employment) is the path to and definition of integration. Working is not just a means for income but holds an intrinsic value in itself

III. A shift of burden of adjustment towards the individual immigrant. A focus on ob-
ligation and de-emphasis on rights

IV. Consensus on the core values of society

The first theme is partly based on economy, claiming that the present problems are caused by a failed integration policy earlier that has created a situation that must be corrected before new immigrants can enter the country. The former approach has been too lenient it is claimed. Re-
cent years’ restrictions are based on this rationale. The government describes its approach as a “fair and firm foreigners policy [that has] created the basis for a successful integration effort” (Regeringen, 2005: 5). However, even though it may be as Entzinger claims that public in-
vestments in integration will be accepted more readily in times of prosperity (cf. Chapter 2), the fact the Danish economy has reached a rarely seen level of growth and a historically low level of unemployment, indicates that the many new restrictions do not exclusively have to do with economy. Hence, this theme also has a cultural part that repeats that too much diversity will endanger social cohesion and therefore access should be restricted to those who really want to be like us.

The second theme is related to the first in the sense that it places responsibility on the previous government, which was unable to include immigrants on the labour market, but on the contrary created a ‘passive dependency culture’. The start allowance and related initiatives all must be seen in this perspective as instruments to alter such a mentality. Thus the focus for the integration approach is labour market integration while less emphasis and priority are given to political and civic integration. Also very little attention, bordering to none at all, has been given to non-self-inflicted explanations like structural discrimination or other types of barriers on the labour market.

The third theme also connects to the previous two themes. As demonstrated in the analysis the responsibility has been placed on the immigrant, who must ‘show a will to integ-
ration’ in order to receive the same benefits as others. An initiative like the integration con-
tracts is illustrative of this reorientation. Integration programmes are delivered with an em-
phasis on compulsion accompanied by the threat of sanctions to eradicate what the government terms ‘clientelisation’. The new focus resembles the workfare discourse that became prominent from the mid-1990s and onwards, and in the Danish case the fusion between the two ideologies finds its strongest expression in the government programme from 2004 entitled Noget for noget [Quid pro quo]. The document emphasises the principle that extra efforts should be rewarded and oppositely that a lack of effort will be punished:

*With rights follows duties*

The employment policies are an example of an area where the principle of “something for something” already partly has been implemented in the form of rights and duties, but where there still is a need for new incentives if we want to reach a situation where it pays to work. This also goes for the area of integration. The far too many immigrants who do not get an education need more offers and barriers should be removed. But as a consequence the flow of money as the social benefits offer should be stopped immediately the second such offers are rejected or neglected (Regeringsaf- tale, 2004: 6).

It is liberal rhetoric at its most basic but here conflated with a welfare discourse. The main task of the state is paradoxically, to quote Joppke, “to make migrants independent of the state” (Joppke, 2007: 4). The main tendency has been not to reward but to sanction, and ‘the extra effort’ has become a norm rather than the unexpected. Fundamental indicators of citizenship have thus become part of this *quid pro quo* logic, which has led to the increased demands for employment, a clean criminal record and so on (see above). The emphasis on sanctions can have severe effects and easily lead to a negative circle where unemployment is interpreted as the lack of will to integrate, which can lead to a reduction in social benefits, which again can lead to social marginalisation.

The fourth theme is the grid of the overall discussion and indicates that integration should lead to a specific form of national identity. An identity which in the age of globalisation stresses homogenisation as well as the Western form of liberalism and the need to reassert the core values of society. These values are political values and not ethical values, which from a critical perspective forced newcomers through a repressive form of liberalism (Joppke, 2007). Next I will look at the Swedish case.
Chapter 6
The case of Sweden - from assimilation to multiculturalism to antidiscrimination to ...?

Immigration to Sweden
Sweden has a population of approximately nine million people. Out of these roughly one million are born outside the country, and an additional 800,000 can be classified as descendants. All in all these groups represent 17.4 pct. of the total population with one third being from the Nordic and (West) European countries (Statistiska centralbyrån, 2008). Until the 1930s Sweden was a country of emigration. More than 1.2 million Swedes migrated mainly to America but also to other countries. The combination of a liberal market economy and state-run welfare state generated the need for recruitment of a foreign labour force to secure the tax base required to sustain this system.

Until 1960s most immigrants came from the Nordic countries but in the early 1970s a large group of Yugoslavians (approximately 60,000) and Greeks (20,000) entered the country as work migrants. Sweden did not set up the same type of guest worker scheme like for instance Germany, instead corporation was managed in corporation with the LO (The Swedish Trade Union Confederation) and the foreign workers were ensured the same wage levels and rights as native Swedes, including access to unemployment benefits (Spång, 2007; Westin, 2006). Hence, the unions did not opt for the protection of domestic workers. This is different from Denmark and Germany as Sweden conceived the work migrants as future citizens.

The economic recession also affected Swedish economy and led the government to stop labour migration from non-Nordic countries in 1972. However, already in 1965 had the government initiated a survey to find out how to inform immigrants about the Swedish society. This led to the creation of the Swedish Board of Immigration in 1969, which introduced so-called ‘regulated immigration’. As a result, fewer and fewer work migrants entered the country even before the stop. Sweden is one out of only three EU countries not to require special work permits for members of the new accession countries; however, the trade unions’ efforts to prevent cheap labour as in UK alongside few open job opportunities within building and construction, have in reality meant that very few migrants have come from these countries.

Looking back people also arrived via family reunification and even more so as refugees. Sweden has a long history of accepting refugees beginning with the thousands of people coming from both the neighbouring and the Baltic countries during and immediately after the Second World War. These were followed by refugees from the Communistic regimes in
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and even later on from Yugoslavia. In the early 1970s the main groups were Kurds, Assyrians and Syrians, and in the 1980s and onwards from Iraqis and Iranians (Benito, 2005). Sweden is known for accepting a large number of asylum seekers and has up until recently rejected rather few compared to other West European countries. Table 6.1 from Migrationsverket illustrates this:

Table 6.1 Number of asylum seekers to selected European countries 2002-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>18 768</td>
<td>16 940</td>
<td>15 357</td>
<td>15 957</td>
<td>11 587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5 947</td>
<td>4 593</td>
<td>3 222</td>
<td>2 260</td>
<td>1 918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3 443</td>
<td>3 221</td>
<td>3 861</td>
<td>3 574</td>
<td>2 288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>51 004</td>
<td>61 993</td>
<td>65 614</td>
<td>59 221</td>
<td>39 315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>11 634</td>
<td>7 900</td>
<td>4 766</td>
<td>4 323</td>
<td>4 315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>18 667</td>
<td>13 402</td>
<td>9 782</td>
<td>12 347</td>
<td>14 465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>17 480</td>
<td>15 613</td>
<td>7 945</td>
<td>5 401</td>
<td>5 320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>26 125</td>
<td>21 037</td>
<td>14 248</td>
<td>10 061</td>
<td>10 537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6 179</td>
<td>5 918</td>
<td>5 398</td>
<td>5 049</td>
<td>5 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>109 548</td>
<td>61 051</td>
<td>40 202</td>
<td>30 841</td>
<td>27 849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>33 016</td>
<td>31 355</td>
<td>23 161</td>
<td>17 530</td>
<td>24 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>71 127</td>
<td>50 563</td>
<td>35 607</td>
<td>28 914</td>
<td>21 029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>36 983</td>
<td>32 676</td>
<td>24 676</td>
<td>22 471</td>
<td>13 350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.migrationsverket.se/ For a longer time perspective see http://www.migrationsverket.se/pdffiler/statistik/tabs2.pdf

As the table shows, Sweden has despite its size received a large number of asylum seekers compared to other countries. Especially refugees from Iraq have turned to Sweden, who has accepted most. According to estimates, Sweden has taken half of the total number of refugees leaving Iraq for Europe since the US led invasion in 2003 and is now home to between 80,000 and 120,000 Iraqis alone (EUbusiness, 16.10.07). Recently Sweden has become less generous towards granting asylum seekers the official refugee status, particularly after joining the European Schengen cooperation in 2001 (Schierup et al., 2006; Statistiska centralbyrån, 2008). Like in Denmark, the government has been criticized for not providing asylum seekers, especially children, with the necessary protection and having people wait for years for an outcome of their application.

A special note on the Turkish minority in Sweden: Besides being the least voluminous both numerically and proportionally among the three countries, the internal differentiation within the minority also differs a bit from the population in Denmark and Germany. Of the approximately 35,000 Turks (in a broader sense) only 11,000 are estimated to be ethnic Turks while the rest are either of Kurdish or Assyrian descent. As the latter groups mainly arrived as
refugees it obviously creates another situation, the questions is rather in what sense? I will get back to this in the following chapters.

**Swedish immigration- and integration policies - the political and discursive setting**

The Swedish integration regime has been hailed as a role model for the world in the sense that it has undertaken the challenging task of combining a universal welfare state with a multiculturalist framework. What this means within institutional reality I will look into next.

Up until 1975 Sweden did not have an official policy of incorporating immigrants, it was simply taken for granted that the newcomers would assimilate into Swedish society. Overall the Swedish model consists of four principles. It comprises a (1) corporatist policy making style with (2) a social democratic universal welfare model; It insists on (3) making diversity (formerly multiculturalism) the basis for policy making and (4) its, for Europe unique, ‘political compact committed to combating racialised exclusion’ realised in a flexible and manifestly antiracist integration policy (Schierup et al., 2006: 196; Soininen, 1999).

It is deeply embedded in the social democratic welfare thinking; is not a static model, but was developed and revised over the last 35 years and although it incorporated neoliberal elements early on, compared to the Danish regime, it still struggles with a number of ambiguities, especially with issues of groups and culture. While the system and individual politicians can speak in favour of cultural diversity, they can also be “completely censorious when it comes to group-thinking” (Brekke & Borchgrevink, 2007: 77). Exactly the struggle to get beyond ‘us and them thinking’ has been the effort in Swedish integration policy in recent years.

The targeted immigration and minority policy was introduced in 1975 after a parliamentary inquiry in 1974 (SOU 1974:69). The policy introduced was condensed into three principles of equality, freedom of choice, and partnership. *Equality* meant that immigrants residing in Sweden should enjoy the same rights as Swedish citizens, including access to the welfare system, and in general minimising the difference between native Swedes and immigrants. *Freedom of choice* meant that people should decide for themselves whether they wanted to assimilate or maintain their native culture, which in that case should be supported although immigrants should agree on essential Swedish values and norms. *Partnership* meant that access to participation should be eased and participation promoted for instance by granting voting rights in municipal and regional elections and by easing naturalisation. Thus, an aim of social equality has informed the formation of the welfare state and been extended to encom-
pass immigrants also. The goal of equality has been central to all later revisions of the immigration and integration policies later on.

Subsequently when looking at the Swedish model in a POS perspective it theoretically ought to have provided good opportunities for immigrant minorities to exercise corporatist influence through organisations on the political agenda. This is not mistaken but it also must be acknowledged that this particularly Swedish way of handling conflict has made it difficult for non-recognised actors, individual and grass-root groups to enter the negotiating arena. The aforementioned principles or political goals have been implemented with the same instruments and policies that incorporated the natives into *folkhemmet*, incorporation through the welfare state (Odmalm, 2004). Obviously a model drafted in the middle of the last century, which had its peak in the 1970s, has faced problems incorporating much more (culturally) diverse groups as well as social transformation. Opportunities for political participation have been limited to mainstream political parties based on class politics. Within this system the individual first and foremost has political rights as a member of a group, which again is part of a corporatist and centralised system of channels for influencing the political decision making processes (Soininen, 1999). With these initial remarks I will continue to the next phase of policies initiated with the proposition *Sweden, Future and Diversity – from politics of immigration to politics of integration* (Proposition 1997/98:16).

The discursive shift from a policy of immigration to a policy of integration came as a result of a long debate where it was claimed that the category of immigrants was too encompassing and upheld a division between us and them. Secondly the notion of diversity was taken as the backdrop for the development of a new Sweden. The development was to follow the trajectory from the 1980s that initiated a gradual dismantling of culture (or cultural rights) stressing that customs that conflict with Swedish law could not be accepted, nor could customs or norms that deviated radically from basic Swedish socialisation and core values (Proposition 1985/86:98).¹

Perhaps just as importantly, a tough economic recession, a collapse of the monetary system in the early 1990s, plant relocations and labour-saving reorganisations in the industry produced a scope of unemployment unseen since the 1930s that also spilled over into the public sector (Schierup et al., 2006). Together with one of the field-specific characteristics of the Swedish labour market, the job security regulation implying that those hired latest were let go first. These changes naturally affected immigrants (with lower seniority) worse than other

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¹ In reality this meant that the recognition of cultural differences was confined to language and culture (as aesthetics) in a more traditional sense (Soininen, 1999).
groups. Thirdly, increasing attention to ethnic discrimination entered the agenda. While particular arrangements like the aforementioned can explain why immigrants were affected more severely than native Swedes, other inquiries suggested that also descendants of immigrants were worse off in regards to labour market participation, which could indicate problems with discrimination.

These intertwined factors and attitudes provide the backdrop for the next phase of Swedish policy. The proposition from 1997/1998 encompasses different political and economic solutions to the increasing marginalisation or just general weaker position in society by going from an immigration policy to an integration policy. It is important to stress that integration in the Swedish (or more precisely social democratic) conceptualisation is a two-way process where both the immigrant group and the majority society have to adjust, hence the idea of a new Sweden resting on diversity and the new integration policy as a policy for all of Sweden etc. This mainstreaming effort indicates a very important shift from group-based to individual-based initiatives. The overall perspective for the new policies initiated in 1997 is a citizenship-based perspective, which stresses equality, pluralism and tolerance with equal rights, obligations and possibilities for all citizens regardless of ethnic and cultural background (Proposition, 1997/1998:16: 1):

The aim of the integration process should be equal rights and possibilities for all no matter ethnic or cultural background, a societal community based on pluralism and diversity and a societal development characterised by mutual respect and tolerance which all regardless of background shall participate in and are responsible for.

With the proposition two new institutions, Integrationsverket (the Board of Integration) dealing with all issues of integration and Immigrationsverket (the Board of Immigration, in 2000 renamed The Swedish Board of Migration) with responsibility for issues related to refugees, asylum seekers, naturalisation etc., were established. In 1996 the Minister for Immigration changed title to Minister of Integration, and in 1998 the ministry moved from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice.

In the Swedish perception integration is strongly connected to a fundamental underlying premise – the notion of the pluralistic society. There is a marked difference between the Swedish and for instance Danish understanding on this matter.2 In the Swedish perception the relationship between integration and pluralism is laid out as follows:

For the one who is a minority the strategy for coping with the majority can easily be to protect one’s own culture and lifestyle. Integration must therefore deal with the possibilities for being part

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2 Although programmes as *A New Chance for Everybody* theoretically are targeted at society at large, the reality when it comes to understanding, defining and handling diversity seems to be that diversity is first and foremost the idea that the minority should assimilate to the majority culture, while the majority should try to understand the minority and thus indicate biased power relations and a strong degree of social control.
of a greater whole without doing damage to one’s cultural and ethnic identity. Some sort of accommodation must always happen in the meeting between people. The process of integration is mutual in the sense that all people have to participate and have a responsibility for making this happen. Integration is not just a question about and for immigrants […] The cultural and ethnic diversity of the society should be the premise for the political development and should be established in all areas and levels of society (Proposition, 1997/1998:16: 22-23).

Although critics claim that this policy did not change anything but the name, these perspectives continue to be dominant in the recent government publications (e.g. Regeringsskrivelse 2001/02:129; RiR 2005:5).

The solution to integration is embedded in a neoliberal discourse aiming at self-sufficiency for immigrants. The instruments are entrepreneurship as a window of opportunity, lifelong learning, deregulations, immigrants as a flexible resource for regional economic growth, and diversity management (Schierup et al., 2006: 223; see also SOU 1996:55; SOU 1996:151; SOU 1996:27). The use of ‘sticks and carrots’ methods and two-tier welfare systems was also discussed, but the more or less social democratic hegemony and still at that time strong labour market organisations made such solutions seem impossible, so the workfare discourse was not implemented in the way as we have seen in Denmark later on.3

Two things stand out when comparing Sweden to other countries. First the handling of diversity and proactive approach to discrimination through positive actions to promote diversity has been at the fore of Swedish integration policy. Diversity programmes are mandatory and the unions are induced to pursue affirmative diversity management. Although strict programmes of affirmative action have been a no go in Sweden as it would stand against the egalitarian principle and be deemed discriminatory. Handling diversity and, we could say, the shift in rhetoric from multiculturalism to diversity are still problematic though. The celebration of mångkulturåret in 2006 may seem peculiar in this sense. As mentioned the uneasy relationship between diversity and individualism on the one hand and cultural group rights on the other still seem problematic in terms of possible directions.

The other thing that stands out is the understanding of self-sufficiency. While self-sufficiency more or less can be substituted with integration in the Danish discourse, in the

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3 In a recent publication Brekke and Borchgrevink (2007) analyse the different discourses in the Swedish debate on (labour market) integration up through the 70s and onwards. They distinguish between the social-liberal and social democratic position, which they identify with respectively the current centre-right government and the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (SN) and obviously the Social Democratic party and social engineers and labour unions. I agree that we cannot speak of one national discourse as such but will argue as in the above analysis that the social democrats incorporated aspects of the social/neo-liberal (and workfare) discourse into the integration policy, most likely inspired by the British approach, which again might have been inspired by American economic initiatives.
sense that integration is seen as labour market integration, the Swedish understanding has quite different implications (Regeringsskrivelse 2001/02:129: 126):

The process of integration is still pressing and relates to the common acceptance of fundamental values of society and to the creation of a united society based on diversity. However participation in this society does not occur automatically when one is self-sufficient. A lot of the people who have migrated to Sweden have a job and can support themselves but do not feel that they are included in society.

While for instance the Danish perception mainly aims at system integration, the Swedish perception points to system and social integration (cf. Lockwood). Again, it should be emphasised that my analysis looks at the legislative and discursive frames and not at the achievements of the given policies. Several critical government reports and national inquiries found that the Swedish policy does not live up to its goals and that there is a “striking disjunction between ideology and everyday institutional practice” as claimed in a recent book (Schierup et al., 2006: 230; see also Integrationsverket, 2001; SOU 2005:56; SOU 2006:79). Less pessimistically, it has been claimed that the integration policy simply has not been implemented (Brekke & Borchgrevink, 2007: 94; Soininen, 1999).

While it is not my intention to evaluate the given policies it does follow that new developments will be built on suggestions, revisions and criticism, partly in response to non-functional institutions and policies, and in that sense it does matter whether the integration policy is effective or not. The recent development in Swedish policy development thus takes two directions, one initiated (and perhaps already put to rest) suggesting to replace the policies of integration with polices on antidiscrimination in 2004 (Ds 2005:12; SOU 2005:41; SOU 2005:56; SOU 2006:79) and another initiated with the change of power at parliamentary level (although building on a social/neo-liberal trajectory already initiated in the 1990s). I will end the section of Swedish integration policy with a return to these recent developments in the light of the discussion of the political opportunity structures in the integration- and citizenship regime. The specific institutions are summarised and framed within the participation space in Appendix D.

**The field-specific opportunity structures in Sweden**

**Formal citizenship and nationality acquisition**

Like Denmark Sweden bases citizenship on the principle of *jus sanguinis* but immigrants and their children are encouraged to naturalise. Sweden has non-restrictive access to citizenship and only about a quarter of all persons with immigrant background are foreign citizens; the rest hold Swedish or dual citizenship (Schierup et al., 2006: 195). This is one of the highest
rates of naturalisation among immigrants and descendants in Europe. In Swedish legislation the term ‘people with foreign background’ is used about people who are not native Swedes (Ds 1999:48). These can again have a juridical status as refugees, asylum seekers etc. Immigrants used to be a common denominator in the public as well as in the official vocabulary even when speaking of children of the original immigrants. This led to both internal and external debates, which finally ended with a suggestion to avoid using the term unless absolute necessary (Ds 2000:43).

Looking at the criteria for naturalisation in more detail (Ds 2005:3), Nordic citizens as mentioned in the Danish case have easier access to citizenship due to Nordic cooperation, in this case two years of residence. Persons with refugee status can become Swedish citizens after four years by applying to Migrationsverket. The procedure takes from one month to one year. Other immigrant groups must have had five years of legal residence but have to pay a fee of 1500 SKR (approx. 175€). Acquiring citizenship requires a permanent residence permit (compared to a limited permit). There is easy access to this permit although permanent residence permits can be revoked if the information given is false or if the applicant has failed to disclose the truth to obtain the permit. The criteria for Swedish citizenship are based in the revised law from 2001 (SFS 2001:82 Lag om svenskt medborgarskap). The only criteria are permanent residence permit, living in the country and that applicants ‘have had and are expected to have an honest lifestyle’ (hederligt levnadssätt), meaning that people with a criminal record are prolonged with a qualifying period depending on the sentence served (ibid: 11§ 5). Thus, there are no criteria of language, loyalty, integration/citizenship tests. In 2003 elements resembling jus soli (what Faist terms jus domicil) was introduced into the law as it is now possible for children born in Sweden to be naturalised by the wish of their parents before the age of 18. If the child has reached the age of 12 he/she needs to give his/her consent.

The debate on and implementation of dual citizenship
Dual citizenship was implemented in June 2001 after the bill was passed with a majority (77 pct.). Until that time persons acquiring Swedish citizenship had to give up their former citizenship. It was believed from a democratic reasoning that a person only should be entitled to vote for one national parliament (Gustafson, 2002). However, implications of increasing globalisation and international migration in combination with many people gaining Swedish citizenship without being released from their former proved it difficult to maintain the existing system. As some persons were not allowed to be released from their former citizenship the argument went that people should be able to vote and have political influence in the country where they pay their taxes and live their lives (Westin, 2006). Gustafson has made a good
analysis of the debate surrounding the decision (2002; 2005), which shows that the discussion is anchored in conceptualisations of integration and questions of belonging and loyalty (see also Spång, 2007).

Paying a little more attention to the question of integration, it was discussed whether acceptance of dual citizenship would encourage or discourage immigrants from fully integrating and becoming part of Swedish society. The government’s position was that citizenship is a means to integration and not the crowning of affairs, which corresponds to the Swedish understanding of integration as a process. The Minister of Integration – at the time Ulricha Messing – argued that: “Dual citizenship and multiple identities are a natural consequence of the official Swedish policy of accepting ethnic and cultural diversity in order to enhance the process of integration”. Later her successor Minister Sahlin stated that: “Dual citizenship shall not just be accepted and respected but also promoted and appreciated” (both quoted from Gustafson, 2005: 15). This is an example on how diversity is realised in law by accepting that people have multiple belongings. From a theoretical perspective the decision to implement dual citizenship also indicates an implementation of transnationalism, in the sense that it takes a position claiming that people will have more ties (see for instance the recommendations from the Citizenship Commission report SOU 1999:34). Transnational belonging has, so to speak, become normalised and institutionalised. It should not be neglected that the preoccupation with the positive benefits for the integration process could not conceal the fact that some people, including the Citizenship Commission, also saw dual citizenship as instrumental in an eventual remigration (also pointed to by Gustafson, 2005: 13). This would actually be a plausible outcome within a transnationalised understanding of integration having moved away from a one-way path of integration. Moreover the implementation of dual citizenship can be regarded as the outcome of a path-dependent process initiated with voting rights for denizens, followed by easier access to naturalisation and hence dual citizenship as a logic continuation of this path (Spång, 2007).

The discussion above sets the context for understanding the rate for naturalisation depicted in Figure 6.1:
As expected the rates increased with the introduction of dual citizenship in 2001 but instead of remaining on its peak it dropped afterwards, suggesting that the introduction immediately made a large ‘bulk’ of people acquire Swedish citizenship because it was now possible and afterwards returned to a more normal level reflecting the number of newcomers in the country eligible for citizenship.

**Political rights and institutions**

Immigrants have access to almost the same rights and privileges as Swedish citizens, also political rights. The Swedish constitution guarantees everybody freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of speech. However, the most important part of the political opportunity structures in this aspect deals with the right to vote and the electoral system. The channels of immigrant representation such as advisory bodies will be discussed later.

Sweden was a pioneer in giving immigrants the right to vote and be elected in municipal elections in 1976. The criterion back then and now is three years of legal residence in Sweden (the Swedish term is *folkboksförda*). The electoral system resembles the Danish system by being a proportional system based on semi-open party lists. The impact of personal votes is nowhere near as strong as in Denmark, but requires a much higher number of personal votes to change the priorities of the candidates and consequently does not create the same incentives for mobilisation in connection with local election and nominating candidates (Togeby, 2008). While women are extremely well represented (45 pct. of the seats in 2005) the same propor-

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4 Some rights secured by the constitution may be limited through law (Ds 2005:3: Chapter 3).
tional representation is only seen for ethnic minorities in a few municipalities. As in many other countries the voting rates for immigrants are lower than for natives although there are marked variations among different groups. Lately it has been suggested by the government-appointed Committee on Communal Democracy that the three year residence criterion should be abolished and the right to vote should start the day a person is registered in the municipality (folkboksfärd), but so far no such changes have been implemented (SOU 2001:48).

Preventions of discrimination

The measures taken against discrimination illustrate how the political and discursive opportunity structures become entangled. Antidiscrimination has long been at the forefront of Swedish integration policy and also the presently elected government maintains that focus. However, besides the legislation and provisions against discrimination there has been an immense discussion on the range and nature of discrimination, most notably on the concept of structural discrimination, which has been the object of several committee investigations.

The Swedish preventions go back to 1986 with the introduction of the general law of ethnic discrimination (SFS 1986:442) and the establishment of the institutions of Ombudsman for ethnic discrimination (DO) specially targeted at combating ethnic discrimination as the name implies. Moreover the DO has, besides its primary task, been highly influential in developing further legislation against discrimination of all sorts. The law was extended in 1994. In 1991 the Equal Opportunity Act came into force. In 1999 a law was amended to provide measures against discrimination in working life because of ethnic background or religion. In 2001 the Equal Treatment of Students Act (SFS 2003:307) was enacted, and in 2003 the Prohibition of Discrimination Act replaced the previous act (Ds 2005:3; SOU 2006:22). As mentioned Sweden has the most wide-ranging legislation against discrimination among the countries in this study, and the MIPEX report evaluated Sweden as closest to best practice of the 28 countries included (see also European Commission, 2005). Sweden ratified the ECHR and ICERD and the recent tendency has been to incorporate EU and international law into Swedish legislation.

There are a number of institutions supervising the protection against discrimination of which the DO is the most important. The Board against discrimination has the task of making decisions concerning the issuance of civil fines (SFS 1999:130). Compliance with the Equal Opportunity Act and antidiscrimination in working life are monitored by the Equal Opportu-

5 For a list of immigrants in commissions and Riksdagen see <http://www.immi.se/politik>; Ds 2003:54 for a government report on election participation in municipal elections in 2002, and the very recent report about party political nominations and mechanisms of exclusion SOU 2006:53.
nities Ombudsman and the Equal Opportunities Board. The DO is one out of five Ombudsman institutions (see SOU 2006:22 for more on the others). The jurisdiction of the DO has been enlarged over the years. It has a three-fold purpose in supervising antidiscrimination measures; evaluating individual cases of discrimination in both work life and social life in general; and influencing public opinion on discrimination. The DO can take complaints in the field of the labour market directly to the Labour Market Court but cannot take discrimination within other fields of society directly to court. However, the DO can always act as a negotiation partner between the conflicting parts. A fourth function could be added as the DO also advises the government on legislative developments regarding discrimination.

The understanding of discrimination itself is essentially derived from the EC Law. It distinguishes between direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, harassment, and instructions to discriminate. However, after the millennium a new form of discrimination gained attention and became focus for an intense political and academic debate that has left its mark on the ongoing legislative and institutional development as well. It is an example on how the discursive setting also affects the political instruments.

The discourse of structural discrimination
In recent years the Swedish integration and immigration discourse has sought to deal with the presence of structural racism and institutional discrimination. This concept explained the increasing inequality between the foreign and native population as a result of widespread discrimination present at all levels of society. A government-commissioned inquiry was to investigate the effects of structural discriminatory practices on integration policy (for a longer discussion see Brekke & Borchgrevink, 2007). The Ministry of Justice defined the purpose of this inquiry as (Kommittédirektiv, Dir. 2003:118):

The purpose of the inquiry of integration and power includes distinctively investigating which structural barriers limit the power and influence of immigrants. Such hindrances can consist of or lead to structural discrimination. The research results and conclusions of the inquiry are thus of great importance as a source of knowledge on structural discrimination.

In its most basic understanding structural discrimination on an everyday basis is claimed to separate people into categories of unequal value (SOU 2006:79).

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6 <http://do.se/o.o.i.s?id=2201>.
7 The definition is given in SOU 2006:22: 54 “Indirect discrimination means that someone is being disfavoured through the application of a provision, a criterion or a means of proceeding that appears to be neutral but which is likely to disfavour particularly someone of a particular sex, particular sexual identity, particular ethnic background, particular religion or other religious belief, particular disability, particular sexual orientation or particular age, unless the provision, criterion or means of proceeding can be objectively supported by a justified goal and the means to achieve the goal are appropriate and necessary”.

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The focus on structural discrimination was followed by a very turbulent debate that peaked in 2003. In September 2000 Ulrica Messing, at the time Minister of Integration, appointed the Integrationspolitiska magtudredningen, a committee that should work with questions of power, integration and the welfare state, under the leadership of Anders Westholm. The committee was meant to deliver its conclusions in late 2005, but by the end of 2003 Messing’s successor Mona Sahlin decided to close down the committee (Öberg, 2004). What happened? The decision was taken after criticism from two academics (both of immigrant background), Masoud Kamali and Paulina de los Reyes, who accused Westholm of being discriminatory and hostile towards immigrants (Dagens Nyheter, 06.12.03). Instead Sahlin established a new committee and appointed selfsame Kamali as director (the other inquiry continued its research, but on a smaller scale). The focus of the new investigation was to be relations between integration and structural discrimination. Of course this resulted in an intense debate where a number of scholars accused Sahlin of politicising research (e.g. Dagens Nyheter, 20.01.04; see also Dagbladet, 16.07.05; Dagens Nyheter, 22.04.04). Sahlin herself responded to the criticism raised by Kamali by saying that: “The critique against me was justified. We have focused too much on the immigrants, but the real problem is the discrimination that the majority exposes the minorities to”, and stated further that she now “would prefer to talk about antidiscrimination policies rather than integration policies” (quoted from Dagens Nyheter, 31.05.04). The last comment indicates an important turn in the discussion, that is, whether structural discrimination should be regarded as a fact and as the take-off for the integration policies, or whether the existence and degree hereof should be examined like any other (social) phenomenon. Westholm took the latter position, while Sahlin and Kamali positioned themselves within the first line of reasoning (Dagens Nyheter, 15.04.03). Both inquires came to the conclusion that structural discrimination indeed exists and is a widespread and pervasive phenomenon (e.g. SOU 2005:56; SOU 2006:79).

Critics have claimed that this position is very convenient for the government as it places the responsibility for structural discrimination within the population and the institutions, while it simultaneously leaves the politicians without responsibility, compared to a situation where the problems were seen as related to the actual welfare and labour market policies (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2005b). My conclusion is that when this focus was strongest the relative openness that surrounded the notion of structural discrimination was replaced by a perspective that regards discrimination in itself as the starting point for further investigations and not just one of several explanations on why the integration process has problems.
The focus on structural discrimination more or less terminated when the Kamali inquiry finished its work in August 2006 and a new political constituency came to power later the same year. The Ministry of Integration and Equality has shown little interest in pursuing this approach to discrimination and integration and proposals to replace the integration law with a law on antidiscrimination have definitely been terminated. That said, the impact of this focus and results from the inquiries together with the longstanding position of antiracism in Swedish policy still seem to have left their mark also on the centre-right government’s understanding of integration and the opportunity structures as such. I shall return to this subject.

Cultural dimension of citizenship

When it comes to the cultural dimension of citizenship there seems to be an ambiguous relationship with cultural rights in Swedish policy. On the one hand it is evident that Sweden has not taken any steps to introduce culturally based citizenship tests or promote a state-determined version of Swedishness as such. On the other hand Swedish has often been seen as the textbook example of a multicultural society. These two characteristics need not be in opposition as the idea of the multicultural society exactly could imply that people should promote and protect their cultural identity. However, such an approach does not seem to be part of Swedish policy, indeed recent years have pointed to a move away from multiculturalism and a general unease with culture. What type of setting does this create in terms of opportunity structures?

In legislation there are very few cultural rights. One is the possibility of the minority to develop his/her lifestyle (Ds 2005:3: 90). Other rights include the freedom to choose religion. In the administrative law a number of rights are inscribed, such as the right to education and rights regarding language and minority statuses. After 2000 the ethnic minority status applies to language and not origin. Among the languages accepted as minority languages are Finnish and Sami, but immigrant languages like Kurdish, Turkish, and Farsi are no longer supported economically.8

Different provisions exist for language educations. In general Swedish is the language in Swedish schools. Compared to the debates across Europe the importance of learning the language is somewhat less prominent in Sweden than in other countries. All newcomers have the right to 550 hours of Swedish (sfi – Swedish for immigrants).

8 This has and probably will further affect the many journals being published in various immigrant languages that previously could apply for support. Radio Sweden’s SR International still broadcasts in 15 different languages <http://www.sr.se/rs/qolo/>. 
Looking at religious rights, Sweden again differs from many other European countries. Religion has been surprisingly marginal in the Swedish debate on integration. This can be explained in different ways. First it could be claimed that the discussion has been suppressed in Sweden (I will get back to the often mentioned Swedish political correctness later), but looking at the debates actually shows that issues of religion have been discussed politically and for instance honour-related violence has been treated by a political task group for a number of years (see the Ministry purpose programme Integration och mångfald: http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2279).

Another and perhaps stronger explanation could be the structural position of religion in Swedish society. Sweden separated state and church in 2000. The Protestant Christian church, Svenska kyrkan, still has a special status in some regards (right to collect taxes and responsibility for cemeteries), but the law leading to the separation from 1998 made it possible for other religious denominations to be registered as belief systems and thereby gain economical support etc. (SFS 1998:1593). Without going into too many details, 22 different belief systems are today recognised officially, including the Islamic corporations council (SFS 1999:974). The strong focus on discrimination has affected religious rights indirectly as the amendment of the antidiscrimination law from 2003 forces employers to secure employees’ religious needs.

Finally I will look at the rights in regards to family reunification and residence permits on the ground of family ties. The rules are in general non-restrictive, in 2003 half of the residence permits were granted based on family ties (compared to 9 pct. in Denmark) (Ds 2005:3: 42). However, there are obviously rules, and a criterion is a dependency relationship in the home country, which makes it difficult to live apart. Dependency relationship means that the applicant is financially, socially and emotionally dependent on a relative who lives in Sweden (see Migrationsverket, 2008: Uppehållstillstånd på grund av familjeanknytning). Residence permits granted on the ground of family ties are temporary, usually given for two years, but if the spouses continue to live together the permit is made permanent (SFS 2006:220).

On a discursive level - a suffocating political correctness?
It has been a common assumption that the Swedes might be very tolerant but at the same time suppresses any real debate about the problems relating to immigration. The question is of course whether this is just a stereotypical assumption or if it holds some or the entire truth.

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9 For the detailed description and subsidy system of these denominations, 2006 figures can be found at: <http://www.sst.a.se>.
First of all I will point to a distinction between mångfald (diversity) and mångkultur (multiculturalism) and contrary to perhaps common opinion multiculturalism is no longer the official identification in Sweden. Multicultural(ism) denotes to an ideology and framework for society while diversity is a characteristic of the society (which then can be promoted, managed, or prevented). Even when the term multiculturalism is used it is done so in a sense that stresses diversity rather than expresses a combination of fixed cultural groups. One example was the celebration of mångkulturaråret in 2006 (year of multiculturalism). Critics spoke against the idea of multiculturalism and the Director of the Multicultural Centrum Leif Magnusson responded to this criticism by ‘removing’ the cultural part of multiculturalism and instead use diversity (see Dagens Nyheter, 10.06.06; Hamde, 2006). But what is left of the concept if it can be used interchangeably with diversity?

The debate on multiculturalism has flared for several years in Sweden and has become conflated with the discussion of integration and the effort to break down the boundaries between us and them. From the outside, the Swedish debate on these issues has been perceived as repressive, naïve and as suffocating the opportunities to talk about the ‘real’ problems (e.g. Karen Jespersen, recently appointed Danish Social Minister and Minister for Equal Rights; see also Bak Jørgensen, 2006). Some Swedish academics agree and have allegedly been marginalised (see Brekke & Borchgrevink, 2007; Carlbom, 2006; Friedman & Friedman, 2006; Hedetoft, 2006d). The dispute seems strange as multiculturalism is not the preferred term anymore, although that very well could be due to criticism by Aje Carlbom, Jonathan Friedman and others.

However, I will argue that there is more to it than so. Some arguments directly challenged the claim that there is no debate in Sweden and said that the fact that Sweden does not have a Danish People’s Party (although the Sweden Democrats somewhat resemble DPP) does not mean there has been no public discussion (e.g. interview with Mehmet Kaplan). Looking back in recent history the exclusion of (mainly) refugees from the labour market already in the late 1980s was used by the political right to speak against welfare clientilism, which was later framed in a populist and perhaps profound racist discourse by the populist movement stressing the ‘cultural peril’ of immigrants (Schierup et al., 2006). Under the economical recession in the early 1990s the populist anti-immigration party Ny Demokrati [New Democracy] entered the political stage and influenced the public debate. However, already in 1994 Ny Demokrati lost their parliamentary representation (Rydgren, 2002). In 2006 Sweden Democrats almost gained representation in the parliament. Their history goes back to 1988 so
there has been a platform for anti-immigration expressions for several years, but it does not seem to appeal to many people (in 2006 2.88 pct. of the voters).

Instead of solely of speaking of repression of the debate, four factors can be argued to be particular for the Swedish case. First, the economic recession did not hegemonise an anti-immigrant discourse but rather maintained a focus on the welfare state; second anti-immigration and the issue of immigrants has not been able to mobilise voters (as for instance in Denmark, Goul Andersen, 2006); third, the Swedish state rather early initiated a dismantling of culture in the immigration/integration policies (Soininen, 1999); fourth, and this could resemble a ‘suffocation’ of the debate; when researchers pointed to repressive patterns among minority groups it triggered accusations of discrimination but was praised by the right wing and consequently ended been damaging for the researcher (Brekke & Borchgrevink, 2007: 86).

Concluding this section it can be added that the recent trend seems to be a more outspoken openness to cultural issues. The so-called Pela and Fadime cases (characterised as honour killings) raised a lot of issues and seem to have created a somewhat ambiguous position that could be defined as ‘meeting in the middle’. As mentioned there has been greater awareness of and political efforts against honour related violence, although this was initiated already in 2003 and not an invention by the centre-right alliance (cf. Integration och mångfald op.cit.). Simultaneously the right-wing movement, most notably the Sweden Democrats, has relaunched itself with newfound decency on both a rhetoric and symbolic level. Having gained more electoral influence than ever before and having a large representation at municipal level, the party downscaled the anti-immigration rhetoric and changed its symbol from a burning flame (blue and yellow) to a blue and yellow flower, still connoting Swedish values but indisputably less hostile.10

**Immigrant representation and consultative bodies**

Actively pursuing the incorporation of immigrant organisations means that the Swedish state like the Danish has been generous in allocating funds to immigrant organisations although subsidising has been far more corporatist. The subsidising system is under reconstruction until mid-2008, which makes the structures difficult to identify at the moment, although it looks like funds will be increased and even more importantly loosened somewhat from the corporatist grip. However, in general the Swedish state has encouraged immigrants to organise along ethnic lines and create a representative base represented by a national federation.

10 *Sverigedemokraterna*’s political programme can be found at: <http://www.sverigedemokraterna.se/>.
The existing system consists of three types of support: contributions to organisations to cover administrative costs; funding for organisations promoting integration; and special funding for projects working with integration. The organisations applying for the first two types need to meet a number of criteria: The majority of the members must have an immigrant background, must place their activities in Sweden, have a national organisational structure, a geographical dispersion that reflects and represents their member base (minimum five local member organisations in three regions, although exemptions exist), have at least 1,000 paying members, co-finance their organisational activities, rest on a democratic structure, have been involved in integration-promoting activities for at least two years, and finally have a plan for promoting integration in the future (Ds 2003:10; Integrationsverkets Stencilserie 2002:5; SFS 2000:216; Ungdomsstyrelsen, 2007).

Out of the 80 national federations listed in 2002, 32 national federations received both organisational and activity-specific support, and 14 organisations received organisational support only. The criteria have a fairly high threshold, which is the reason for the so-called support to establishment subsidy where applying federations can receive funds for up to three years if they have at least three member organisations, 400 members and can document activities for one year. Scrutinizing national federations subsidised further, reveals that out of the total number only three federations are organised in non-ethnic lines (two are trans-ethnic women’s federations and the last one trans-ethnic umbrella organisation). The majority reflects a specific ethno-national minority group. But the list also shows that despite the efforts to channel immigrant organisational activities into one national federation, there are competing national federations, e.g. the Kurdish Federation, the Kurdish Council and the Kurdish Union. Thus even within a strong corporatist system variation exists. Nonetheless the system is highly regulated and due to control from the public administration organisational activities are tightly steered and controlled from above.

As mentioned the system is being revised and restructured in these very months, which caused serious concern for some of the organisations I talked to, as they are very dependent on the state subsidises. Until this year the subsidy was subjugated to a defined goal of increasing the possibilities for participation and self-sufficiency for recent newcomers to Sweden, to promote equal rights, obligations, and possibilities for all no matter religious and ethnic background, to combat ethnic discrimination and racial hostility and to create and enhance awareness of the changes in individual life and societal development that a policy of integration brings about (SFS 2000:216). Many of these activities have been controlled by the Board of Integration, which now has been closed down. Instead the tasks have been transferred to Ung-
domsstyrelsen (the Swedish Board of Youth Affairs), which will be in control of financial support to ethnically based organisations, integration projects, and support to antidiscrimination and antiracist organisations and activities (see especially SFS 2002:989). A new type of support will be initiated in 2008 targeting and supporting the organisations’ own initiatives, which are not necessarily identical to the integration-political goals. Support will be given to activities dealing with culture, identity, language and participation (Integrations- och jämställdhetsdepartementet, 2007). A new and strengthened subsidy system for antidiscrimination and antiracist activities will be implemented. The overall focus for this new system is to limit exclusivist tendencies (utanförskap) and hence strengthen inclusion.

The incorporation of immigrants into the decision making processes has been investigated by the inquiry for integration, power and politics, which concluded that their political influence is rather marginal (although members of organisations themselves claim to have effected legislation on voting rights, mother tongue education and other issues) (Ds 2004:49). Qualified further, other researchers have argued that organisations play an important role for their members but the organisations’ participation in Swedish society is marginal (see Benito, 2005; Dahlstedt, 2003).

The municipalities decide whether or not to establish immigrant services. Many have done so, but in general the degree of influence is low at the municipal level. Most political activities are based at a national level in the activities of the national federations and umbrella organisations where opportunities are provided through consultative bodies and advisory councils. The primary partner used to be the Board of Integration, which cooperated with many of the national federations, but it is uncertain if another institution will fulfil this role now. Other typical partners are the Departments of Culture, Social Affairs, Justice, Integration and Equality, Foreign Affairs and the Board of Migration. The main advisory body is the Council for Ethnic Equality and Integration (Regeringens råd för etnisk jämlikhet och integra-

11 The focus on culture and identity may seem contradictory when culture at the same time is being removed from the political discourse. The focus on culture and identity rests on not wanting to end up in an either/or situation, i.e. either solely subsidise organisations working with integration political issues or solely subsidise cultural organisations. In the endeavour of creating a coherent subsidy system both positions have come up, which led a task force set down by government to conclude in 2003 that: “It is important to stress that questions of identity, culture, and language are important issues also for the ethnic groups who do not hold minority status. Such activity is important for persons with roots in other countries and cultures to gain an identity, know the relation to and reach participation in the society as a whole. Thus it is the responsibility of the state though the subsidy system supports all ethnic organisations in promoting such activities no matter their status” (Ds 2003:10: 65-66). These recommendations are followed by the recent center-rigth government as well.

12 More information about the temporary system and the forthcoming developments can be obtained at: <http://www.ungdomsstyrelsen.se/kat/0,2070,4,00.html>.
tion). Also this institution’s influence has been disputed, while again immigrant organisations claim to have reached political goals via this institution (Ayter, 2007: 82). Outside the administration the main partner is the ABF (Workers’ Educational Association of Sweden), which has had a major impact on the organising processes. An institution particular for Sweden is the Anti-Discrimination Bureaus located at regional level and in larger cities (hence one region can have several bureaus) and funded by the Board of Integration, but operated by SIOS, an important and very influential immigrant umbrella organisation. The Bureaus are advisory councils and their main task consists of providing legal advice to individuals who experience discrimination in everyday life. The focus on discrimination has not diminished after the change of government although the believed causes and explanations have.

The last field of specific opportunity structures deals with affirmative action, which has long been resisted in Sweden as it goes against the principle of equality and discriminatory selection. However, the persistent problems with lower levels of labour market participation for immigrants and descendants recently led a public inquiry to conclude that: “positive special treatment on the grounds of ethnic background or sex should be allowed in working life. Exemptions from the prohibition against discrimination in working life are therefore introduced” (SOU 2006:22: 59). Whether or not the new government will follow these suggestions is uncertain, but in the budget proposal for 2008 it is stated that the overall recommendations of the White Paper (a coherent legislation of discrimination) will be implemented, the content is not described in detail. On its webpage, the Ministry of Integration states that: “Except from the first period in the country there shall not be any special politics for immigrants”, which leaves a slightly contradictory conclusion (cf. Integration och mångfald op.cit.).

Welfare state arrangements and integration

Before transforming the policy of immigration to a policy of integration (at least in discourse), immigrant policy programmes were seen as one type of welfare programme among others. As mentioned the aim was to narrow the gaps between immigrants and native born Swedes and to ensure the same standard of living by integrating immigrants into the welfare state. Policies were modelled on policies created for other areas of the social sector (Borevi, 2002). Sweden in this sense has tried to fulfil the Marshallian understanding of citizenship, by aiming at equity in all spheres of society.

13 The council has a long history as it was established as the Council of immigration back in 1975 but changed its name and purpose in accordance with the changes and perceptions of Swedish immigration and integration policy over the years. Thus, in 1996 it was changed to the Immigrant and refugee political council before finding its current form.
The Swedish model comprises different features, some of which are still present in the model today. These features include economic management premised on a corporatist relationship between the state, unions and the employers; a large universalist welfare state with a large public sector, developed and maintained by a long-term political hegemony of the Social Democratic party (Schierup et al., 2006: 200). Other characteristics include centralised wage bargaining institutions and job protection schemes. The latter aspects have had an important impact on respectively the existence of an illegal or undocumented labour market and making it hard for newcomers to gain foothold on the labour market. Instead people with immigrant background have become trapped in a welfare dependence that has proven hard to break even during an economic boom that Sweden is facing these very recent years (Konjunkturinstitutet, 2007). This framework characterised the way immigrants were positioned in society as well.

Different changes have occurred over the years though. First, some general tendencies in Sweden: The interest organisations’ power to influence policy making has been reduced due to a general ideological shift in a neoliberal direction, born in the US and slowly but surely gaining ground in Europe. The Swedish state’s stance on the position of immigrants in society is clearly affected by this change. Some of the neoliberal instruments and solutions, e.g. ethnic niches and entrepreneurship, deregulations and the creation of unskilled work for unskilled job seekers, which stands in opposition to the previous ideological stance; to improve skills and education through an active labour market policy to secure equality. Sustaining the Swedish welfare state is a demanding task that requires near to full employment, which Sweden actually succeeded in doing until the early 1990s. The recession in the mid-1990s brought about central changes that are visible today, most importantly welfare policies and integration policies fused and changed focus from redistribution to reducing the costs of social provisions (Schierup et al., 2006: 205). The change from the old to the new model is marked by workfare practices. So far the development resembles a general European (and US) trend.

Where Sweden differs is in the explicit stance on discrimination that is inherent in the welfare arrangements also. The backdrop for the Swedish policy both in terms of integration and welfare policies is the notion of diversity. Both sides of the political spectrum and employer organisations have been affirmative in their understanding of diversity and combating social exclusion (as illustrated by the present centre-right government), which means that diversity management and antidiscrimination are embedded within this ‘soft’ version of neolib-
eralism. Likewise the goals of self-sufficiency are coupled with notions of empowerment, standing on the shoulder of a century long tradition and it seems that not only the ‘stick’ is used to reach the goals. Basically, Sweden does not enforce the same degree of sanctions as other countries pursuing the same economical approach; on the contrary, the government has, for example, proposed a so-called sfi-bonus for foreigners who learn Swedish faster than expected in the mission statements for the integration policy for 2008. The purpose is to stimulate people to obtain the necessary human capital skills needed to enter the labour market, but is a completely different approach than for instance the Danish and German in offering a carrot rather than a stick (Integrations- och jämställdhetsdepartementet, 2007).

The Swedish model today - from assimilation to multiculturalism to antidiscrimination to …?

Returning to the overall characteristics of the Swedish model, the Swedish system offers substantial economic, civic and political rights. There is relatively easy access to naturalisation coupled with acceptance of dual citizenship, which, when looking at the rates, has been very successful. Cultural rights are to a large extent characterised by their absence, meaning that there are no formal criteria for what can be allowed, although immigrants on a collective level are encouraged to strengthen their cultural identity and language as shown for instance in the framework of the subsidy system supporting immigrant organisations. Summarising the contours of the Swedish integration and citizenship regime leads to at least six (somewhat overlapping) central features:

I. A traditional liberal refugee policy alongside relatively open borders has created a New Sweden in terms of population. Tight regulations and corporatist style policy making has to a large degree prevented a clandestine immigrant labour market

II. A neoliberal or social-liberal ideology embedded also in the Swedish approach without wanting to diminish established social rights, although there has definitely been a shift towards increased control and discipline

III. A tight focus on discrimination and antidiscrimination

IV. Diversity as the backdrop for societal developments for good or worse

V. Continued activities to reduce exclusionist tendencies, i.e. marginalisation and so-called ‘outsideness’

VI. An unclear understanding of culture and the position of cultural groups

The first feature is more a characteristic of the Swedish society than a part of the integration policy and an example of how immigration, integration, welfare state and labour market policies are conflated. The recent tendency seems to be a slightly less generous acceptance of

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14 The more aggressive neoliberal critique of the size of the welfare state and regulated labour market as a hindrance to integration also exists in Sweden to some degree also within the Liberal party.
asylum seekers and family formation although Sweden still accepts a proportional larger number of both categories than its Nordic neighbours. However, the increasingly diverse population had established an understanding of diversity as the only possible backdrop for society as such, and it does not seem to be affected by who is in power.

Sweden faces problems with a consistent gap between natives and immigrants, including descendants, in labour market participation, so there has been an immense political focus on reducing the number of marginalised people on non-Swedish background (Integrations- och jämställdhetsdepartementet, 2007). Especially the concentration of allegedly marginalised immigrants in the larger cities has been targeted, and the policy is at the moment being reconfigured to a so-called urban development policy (Integrations- och jämställdhetsdepartementet, Pressmeddelande 19. September 2007), to be achieved basically through a strategy of empowerment. This situation is explained by a failed Social Democratic integration policy, which has created a disjunction between ideology and practice.

The radical changes from the previous to the current government are hard too see even in the discourse, however. The social liberal approach and solutions based on workfare practices are not the invention of the centre-right government, but were introduced much earlier. In general it is a form of ‘neo-liberalism with a human face’ that is present also today. Focus is on the individual, and integration politics are part of a mainstreaming process. Changes can be expected in the labour market regulations and the approach of corporatism has been diminishing for some years (Lindvall & Sebring, 2005) although there are still important corporatist elements in politics and society. One thing that stands out is, as mentioned, the strong focus on discrimination. Although the internal inquiry into structural discrimination has been put to rest for now, it seems that strong attention is maintained on general processes of discrimination and even racism although there is a reluctance to use this specific term. Individuals are believed to have the same possibilities, but the studies that demonstrate that immigrants have lower participation rates even though they hold the same skills have been taking into account, and hindrances to the individual in terms of equal possibilities in reality, e.g. discrimination, are combated. An example is the increased funding of the DO. Discrimination is then taken to be one explanation for the lower rates of participation, but not the only one. Brekke and Borchgrevink argue that there has been a shift from an antidiscrimination approach to a social-liberal approach. I tend to disagree that there has been a radical shift and will argue, as shown, that rather elements of both approaches have been introduced earlier and also co-exist today with the emphasis now on the social-liberal aspects.
The last thing that deserves to be mentioned is the handling of culture. I will argue that the notion of diversity has replaced the more ideologically loaded concept of multiculturalism. The class-based unionised system of incorporation has, as argued, made it difficult to encompass cultural or religious claims making. Issues of culture and identity have been limited or redirected to associational life but cannot be addressed via the institutionalised channels of influence. The idea of granting special rights to cultural groups has been contested as it speaks against the ideals of equity. The understanding of culture can be framed in distinctions such as essentialist vs. constructivist and ‘thick’ vs. ‘thin’ descriptions of culture, but in the Swedish debate there is a fear of filling out the concept with any content at all apart from aesthetic and artistic denotations. It is remarkable how the notion of culture completely escapes the aims of the integration policy except when speaking of antidiscrimination but even in the outline of the efforts proposed to reduce honour-related violence culture is not mentioned at all. This does not mean that Carlbom is right in his diagnosis of the Swedish condition but it does show that the Swedish policy makers and the public debate have great difficulties discussing and conceptualising the concept. The positive side is that the debate has not been culturalised as has happened in Denmark; the downside is that diversity more or less can become an empty container not providing any guidelines for cultural difference. Both ends of the continuum nonetheless affect the migrant organising processes.

Leaving a country that is characterised by continuity and consensus-seeking in policy making, I now turn toward the opposite: the German case, that is a case defined by competition and changes in policy content.
Chapter 7
The case of Germany - from Ausländerpolitik to Zuwanderungsgezets

Immigration to Germany
In the literature Germany is often taken as the proto-typical example of an exclusivist model of incorporation, but since the early 1990s Germany has been changing its legislation towards a more inclusivist direction and has launched one of the least control-minded models of civic integration in Europe. I shall elaborate on this below.

Out of 82.6 million people in Germany, 7.3 million (8.8 pct.) have non-German citizenship but the total number of migrants and descendants who have acquired citizenship exceeds 15 million (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2006). This makes Germany one of the larger immigrant countries in Europe, which is strange as Germany until very recently maintained a self-understanding of not being a country of immigration. This self-understanding obviously has affected the way the integration and citizenship regime has been constructed. The German case presents an illustrative argument against employing too static explanations in terms of historical trajectories when explaining contemporary systems of incorporation.

Germany has a long history of immigration from the Edict of Potsdam in 1685, which granted 44,000 Huguenots from France refugee status, to the current, somewhat vague, implementation of a German style Green-card. In the 19th century, however, Germany was a country of emigration, a situation that changed with a large inflow of Polish workers in the 1880s and onwards. Focusing particularly on recent newcomers, Germany has been lenient when it comes to receiving refugees after World War II, despite its anti-immigration ideal. With the Nazi dictatorship fresh in mind, The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany was implemented in 1949. This is worth mentioning because Article 16 defines asylum as an individual constitutional right and Article 116 para. 1 furthermore creates the foundation for the ‘return’ of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to Germany and reflects the ethnic dimension of the German citizenship. The latter has led to a situation where every other immigrant to Germany has been of German origin. The fall of the Iron Curtain pushed this inflow further, peaking in 1990; Germany has since the early 1990s tried to take measures to moderate the returns.¹ Up until 2005, Aussiedlers enjoyed both eas-

¹ Most notably with the Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz from 1993. After this law people with an ethnic German background from other countries are only allowed access if they can prove that their German ethnicity gives
ier access to civic and political rights, but the introduction of the new integration plan has minimised the difference between them and other immigrant groups considerably.

From 1955 to 1973 Germany upheld a guest worker scheme built on bilateral agreements with the Mediterranean countries (Italy in 1955; Turkey in 1961), which also here came to a ban due to the economic recession following the oil crisis in 1973. More than 14 million workers entered the country in these years. Most of them actually went back home but after the ban 3.1 million had decided to stay (Cyrus, 2005; Liebig, 2007a). The largest group among the guest workers was, as mentioned, the Turks. The subsequent inflow of newcomers to Germany mirrors the situation in Denmark and Sweden (family reunifications and asylum seekers) with three exceptions: the Aussiedlers, the green card entrance providing for instance IT-specialists temporary access to work in Germany for a limited number of years, and a higher number of Jewish quota refugees.

Due to the constitutional obligation, Germany has accepted a large number of refugees over the years (also others than ethnic Germans), which peaked in 1992 when Germany received 438,200 asylum seekers out of the European total of 684,000 (Schierup et al., 2006: 147; cf. Table 6.1). The access was restricted in 1993 with the asylum compromise (Asylkom- promiss) and numbers have dropped consequently.

The jus sanguinis based citizenship in its most radical form has given rise to a second generation of ‘permanent’ foreigners born in Germany numbering more than 1.5 million people, i.e. 20 pct. of the foreigners living in Germany in total. The number is even more pronounced among the Turkish minority where 35 pct. were born in Germany. The changes in the citizenship law from 1999 will without doubt change this situation where children born in the country automatically receive German citizenship, but have to renounce other citizenship before the age of 23 to keep their German citizenship.

The German system operates with a number of status, residence, and work permit categories, but also this very hierarchic system has been simplified after 2005 (for a detailed account of the previous system see Morris, 2002). Today the state operates with a distinction between German citizens and foreigners. People holding dual citizenship are, like in Sweden, only registered as German citizens. Resident permits are limited to two types – temporary and permanent – and work permits are no longer issued except in relation to government controlled seasonal workers’ programme or contract workers (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2005a).
Until very recently the statistics contained no information on descendants whose parents (and thus also the children) had naturalised, but the reconfiguration of the so-called Mikrozensus has since 2005 made it possible to trace descendants also and subsequently make longitudinal analyses.² This possibility has been perceived very positively compared to the situation in Denmark where the category has been criticised for maintaining people with another ethnic background than Danish as deviant. In the German context it has revealed marginalised people who are not part of the statistics (interview with Ulrich Raiser, Der Beauftragte des Berliner Senats für Integration und Migration).

Germany has been facing tough economic times with unforeseen costs in connection with the reunification and a general economic recession. However, increasing economic growth in recent years in combination with continued stringency call for optimism (Economist: Country Briefings: Germany Oct 16 2007). The unemployment rate is still higher than in the Nordic countries, but is approaching the Swedish level.

**Mapping Berlin**

As most of my field work took place in Berlin and the organisations in my study are based there, I provide the particular data for Berlin in this section and later return to the particularities of the city’s integration approach. Berlin is in many ways an interesting case, both for being divided and reunited within ‘only’ four decades and recently having to cope with a diminishing population.³

After the reunification, Berlin was expected to enter an economic boom, but the good period did not last long, and neither demographic nor economic expectations materialised. At the end of 2004 there were 450,900 registered non-German citizens in Berlin (Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin, 2006), but naturalised (and repatriated Aussiedlers) and temporary migrants are not included in this figure and the number is estimated to be around 600,000 all in all. This means that roughly 15 pct. of the population in Berlin are of non-German origin. The Turkish minority constitutes the largest minority group with 188,732 persons in 2004 (Beauftragte für Integration und Migration, 2005a). Also here

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² Among 1 pct. of the households in Germany that is. This makes it statistically significant though. For more see: <http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Wissenschaftsforum/MethodenVerfahren/Mikrozensus/SUFMikrozensus.psml>.

³ Diminishing populations are globally recognised phenomena – sometimes captured in the phrase ‘shrinking cities’. The catchword is perhaps more appropriate for cities like Manchester, Phnom Penh, Johannesburg, and Detroit, but the driving forces of deindustrialisation, loss of employment opportunities and suburbanisation also describe the reality of Berlin, which has seen a large number of native Germans retreating to the suburbs and neighbouring states. While the German middle class in Berlin has diminished, the foreign population has been increasing, but overall the population dropped by 100,000 people between 1993 and 2004 while the number of foreign residents increased from 393,000 to 450,900 people in the same period, which tells us that Berlin proportionally is becoming more and more diverse.
naturalised Turks are left out of the statistic, and a slightly decreasing number of Turks in recent years indicates that more Turks have naturalised. The foreigners are not divided equally over the districts of Berlin. Especially Mitte, Neukölln, and Friedrichhain-Kreuzberg have a larger foreign population, although neither of the three districts have more than 25 pct. non-German nationals – far from the number of foreign citizens in for instance Rotterdam and thus not the ethnic ghetto it sometimes is described to be. Apart from the particularities the flows of migration in recent times resemble the situation in the rest of Germany.

**German immigration and integration policies - the political and discursive context**

Until recently, Germany has not had a response to integration. A combination of bringing the guest worker model to the extreme and an ethnic and exclusivist conceptualisation of citizenship created a setting where newcomers were accepted in large numbers, but no measures besides controlling the inflow increasingly over the years were taken. People could do what they wanted as long as they did not violate the law and they were expected to return to their homelands. I will not repeat the findings of Brubaker and others on the historical linkage between historical trajectories and contemporary notions of citizenship, nor will I question the general findings. I will focus on the situation today, which indirectly presents a critique of the most static of the Brubaker-inspired analyses (and challenge the path dependency approach), as the German status indeed has developed, and show that it is possible to change from ethnic to civic conceptualisations of citizenship.

Immigrants in general enjoy substantial civic and social rights in Germany. However, non-access to political rights due to exclusivist ethnic criteria for naturalisation and has left them stuck in a denizen type of status for years or what Soysal classifies as postnational membership. This has changed somewhat since 1999, although substantial rights are still available for citizens only. The access to citizenship has become much easier. The new Citizenship Act and Immigration Act have led to a fundamental shift in German politics for the first time presenting a framework for integration but also affecting notions of national identity and cohesion. There has been a rhetorical and discursive shift where the previous self-understanding increasingly is being challenged from many sides. This can be illustrated by a number of recent statements, e.g. “We no longer talk about migrants, but with them” asserted Maria Böhmer Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration (Regierungonline Latest News 12.07.07). Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that “Integration does not mean that we will become all the same [...] I do not need to leave behind where I come from in order to arrive at my destination” (ibid.). The government seeks to pursue a so-
called “policy of the outstretched hand” (ibid.) despite disturbances on the way. It is not only words as illustrated by the legislative changes, and in sum the German policy has quite literally gone from A to Z in the change from an Ausländerpolitik to Zuwanderungsgezets although some backlashes could be observed as well.

The changes in Germany have been ongoing since the coalition between the Social Democrats and the Green Party. The most important change was initiated with the Citizenship Act that came into force in 2000 although without some of the (most progressive) proposed changes such as acceptance of dual citizenship. The changes were introduced out of necessity, as high-skilled labour shortage in combination with high unemployment in other sectors paved the way to political responses.

The notion of integration and hence the approach towards the Zuwanderungsgezets became part of the political agenda in 2000 when the government formed the so-called Süßmuth Commission named after the responsible CDU politician Rita Süßmuth. The report entitled Structuring Immigration, Fostering Integration (English version) was published in 2001 and marks a beginning but profound shift in German politics. The suggestions included a point system as basis for receiving a relatively large number of newcomers (after Canadian inspiration), measures to speed up the asylum procedure, a break with the fundamental right to political asylum, new provisions related to internal security (basically easier access to expulsion) and proposed efforts to foster integration with knowledge of German and cultural awareness as the central points. In its initial form the report was very liberal and progressive and initiated four years political discussions as the suggestions were put into a bill introduced to the parliament by the ruling coalition. In June 2004 the negotiations led to a compromise and a watered-down version of the proposal from the commission in the shape of an immigration bill that came into force January 2005. The CDU was, as previously, against the most progressive elements of the bill (Özcan, 2004a; Münz, 2004).

The main changes in German immigration and integration policy happened with the reform of the nationality law in 2000, the introduction of the immigration law in 2004 and recently with the National Integration Plan (NIP) revealed July 12 2007 (Die Bundesregierung, 2007a). The full title is Der Nationale Integrationsplan: Neue Wege – Neue Chancen, which brings associations to for instance the Danish programme A New Chance for Everybody discussed in Chapter 5. In the German case it must be admitted that the NIP, as the latest reform of an antiquated incorporation system, definitely does introduce new ways, but whether it brings about new changes is for the future to see. The NIP provides local and state officials with a federal framework for controlling immigrant integration programmes.
The June reforms included different initiatives such as a regularisation of ‘tolerated’ asylum seekers, raising the minimum age of family reunification for spouses from 16 to 18 years, and introducing a loyalty declaration as a criterion for naturalisation. People wishing to immigrate must now also pass a basic German language test. Furthermore the NIP updates the integration programme for immigrants by increasing the number of German language instruction from 600 to 900 hours and introducing 30 hours of civic instruction (Die Bundesregierung, 2007a). The NIP presents a detailed framework for different levels of society with a specific framework intended for the federal states, municipalities and NGOs (Nationale Integrationsplan – Kurzfassung für die Presse; Bundesregierung, 2007b). Although being constructed from above the government and workgroup behind the NIP have tried to include representatives from different levels of society, which at least gives the impression that notions of dialogue and integration as a dynamic two-way process are taken seriously. Representatives from immigrant organisations, religious minorities, academic experts and other groups have thus been part of the NIP working group, which stands in contrast to the seemingly progressive Süßmuth Commission, which in reality only included one immigrant (a Turkish travel agent and member of TGD, later social democratic MEP) in the process. Initiatives like the Integration Summits are another example of this trend.4

**The field-specific opportunity structures in Germany**

In Germany, labour unions and churches play an important part in relation to immigrant organisations (Vermeulen, 2006). They provide services that may lessen or secure demands for separate immigrant organisations and thus constitute an important part of the opportunity structures. A particular role is also played by the welfare service, the first actor to support integration for immigrants. The German welfare model is different from the Danish and Swedish in this sense as it relies on semi-public and non-governmental institutions. These institutions also take part in the framework for integration and thus add further to the complexity. The new Law of immigration also assigns them a stakeholder role in the development

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4 A number of Turkish organisations and delegates boycotted the latest summit in protest of a law they as discriminatory towards Moslems. The protests, however, are part of a political struggle and its outcomes and as such quite ‘healthy’ for the overall democratic process. Arguments were given from both sides and the media covered it substantially (DW-WORLD.DE, 12.07.07). The Turkish groups are being invited to the next summit in 2008 and their protest has sparked a debate in the immigrant communities. The content of the protest will be analysed further in the next chapter. The Turkish organisations claimed that they were not taken seriously, but if we look at the development over the past years the Turkish voters have played an increasing role in mainstream politics, not least in the 2005 elections that brought Merkel to office (e.g. Spiegel Online International, 15.09.05).
of the new integration services (Liebig, 2007: 29). The specific institutions are summarised and framed within the participation space in Appendix D.

Berlin differs somewhat from this outline however; the local administration dominates issues related to integration and have determined the scope and content of local integration policies. Berlin developed an integration policy already in the early 1970s and has been an inspiration for recent developments in other states and at federal level. In the following I will discuss both the national POS in general and, when relevant, the particular arrangements in Berlin.

The relationship between the federal states and the (federal) government is constructed in such a way that the policies are developed at a federal level (but other or additional policies may be developed at state level), while implementation is the responsibility of the states. This has created a setting where there the states have issued independent and quite distinct integration programmes (Sachverständigenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration, 2004: 248).

Formal citizenship and nationality acquisition

Naturalisation rules were extremely restrictive in the 1970s and 1980s. The result was a very low rate of naturalisation with less than 0.5 pct. of the foreign residents acquiring German citizenship per year (Schierup et al., 2006). The revision of the law in 1990 and later in 2000 created a boost in the number of naturalisations. The revision in 2000 introduced elements of *jus soli* in the law. Children born in Germany by parents with permanent residence permit (having lived legally in Germany for at least eight years) are automatically granted German citizenship. If the parents have non-German citizenship the child has to choose nationality before the age of 23 as the law prohibits dual citizenship. The revisions from 1990 did not prohibit persons undergoing naturalisation from regaining their other nationality, but the revision in 2000 in general prohibits dual citizenship unless it is difficult for people to renounce their former citizenship or loose financial assets in the home country by doing so. Thus, despite the prohibition against dual citizenship, 44.9 pct. of all naturalisations in 2000 led to dual or multiple citizenships (BBA, 2002: 414).

The original proposal from the Social Democratic-Green alliance was to allow dual citizenship, but the end result was as can be seen the opposite. Although the numbers increased, the average annual naturalisation rate from 1988 to 2003 was 2.8 pct. compared to 3.6 pct. for Denmark and 6.5 pct. for Sweden. The criteria for naturalisation of immigrants living in Germany have been liberalised by lowering the ethnic criteria; having lived legally in Germany for eight years, having a permanent residence permit, but other criteria have been added to the
list as well; the applicants must declare allegiance to the free and democratic order, must be able to support themselves and their family members, may not have been convicted of any criminal offences and, as mentioned, must renounce any other nationality (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2005a: 87-88). The law of 2000 also states that dependence on welfare or unemployment does not prevent naturalisation if the person cannot be held responsible for the situation. However, reliance on welfare benefits may lead to the loss of a residence title and thus indirectly affect access to naturalisation (Cyrus, 2005). Finally, the recent introduction of the integration course stipulates that only persons with a sufficient command of German language are eligible for naturalisation. Completing the integration course successfully lowers the number of years required to seven from eight. The nexus between identity, security and integration has also put its mark on German legislation, and the Counter-Terrorism Act of 9 January 2002 has resulted in new security requirements also affecting access to citizenship. Naturalisation authorities now regularly check with authorities for the protection of the constitution to find out whether applicants have a record of anticonstitutional activities.

Table 7.1 Number of naturalisations from 1995-2004

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<td>Türkei</td>
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<td>46,294</td>
<td>42,240</td>
<td>59,664</td>
<td>103,900</td>
<td>82,861</td>
<td>76,573</td>
<td>64,631</td>
<td>56,244</td>
<td>44,465</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>1,529</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>14,410</td>
<td>12,020</td>
<td>13,026</td>
<td>9,440</td>
<td>6,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbien und Montenegro</td>
<td>3,623</td>
<td>2,987</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td>2,721</td>
<td>3,444</td>
<td>9,776</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>8,375</td>
<td>5,504</td>
<td>3,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>1,819</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>4,773</td>
<td>5,111</td>
<td>4,750</td>
<td>4,948</td>
<td>4,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marokko</td>
<td>3,288</td>
<td>2,918</td>
<td>4,010</td>
<td>4,881</td>
<td>4,312</td>
<td>5,008</td>
<td>4,425</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>4,118</td>
<td>3,820</td>
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<td>Libanon</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>1,782</td>
<td>2,491</td>
<td>5,673</td>
<td>4,855</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>2,651</td>
<td>2,265</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kroatien</td>
<td>2,479</td>
<td>2,268</td>
<td>1,789</td>
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<td>1,536</td>
<td>3,316</td>
<td>3,931</td>
<td>2,974</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>1,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnien-Herzegovina</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>1,926</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>3,469</td>
<td>4,238</td>
<td>4,002</td>
<td>3,791</td>
<td>2,357</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>2,103</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,464</td>
<td>3,129</td>
<td>3,452</td>
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<td>4,459</td>
<td>3,014</td>
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<td>4,966</td>
<td>2,787</td>
<td>1,604</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>2,646</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>7,459</td>
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<td>Russische Föderation</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>4,972</td>
<td>3,734</td>
<td>2,764</td>
<td>4,381</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>3,295</td>
<td>3,656</td>
<td>3,889</td>
<td>3,644</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Irak</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>2,999</td>
<td>3,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>2,844</td>
<td>3,164</td>
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<td><strong>Insgesamt</strong></td>
<td><strong>71,981</strong></td>
<td><strong>86,356</strong></td>
<td><strong>82,913</strong></td>
<td><strong>106,790</strong></td>
<td><strong>143,267</strong></td>
<td><strong>186,688</strong></td>
<td><strong>178,098</strong></td>
<td><strong>154,547</strong></td>
<td><strong>140,721</strong></td>
<td><strong>127,153</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5 The latter criterion does not count for EU citizens from countries that do not demand this of German citizens.
The Residence Act is directed from a federal level, but some states have included further criteria for naturalisation. The previously mentioned test introduced in 2006 in Baden-Württemberg is one such example, although it is being investigated whether it breaches Article 3 in the German Constitution as it violates the principle of equality enshrined in the constitution (see Expatica, 11.01.06). Also the state of Hesse introduced citizenship tests. This dispute over practice definitely revolves around the fact that Germany has not had any approach to integration until recently and only now has to decide on its practice.

The integration test introduced with the June reforms takes a more relaxed approach to testing applicants and stresses knowledge of language over other factors, although basic knowledge of Germany’s civic values and acceptance of the rule of law are required. The more aggressive style of the mentioned states will probably not gain precedence, as the government’s integration commissioner Maria Böhmer stated that: “A person becomes a citizen of Germany, after all – not of a German state” (DW-WORLD.DE, 16.03.2006). The cultural dimension of these issues will be further discussed shortly.

Political rights and institutions
Political rights for non-citizens are very scarce in Germany. The Federal Advisory Board on Foreigners and some states considered introducing local voting rights but the initiative was ruled out by the Federal Constitutional Court for breaching the constitution that places all decision making power with the German people, which was interpreted literally not to include foreigners (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2005a: 48). European elections are the one exception as EU citizens living in Germany have the right to vote and run for office in these elections. The same right is extended to participation in local elections.

Although the criteria for naturalisation have been lowered, as just outlined, the dropping rates of naturalisation create a democratic deficit as a large group of people cannot participate in the institutional political life and decision making processes. Solutions to this problem would be to allow dual citizenship, which perhaps would encourage some of the remaining foreigners to apply for German citizenship, or to amend the institution and introduce local voting rights for foreigners. The latter has not been suggested by the authorities, but has long been part of immigrant claims making. The fall of 2007 saw yet another joint venture between immigrant organisations to put this claim on the political agenda under the slogan “Hier, wo ich lebe, will ich wählen!” (www.wahlrecht-fuer-migranten.de). The claim was supported by German welfare organisations, Bündnis90/Die Grünen and others.

More details can be found at the official website: <http://www.einbuergerung.de/index2.htm>.
Again, Berlin differs somewhat by being a city-state, which means that the right to vote in local elections is exercised in the elections for the district assemblies (Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin, 2006). The Senate has also made public that it welcomes a social debate about the right to vote in local elections.

Despite the large number of immigrants excluded from institutional political participation, immigrants as such have long been part of the political life. The potential of immigrant votes are becoming more and more important. For example, the 1998 election was decided with a very fine difference – 0.3 pct. – which made several parties realise that immigrant votes could be decisive (Cyrus, 2005).

From an empirical perspective internal differences can be detected also in this sphere of society. Immigrant politicians are being framed as belonging to this or the other fraction and pressure is being put on these persons. The social democratic party with its close linkage to the labour unions has been the traditional platform for politicians with immigrant background, but especially the Bündnis90/Die Grünen has later taken over this role. Cem Özdemir, a member of Bündnis90/Die Grünen, became the first person of Turkish descent to be elected to the Bundestag in October 1994. But most parties, except for right-wing anti-immigration parties, have in general tried to incorporate (naturalised) immigrants and have set up special committees for the integration of immigrants, not least Turks. Some examples are the Federation of Turkish Social-Democrats, Liberal Turkish-German Union, the currently idle immigrant forum of the Green Party ‘Immigrün’, and the German-Turkish Union (Argun, 2003; Hunger, 2000). Naturalised immigrants are today represented at all political levels as well at in the European Parliament although they are heavily underrepresented at all levels. In 2005 only five members of the federal government had an immigrant background and in the 15 state parliaments further eight persons with an immigrant background were members (Cyrus, 2005: 32). The deficit is clearly grounded in the lack of political rights and exclusivist political opportunity structures.

Preventions of discrimination
Germany has also ratified the ICERD, which provides basic and presumably effective instruments against racist and anti-Semitic statements and acts, and the convention has been used frequently against radical right-wing persons and neo-Nazi organisations. Germany has also experienced different waves of violence against immigrants, which made both immigrant and
German organisations call for actions. However, the convention does not cover discrimination in neither its most visible form nor in its more invisible institutional and structural form.

Prevention of discrimination only recently became part of the Penal Code in Germany. In 2004 was the first draft of an antidiscrimination legislation debated in the Bundestag. The motivation was not internal, but rather external as Germany had to implement the EU directive. In 2006 the Anti-Discrimination Act (*Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz*) was finally introduced (AGG, 2006). The situation is peculiar as the industrial sector has been sceptical towards the Act due to increased administrative costs and general bureaucracy (Regierungs online Latest News, 16.08.07). The framework for antidiscrimination is still rather vague compared to frameworks in other countries and must be seen as work in progress. So far there are no state-sponsored offices dealing with discrimination issues, but the Anti-Discrimination Commission has since its establishment received around 2,300 complaints about discrimination on account of age, gender, disability, and ethnic origin (ibid.): However, the number of violent racist attacks is much higher.

The debate and investigation of institutional or structural discrimination is non-existent. This is perhaps not surprising as the German approach consisted of four decades of systematic institutional discrimination of the original guest workers who were trapped in low-skilled jobs and without basic political rights. At least it would take a very dedicated postnationalist to identify the positive aspects of this situation.

Also in this area Berlin differs from the federal level. In the autumn of 2000 the programme ‘Measures and Concepts against Right-wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism’ and the local Senate set up a Senate Co-ordinating Centre Against Discrimination Based on Ethnic Origin, Belief and Religion in 2005. The main tasks are: raising awareness for discrimination through public relations, dialogue and empowerment; counselling, investigation and support in individual cases; collection of facts; uncovering causal relationships and

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7 The murder of two Turkish girls by arsonists in Mölln in 1992 and later a Turkish family in Sollingen in 1993 sparked calls for action all the way to the political top when then President Weizsäcker condemned the tragedy (Joppke, 1999). Sadly little happened afterwards in terms of prevention of discrimination. However, these incidents (as well as an earlier racist murder of two Turkish youths in 1984) were a driving-force for creating unified Turkish organisations to stand stronger in public and claims making. The TGB was established in 1983 in the image of the *jüdische Gemeinde zu Berlin*, and the murders in 1984 impelled a Turkish SPD politician to establish the *Bündnis türkischer Einwanderer* in Hamburg later that year (Kastoryano, 2002a: 133).

8 The German Secret Intelligence Service, in charge of the investigation of racist and right-wing extremist motivated violence and other actions, reports 15,361 right-wing extremist motivated crimes, of which 816 were explicitly violent in 2005. In 2006 the numbers had increased to 17,597 and 919 (Information, 29.11.07).

9 Initiatives within the NIP framework without relation to explicit antidiscrimination issues, such as vocational training and educational skills in general, are gradually improving the marginalised position of both the original guest workers and their descendants. The second and third generation definitely have better conditions than their parents’ generation, but social upward mobility is still low (compared to German youth).

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structures; drawing conclusions in the form of recommendations. The Senate co-operates with other institutions such as Anti-discrimination Network Berlin.

**The cultural dimension of citizenship**

As Germany is the prototypical example of a citizenship regime based on ethnic criteria, I would theoretically expect a high cultural threshold for obtaining citizenship (if indeed possible). This is actually the case in Germany, but as suggested the ethnic dimension has been downplayed in recent years. Different contradictory elements existed in law until 2000. After the 1990/1993 reforms, immigrants were, on the one hand, entitled to citizenship if they had resided in the country for 15 years (Anil, 2007); on the other hand, applicants were required to demonstrate an ‘identification with German culture’, a condition that could not be fulfilled if the applicant was active in an ethnic organisation (Koopmans et al., 2005). Thus, neither naturalisation nor participation in some parts of civil society were basically encouraged. These demands have been changed after 2000 and again with the Immigration Law in 2004 and the NIP in 2007. Now there is a requirement of command of German language. Either the applicant must have a certificate from a language school or must otherwise demonstrate language abilities in an interview with the naturalisation authorities. The practice differs from state to state, and some states have introduced blatantly discriminatory practices by demanding that Moslems take special tests etc. Besides the language test, applicants must also demonstrate a basic understanding of Germany’s civic values, accept the rules of law and democracy and renounce their former nationality. In addition to the integration course, applicants must wow that they accept the rule of law and democratic norms of German society (The Residence Act (AufenthG) of 30 July 2004).

The centrepiece, however, is knowledge of German language, which is seen as the crucial requirement for participating in German society. The new model with 600 hours of German language instruction and 30 hours of civic instruction puts the old ethnic exclusivist conceptualisation to rest once and for all. Language courses used to be offered only to the Aussiedlers who needed a brush-up, but was not offered to other groups as they were not meant to naturalise and stay in Germany. It is now offered to all newcomers and people already living in Germany who lack German skills. Section 44a in The Residence Act defines the latter as a person who ‘is unable to communicate verbally in the German language at a basic level’ or ‘has special integration needs’, i.e. recipients of employment benefits.

The status of the course is vague, however. The right to participate is stressed, although there is not much doubt that is obligatory (even though a given person may not want to natu-
ralise later) so, as Joppke also points out, newcomers are at the same time entitled and obliged to enrol in an integration course (Joppke, 2007: 13). Successfully completing the course lowers the residence requirement from eight to seven years; not enrolling in or completing the course is subject to negative sanctions. These involve a modest cut-back of the social benefits and another vaguely defined statement of non-renewal of temporary residence permits or refusal of permanent residence permits (Residence Act (AufenthG) of 30 June 2004: Article 8.3).

The aim of the integration course is according to Article 43 (3) to:

[A]cquaint foreigners with the language, legal system and culture in Germany and Germany's history. These measures are intended to acquaint foreigners with the way of life in the Federal territory to such an extent as to enable them to act independently in all aspects of daily life, without the assistance or mediation of third parties.

The benefits of learning the language are seen in relation to integration and are basically regarded as the crucial element in that process. It is described in the folder Welcome to Germany (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2005b: 4):

As a consequence, working towards integration, i.e., the peaceful co-existence of native Germans and immigrants, is a crucial task for society, one that we need to address jointly. Integration opens up many opportunities. Most importantly, it offers immigrants the chance to participate in German society on an equal level with German citizens. However, for integration to be successful it also requires your active involvement. This means learning the German language, for instance, or identifying with German norms and values. Language is the key to successful integration. As such it is worth making the effort to speak German with acquaintances and relatives, but above all with German people. It is only through personal contact that you will truly begin to belong here and become confident speaking the German language.

The objectives of the orientation course (within the integration course) are described in Concept for a nation-wide integration course (Bamf, 2005) where a number of bullet points are presented: Develop an understanding of the German State; Develop a positive attitude towards the German State; Provide information on their rights and duties as residents and citizens; Develop the ability to inform oneself (method competence); Enable participation in social life (ability to act) and; Acquisition of intercultural competence (ibid: 20-21). These objectives do not fall far from for instance the Swedish approach seeking to minimise the gap between social classes and hence provide equality through social engineering. Summarising the content, the keywords are participation, empowerment, identification and social equality. These objectives were formulated in a declaration of the Federal Government in 2006: “Erfolgreiche Integration bedeutet Identifikation, Teilhabe und Verantwortung. Dafür sind Anstrengungen seitens des Staates, der bürgerschaftlichen Gesellschaft und der Migranten und Migrantinnen selbst notwendig“ (Bundesregierung, 2006).
The backdrop is an understanding of the German society as striving towards diversity, e.g.: “There is no question of their renouncing their own cultural identity; rather they should become intercultural” (ibid.). The approach taken in Berlin was launched under the slogan ‘Vielfalt fördern – Zusammenhalt stärken’, which has different connotations than the federal slogan of ‘Gutes Zusammenleben – klare Regeln’. The content of the Integration Policy of Berlin (Beauftragte für Integration und Migration, 2005b) is rather similar to the NIP – or rather I would say that Berlin has put its mark on the federal approach.

However, like in the Danish approach to integration, obligations follow rights, e.g. as stated by Schäuble, Federal Minister of the Interior: “Immigrants and our society together must contribute to successful integration on the principle of providing support, but expecting more in return” (http://www.zuwanderung.de/english/3_prognosen.html). Also this point is stressed explicitly in the declaration of the Federal government (Bundesregierung, 2006):

Es gilt, ein gemeinsames Verständnis von Integration zu entwickeln, das wechselseitige Pflichten und Rechte begründet: für Migrantinnen und Migranten wie für die heimische Bevölkerung. Wer Forderungen stellt, muss auch fördern. Wer Rechte beansprucht, muss auch Pflichten erfüllen.

The confusing and contradictory remarks about possible sanctions leave the German approach among the softer ones in Europe when it comes to social control.

Returning to the cultural dimension of citizenship, the strengthened focus on language also stretches to potential newcomers’ spouses brought to Germany via family reunification, who must also complete a language test in order to enter the country.

Despite substantial changes in the German approach to integration – and essentially to national identity – the changes should not be overestimated. Pursuing an approach of ‘interculturalism’, which seems to be the preferred term in Germany, does not mean that the public will feel the same urge for social transformation. Germany still experiences immense problems with racist actions and with discrimination on both street level and the political level as the Turkish walkout from the Integration Summit demonstrated (Sunday’s Zaman, 05.08.07). Several of the people and organisations I talked to in Germany stressed this point and claimed that CDU-driven culturalised ideas of Germanness (Deutschtum) were still dominant (although the important changes have been initiated by none other than the CDU both on federal level and in Berlin). Likewise has the debate on so-called parallel societies and ethnic ghettos pointed to perceived or existing problems (e.g. Heitmeyer et al., 1997; Spiegel Online International, 05.04.06). The recent discussions of ‘honour killings’ point to other areas of conflict between different sets of cultural norms (International Herald Tribune, 04.12.05).
However, there is no doubt that the government seeks to bring immigrant representatives into the process. The creation of the NIP illustrates this; here ten immigrant organisations as well as a number of academics of non-German background took part in the different working groups, which at least on a political level indicates that the notion of integration as a two-way process is being tested.

**Religious rights**

Securing religious rights has been a question for the federal states, which have taken different trajectories. For instance, demands of local mosques have been rejected in some states (*e.g.* Berlin) and accepted in others (*e.g.* in the Ruhr area). The same goes for the call to prayer. It is not as much a question of religion as of what to do to with Moslems in Germany. The idea of immigrants participating as Moslems within society clashes with especially the Christian Social Union’s emphasis on a German Christian *Leitkultur*, but there are more than 3.5 million Moslems in Germany, constituting 4 pct. of the total population, which makes it a hard group to neglect (Pfaff & Gill, 2006).

Generally speaking Islam does not hold the same legal status in the governmental framework as Judaism, Catholicism and Protestantism. Individuals enjoy religious freedom under the German constitution, but full exercise of religious liberties by a group is dependent on state recognition of a religion as a corporate body. Officially recognised religious corporations (*Körperschaften des Öffentlichen Rechts*) (KÖR) have autonomy from the state government and are entitled to offer instructions in the schools, receiving funding in the form of a public tithe, have a say in (public) cultural affairs etc. The conditions have been hard to meet and include that the religious group must have a single organisation with formally constituted leadership, must recognise the constitutional order as the supreme political authority; and must demonstrate that it has been constituted in the state for at least 30 years.

The structure of Islam itself (without a single organisational hierarchy, immense internal variation, and a rather recent establishment in German society) has proved the biggest obstacle. Furthermore the demand for one united Muslim organisation can be seen as an essentialist perception that rests on the assumption that all people coming from Muslim countries are a closely related group, whose supposedly joint interests could be represented by a single delegation (Spielhaus, 2006). The reality is that even practicing Muslims have very few common interest beyond the demand for equal treatment like other religious groups. Both the Turkish

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10 For more information on Muslims in Germany see: <http://www.bmi.bund.de/nn_1018358/Internet/Content/Nachrichten/Pressemitteilungen/2006/Einzelseiten/Islamkonferenz__Kurzinfo.html>.
state in the form of the Diyanet/DITIB and more conservative (or even extremist) fractions such as the Millis Görüs compete to represent the Muslims. German Moslems have organised on local and regional level, but have so far had very little success in creating a national coalition. The latest creation of the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD) only represents a fraction of the German Moslems. In Berlin, however, the Islamic Federation of Berlin (IF), which stands in opposition to the Kemalist and secularist interpretation of Islam by DITIB, became the first organisation granted KÖR status. The focus of the IF is anti-assimilationist and has been criticised heavily by other Turkish civil organisations, e.g. the TBB who has argued that ‘negative religious liberties (freedom from Islamic dictates) are more important to German Moslems than positive ones’ (former chairman of the TBB Kenan Kolat in Pfaff & Gill, 2006: 818).

Controlling Islamic influence has been tested several times over the last years. Two states, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, passed legislation forbidding headscarves, and the State of Berlin passed legislation to ban headscarves and other tokens of religious piety in public workplaces, although former Chancellor Gerard Schroeder strongly discouraged such laws. Some of the individual controversies have been taken to the Constitutional Court, which upheld the basic rights of immigrants in different cases. In 2002 the Court guaranteed the right of Moslems to practice halal slaughters. In 2003 Germany had a headscarf case, the so-called Ludin case, where the court found it permissible to wear the headscarf while teaching. The decision had no effect on the actual practice though, as the state governments administer the educational policy supremely (Leise, 2007). The case was later taken to the European Court of Human Rights, which on June 29, 2004 ruled that policies to regulate and delimitate religious expression in public institutions were permissible. Following the European Court’s decision, other states also limited religious dress in public employment (Pfaff & Gill, 2006). Also this reality seems to be far from the postnational utopia imagined by Soysal and others.

New winds seem to be blowing across Germany the last two years though. With the creation of the NIP a political aim has been to include immigrants and also religious minorities more in an ongoing dialogue as well as the decision making processes. The Deutsche Islam konferenz (DIK) is one such initiative. It has been held twice so far (once in 2006 and again in May 2007) (cf. note 10, p. 183). Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble invited 15 Moslem leaders with different ethnic background and religious affiliations (among these politicians and members of the TGD, DITIB, VIKZ, ZMD, and the Alevi community) to discuss what the government could do to improve the position of Moslems in German society. Before the May meeting there was a public debate whether to include a veiled Moslem woman...
among the participants, which ended with Schäuble only inviting the original 15 members (Leise, 2007). However, the debate illustrates two things: that such issues now are discussed constructively in German society and that the discussion affects social practice in other areas, for instance the recent introduction of female-only language classes.

Immigrant representation and consultative bodies

Germany has an extensive system of representation of foreigners on the local level, although representation in the local decision making practice differs from state to state. Since the early 1970s, several types of foreigners’ advisory councils have been established in the different states. In some states they consist of non-citizens only, while they in other states include representatives from local councils etc. In some states, migrants can freely elect their own representatives; whilst in other regions and at the national level, they are appointed by the government. Voter turnout for the councils in general is very low. The migrant associations that partner in these consultations can apply for government funding. The general evaluation is that they are characterised by political insignificance (Cyrus, 2005). In some municipalities they have the right to put up resolutions to the record of the local council, but generally they are only allowed to make non-committal statements (LAGA, 2004). As in Denmark the councils seems to have an unpredicted function as they serve as a basis for political entrepreneurs, and the mainstream political parties have recruited several activists among these members.

So far immigrants do not have representation at a federal level (as in Denmark and Sweden) although the inclusion of immigrant stakeholders and organisations in the creation of the NIP, Integration Summits, and DIK to some extent takes immigrants into the decision making processes at a federal level. At best these initiatives are ad-hoc solutions and no institutionalised advisory body exists at a federal level today. This stands somewhat in contrast to the fact that the large minority groups are highly organised with a system of local, regional and national organisations, again coming together in different, very large umbrella organisations. However, a strong organisation in no way ensures participation in the established political channels.

Berlin set up the Ausländerbeauftragte in 1981. The bureau holds the Commissioner for Integration and Migration.11 The founder was Barbara John, a moderate CDU politician, who held the post for 20 years. The Ausländerbeauftragte for instance emphasised naturalisation, and the rates have been higher than in other German states (Vermeulen, 2006: 85). The policy of Ausländerbeauftragte has until recently been limited by the both the exclusive integration

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11 See Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin, 2006 for more info.
approach (or lack of same) on a federal level and by restrictive approaches by the conservative wing of the CDU (Personal communication with Barbara John, Berlin 2006).

Looking at the framework for immigrant organisation, the constitutional law gives only German citizens the right to assemble and the right to establish organisations, but the legislation extends this right to non-citizens also, although it is subject to certain clauses under the association law. Political activities that support or engage in violence are not surprisingly prohibited. However, the interpretation has led to more absolute actions, for instance to prohibit organisations like the Anatolian Islamic Federate State organisation founded by self-appointed caliph Cemalettin Kaplan. Also a number of Kurdish organisations have been prohibited. As in many other countries this form of legislation was tightened further after 9/11 (Faist, 2006).

I will get back to a further characterisation and analysis of the immigrant organisations in Germany in the next chapter, but in order to understand the particular structural framework that has been developed today it is necessary to comment on the development over time. From the mid-1940s until 1960s the religious and social welfare organisations were in control of servicing the immigrants. Immigrants were constrained from forming their own organisations and the gradually developing organisations were met with distrust and discrimination (Cyrus, 2005: 18-19). The organisations followed the general development outlined by Layton-Henry almost by the book (cf. chapter 2) and began to demand recognition and support from the German authorities. Confronted with this development and gradually acknowledging the civic potentials of civic engagement of immigrants, the different states began to support the activities of immigrant associations.

Today, immigrant associations receive assistance from different programmes that aim to promote integration. The expenditures for such activities on a federal level were in 2003 574 million €, and 496 million € in 2004 for the infrastructure of integration measures for immigrants and for language training (Cyrus, 2005: 19). The subsidy system in Berlin is less straightforward, as it supports immigrant organisations on the one hand, and on the other holds the conviction that too many (Turkish) organisations could hamper integration (Vermeulen, 2006: 88). Hence, the Ausländerbeauftragte did not support the immigrant organising

12 The Office Responsible for Defending the Constitution investigates the perceived Islamic infiltration. It estimates that out of 3 million Muslims living in Germany 1 pct. is presumed to be Islamic. Among the latter group the most famous is the Millî Görüş organisation with 26,000 members. It should be said that this characterisation is challenged by academic scholars (Schiffauer, 2004).
processes as a whole, but rather offered support to the most prominent organisations which offered best access to the immigrant communities.\(^\text{13}\)

A further characteristic is increased competition between the social welfare organisations and the immigrant organisations on government funds for integration promoting activities. The German welfare associations have generally been the main recipients of funds when they acted as supplier of projects like language or professional training courses. Often immigrants were employed within these associations, however. The pressure arising with the very grand plan of the NIP, most notably the integration course, has created a supply for providers of language and orientation courses and in recent months well-known immigrant organisations have become suppliers of these services and challenged the historical monopoly of the welfare associations. The approach again differs from state to state. Berlin launched different programmes for the promotion and assistance of immigrant associations in the mid-1980s, and a wide range of immigrant associations receive permanent assistance to finance running costs (Blaschke, 1996). North-Rhine Westphalia introduced a programme for promoting immigrant associations in 1997.

As regards programmes of affirmative action none such exist today. In the creation of the NIP it was debated however, whether targeted actions should be taken towards immigrants with special needs to enable them to support themselves or not. So far no concrete steps have been taken.

**Welfare state arrangements and integration policies**

The German welfare model can be characterised by the notion of ‘social market economy’. A model that was conceived by the Finance Minister and later Chancellor Ludwig Erhart and played a crucial role in Germany’s self-understanding for half a century (Schierup et al., 2006: 139). As mentioned in Chapter 4 it differs from the Danish and Swedish models by belonging to a conservative-corporatist type of welfare state (in Esping-Andersens distinction). This model has specific characteristics: provisions arranged through compulsory social insurance (guaranteed people in the labour market replacement levels of up to 80 pct. of previous pay should they be unable to work, including even temporary unemployment); the centrality of the family as key caregivers with the ultimate responsibility for the welfare of family members (most often a male breadwinner model where females (traditionally) are responsible for childcare and eldercare); strong labour market regulations to protect the already employed

\(^{13}\) Mainly Turkish organisations.
(which again allows the household to take responsibility over most welfare functions) and collective wage bargaining (ibid: 139-140). The framework was worked out in times of prosperity and full employment but is seriously affected by unemployment on a grand scale as it is a very costly system that guarantees sustainable living in times of unemployment for the household and hence a system that demands full employment to be sustainable in the long run. However, full employment in Germany has been challenged by the economic processes of globalisation and high wage levels and has left the German model in a fragile state with unemployment rates at or above 10 pct. since the mid-1990s. Moreover there are ongoing structural problems of raising the Eastern part of Germany, which was heavily affected by de-industrialisation, to the Western level of economic performance after the reunification in 1990. The model is also challenged when females are drawn into the labour market as it leaves a lack of caretakers for children and elderly.

These challenges and shortcomings in achieving the goals needed to sustain the system somewhat explains (but does not justify) the absence of a German approach to integration and anti-immigration. The logic seems to be that as long as foreign workers found a position in the labour market things were good, but in times of economic recessions foreigners would presumably have a hard time finding employment and would inevitably become a financial burden, so why try to incorporate them in the system and provide them with even more rights and entitlements? This created the condition for an irregular labour force within a very regulated labour market as illustrated brilliantly in the seminal documentary *Ganz Unten* by Günter Wallraff in 1985. In other words, the migrant workers provided “mobile and flexible labour in an otherwise inflexible labour market” (Schierup *et al.*, 2006: 151). Foreigners do have access to the regular social assistance payments like any citizen, as the social security system does not distinguish among nationality lines in most aspects, although third-country nationals face some discrimination and hence economic difficulties.14

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14 Unemployment benefits demand quite reasonably that able-bodied persons are available for the labour market. However the availability is contingent on surpassing labour market tests, e.g. privileged unemployed is first in line, which means that immigrants cannot be accepted as available to that specific section of the labour market and hence not entitled to social benefits (Cyrus, 2005). Dependency on welfare services may affect the obtaining of permanent residence permits or even lead to the loss of a residence title, and in that way affect access to full welfare services. Normally the move from temporary to permanent permit can be made after five years in the former state if the applicant also holds a work permit. The applicant must not be dependent on welfare at the time of applying and the intervening period until the permit is granted (Morris, 2002). The system has been simplified with the 2004 Law of Immigration and previously different residence categories, e.g. the right of abode (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*) was also dependent on self-sufficiency. The system is potentially discriminatory against women as they often hold part-time low-skilled jobs that do not provide insured employment, thus access to employment becomes coupled to the accumulation of security (Morris, 2002).
Another characteristic of the German model is the particular role held by the semi-public voluntary welfare organisations, which were the first actors to provide integration support to immigrants and today is responsible for an important part of the facilitation of integration measurements. There are six welfare services in Germany, three of which target at immigrants; the Caritas (the welfare organisation of the Catholic Church), the Diakonie (the welfare organisation of the Protestant Church) and the Arbeiterwohlfahrt (labour welfare services linked with the Social Democrats). These organisations facilitated welfare and (later) integration services to immigrants, according to the immigrant’s country of origin – the Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO) being responsible for all non-Christian nationalities (Liebig, 2007a: 29). This distinction was officially abolished in 1998, and the organisations may now offer their service to any group at their own discretion. In reality the separation among nationalities remains. Focus has changed from labour market integration towards social advice and lately the organisations have been the main providers of language training and now also the main contractors for the new integration courses. As these organisations have strong structures and a historically strong position in German society, public funding and of course a high degree of professionalism, they have contracted much of the funding available for integration projects and in this way are competitors to the immigrant organisations applying for the same funds. However, the reformation of the system also meant that immigrant organisations that are members of or associated with the welfare organisations became eligible for counselling service funds (Cyrus, 2005). Indirectly the dominant position of the welfare organisations has also been a push-factor for the immigrant organisations to create stronger associational networks and organisational structures and has led to the establishment of nationality-specific business centres and chambers of commerce etc.

Consequently, the particular institutional infrastructure of the welfare state model in relation to the integration regime has had a clear impact on the immigrant organising processes in Germany. The absence of a framework for integration in combination with particular welfare state structures has created a situation characterised by inflexibility and few possibilities for incorporating immigrants.

Recent reforms of the labour market, seasonal guest worker programmes (agriculture, construction, catering) in the form of bilateral agreements with central and eastern European countries, and programmes for foreign contract workers (workers employed by firms in their home country who come to work in Germany for up to two year) have changed the labour

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market in general and a highly regulated system in particular (Schierup et al., 2006). The inflow of a low-wage workforce on a legal basis has pushed unemployment of German labour upwards, but this new wave of migration also has consequences for the immigrants living in Germany. Without formulating the aim within an integration framework, the German model of long-term employment, the employer and the trade union was a site of interethnic integration and communication, and studies and experience show that racism and discrimination have always been less prominent in workplaces than in other spheres (Cyrus, 2005). But the decline of long-term employment, the decline of full employment and the introduction of contract workers have diminished this type of social integration on the labour market. Hence, I end this description with a quite complex conclusion of the German welfare model, as it one the one hand can be characterised by lack of access due to inflexibility, and on the other hand has increased disintegration and marginalisation when introducing flexible arrangements in the labour market.

The German model today - from Ausländerpolitik to Zuwanderungsgezets

For many years, the statement “Germany is not a country of immigration” summed up our country’s basic policy towards foreigners. The fact that many people come to Germany for a wide variety of reasons and often stay for long periods, even permanently, was largely ignored. Many people closed their eyes to the reality that Germany has long been a country of immigration. The opportunities brought by immigration were squandered, while obvious problems were suppressed rather than dealt with (Former Federal Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily in Immigration Law and Policy; Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2005a: 2).

Schily’s words may seem trivial for anyone else than the Germans, but for Germany they articulate a progressive discursive change from one self-understanding to another. Germany has de facto taken in more immigrants than any other European country but has maintained an exclusivist incorporation system in combination with ad-hoc solutions when solutions were required. The different reforms already mentioned form the basis of the new German approach. The question is whether the new approach will provide the needed framework for integration or the setting will be a form of ‘arriving at a new policy without abandoning the past’ to rephrase the words of Chancellor Merkel.

The German framework for integration can be summarised with the following features:

I. From ethnic to civic conceptualisation of citizenship
II. Immigration, integration and welfare state intertwined and interdependent
III. Social integration as the outcome of integration processes. Language as the basis for identification
IV. Neo-liberal trends also decisive for the German approach – rights and obligations
V. Strengthening civic engagement and participation
VI. Poor instruments against discrimination. The historical trajectory still present
The first feature was discussed in detail in the previous analysis and need not be discussed further. I would like to add a few theoretical conclusions, however. First it should be said that although the ‘cultural’ and ‘ethnic’ threshold has been lowered considerably, the prohibition of dual citizenship still seems to be a large obstacle to naturalisation of the large group of non-citizens (Anil, 2007). Transnational belonging is arguably an important part of immigrant (and most notably Turkish) identity in Germany.16

In the creation of the NIP and with the introduction of the new Immigration Law and Residence Act, Germany officially encourages non-citizens to naturalise but simultaneously refuses to remove the most evident obstacle, which makes the encouragement seem fluffy. However, globally and on a European level there is growing consensus to allow dual or multiple citizenship, now also recommended by the EU and the convention of the Council of Europe (e.g. Schneider, 2005; Hansen & Weil, 2001). As Germany has been following the recommendations of European Common Basic Principles quite closely in recent years, the idea that also this feature would be introduced in law is not unthinkable. Had the German policy makers followed the recommendations of the Süßmuth Commission, Germany would today have had one of the most liberal integration regimes in Western Europe. But for the time being, which is what counts, there is political opposition to this idea, mainly from parts of the CDU, that mirrors the discourses found in Denmark. Also the economical context and criteria matter for the naturalisation process of course. After the legislative changes, unemployed are no longer eligible for naturalisation despite their interest in naturalisation. In times of economic recession and high unemployment rates this clearly affects the rates of naturalisation.

The changes present a challenge to the postnational theoretical framework. The large number of foreigners living in Germany (either due to lack of possibility for naturalisation or from own choice) has been taken as evidence for postnational membership (e.g. Soysal, 1994). The stagnation of naturalisation rates even after the much needed liberalisation of the residence act seemingly supports this claim as well. The claims raised by immigrant organisations for voting rights and access to dual citizenship oppositely indicate that citizenship indeed matters. I will argue that Turks in Berlin easily may have a greater sense of belonging to Turkey or an imagined Turkish community across Europe, but still they orient themselves towards the institutional context they live in as the claims above show. Thus citizenship

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16 An investigation showed that every other Turk in Germany would apply for dual citizenship if it was possible. Among the second generation the share was even higher, with around 75 pct. in 1998 and 2002 (Özcan, 2004b).
should perhaps not be seen in a development of postnationalism but rather of transnationalism. I will get back to this in Chapters 9 and 10.

The second feature involves how integration becomes interdependent on policies of immigration. In the German system further complexity is added to the model by the stakeholder position of welfare organisations within the integration framework. There has been a lot of talk about the alleged ‘crisis of the welfare state’, and in the case of Germany the story does hold some truth. The very expensive welfare model has become unsustainable and even though the unemployment rates (and the German economy in general) are improving, the system definitely needs to be reformed in order to survive. The traces of the former immigration trajectory in this sense have become a hindrance for boosting the economy, which among other things is challenged by demographic changes. Basically Germany needs foreign and not just highly skilled labour, but still until the late 1990s upheld the anti-immigration position. The Süßmuth Commission’s report offered different solutions to this crisis and the title illustrates how integration and integration are coupled in one discourse. I will put the welfare state into the equation and extend the title with an additional component: Immigration, Fostering Integration, Saving the Welfare State. There is a demand not just to accommodate potential migrants in the system, but also to include the people already residing in the country.

The third, fourth, fifth and sixth features of the German integration regime are interconnected and involve the steps taken to secure this goal. Linguistic training (the integration course), education, vocational training, and the promotion of social integration in general are the central elements in the approach to integration. The aim of social integration is framed in a two-way understanding of integration. It is repeated several times in all the aforementioned documents that social integration is a task for society as a whole. Several of the initiatives mentioned could support the drive towards this goal, but the lack of a coherent antidiscrimination legislation and institutions is a problem in terms of achieving this goal. The same reluctance shows itself in the German self-understanding of its future. Diversity is mentioned several times, but very seldom I found a self-definition of Germany as a multicultural country, despite the composition of the population. Rather the somewhat vague notion of interculturalism is employed. The content being that a general competence on how to communicate between cultures is a necessity for all members of society, but as the content of the integration course illustrates it is basically the foreigners who have to learn about the German way of doing things. The fundamental values must be respected etc. When non-German culture is mentioned it is limited to arts, aesthetics, and popular culture (music, food, dance etc.) and
thus resembles the situation in for instance Denmark (e.g. Die Bundesregierung, 2007a: 127-137).

Like in many other European countries a neo-liberal discourse and practice has entered the political agenda and the goal of self-sufficiency is also ranked highly in the German approach. The focus and rights and duties point in the same direction. That said the German approach so far has introduced a softer version, with less focus on sanctions, e.g. cut-backs in social benefits if people do not complete the integration course, but ‘only’ up to 10 pct. Likewise, positive sanctions are offered in case of good results, which like in the Swedish model is carrot over stick. As of now Germany as mentioned seems to have constructed one of the least control-minded variants of civic integration.

Other features include a new focus on ethnic entrepreneurship that has not been promoted until recently, as immigrants not were supposed to establish long-running businesses and hence stay in Germany. This has definitely changed and the investment amount demanded for entering Germany to establish businesses has been lowered just recently. Investigations show that self-employed immigrants fare better than self-employed Germans while the opposite is the case for the employed. This form of self-empowerment and improvement of living conditions is generally pushed in the neo-liberal regimes and seen as a window of opportunity, while it in other welfare models has been regarded as a potential occupational ghetto (Schierup et al., 2006). The political debate has been distressed about ethnic ghettos and lack of societal cohesion in Germany, so this instrument is only now being investigated and promoted while it in reality has been an option for immigrants for a long time as any walk in Kreuzberg will show.

Finally Germany’s particular structure of federal states indicates that the political opportunity structures matter for good or worse. This construction makes initiatives as the one in Baden-Württemberg possible, while the opposite is the case in Berlin where a progressive and liberal approach compared to the other states has been pursued for many years. Neither state characterises society as a whole, but investigating the federal framework indicates that development is moving in the direction of Berlin rather than Baden-Württemberg.
Chapter 8
The interplay between political and discursive opportunity structures and Turkish organising processes in Denmark, Sweden and Germany

Introduction
In this chapter I will first outline the general patterns of Turkish organisations in Denmark and describe how the given opportunity structures have affected the ways in which Turkish immigrants have organised collectively. In the chapter I will discuss both the overall Turkish organisational landscape in a generalised way and present a substantial analysis of concrete organisations. This analytical structure is repeated for the Swedish and German cases. Furthermore, I provide concrete examples of organisational trends that reflect both the structural context and the diversity between the organisations. I find the presence of such differences an important part of the analysis as it contributes to new knowledge of the heterogeneity of the field. Koopmans et al. more or less reject inter-ethnic differences and in fact only acknowledge ethnic and religious cleavages in broad categories, i.e. Turks, Kurds and Muslims, but as the analysis will show the differences and categories of differentiation are far more complex than so. Narrowing the problem even more I am interested in providing further understanding on how the same structural conditions may have different outcomes for different groups.

Following from this I make a concluding comparison on the three cases and look at the nexus of national claims making, political opportunity structures and the transnational challenge. Subsequently, I employ a dual comparative research strategy. Firstly by looking at internal organisational differences within each national setting and secondly by comparing the three national cases.

In the latter part I focus especially on the issues of integration, naturalisation and dual citizenship. Ending the chapter I return to explaining convergent and divergent patterns and the necessity of bringing the transnational perspective into the analysis to overcome the methodological nationalism that indirectly underlines the POS framework.

Organisational patterns in Denmark – a general outline
There is no accurate knowledge on the exact number of immigrant organisations in Denmark as such; however, organisations and associations receiving support from municipal or central level will be registered, but as the subsidies are allocated from various more or less transparent sources there is more than one register. Therefore accurate information on the number and share of Turkish organisations does not exist either. Not surprisingly, the database (see Chap-
ter 2) shows that the Turkish organisations constitute a large share of the immigrant organisations, which indicates that the Turkish immigrants for a start are not underrepresented when it comes to establishing organisations. Out of the 770 organisations listed in the database almost 150 are listed as Turkish (or Kurdish), but a large number of the total (almost 200) are trans-ethnic organisations or do not pay attention to ethno-national backgrounds as such, which means that Turks could also be members of these organisations. Most research tends to agree that Turks have a high level of organisational activity compared to ethnic minorities in general though; the same tendency goes for political participation (Togeby, 2008).

As mentioned in Chapter 5 the Danish system of incorporation formally incorporates immigrants as individuals but *de facto* or indirectly encourages immigrant organisations to organise in ways that can secure representation of the different groups living here in the channels for consultative participation, which basically has meant organising along ethnic lines.¹

Initially the incorporation was facilitated primarily by labour market agencies and trade unions, but gradually the system has been developed with institutional channels for immigrant participation although the influence on the decision making processes must be questioned. The political institutions have changed over the years with the most radical changes occurring with the change of government in 2001. But also these changes are interdiscursively connected to the political path of the previous SR government. The discursive structures have framed the immigrant political issues in a problem-based restrictive way that has had a clear impact on the organising processes and on the immigrant political discourse. This has made certain types of claims making possible and others seem less favourable. The institutional and discursive structures are conflated, which delimits the scope of strategies and action available for the immigrant organisations. My argument here is that the combination of existing substantial rights and a closure towards immigrant identity politics has conditioned a situation where the immigrant organisations display a large degree of adaptation that at the same time discourages claims making wishing to extend the field for negotiation. However, this does not mean that immigrants are left without autonomy and agency, but rather that their organisational profiles and activities are guided in specific directions where the organisations learn how to take advantage of the possibilities that are perceived to be open.

The Danish model comprises elements from corporatist, statist and liberal patterns of incorporation. For at least the last decade the liberal influences have been predominant, how-

¹ Mikkelsen has on different occasions given an overall outline of the history of immigrant organisations in Denmark where the main tendency is that the organisations over time go from being kinship organisations orientated towards the homeland to gradually having more orientation towards the situation in the new country as was also the main finding of Layton-Henry (1990).
ever. This would indicate a greater sphere for variety, but the reality is conformity and convergence in the organising processes. Immigrant organisations in Denmark are generously funded compared to other countries, but the subsidies are coupled to the hegemonic discourse of integration. So although they have other choices, the immigrant organisations are positioned in a field that promotes a high degree of adaptation in the general organising processes.

I nevertheless find internal competition among the Turkish organisations, drawing on ethnic, religious, political and generational distinctions. These differences create competition in the infra-political sphere but do not necessarily alter the overall patterns of organising. Profound different organisations within the Turkish community articulate a remarkably convergent understanding of integration, which affects the purpose and aim of the organisations. The divergence is located in the organising processes taking in a transnational perspective. The question is what conditions these divergences then. Here I find that the national integration regime alone cannot explain the organising processes. In order to provide substantial answers, transnational political ties and social formation must also be taken into account.

Organisational forms

The organisational landscape is rather fragmented in regards to organisational types and structures. The eligibility criteria needed for funding are rather easy to fulfil (cf. Chapter 5). Therefore there are many small organisations with less than 100 members as they qualify for support for daily maintenance etc. Still, these organisations are affected by the increased demands for financial transparency. There are few incentives, however, for establishing large-scale national federations as in Sweden and Germany, as these are no guarantee for increased influence or subsidies.

Mikkelsen’s database contains information on organisations going back to 1942, so a large share of the total 770 has since closed down. The pool of organisations mainly organised by Danes was later supplemented by associations and social and cultural clubs established by the Turks themselves, while the trade union remained the central unit for labour market issues and organised people along social class.

For a few years it seemed like the social identity of belonging to a common workers’ proletariat and struggling to improve living and working conditions was more important than the ethnic background of the individual worker. When the economic recession hit the country and unskilled labour went out of demand, immigrant workers were slowly pushed out of the labour market, which opened up for new cleavage structures and new collective identities. Although the Social Democrats and labour unions tried to prevent the situation, immigrants
gradually became socially marginalised and isolated from the labour market. The trade unions and organisations that mobilise around labour market issues still play a role though. The 1980s and 1990s both mark a peak period in the establishment of new immigrant organisations, but have each their characteristics. I will argue that the emergence of new organisations cannot alone be explained by unemployment and social marginalisation.

The overall organising processes are influenced by at least three different factors. Firstly; the specific opportunity structures have on the one hand created a situation where the organisations articulate various discourses and pursue different types of claims but in reality follow the same trajectories and subsequently act in convergence. This is especially visible in the neo-liberal turn adapted either consciously or unconsciously by very different organisations, e.g. Foreningen O.N.E. and Foreningen Nydansker, Demokratiske Muslimer, making labour market issues an important part of their activities. On the other hand the organisations do not necessarily utilise the possibilities that actually do exist. As I argued in Chapter 5 (following Togeby) the Danish electoral system offers good possibilities of listing and entering the local city councils, but rather few organisations pursued such goals on a collective level. Furthermore I will argue that political entrepreneurship is important and points to agency but at the same time can be seen as a response to closed structures. Basically it can be a tool to achieve social recognition in a society with few openings.

Secondly; the conflation of the political and discursive opportunity structures influences the organising processes. The present openness for a secular reconfiguring of Muslim identity indisputably gains a lot of support from a broad political spectrum while orthodox Muslim identity oppositely is given few possibilities. Likewise are projects and discourses aiming at (in a progressive rhetoric) liberating or emancipating women, e.g. by entering the labour market or (in a prejudiced/negative framing) helping them transcend perceived repressive family patterns. The same goes for projects and organisations working against forced marriages etc. I will argue, however, that what is seemingly a discourse of equality has an underlying twofold aim – enhance self-sufficiency (and hence ease the ‘burden’ on the welfare state) and prevent radicalism.

2 In 1999 72 pct. of all wage-earners with immigrant background were members of a union compared to 87 pct. of the native Danes (Goul Andersen, 1999). Unfortunately I do not have any figures from the Turks as an isolated group, but other studies have shown that the Turks have a high level of membership compared to other ethno-national groups (Schmidt & Jakobsen, 2000). The rates of the second generation isolated come close to those of the Danes (ibid.). Some of the smaller Turkish organisations I talked to had good connections with the trade unions and made arrangements in cooperation with these. Selçuk from Hedensted Alevi Kultur Center told me that 3F for instance has shown great interest in the organisation and has set up meetings in order to learn about the organising processes among these immigrants (interview with Selçuk).
The structural position in the host society is not the only influencing factor; also the political climate and situation in Turkey (more general in the homeland) play an important part in the organising processes and create political and religious cleavages among the Turkish immigrants also in Denmark. This is the third factor. The immigrants arriving from Turkey were both Turkish and Kurdish – the majority Sunni Muslims and a large minority Alevis – however these internal differences mattered less as all first and foremost were workers and part of a working class proletariat. After the military coup in 1980 political and ethnic cleavages were widened and antagonisms between left-wing and right-wing and Turkish (ultra-)nationalists and Kurds blossomed and were also transplanted to Denmark.

In the following I will discuss the organisational patterns found within the Turkish community with respect to the above mentioned factors in more detail.

**The organisational patterns - discourses and content**

Generally speaking I find four main types of organisations to be dominant; ethno-national organisations, religious organisations, trans-ethnic umbrella organisations and recently the young professional networks. The different types of organisations cannot be explained directly as an outcome of the POS but must as argued be understood within the nexus of political, discursive and transnational factors, although one type of factor will be more influential than another type. Their success, however, is more closely related to the impact of the POS. I will furthermore argue that the less contact with the authorities (vertical network ties) the larger internal disputes I find.

**Ethno-national organisations**

The Danish state has officially done little to encourage the establishment of ethno-national organisations, besides the early consultative and social clubs. This type of organisation nevertheless remains an important form of organising.

Two factors stand out as being important for such organising processes. The first one is the continuance of the *hemşeleri* (village-based ties) organisations. These rest on the relatively uniform immigration to Denmark from specific areas in Turkey, mainly from limited areas in the Çorum, Konya and Sivas provinces in central Anatolia. This resembles a form of chain migration (today termed migration networks). The already established networks among these villagers made it almost ‘natural’ and at least very easy to establish extended family organisations in Denmark. Many of these organisations have existed continuously for the last two to three decades. One example is the Kurdish association Bumsuz, which is named after a
(Kurdish) municipality in the Haymana district in Ankara and hence is an association for people originating from this area.³

Joining an organisation is for many members first and foremost a social activity (cf. Moya, 2005). People get together not to change society but to be together with other people. Several organisations have indeed protested against being labelled as political organisations, as one of the consequences has been the loss of economic support. Membership of this type of organisation does not exclude members from joining other more political organisations. This type of organisation will have a high level of voluntarism where most funds come from member fees, a closed structure in the sense that it mainly speaks to specific families or hemşelirîs, a low level of outward communication and will rarely feel the need for detailed homepages or newsletters.

The second factor influencing the establishment of ethno-national organisations is transnational influences from Turkey. According to Østergaard-Nielsen and Togeby there is very little evidence that Turkish migrants have brought the conflicts from home with them to Denmark. I follow their argument to the extent that loyalties have been transferred to Denmark, while conflicts might not have to the same degree, but as I will argue later the struggles that do occur can and must be explained both through internal and external influences and hence also through the political situation in Turkey (Togeby, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a).

The Kurdish fractions - homeland influences and transplanted disputes

The Kurdish organisations are characterised by internal conflicts resting on differences in political aims and ideologies. The left wing supported the Kurdish independence struggle in Turkey although some were against the methods pursued by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The cleavages were strengthened also by the fact that political refugees started arriving from Turkey.

Generally I will point to an opposition between two main Kurdish organisations, Fey-Kurd (1986), which was pro PKK (and for some years the direct representation in Denmark), and KOMKAR (1986), which has managed to attract different types of support groups and has established various sub-groups.⁴ The exact same distinction is found in several European countries including Sweden and Germany and hence presents an argument against the influ-

³ The social form of organisation of the hemşeleri is also very popular today and most of the informants I talked to were members of this or the other organisation without putting too much identity into it. It was just something one did, and a space for cultural activities and celebrations (interview with Mesut A; Interview with Berkhan and Suuyip).
⁴ Mikkelsen deals with this development more extensively (Mikkelsen, forthcoming: Chapter 6). Here I only point to the main trajectory.
ence of the national integration regime on the internal organising processes, *i.e.* parallel organising processes are found in (very) different institutional settings. Fey-Kurd managed to engage especially women, students, artists and independent and self-employed, while KOMKAR recruited less broadly. Mikkelsen explains this difference in members by the fact that Fey-Kurd engaged both work migrants and refuges while KOMKAR mainly attracted the latter (Mikkelsen, forthcoming).

Initially the relationship between the two fractions was hostile but from the mid-1990s and onwards the tensions have minimised if not disappeared. Both groups still exist today where Fey-Kurd is very engaged in direct homeland incidences such as the status of Abdullah Öcalan (who was captured and imprisoned in 1999) and the dispute surrounding the Kurdish Roj-TV. KOMKAR and the two perhaps most important sub-groups *Det Kurdiske Initiativ i Danmark* (IKD) and *Dansk-Kurdisk Råd* (DKR) (formerly *Dansk-Kurdisk Råd for Menneskerettigheder*) are occupied with the situation (for Kurds) in Iraq, the treatment of the Kurdish minority in Turkey and the ongoing negotiations of Turkish membership of the EU. Both organisations basically work with more or less the same issues and problems related to Kurds; the difference lies in the sympathies and methods employed. KOMKAR disassociates with the PKK while Fey-Kurd challenges the framing of PKK as a terrorist organisation. Both organisations have been successful in obtaining support from well-known Danish politicians, journalists and other public figures. KOMKAR has perhaps been better at making itself visible at an official political level. Examples being a conference arranged in corporation with Danish politicians and in 2007 having a delegation from the DKR at the European Parliament. The support has minimal impact though. The fact that ethnic minorities are not incorporated as ethnic minorities in Denmark but as either individuals or immigrants collectively makes identity politics and claims of minority status non-pursuable. Such claims have for instance been of utmost important in Germany. Moreover very few political parties and individual politicians would interfere with Turkish domestic matters. Some parties sceptical of Turkey’s admission to the EU have used the lack of minority rights for the Kurds as an argument for not accepting this admission, but the support does not extend in any way to the Kurdish minorities in Denmark.

On the webpage KOMKAR today tells about two present and one former member of the Danish Parliament with Kurdish background and at least one of these is also an active sup-

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5 In early April 2008 The European Court of First Instance actually decided that PKK could not be regarded as terrorist organisation and should be removed from the EU list of terror.

6 For more on both cases see <http://kurds.dk/>.
porter of the organisation (interview with Özlem Cekic). Fey-Kurd has been more active in arranging street-level demonstrations, the most recent in December 2007. None of the organisations are particularly visible in the written media and a search for the organisations in the Danish newspaper database Infomedia gives very few results and almost solely in connection with other organisations, e.g. Democratic Muslims.

The general trajectory for these Kurdish organisations illustrates a lot of activity in the 1980s when the political opposition and hostility was much more outspoken compared to the late 1990s when the organisations adapted more to the Ministry’s demands in order to receive economic support and into a period with less hostility among the organisations. The examples of Fey-Kurd and KOMKAR show how not only the position in the host society but also influences from the homeland are decisive for the organising processes. Transnational claims making is being placed on the national agenda.

**Religious organisations**

Up through the 1980s a competition between other identity categories, i.e. political-religious organisations, also originating from incidents in Turkey took place. Different Islamic organisations, both moderate and radical, tried to engage the Turkish immigrants, and the Diyanet therefore established a branch in Denmark in 1981 to steer the Turkish immigrants ‘away’ from extremism and to engineer religious activities by providing *hojas* and buildings for mosques and religious guidance and support (Simonsen, 1990; interview with Isa from the Diyanet). Nonetheless the political-religious movement Milli Görüş, which was connected to the now prohibited Refah Partisi in Turkey, established its headquarter in Cologne in 1985 and also created a Danish branch – the *Danimarka Müslüman Göçmenler Teşkilatı* (DMGT). While the Diyanet represents the Turkish State’s version of ‘secular’ Sunni Islam, DMGT represents the opposite and has no connections with the Turkish state besides being sympathetic to the religious developments. Individually they are two of the largest Muslim organisa-

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7 The demonstration was a protest against the Turkish state’s prosecution of 53 mayors from Kurdish municipalities. A petition was sent to Anders Fogh Rasmussen encouraging him not to follow the Turkish accusations and demands to close down Roj-TV broadcasted from Copenhagen. The demonstration was announced by D-KKC and Fey-Kurd on Modkraft.dk, a leftist Danish website that has been sympathetic to the Kurdish independence struggle. This further shows how alliances with the left still are present today.

8 Participating in a cultural event with one of the most famous Kurdish musicians Şivan Perwer (since 1976 living in exile in Germany) in Gellerupparken in Århus, the Kurds I talked to did not really feel any hostility between the Kurdish fractions and basically just wanted to be able to express Kurdish identity in Denmark, Turkey and elsewhere. Thus, I do not expect the organisational strife to be lived out at individual level necessarily.

9 The DMGT is actually the Turkish abbreviation of the Confederation of Muslim Immigrant Organisations in Denmark but mostly attracts Turks (see more about these organisations in Pedersen, 1999).
tions in Denmark although they mainly represent Turks.\textsuperscript{10} This of course has to do with the large number of Turks in Denmark. While Milli Görüş has been forbidden in Germany, DMGT has lived a more peaceful life in Denmark and one of its earlier leaders Zevki Kocer was for a number of years deputy chairman for the Council for Ethnic Minorities (REM) and hence employed by the Ministry of the Interior.

\textbf{The Alevi organisations}

The Alevi organisations provide a very interesting example on both adaptation and transformation. The Alevi started organising rather late and went from being supporters of social democratic parties to being a religious organisation. The Alevi have opposed the Sunni dominance in Turkey for many years, paradoxically by supporting the Kemalist system as it at least held religion outside the political system. The Sunni dominance stayed unchallenged until the late 1970s and most notably the early 1990s. Orthodox Sunni groups had long been harassing Alevi in Turkey and things escalated dramatically with the incidents the June 2 1993 in the city of Sivas with the killing of 36 Alevi artists, musicians and intellectuals attending a cultural Alevi festival and in the outcome of the protest following the shooting at random tea-houses killing one and wounding numerous in the Istanbul neighbourhood Gaziosmanpaşa in 1994 (allegedly done by orthodox Sunnis) where police opened fire and shot into the crowd killing more than 27 protesters (van Bruinessen, 1996).

Up until the 1970s the young generation of Alevi had almost completely rejected the religious aspect of Alevism and only took pride in the social and democratic principles of Alevism. However, the failure of the left in the 1970s and the continuous and escalating repression of Alevi identity initiated a transformation where Alevism gradually was turned into first a cultural and later a religious identity. Another consequence of these incidents was that many Kurdish Alevi who earlier had little support for the PKK now gave considerable support to this party. The incidents further gave way to a massive mobilisation of Alevi living in Europe. A lot of Turks and Kurds with Alevi background came to Europe as work migrants in the 1960s and early 1970s and it is estimated that up to 30 pct. of the Turkish nationals in Europe are Alevi.

The Alevi in Denmark were already part of other immigrant and political organisations before mobilising around Alevi identity. After some years where they lost their subsidies they assumed an organisational form and articulated a discourse that has been highly successful.

\textsuperscript{10} Religious organisations belong to a special category of organisation as they often involve facilitation of a particular mosque and ‘members’ may more or less be the community making use of the mosque’s services but not engaging in other activities than that. Research from Catinet shows that Turks visit the mosque neither more or less than other Muslim ethnic minority groups (Catinet, 2003).
The organisation emphasises education and integration and the Alevis are doing very well compared to other groups. Furthermore the emphasis on gender equality and a very relaxed attitude to religion and religious obligations have placed the Alevis in a favourable position. It would an exaggeration to claim that they get special treatment, but indirectly many other organisations (trans-ethnic, solidarity, integration political etc.) initiate from the Alevi members who provide important interlocks between different organisations. Compared to other organisations the Alevi organisation has far more horizontal and vertical ties than other organisations. The organisation is also bound up in a European network of Alevi organisations directing claims at Turkey and the EU. The trajectory and organisation of the Alevi community is a good example of a proactive strategy. Feramuz Acar, the Chairman of DABF, stated that:

All those who have come from Turkey are called Muslims … we would not put up with that. So we started our own association [Pirder – the local branch of the Alevi organisations] to show that we are different or rather profoundly different and we obviously also wanted to do integration work. We would like our people to be talented and resourceful for society […] How can you put it – to take matters into one’s own hand instead of waiting for the world or the authorities to take action (interview with Feramuz Acar).

Creating linkages between various levels has been an important strategy for the Alevi organisations. Two examples are the interlocks of Yildiz Akdogan and Muharrem Aydas. They were both among the initiators of G-2 – an important youth organisation now closed down. Aydas later went to POEM, joined the political party Centrum Demokraterne, was a member of the Alevi organisation, launched SOS-Tyrkiet, and initiated a TV channel, TV-Mosaik, targeted at immigrants. Today he has withdrawn from all these organisations but works with diversity management (interview with Muharrem). Yildiz started out in local organisations in Århus, joined G-2, is currently spokesperson for Democratic Muslims, initiator of TriEU, freelance reporter for Haber and was in 2007 elected to the Parliament for the Social Democrats (interview with Yildiz).

The Alevis have adapted the official discourse of integration and when they are in opposition to the Ministerial approach it mostly has to do with what they perceive as yielding too much space to radical Islam. The Alevis applied to be become a ‘recognised belief system’ independent from other religious, most notably Muslim groups. Their application was actually successful and the Alevi organisations were officially given the status of a ‘recognised belief system by the Church Ministry in 2007 (cf. Chapter 5). The organisation writes in the press release announcing the new status that: “As Alevi belief system and community we have to this date not experienced problems in relation to living out our religion or opposition or con-
flicts in regards to being integrated into the Danish society” (DABF, 15.11.07). But in interviews with members of the different Alevi organisations the informants emphasised that they, especially after the caricature crisis, did not want to be taken as Muslims and one informant said that the organisation had received threats from anonymous Sunni Muslims who accused the Alevis of deviating from the true Islamic faith. The new status has had an immediate impact on the organisational profile. Shortly after obtaining the new status all the member organisations of DABF changed their respective names to Alevi Kultur Center (bringing the name in congruence with the German organisations) and established a common council of faith (DABF Trosråd) likewise found in the German and European branches. The decision to be recognised as an independent belief system is now being used in other European countries to back up claims of a similar status or being recognised as an independent minority. The Alevis have obtained a similar status in Germany. I will return to this discussion in Chapter 10.

**The impact of the discursive opportunity structures on religious organisations**

The Alevis are not the only ones benefiting from a changed discursive context. The aftermath of 9/11 has without doubt forced Muslims both individually and collectively into different strategies. Some go into defence, some have taken a pro-active attitude to engage in Western liberal democracies, some have tried to change the organisations from within and others again have found a revitalised Islamic spirituality. The public and political debate on social coherence and fundamental values has opened up a space for a new type of collective religious identity that emphasises secularism, social integration and loyalty. The primary example is Democratic Muslims launched by Nasser Khader and others backed by prominent financial persons (cf. Chapter 3).

Turkish organisations, however, have on a collective level been outside of these discussions although the DABF’s application to be recognised as a belief system must be under-

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11 Most of the material quoted in this and the following two chapters are translated by me from documents in Danish and Swedish. The original title and references in general are found in the designated section in the list of literature. Quotations from documents with English and German titles are left as they are as it is presumed that most readers will be able to read these, which might not have been the case for quotations in Danish and Swedish.

12 Similarly, non-Alevi informants told me that they were ‘warned’ against being together with Alevis as they were presumed to be living promiscuous lives (e.g. consuming alcohol) so the position is definitely there and articulated in various ways and with various strength (e.g. interview with Ayçin).

13 The question of who the religious organisations represent is even more complex than for non-religious organisations. The question whether the milieu around a specific mosque or a given religious figure can be counted as representing an organisation is debatable. The lack of a formal hierarchy with Islam also makes it difficult to speak of organisations in an ordinary sense. I include religious figures and spokespersons as representing a broader community, in this case Fatih Alev, in the discussion of collective organising processes as such persons express points of view that can be found on a collective level.
stood in this context. Most often the discussion of being Turkish and Muslim is being coupled with the political situation in Turkey today, i.e. accusations against the conservative-religious AK Parti of transforming the secularist Turkey founded by Kemal Atatürk into a (Islamic) fundamentalist state and secondly the ongoing negotiations of EU membership (Bak Jørgensen, 2004).

However, the Turkish organisations, both religious and non-religious, have claimed that Turkey illustrates that it is possible to be both Muslim and democratic. This point of view is reflected also by the Turkish organisations in Denmark, e.g. by the non-religious TriEU. Among the religious organisations is the, in principle, apolitical Diyanet, which nonetheless mirrors the attitude of the Turkish state and religious reformers like Fatih Alev. Alev is now active in the umbrella organisation Muslimernes Fællesråd, which also has distinct Turkish organisations among its members. He argues that the young generation of Muslims must break with their parents’ generation as it represents another cultural background and practice, e.g. brings in imams with no knowledge of Danish society, customs and rules. This will exclude the youths who feel dislocated in the Danish society even more, he claims (interview with Fatih). This attitude is found among many Muslim youths and in recent years the number and popularity of such organisations have risen dramatically. SOLEN represents one such organisation that holds the views outlined by Alev (see Hussain, 2007 for more on Muslims in Denmark).

**Trans-ethnic umbrella organisations and generational challenges**

The gradual development of the Council of Immigrants and its later configurations indirectly encouraged the immigrants to make an effort to organise in larger entities to optimise their possible influence due to the limited number of members in the council. Whereas in Sweden and Berlin/Germany the organisations are represented as organisations, the Danish variant after 1999 incorporates only individuals.

There are very few umbrella organisations in Denmark compared to other countries. I have found very few successful examples of central representative organs or umbrella organisations. The few successful organisations that have been established were challenged by internal disputes and increased demands from the Danish authorities. The last major one, POEM, indeed closed down in 2004 for these reasons. The first umbrella organisation was established in 1976 when Gæsterarbejdernes Fællesråd i Danmark was established.

This story has been described elsewhere, but briefly summarised overrepresentation of some ethnic and national groups on the board led to the creation of a competing organisation IND-Sam in 1981 (Mikkelsen, 2003). Also IND-Sam had internal problems, and in 1995 a
number of organisations under IND-Sam broke out and launched POEM – *Paraplyorganisationen for de Etniske Mindretal*. IND-Sam and POEM found common ground in a criticism against the construction of the Council for ethnic Minorities, which they found was both too dependent on the state and lacked influence. As an alternative they made a joint venture and established The Ethnic Minorities’ National Federation (ELO) in 1999, although it was in direct opposition on most other matters.

IND-Sam was the to-date most influential umbrella organisation but was forced to close down after it lost its subsidies in 2003 due to problems with the financial accounts. POEM suffered the same destiny in 2004. When IND-Sam and POEM closed there was no basis for continuing ELO either, which also ceased to exist. Financial problems were not the only issues at stake though. The closure of IND-Sam illustrates how the political agenda directly affects the organising features. At this time the notion of and measures against forced marriages were prioritised on the political agenda and in terms of policy making later led to the 24-year rule in 2002.\(^{14}\) IND-Sam received very large subsidies, which as today were given to organisations working pro-actively for integration. Preventing forced marriages is understood as working for integration and hence IND-Sam was in the ministry’s favour.

The other important fact is that the ministry and the administrative agency did very little to keep both IND-Sam and POEM alive. When the subsidies stopped no efforts were made to encourage the immigrant organisations to establish central organs which keep up with the general approach. In 2008 no umbrella organisations have the level of influence or positive position as IND-Sam had.

If the state and political opportunity structures were not favourable for these umbrella organisations the discursive structures were perhaps more inclusive and partially explain the resistance to such platforms. In describing the difficulties in establishing POEM, Muharrem mentions many of the obstacles, such as creating a lean and functional organisation, writing a newsletter and, perhaps even harder, agreeing on a common profile and so on. He evaluates the process by saying that.

\(^{14}\) One of my informants worked as youth to youth counsellor at the time in IND-Sam and discovered that the number of reported incidents of forced marriages in this particular case young persons seeking IND-Sam’s help to prevent being married against their own will, was exaggerated immensely. In his investigations he found only three concrete cases compared to the 187 cases reported by the Århus branch of IND-Sam to Karen Jespersen, then Minister of the Interior (interview with Mesut A). The case later started to roll and Mesut contacted the chairman of POEM, who took the case up in the media as well (interview with Muharrem). According to Mesut the politicians and administrators by then knew the numbers were wrong, but the framing and alleged scope of the problem of forced marriages was maintained and became part of the political decision making process. Mesut also problematised the level of funding to IND-Sam at the cost of other smaller and larger organisations and presumed that joining the political agenda on forced marriages had a spin-off in terms of subsidies. The name is revealed as the story and actions taken are publicly known.
Despite the problems we had successes. The greatest success was visibility. That was the greatest [...] I also think it has to do with ... do the media select us [listen to us] or do they not? This visibility is something you can work with but if the media change their focus then you can shout all you want but you are not visible but over short time they got the impression that here we have an organisation for immigrants and the media do have a need for the immigrant organisations because when the government makes an initiative then it is the Danish mentality that you need to give voice to the counterpart, that is press ethics, for instance now this and that has happened and what do the immigrants think of that and who is more obvious to ask than the immigrants. That was all very good but then we got an influence that perhaps was bigger than we were entitled to (interview with Muharrem).

The quotation illustrates how the discursive opportunity structures at the time, e.g. access to the press, were favourable for influencing the public debate. Later in the interview he says that success does not equal political influence and outcomes, and when it came to the latter they did not achieve this goal. POEM had a number of key issues that they fought for, most notably mandatory direct election to all municipal integration councils; upholding the mother tongue education; but in general they were critical towards the proposed and executed tightening of the law of integration. However, as immigrant organisation and representatives they did not participate on equal footing. When POEM and other organisations received the new proposals they were made by professional and highly competent legal experts, and the organisations had to comment upon the proposals without legal expertise.

Secondly they had very tight deadlines for comments and for everybody the organisational engagement was a sideline and not fulltime profession. In the end it meant minimal influence to POEM, and Muharrem stresses that Danish NGOs like Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke and DCR in this sense had far more direct influence. Moreover POEM, REM and immigrant organisations in general were criticised by people with immigrant background who claimed that these organisations represented only their members (interview with Muharrem).

Youth organisations and solidarity organisations were launched in the same period. The growth of this type of organisations cannot be explained solely through the context of the opportunity structures either. Of course, their profiles and aims also must be understood in this context, but I also see these organisations emerging as a response to the generational differences and hence as an outcome of heterogeneity. Over time the second generation had reached an age where they reacted against their parents’ generation’s way of doing things.

Turkish youths in particular were active in these organising processes and established well-known (in terms of publicity and research, e.g. Mørck, 1998; Siim, 2003) organisations like CEMYC (already in 1989 mainly Turks and Pakistanis), Dialog 2 (1996, mainly Turks), G-2 (1994) and SOLEN (1999). These organisations had an extremely active member base that was very visible in the media and public debates and especially spoke out on integration. Evaluating the substantial influence of the organisations gives almost as bleak perspectives as
the one presented by Muharrem. A member of G-2 says in an interview in an earlier research project that: “I don’t think that much can be achieved through the organisations. I mean, we don’t have any influence in reality” (from Hammer & Bruun, 1992: 17; my translation).

Influence may not be experienced as such, however, and there is no doubt about that the participation in these organisations for some members gave additional resources, experience and social capital that paved the way for influence at other levels (cf. Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Putnam, 2000). It leads towards a possible conclusion that, firstly, many of these organisations were run by a few but very active members who bring their experiences and resources with them to other organisations and, secondly, that organisational activity can be a platform for utilising social capital and points to a form of ethnic entrepreneurship. Despite their high levels of activity, these specific youth organisations have almost all closed down (CEMYC, Dialog 2, G-2) or at best may be considered sleeping organisations.

A possible explanation, also suggested by some of the informants, is that members join these organisations when they are relatively young and the experiences, resources and capital established here are taken to a higher level of influence, in some cases in the integration councils, in labour market positions working with integration issues and in many cases within the established political parties, while others of course lose their organisational engagement altogether for personal reasons or disappointment over the lack of direct influence. In any case the previous discussion shows how the organisations make use of various types of activities and strategies when pursuing distinct claims. Being engaged in the Council for Ethnic Minorities for instance points to a goal of institutional participation while some of the youth organisations’ activities have a more confrontational yet legal aim.

**The ‘liberal turn’ - the emergence of young professional networks**

In the recent years a new type of organisation has emerged, which can be regarded as a direct outcome of the opportunity structures. Subsidisation has become coupled with pro-active activities to enhance integration (e.g. enhancing participation, getting women out on the labour market, working for gender equality, homework assistance and lately preventing extremism and Islamic radicalisation). This can probably be explained by the increased demands of professionalism that several organisations had problems fulfilling. Very few of the mentioned organisations and immigrant organisations in general had a professional staff and were based
The increased demands for receiving economic support clearly affected the organisational profiles. During the 1990s the subsidies from the Ministry of the Interior and later Ministry of Integration increasingly targeted activities promoting integration, and several organisations lost their funding as their activities were deemed not to promote such. The impact on the organisations is easy to identify. The organisations loosing support were fast to incorporate if not the requested activities then at least the required discourse. The same can be said for immigrant organisations in general. I will not dismiss that many organisations have sought to promote integration locally and nationally of their own choice, but there is a striking congruence between formulations and definitions of integration inscribed in the regulations and mission statements of the various organisations.

The regulations of Anatolsk Kulturforening, KUF and SOLEN are good examples (for the latter; informal interview with Zeynep). Dansk-Kurdisk Kulturcenter (part of the Fey-Kurd umbrella) lost the financial support but soon after (in 2004) redefined its purpose and now has guidelines and mission statements resembling the official understanding and the other organisations (Communication with Fey-Kurd). The last example is the now sleeping organisation Stifinder, which illustrates the discursive change in the integration discourse itself. Stifinder takes an explicit pro-active position to integration. In the articles of the organisation it is mentioned that: “The association’s main purpose is to organise youths with another ethnic background [than Danish] besides working for their integration in Danish society” (Stifinder vedtægter: §2.1) and “to contribute to creating a dialogue and building bridge between the cultures in Denmark and thereby create mutual understanding, respect and tolerance between the cultures” (ibid. §3.4). The wording is very similar to the regulations of for instance SOLEN. But Stifinder also stresses the importance of self-sufficiency and labour market participation. The ‘about’ section on the webpage of Stifinder offers the following description:

We – as entrepreneurs and leaders of the association STIFINDER – are a group of academics still under studies; the majority is born and bred in Denmark and the rest born in Turkey. As integrated students we want our share [persons taking higher educations] of the population to increase. We therefore have an aim of providing guidance to youths, with the purpose of enhancing educational opportunities.

It is important to note that almost half the economic resources come from membership fees etc. (Mikkelsen, 2003). Moreover, many organisations have been given the right to use specific premises for free by the local authorities, which might not figure in the fiscal accounts.

Turkish organisations loosing financial support seem to be overrepresented, but I have no explanation besides the fact that they often have a strong focus on homeland issues. Among the organisations loosing subsidies were; Den Tyrkiske Foreldreforening; Dansk-Kurdisk Kulturcenter (part of Fey-Kurd); The Alevi organisations in Denmark; Odder Kulturforening; Tyrkisk Kulturforening i Albertslund; Vejle kvindeforening, Foreningen for Kurdiske Militærmøgtære (part of Fey-Kurd) and Tyrkisk Islamisk Kulturforening.
work, and provide information about the possibilities that exist in the Danish educational system and on the labour market and thereby enlarge their horizon and enhance their motivation for further education.

The instruments of taking responsibility, setting good examples as mentors, paying special attention to acquiring Danish language (specified in more detail in the section titled ‘Room for everybody’) and not least aiming at entering the labour market are coherent with the Danish system of integration. The content of the government programme *A new chance for everybody* analysed in Chapter 5 provides an understanding that comes very close to the self-understanding of Stifinder. Stifinder received the annual ‘integration prize’ conferred by the Ministry of Integration in 2003, which also serves as a marker of coherence between the organisations profile and the incorporation system.

This tendency has become even more outspoken in later organisational developments. Here the organisations specifically target the elements in the integration discourse they can adhere to without being reduced to ‘victims’ of an overruling process of integration. The conflation of the institutional and discursive structures allows this type of identities to be negotiated. The underlying neo-liberal ideology being the backdrop of the Danish system of incorporation is exclusive to some groups and collective identities, but also allows for the emergence of a more liberal immigrant elite.

In this particular case I focus on *Foreningen O.N.E*. O.N.E. illustrates that immigrant organisations no longer need only to belong on the political left and have alliances with other left-wing organisations. This ‘elite’ differs from the elite in other types of organisations, where the elite position has been established through political engagement. This type of organisation is based on the same degree of voluntarism as the other mentioned organisations but creates ties to especially the private sector. O.N.E. dismisses the concept of integration by taking the process for given:

> We want to contribute to a better society where there is no more talk of foreigners and integration because we are of the opinion that integration only can happen when people have understanding and respect for each other. That can happen when both parts accept that integration happens on the labour market. It is not enough to take a good education – we also have to enter the labour market (“Søjlenes oprindelse”, 2007).

This understanding matches the official integration policies, but O.N.E. (and formerly Sojlen) does not see itself as needing public help. Instead it points to its own resources and describes its purpose as:

17 Here it should also be mentioned that a minority within the Turkish community has been active in extreme right-wing groups such as quasi-fascist ‘Grey wolves’ and that conservative and right-wing nationalism has had great support from many Turks since the birth of the Republic. These groups play a smaller role today and therefore also in my analysis.
But what about them [the members]? The already educated and resourceful who managed very well on the labour market. They had not experienced the need for home work assistance during studies and did very well on the labour market. But they still had a need – and this was a need for a network with others with both same and different occupational background. A network that focused on the business world and their joint Turkish area of interest and background. There were many examples of network organisations in Denmark, hence it was not an alternative but a supplement for people seeking a Danish-Turkish network (from “O.N.E.’s stifelse”, 2007)

O.N.E. rests on the same organisational pillars of voluntarism and member fees but is also supported by private firms such as Novo Nordisk. It does not receive public funding. The linkage to the private sector is interesting as it points to a stronger responsiveness to immigrants in the labour market than they until recently have met in the public sector and in integration policies. Whereas the ministry as mentioned only very recently launched an official diversity programme, several large private (and semi-private) companies have long had diversity programmes, e.g. Novo Nordisk, TDC, KMD, Post Danmark. If there is a need for educated labour, these private companies have been more easy-going in incorporating immigrants. The private market is not per se ‘colour blind’, but there do seem to be mutual interests among networks like O.N.E. and the large internationally oriented companies as neither regards ethnicity to be an obstacle – perhaps on the contrary.

This can be further argued when I look at the O.N.E. Magazine published free of costs for the members of O.N.E. 18 The magazine presents financial news of interest to people interested in Turkish economy and interviews or profile portraits of successful Turks living in Denmark. Very often these portraits start out by mentioning the profession and company the interviewee works for, e.g. “She does not do anything in her spare time as she does not have any spare time says …” (O.N.E. interview with Susan Arac). 19 To conclude the analysis of O.N.E. it is a type of organisation that encourages entrepreneurship but does so primarily in the context of the private market where the channels for mobility are relatively inclusive and ethnicity not necessarily a positive or negative marker. 20 Hence O.N.E. at one and the same time is affected by and tries to enlarge the Danish political opportunity structures as it does

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18 For an overview of the issues published go to <http://www.1-online.dk/ONE.pct.20Magazine.html>.
19 Since I started my project several new Turkish and Kurdish organisations have been established which somewhat follow the tendency of O.N.E. They are network-based associations focusing on education, resources, knowledge sharing and have a social aspect. Two examples are the Network for Educated Alevi in Denmark (NUAD) and the Association for Kurdish Students and Academics (Fokus-A). The ever developing network technology and the facilitation of personal networks like Facebook revealed a larger number of groups covering more or less the same issues (where I ‘re-found’ several of my informants), but again I do not have the space to go into this discussion or undertake this investigation.
20 Although the intense focus on the Turkish business world and news on which international firms invest and locate to Turkey also could be beneficial knowledge for some employers and make the Turkish background the asset worth investing in.
whatever it can to make itself independent of the welfare system and integration regime and by doing so live up to the end-goal of the Danish integration policies.

**Overall patterns of incorporation and the organisational landscape today**
The Danish system of incorporation and integration regime have especially set the frames for a rather fragmented organisational topography. Although the Social Democrats were the initiators of the existing integration legislation and discourse in general, the fingerprint of the Liberal-Conservative constellation has made its mark on the legislation and hence on the organising processes of immigrants. The Danish system has not sought to incorporate immigrants as collective groups as would be the approach of a strict corporatist system. Instead focus is on the individual immigrant, sometimes with special attention to other social categories such as gender. The intersection between gender and immigrant background has been given a lot of attention and resources have been allocated to programmes and projects dealing with this group. The goal is to give the immigrant equal standing with other residents *vis-à-vis* the state, most notably on the labour market. Integration and incorporation are sought at local level where the municipalities are responsible for developing the adequate instruments.

Political incorporation at first took place through *Indvandrerrådet* [The council of immigrants] established back in 1985 when the 14 members were elected by the organisations in *Indvandrernes Representantskab* [the immigrants committee of representatives] (Hammer & Bruun, 2000). In 1999 there were 184 member organisations. The Danish state did not promote any types of organisational profile or encourage immigrants to unite in larger ethno-national organisations. The council had formal representation in hearings regarding immigrant issues at the Ministry of the Interior. However, no formal demands or advantages were given to larger organisations or trans-ethnic organisations. This has changed somewhat in recent times where special religious attitudes are favoured. The council changed its name with the Integration Law in 1999 and transformed the Council of Ethnic Minorities, which remains the only formal channel of representation today (*cf.* Chapter 5).21

As mentioned in Chapter 5 the members today are chosen from and by the municipal integration councils. The limited access to representation and decision making processes has indisputably influenced the organisational and individual patterns. Some municipalities tried to establish an ethnic and religious representative board of members which, as mentioned,

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21 The change of name itself is illustrative of the way collective identities are constructed in the public sphere and policy. Here it shows that it took almost three decades after the formal ban of immigration to change the category of immigrants, which carries the possible return inherent to ethnic minority that has connotations of permanency and situates the objects within the majority society. The term ethnic minority has later been elaborated with religious categories.
indirectly encouraged different immigrant groups to organise along ethno-national lines in order to achieve a seat in the local council and hence set the framework for locally based corporatist frameworks not recognised on a national policy level (interview with Hasan). The integration councils have also served as entrepreneurial spaces and opportunity structures for immigrants seeking influence in local and national politics as well as increasing their personal resources. From the state perspective the integration councils are an important tool in creating equal possibilities and secure participation on equal footing with the native Danes. Most of the people I interviewed as individuals and as representatives for a given organisation were sceptical of these councils as they primarily regarded them as pro forma institutions without real or substantial power. In the 2007 national election several candidates with immigrant background had a past in the integration councils and this ethnic-political entrepreneurship has become a visible tendency in Denmark.

However, the seemingly liberal Danish approach is not altogether liberal, as discussed in Chapter 5. A pure liberal approach would aim to create equal opportunities for all in order to enhance the individual’s chances of self-support, but the relatively weak antidiscrimination efforts, direct and institutional/structural, do not live up to this goal. Neither would I expect to find intermediating institutions like the integration councils. Liberal approaches would also be expected to be much more decentralised, as for instance in the UK, than is the case in Denmark. Instead the Danish approach contains elements of corporatist, statist and liberal approaches by having liberal goals of self-sufficiency and self-responsibility, but at the same time making use of social control and top-down control. This is perhaps best illustrated with the integration tests, integration contracts and many criteria to apply for naturalisation. The current government’s political approach has indeed been characterised as ‘contract politics’. Likewise are most important decisions taken at a national central level while the municipalities are left with implementing the laws and instrument that may create a difference between discourse and practice.

The Danish system in this sense is hard to define. On the one hand there is a general openness for immigrants organising collectively as anybody is free to establish associations etc. This provides a good setting for bottom-up activities in civil society, but on the other hand subsidies are being allocated in accordance with a narrow definition of integration and thus controlled from central level. No advantages are given to particular ethnic groups, other than locally based initiatives targeting this or the other ethnic group, but it can be argued that there is a lot of focus on activities preventing Islamic extremism, democratisation processes within Islam and emancipation of Muslim women.
As Togeby has argued, I will also claim that the Danish society is closed in regards to opportunities for immigrants (Togeby, 2008). Although the legislation aims at providing equal opportunities, the reality remains that it is much harder for immigrants to gain social status through the normal channels. Still today where Denmark is *de facto* a multicultural society immigrants are underrepresented in the higher strata of society, although some groups have shown strong social upward mobility. Especially the media sector appears to be extremely ‘white’.

To overcome this dislocation two options for social recognition then seem to be available, that is political entrepreneurship or entering the ‘integration industry’ (*i.e.* integration workers, counsellors etc.). After responsibility for facilitating the integration process was moved to the municipalities a large number of job positions in the integration area have been established at different levels, interpreters, neighbourhood programmes, language schools, social workers, at municipal level, ad hoc projects and so on. A large share if not most of such positions are occupied by people with immigrant background. The problem seemingly is that many people have ended up in this occupation as it has been the only possibility for a career. This opportunity rests on the dubious premise that immigrants necessarily know what is best for other immigrants. Also a large share of my informants presently belongs to this category or had done so previously. One informant, who wishes to be anonymous in the specific case, had just submitted the master thesis for a university degree and still had bleak expectations about ending in such a position as the only offers X had received so far, was of this kind. For others, however, it can as mentioned be a site for gaining access to the political channels. In this sense it can be a necessary evil, although I should also be careful not to rob agency from people who pursue such a career out of social engagement for instance (*e.g.* interview with Özlem Cekic).

Several of my informants are or have been active in mainstream political parties. Nine had been listed for municipal elections, three had been elected. Three were candidates in the 2007 national election and two were elected to parliament. Several had previously been active members of integration councils in different municipalities. The high number definitely indicates that participating in established political channels can be an outcome of being active in civic organisations. In the interviews it also became clear that neither opportunism nor pure altruism seldom were the driving forces. Instead the given persons had experienced the limita-

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22 This is also supported by Togeby. In the 2001 election she has a figure showing the occupation of nominated and elected candidates with an ethnic minority background. Integration workers account for 27 out of 146 listed candidates and 15 out of 51 elected candidates and thus are over-represented compared to other occupations (Togeby, 2008).
tion of immigrant organisations’ influence on the political decision making, as described by Muharrem above, and took their experiences and network a step further up the social ladder. Most of the elected persons stated that their main interest was not integration issues, but felt that they were pushed into having an opinion about these issues due to their ethnic background. However, other non-political informants also said that I should visit a Turkish social association when the politicians visited them during election times and hear if they only spoke of environmental issues or the health sector? Of course not, were their judgement, like any others they take advantage of their background and try to mobilise voters on issues they care about, which very often will include issues of integration, discrimination and inclusion. On the other hand Susan Arac, who was elected to the city council of Århus, presents a legitimate argument when she asserts that considering the number of personal votes and the districts they were given in, not only Turkish voters can account for the very large number (interview with Susan Arac). She got the second highest number of personal votes out of the 35 candidates and thus came in second after the candidate who was elected mayor (http://www.kmdvalg.dk/av/a464751A.htm).

There may be many reasons why people choose to engage in organisational activities and it definitely demands a sensitive analytical perspective to reach the individual understanding. On a general level this discussion refers back to the collective action dilemma, which Olsen pointed to almost 25 years ago (Olsen, 1965). If the goal is collective influence which is achieved anyhow why should the individual bother to participate (i.e. the free-rider dilemma)? Here it can be argued that rational utility is not the only decisive factor and social relations rather than political influence may be the primary reason for spending time in a given organisation (cf. Moya once again). Still, the question remains what collective activities people choose to engage in rather than why (Bengtsson, 2007).

The Turkish organisations in Denmark are like the general organisational landscape characterised by fragmentation. In Figure 8.1 I attempt to map the interlocking links between the different organisations. We see that for instance the Kurdish organisations have fewer interlocking ties with other organisations than for instance the Alevi. The organisations included in the figure are a selection of organisations obviously, but not selected totally eclectically as they reflect the most prominent Turkish organisations active in the mentioned years and mentioned in the present analysis. I could also have included other minor Kurdish organisations connecting to either Fey-Kurd or KOMKAR, but it will not change the general tendency outlined.
The impact of the integration and citizenship regime stands as a major internal influence on the organising processes. Another influential factor is that even non-citizens in most ways enjoy substantial rights in most regards, which arguably have suppressed and diminished much of the claims making we find in other national settings providing less extensive rights. This is also an explanation for a general organisational decline in both new organisations and activities. What could be expected is that the claims making would be directed towards issues and areas where non-citizens and immigrants do not have access to the same entitlements as citizens, but as will be elaborated shortly this is not happening to any extent either. Again I will point to the POS having an identifiable impact but very much on the discursive level. The issues deemed important for many of the immigrant organisations are the same issues highlighted by the Government and Ministry of Integration, e.g. employment, gender equality, female participation etc. Saying so does not mean that these issues are not important for the immigrant organisations, but it is striking to see how they have gained hegemony in the organisational discourse also.

An immediate example can be given with the religious interest organisation Democratic Muslims, which on their listed activities advertises a ‘jobbørs’ [event where applicants can...
meet companies with open positions, and companies can meet qualified job seekers], which
the organisation has organised some times. Providing such a possibility for unemployed Mus-
lims presumably is a good thing, but why would it be the task of a religious interest organisa-
tion working with democratisation processes within Islam? The underlying assumption is
twofold: Radicalism can be hindered if people become participants on the labour market, and
through their presence at this particular event the candidates position themselves as the ‘good’
unproblematic kind of Muslims.

Other organisations would stress the empowerment aspect or emancipatory perspectives,
but the end goal is the same – getting immigrants on the labour market. The interesting find-
ing is that the incorporation of this discourse is happening across the organisations and reli-
gious, cultural, student and ethnic organisations strive towards the same goal. This discursive
convergence can perhaps also explain why there is less ideological strife between the different
fractions within the Turkish minority groups in a Danish context.

The conclusion for now is that there is outspoken convergence in the understanding of
integration in Danish society among the different organisations, but the divergence occurs and
becomes visible especially when I investigate the transnational engagements and what I term
transnational identification. The other important cleavage structure is centred on religious
categories and what can be identified as a discursive shift from being guest workers to being
ethnic minorities to being, externally, Muslims vis-à-vis Danish society and, internally, de-
mocratic Muslims vis-à-vis extremists/orthodox/fundamentalist/radicals.

Moreover I will argue that the internal differences on one level have decreased in terms
of open struggles, although the internal variation remains rather widespread reflecting the
ethnic, generational, and religious diversity. On another level the differences have become
more outspoken and especially the Alevi organisations’ formal application of not being con-
sidered as a Muslim minority group has sparked this tendency where it reflects a distinction
transplanted from Turkey. Despite these conflicts and differences I did find some interlocking
board members among the different organisations included in my analysis, but the general
overview also shows that the major differences are still found along religious and ethnic lines.

**General organisational patterns in Sweden**

Participation in associations and organisations has a long tradition in Sweden. A report pub-
lished in 2003 by Statistics Sweden estimated that 90 pct. of Sweden’s population in the year
2000 were members of one or more organisation (Statistiska centralbyrån, 2003). Narrowing
the focus to immigrant organisations the institute of immigration in Borås in 2002 listed 80
national (ethnic) federations encompassing 2,300 local associations, but the number could easily be much higher as associations not funded by the public need not be registered (http://immi.se/sweden/).

The Swedish way of including associations is embedded in the tradition of *folkrörelse*, popular civil society movements (labour, spiritual, youth, and women social movements), which played a crucial role in building the social and political structures in late industrial society and most importantly promoting equality. Migrant organisations are expected to fill out the same function, with emphasis on education and adaptation in order to achieve the goals of equality, partnership and freedom of choice (Ålund & Schierup, 1991; cf. Chapter 6). This form of popular movements and civic engagement hence contains an inner logic of integration. Alongside or even out of this development grew a very strong corporatist tradition; that is institutionalised forms of organised interest. The Swedish state sought to incorporate and include interest organisations in the political decision making processes and regarded this as an important welfare political instrument (Bengtsson, 2004; Borevi, 2002).

However, a privileged position in labour market issues and labour organisations and unions has made non-class based interests hard to pursue within this system (Odmalm, 2004; Soininen, 1999). This aspect goes back to the previous discussion on diversity and culture in Chapter 6. My main argument, which I will unfold in the following sections, is that the Swedish corporatist system has forced the organisations into a high degree of internal convergence with very little room for variation. Divergence is still present in the organisational processes, but while the convergence is directly coupled to the discourse of integration the divergence shows itself in the development of transnational social spaces. The first part will be discussed in this chapter, while I will return to the transnational discussion in Chapter 10.

**Organisational forms**
The predominant form of immigrant organisation is the ethno-national organisation which is directly linked to the Swedish corporatist approach. Since 1975 with the introduction of the multicultural policy the Swedish state has subsidised immigrant organisations with different changes over time. Subsidising ethno-national groups gives ethnic minorities the possibility and right to protect and develop their cultural heritage, and their organisations are assumed to be the official channels for incorporation. As such the organisations have the same status as Swedish organisations and are hence recognised as formal partners, although their real level of influence has been disputed (e.g. Aytar, 2007). Also it should be noted that the criteria mentioned in Chapter 6 must be fulfilled and for instance the Alevi community in Sweden is
left without support due to low membership. Table 8.1 depicts the Turkish, Kurdish and Assyrian federations subsidised by the Swedish state.

Table 8.1 Organisational support 2007/2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federations</th>
<th>Members numerically</th>
<th>Number of organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrianska Riksförbundet*</td>
<td>21,225</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkiska Riksförbundet*</td>
<td>10,704</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdiska Riksförbundet*</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svensk-Turkiska Riksförbundet*</td>
<td>3,529</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assyriska Riksförbundet*</td>
<td>8,798</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdiska rådet*</td>
<td>3,710</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdiska Unionen*</td>
<td>3,102</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assyriska Ungdomsförbundet^</td>
<td>3,617</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrianska Ungdomsförbundet^</td>
<td>8,539</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkiska Ungdomsförbundet^</td>
<td>3,585</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistans Demokratiska Ungdomsförbund^</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The particular institutional model has created a hierarchy of central and/or umbrella organisations on a national level that are offered possibilities for influence in various consultative bodies and advisory councils. The national organisations have a larger number of local membership organisations differing between ethnic groups and national federations. The system is extremely fixed, however, and until 2007 this specific form of organisation constituted the only possible way of organising if the organisations applied for financial support. Most of the organisations also have women’s and students’ divisions, sometimes both on local and national level. This is a consequence of the incentive structures as organisations were rewarded financially for activities targeted at women and children as these groups were perceived to have special needs and potential for social change and mobility.

Another characteristic is that many of the organisations I include in my study have stronger ties to European and international confederations than was the case in Denmark. Some of the national federations like the Assyrian Federation was also initiated and supported by international groups. The creation of national federations has a longer history than the introduction of subsidies in 1975. Already in 1829 the first Finish organisation was established in Stockholm, and in 1909 the first Italian organisation appeared. The establishment of new national organisations later follows the inflow of work migrants, which in the 1970s ends up with an official multicultural approach. It is hard to say if the historical tradition for establish-
ing national organisations also has had its impact on later organising processes, but considering the large number of immigrants the relatively low number of trans-ethnic organisations is remarkable.

**The organisational patterns - discourses and content**

There are deviating opinions on the purpose and orientation of ethno-national organisations in Sweden. Odmalm argues that there is little homeland orientation among Turkish groups in Malmö while Dahlstedt’s study of immigrant organisations points to a larger percentage of the organisations being interested in homeland issues (Dahlstedt, 2004; Odmalm, 2004). My own investigation actually came to a joint focus on both homeland and ‘Swedish’ issues among the organisations, partially explained by the explicit transnational activities of some groups. Like in the Danish case the organising processes depend on the inflow and status of people where refugees tend to be more political than labour migrants for instance.

Generally speaking I distinguish between four main types of organisations, which proved more prominent than others: ethno-national organisations and federations, antidiscrimination movements, trans-ethnic umbrella organisations and religious organisations. The first is the predominant type of organisation. Within in these rather broad categories there is also room for divergence although there seems to be fewer disputes and conflicts between ethnic groups in Sweden than in Denmark.

**Ethno-national organisations**

Looking first at the work migrants, immigrants from Kulu and surrounding villages provide a striking example of a migration network. An estimated number of 30,000 people migrated from Kulu to Sweden, of which 20,000 live in Stockholm alone (SvD, 22.10.06; SR, 15.12.06). This has obviously had immense consequence for Kulu, which has become a rather prosperous city due investments and remittances and hence provides an illustrative example on how transnational economic circuits affect the place left behind. Today one even finds an Olof Palme Caddesi [street] and can eat at restaurant İsveç [Sweden] in Kulu. People left Kulu for unskilled labour and jobs in the service sector but still have been able to send back money although life may not have turned out as many expected. Today people have migrated from poorer parts of Turkey (mainly Kurds from Agri) (ibid.). However, it is these people who today are members of the Turkish and Kurdish organisations in Sweden and this parallels the social organisations in Denmark.
An example of a long-running hemşeleri association is *Alby Turkiska Arbetar och Kulturförening* (see Appendix A), established by Kulu Turks in 1973. The organisational story is described in the following way:

The families who came to Alby often knew each other from back home. People originated from villages in the same area. Often people were also connected by family ties. In a foreign environment it was natural to stick together. There were so many things [language, knowledge etc.] in the Swedish society that one needed the help of others to manage (Om oss).

This story again could describe the conditions and experiences of Turks living in Denmark or elsewhere, but the difference in organising processes is influenced both by existing migration networks and it follows by the Swedish form of incorporation. The association states in the same section that:

[…] Swedish organisational principles were unfamiliar to the immigrants from Kulu. When the Turks established their organisations it happened after a Swedish model and only after Swedish example […]. When the organisations were created they were given, precisely like any other organisation, support from the municipality. The formal criteria were relatively simple. But the organisations were met with other even more diffuse ideological expectations to the organisation (ibid.).

The story of Turkish organisations like Alby Turkiska Arbetar och Kulturförening illustrates how the Swedish corporatist model functions. People are incorporated as individuals belonging to a collective, which is then situated in the representational opportunity structures. Alby Turkiska Arbetar och Kulturförening is member of the *Turkiska Riksförbundet* (TRF) and *Turkiska Ungdomsförbundet* (TUF), which again are connected to European organisations, and it is connected also to a women’s organisation, *Alby Kvinnocenter*. It is funded by *Ungdomsstyrelsen* (cf. Chapter 6) and is member of and supported by the local branch of ABF (the Workers’ Educational Association) and thus indirectly linked to the Social Democrats.

Alby Turkiska Arbetar och Kulturförening and its ties with TRF and other organisations provide just one example of an organisational network combing local, national and European levels. Leaving aside the European level for now, the outlined network illustrates how the Swedish system functions in practice. The Turkish migrants are sought incorporated in the same manner as the various *folkrörelser* aimed to do through workers, women’s and youth organisations. The same types of organisations are identified in the Turkish way of organising. The organisations are pushed to emphasise cultural integration and education in order to achieve the goals of freedom of choice, partnership and equality and the incentives are presented in form of financial support. The overall goals of integration have as mentioned been altered with the recent developments in the integration law and now emphasis is placed especially on reducing social marginalisation and promoting integration. But the mission statement of the Alby Kvinnocenter is an example of the continuity in the integration discourse and the transformation:
We want to break the social marginalisation of the women. Offer them employment that makes sense. Offer them possibilities to develop their Swedish language skills. Through information increase their understanding of the Swedish society (http://home.swipnet.se/albykvinnocenter/sidor/varforenig.htm).

Ethnic Turks, however, only constitute one fraction of the supported ethno-national organisations, Kurdish and Assyrian organisations are the other prominent groups. The organising processes of these groups to a large degree parallel the structure just outlined.

**Kurds in Sweden**

The Kurdish organisations apparently have had fewer internal conflicts than in Denmark and Sweden and actually seem to be working together on many issues and have interlocks connecting some of the organisations (see Fig. 8.2). This is somewhat peculiar as I find the same political fractions and ties to political parties and movements in Turkey as in the two countries up for comparison.

The majority of the Kurds in Sweden originates from Turkey. The Kurds in Sweden started arriving as labour migrants in the 1960s (also from the Kulu area) and later in a larger number as refugees from Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The chairman of the *Kurdiska Riksförbundet* (KRF) emphasised this fact and considered this as the reason for the moderate success of Kurds in Sweden, that refugees were intellectuals and political dissidents, which in her opinion is equal to possessing resources (interview with Aycan Bozarslan). Aycan states that “Sweden is a centre for Kurdish intellectuals, politically active and authors also today”. This self-understanding was somewhat supported when I talked to Turks and especially Kurds outside Sweden who categorically described the Kurds in Sweden as ‘very political’. After Iraqi Kurdistan and the Caucasus Republics, Sweden is indeed the country with the highest rate of (Kurdish) cultural activities (Khayati, 2008). Sweden is home for two Kurdish TV channels, several local radios, three main umbrella organisations with international and transnational connections, three publication centres, and the country in general plays an important part in upholding and developing Kurdish identity. In 2006 the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Nordic Representatives hosted the first ever Kurdish Gala soirée attended by both Swedish and Kurdish celebrities (ibid.). The transnational connections are further expressed by the recently established Kurdistan Airlines providing direct flights between Stockholm and Arbil.23

The overall organisational structures also differ between the countries, where the Kurdish organisations in, for instance, Germany are characterised by more fragmentation and smaller units compared to the organisations in Sweden. KRF is the largest of the Kurdish um-

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23 The capital of the Kurdish autonomous region in Northern Iraq, Hewler in Kurdish.
brella organisations and has 35 member organisations as well as separate women’s and youth organisations. It is furthermore connected to both ABF and SIOS. Besides the KRF there are two other large umbrella organisations, the **Kurdiska Unionen** and the **Kurdiska Rådet**, and a large youth organisation, **Kurdistans Demokratiska Ungdomsförbund**. In addition, there exist numerous smaller but well-established organisations. KRF is unique in the sense that it has managed to incorporate Kurdish minority groups from all parts of Kurdistan and all material is distributed both in the Northern Kurdish Kurmanji dialect and the Southern Sorani dialect. It is independent of political parties but links up to explicitly political organisations outside Sweden (PKE-Platform and Dem-Kurd) and is actively engaged in the discussion of minority rights in Turkey with much emphasis put on the status of the Kurdish language(s). These international organisations again are interconnected to other umbrella organisations, e.g. the various fractions of Komkar (which also has a Swedish fraction **Svensk-Kurdiska Arbetarföreningen** KOMKAR-Swed). Komkar actively supports the Right and Freedom Party in Turkey (**Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi**, Hak-Par) and the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK) (as well as regional pro-Kurdish parties). On its webpage KRF links to the site of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). KRF is part of a complex network of national, regional and international organisations but many of its activities are indeed centred on Swedish conditions and especially on educational and gender related issues.

The second largest Kurdish umbrella organisation **Kurdiska Rådet**, founded in 1994, can be situated in a similar type of network linking up to the European Kon-Kurd confederation whose members include the Danish Fey-Kurd organisation and supports the PKK. So I actually find the same political divisions between the Kurdish groups in Sweden as in Denmark but with apparently fewer internal disputes. This can for instance be backed up by interlocks between KRF and **Kurdiska Rådet** (interview with Gulan). It is difficult to tell what has caused the relatively peaceful co-existence however, *i.e.* the type of Kurdish migrants/refuges, the Swedish political opportunity structures or a third explanation, but the corporatist inclusion of the various Kurdish fractions and the pre-defined emphasis on issues like education, integration and equality has arguably steered the organisations towards rather similar organisational paths, which may make similarities more visible than differences.

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24 An example of the equilibrium is the announcement of a public demonstration in December 2007 against Turkish plans to invade Northern Iraq. The demonstration was organised by **Samordningskommittén för kurdiska politiska partier i Sverige, Kurdiska Riksförbundet** and **Kurdiska Initiativet** (Fkks, 24.10.07) and supported by Gulan Avci.
Sweden has until recently been very supportive in maintaining Kurdish languages (and expressing Kurdish culture). Although Kurdish is no longer considered an ethnic minority language, the previous support has had an impact on the organising processes.

**Assyrians in Sweden**

The Assyrian and Syriac minority groups are other examples of the larger ethnic groups in Sweden. Their trajectory both resembles and differs from the Kurdish one. The Assyrians first arrived as refugees in a very limited number (205 people to be exact) in 1967. Later another small group was accepted as refugees in 1972 and again in 1976 (Nordgren, 2006: 60). The Assyrians are a Christian minority group from mainly Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, and the majority belongs to the Syrian-Orthodox Church.\(^{25}\) Their status kept changing throughout the 1970s and 1980s where they at some periods were regarded as refugees and at other times could not get asylum, but as also the Assyrian community is an example of a migration network many people gained access via family reunification. Many of the Assyrians ended up in Södertälje due to the constantly increasing number of Assyrians living there. Today Södertälje is known as the unofficial capital of a non-existing Assyria.

The new political and structural context paved the way for disputes between mainly two fractions of the Assyrians/Syriacs. The first two decades the Swedish state categorised all members of these ethnic groups as Assyrians, but tensions grew between the Assyrians and the Syriacs, although on a discursive level. This conflict is known as the ‘name strife’ and has to do with identity, self-identification, language and culture. One group considers itself Assyrians and belongs to the Aschurch of the East; others term themselves Syriacs, stressing the Aramaic heritage; a third denomination calls themselves Kaldéer because they belong to the Kaldeian-Catholic Church, but they also claim Assyrian ethnicity.

During my fieldwork I only talked to Assyrians, but looked into material of the Syriacs as well. These two major fractions established each their confederation Syriska Riksförbundet and Assyrianske Riksförbundet (ARS being the first one established in 1977 and SRF following in 1978 at the named Suryoyo Riksförbundet). International Assyrian and Syriac organisations played a prominent role in shaping the organisational structures, *e.g.* Assyrian Democratic Organisation (ADO), Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA) and a bit later the Syriac Universal Alliance (SUA). The latter was established in 1983 and has its headquarter in Sweden.

\(^{25}\) There is estimated to be around two million Assyrians worldwide. The majority, estimated at about 800,000 live in Iraq and 500,000 in Syria, but almost 400,000 have ended up in Europe and the US either as work migrants or as refugees. Of these almost 80,000 live in Sweden and a similar number in Germany (Nordgren, 2006).
The young Assyrians have been very active in restoring the Assyrian language for instance, bringing it closer to an ‘original’ state (interview with Abboud; see Chapter 10). Exactly the understandings of language, history and culture have been the main marker in the dispute between the two national federations. To my knowledge there are no direct interlocks between these organisations besides membership of ABF and SIOS for both federations (see Appendix A and Fig. 8.2).²⁶

The dispute takes place on an intellectual level, however, and to my knowledge, again, no violent confrontations have taken place in Sweden. Both adhere to Christianity, but belong to each their denomination. They also take part in a joint international discourse revolving around centuries of persecution perhaps culminating with the genocide in Turkey in 1915 where almost half the Assyrian population lost their lives (according to Assyrian sources). The genocide termed Seyfo in Assyrian or literally ‘year of the sword’ is an important marker for Assyrian identity today. In the words of an Assyrian youngster: “I knew what Seyfo was before I knew what Hennes & Mauritz was” (quoted from Nordgren, 2006: 131; my translation).

The organisational structure reveals rather similar structures, which also here can be explained by the Swedish incorporation system. Both federations have created separate women’s and youth organisations, both stress education and integration, and aim at obtaining political representation. In an interview with the board of ARS I was told that an internal investigation showed that 140 persons with Assyrian background stood candidates for election in 2006 (Interview with Andreas, Abboud and Rachel). However, the cultural reconstruction and language restoration are definitely the main focus for both organisations. This focus is emphasised already in the first issue of Bahro Suryoyo:

Everything that exists in the world changes over time. This also implies that people [i.e. cultures] can change and even disappear. Actually the idea of religion is that every human is a guest, hence the peoples of world [again cultures, tribes etc.] can also be guests. BUT IF THE PEOPLE HAS PROOF OF ITS CULTURE then the people has not disappeared (Bahro Suryoyo, 1979:1; Capital letters in original).

²⁶ In 2001 the syrianska assyriska akademiker i Sverige (SAAIS) was established as an interest organisation for young academics with Assyrian and Syrian background, working for the same goals as the Danish organisation Stifinder previously mentioned. According to a member of the Board, the organisation is totally independent of religious and political affiliations (correspondence with Aylin, Saais). In a press release from Ungdomsstyrelsen the Syriansk/Assyriska Riksförbundet is listed as receiving support from the Board in 2008 (Fördelning av statsbidrag till organisationer bildade på etnisk grund perioden januari – juni 2008). It is the second example of an organisation carrying both the Assyrian and Syriac name. The federation does not seem to have a webpage, and unfortunately I have not established contact with the federation. I assume, however, that the federation represents both groups and thus unites two groups, which have been in opposition for a long time. Like the two other federations, Syriansk-Assyriska Riksförbundet is based in Södertälje.
Hence, the organising processes of the Turks, Kurds and the Assyrians/Syrians differ in some ways, but follow similar organisational trajectories in other ways and have the exact same cooperation partners and position within the political opportunity structure. Even where there have been infra-political differences as the ones just mentioned between the Assyrian and Syriac communities and federations the overall mode of adaptation is one of convergence.

**Trans-ethnic umbrella organisations**

The corporatist system and tradition for collective organisations in various areas of society also have set a framework for trans-ethnic organisations representing immigrants in different trades and spheres. Two organisations stand out in scope, member base and constituency; SIOS and the National Federation of Immigrants (IRF). SIOS goes back to 1972 (by that time named FIOS) and IRF was founded the year after. They have a completely different member base.

IRF gathers a number of smaller national federations and fewer trans-ethnic organisations and interest groups. In addition to working with education and immigrant culture(s), IRF publishes the Journal *Invandraren* [The Immigrant]. It is closely connected to the Immigrant Institute, which is a semi-public research and documentation centre.

The other main actor is SIOS, which gathers 15 of the largest ethno-national federations including the Turkish, Kurdish (only KRF) and Assyrian/Syriac, which again cover approximately 450 local associations and more than 90,000 members (About SIOS). In SIOS Programme of Principles the organisation’s values, views and principal standpoints are established for the following priority areas: language and culture, equality and diversity, development of democracy and the multicultural society (About SIOS). It is (like IRF) a non-political, non-religious organisation. It has an interesting agenda as it stresses an approach that used to be in coherence with the official Swedish policy but today stands somewhat in opposition. SIOS has accessed the decision making processes and been part of the established system for years. It is also interesting why such an organisation can succeed in Sweden and not in Denmark, even more so considering the heterogeneity of the member organisations, e.g. including Turks, Kurds, Assyrians, Syriacs and others.

SIOS has apparently managed to find a balance between the different ethnic groups involved in the organisation and its discourse is distinctly apolitical and irreligious when it comes to the member organisations. Some ethno-national federations have actually been re-

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27 For example the Trade Union for Active Immigrants (FAI), Swedish Immigrants Against Drugs (SIMON), Swedish Immigrant Psychologists, The Group of African Academics to mention but a few.

jected when applying for membership. In a publication by SIOS describing its development over 33 years, it states that the Kurdish federation at first was rejected in 1981 as it was deemed too political with most emphasis on homeland issues. Furthermore it represented an ethnic minority making claims within another country’s territories, which also was represented in FIOS, i.e. TRF (FIOS 1972 – SIOS 2005: 17). Only when working together on a joint venture on disabled immigrants in 1996 – and thereby proving their interest in Swedish conditions one could claim – was KRF deemed eligible for membership. The administrator of the project for KRF was Aycan Bozarslan, who today is chairman of KRF and member of SIOS’ executive committee.

Personal skills and resources definitely have their impact on organisational trajectories and future interlocks. The potential dispute between Kurds and Turks is just one imaginable conflict, the Assyrian/Syriac critique of the Turkish state’s lack of recognition of the genocide was another potential political dispute. However ARS’ board writes that:

The board was interested in all possible activities that benefited the Assyrians. We decided to apply for membership. It was not difficult to obtain membership. […] We in the board thought or suspected that the Turkish federation objected to ARS membership. But it was never confirmed. Any real problem between us and TRF never occurred, even though it was a part of ARS’ agenda to accuse the Turkish authorities of harassing and persecuting the Assyrians in Turkey. I do not think that there were discussions in SIOS regarding ARS’ membership as ARS was powerful at the time and SIOS thus could not afford to reject [ARS]. The need was mutual (ibid, 16-17).

The analysis and choices made by ARS here are illustrative of the existing power relations and struggles between different immigrant organisations taking place in the infra-political sphere. ARS understands itself, at least at the mentioned period, as a major actor, which meant that their agenda and membership were accepted because they would ultimately be beneficial for SIOS and paradoxically also for TRF. The critique of the Turkish state’s denial is still part of ARS’ political agenda but it is no longer an issue within SIOS, at least according to a member of SIOS’ board (communication with SIOS). The criticism also diminished as ARS’ members at the time were new to Swedish ways of organising and in their own opinion they learned immensely from the other ethno-national federations’ SIOS members and gradually began to change from a sole focus on Assyrian questions to be involved with questions relating to the Swedish society. Working together with the other ethno-national groups forced ARS to make common cause, but all in all ARS sees it as a positive development (ibid.).

This is a very good example of how voluntary organisational participation in civil society is coupled with democratic processes. Furthermore the inclusion and adaptation of the existing norms strengthen the system itself and reproduce the organisational structures. ARS
for instance developed the organisation in correspondence with SIOS’ structure and also founded a women’s organisation and a youth organisation – again not because organisations only had male members before, but because the incentive structures were favourable for activities targeted especially at these groups.

**Antidiscrimination movements and organisations**

Over the decades, the Swedish state has put great emphasis on preventing discrimination and as discussed in Chapter 6 posed different explanations and solutions. At the time of writing this dissertation yet a new proposal for a coherent antidiscrimination legislation has been proposed by the Ministry of Integration and Equality both simplifying and strengthening the existing institutions and policies (see Proposition 2007/2008:95). However, looking at the status of antidiscrimination movements and organisations over the last years reveals a long list of such organisations.\(^{29}\) In January 2008 Ungdomsstyrelsen stated that support was granted to 20 out of 35 antidiscrimination bureaus applying (Ungdomsstyrelsen, 2008c).

This fact raises a number of questions and possible hypotheses. First I would ask why there should be room for so many organisations of this kind in a country that offers substantial protection against discrimination and has made the discussion of discrimination part of both the political and public agenda. The reason could of course be a real need, *i.e.* a high level of discrimination, but there is no real evidence for this claim. I would also expect the immense focus on discrimination to widen the field for possible actors, but as there is an internal stratification between the publicly funded bureaus and organisations and the self-supported, this explanation is not adequate either. Probably a partial explanation must be found in the (recent) historical context where Sweden in especially the 1980s and early 1990s experienced a lot of immigrant hostility.\(^{30}\) But on a broader scale racist movements grew considerably in the 1980s and a new race ideological underground culture emerges. This movement is linked to the *Nordiska Rikspartiet* (NRP), which has roots in national socialism and the Nazi heritage of the 1930s. NRP lacked the organisational structure to survive in a parliamentary setting and was forced to close down, but it provides the connections and continuity between the racial ideologies of former times and racist movements in present times.

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\(^{29}\) Going through the lists of antiracists and antidiscrimination organisations at the Immigrant Institute and the links posted by ADB adds the number up to more than 50 organisations not including the different Ombudsman institutions, most notably the DO: [http://adb-stockholm.org/adb-syd/index.htm], [http://adb-stockholm.org/adb-sthm/index.htm] and [http://www.immi.se/sweden/]. If I add the member organisations of *Centrum Mot Rasism* and *Nätverket mot Rasism* the number probably comes closer to 100 different organisations [http://www.centrummotrasism.nu/Default.aspx?id=5699] and [http://hem.passagen.se/hasans/Netv/].

\(^{30}\) Perhaps culminating with the ‘Laser man’, who – due to a strong hatred of all immigrants – in 1991-1992 shot 11 immigrants, one fatally, with a rifle mounted with a laser sight before being stopped.
However, as I wrote in Chapter 6, anti-immigration and migration-related problems have not appealed strongly to voters. I will not go into more detail with this type of organisations for now. The organisations discussed so far are all members of SIOS and hence connect to this approach, while very few are members of the other larger actors in the field, Centrum Mot Rasism and Nätverket mot Rasism. Antidiscrimination or the goal of equal treatment is definitely on the agenda of most organisations, but it is not something most of the organisations I interviewed put special emphasis on. Neither did they speak of experienced or perceived discrimination to the degree my Danish informants did.

I will advance the conclusion that it is exactly the lack of appeal of anti-immigrant issues that paradoxically sets the field for the large number of these organisations as such organisations on the contrary had a high appeal to many people. Since people did not accept exclusivist rhetoric, support to antidiscrimination was prioritised. Basically the discursive opportunity structure encourages such type of organisations and activities.

**Religious organisations - Muslims in Sweden**

Religious organisations’ main opportunity structure is the Swedish Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities (SST) under the Ministry of Culture. SST is responsible for allocating subsidies etc. to communities entitled to such grants. Religious organisations are regarded as an important organisational form that is part of the popular movements. SST stresses that “the significance of such movements is apparent to the extent that the state gives certain financial support to popular movements that are to the benefit of everyone” (SST: SST in English). In 2007, 39 ‘communities’ (coming from the 22 recognised belief systems) were entitled to grants. No religious tradition is prioritised over others.

The Swedish Pentecostal Movement and the Roman-Catholic Church received the largest subsidies, which amounted to almost one third of the total pool, but the various Islamic organisations received close to 13 pct. combined (SST: *Udbetalda statsbidrag 2007*). Four new Islamic organisations also received additional support allocated in an establishing phase. The Islamic organisations received additional educational funds. The Swedish Orthodox Church also receives a considerable amount. SST also lists the number of members served by the denominations, a head count of people who use religious services. The numbers are interesting as the Muslim organisations accounts for 100,000 out of the total of 754,000 counted, and the various Assyrian and Syriac churches account for 45,000 (SST: *Antal betjänade i de bidragsberättigade trossamfunden 2006*). The total number itself is low compared to Denmark, which upholds a state church and hence has a higher number of official, but not necessarily more active members. The numbers from SST should be read carefully as they exclude
religious practices not taking place in churches or mosques etc., but if taken at face value they
indicate that the Swedish Muslim and Assyrian/Syriac immigrants show greater outward reli-
giosity than other religious groups as they make up almost 20 pct. of the listed members.
The organisational structure parallels the structure in other organisational fields with central-
ised unifying organisations. The national organisations each have a number of member orga-
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The Muslim organisations are organised mainly in three national federations: Förenade
Islamiska Församlingar i Sverige (FLIFS), Sveriges Muslimska Förbund (SMF) and Islami-
ska Centerunionen (ICUS), which all receive subsidies from SST. The federations have 37
member organisations (Anwar et al. 2004; Larsson, 2007). From a Turkish perspective the
most important of these federations is the SMF, which today has about 70,000 members.
Many of these are Turks, and SMF works closely together with TRF/TUF and many are
members of both federations. The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs also has a Swedish
branch, the İsveç Diyanet Vakfı, which primarily is connected to Turkish-run mosques around
the country.

Indirectly SMF (and others) also links up with SIOS as the members of for instance TRF
at the same time are members of SMF, TRF and SIOS and hence have discussed religious
questions and discrimination, islamofobia and the like in SIOS (interview with Mehmet Kap-
lan). So there are direct interlocks between the secular and religious organisations.

To my knowledge there have been fewer internal disputes between the Muslim organi-
sations than in Denmark and Germany, which is remarkable. The Swedish corporatist system
has encouraged the foundation of national level organisations, which possibly have dampened
internal conflicts and created a more uniform body. Basically has led to increasing conver-
gence. The combination of a strong corporatist grip and the particular incentive structures in
this sense shows to be stronger than the inner logic of organising within Islam as a faith sys-
tem, which unlike Christian traditions, has no hierarchical structure. But the gains by organis-
ing in this particular way hold stronger incentives than other and traditional trajectories.

If this holds true it is quite remarkable as the national federations unite both Turkish
state-approved congregations and Saudi-sponsored organisations. There have been some in-
ternal conflicts though, most recently during the latest Swedish election. An example is the
case of Mahmoud Aldebe, a well-known Swedish Muslim, who in 2006 sent a letter to all
members of the Swedish parliament calling for special laws for Muslims if Muslims should
succeed in integrating and feel included in Swedish society (SVT, 28.04.06). His argument is derived from a universalist and postnational framework where such rights are legitimated by reference to a higher system of human rights. In addition he tried to position Swedish Muslims as a Swedish minority group. The problem was that he signed the letter as coming from *Sveriges Muslimska Råd*. The response came immediately both internally and externally. Swedish politicians spoke against such claims and SMR’s connection with the Social Democrats was problematised. Other responses came from within the SMR where Mehmet Kaplan at the time rejected these claims and said that no such approach or claims had been decided in SMR. Thus, the dispute both took place in the infra-political sphere (between the organisations) and at public level, but as the letter was an open letter addressed to the politicians in public all actions in the dispute evidently became part of a broader public discourse. The Al-debe dispute is interesting as it shows how different frames are employed to construct both the problem (alleged marginalisation) and the solution (special laws) through a marginal and confrontational position in the established political channels.

In contrast, the dispute between the Assyrian and Syriac groups did not involve the public to the same degree. It remained within an infra-political sphere and was simultaneously situated in an international dispute but completely surpassed the Swedish public level. Here the local is directly connected to the global agenda. On a national level the two large federations have been working together on issues that benefit both groups, which basically is every issue within the political dimension. At present two members of Riksdagen, both elected for the Social Democrats, are of Assyrian/Turkish descent, but none of them have direct ties to the national federation(s).

The at one and the same time diverse but also cooperating landscape of religious organisations, here focusing on Muslim ones, has to do with the political climate in Sweden and public response to Muslim identity and belief. Studies have shown that the majority of Swedes in general is in favour of multiculturalism and diversity, but tends to be more sceptical towards Islam (Integrationsverket, 2005). The study from Integrationsverket revealed that four out of ten agreed that Muslim values are in conflict with Swedish democratic values (ibid.). Two main tendencies seem to affect the organisational processes in this regards. Firstly; there is much less public debate about Islam and Muslims in Sweden than in Denmark and Germany. Here I will recall the issues of an assumed political correctness or a suffocating debate, but the fact remains that the climate has not always been as it is today. In Mehmet Kaplan’s words: ‘the 80s in Sweden were like the 90s and recent years in Denmark’. In the interview I ask him to compare the situation in Denmark and Sweden:
Oh, another difficult question. Both yes and no [are Muslims better off in Sweden than in Denmark]. Yes because we do not have the vulgar tone/rhetoric in the debates that you have in DK. It is kind of sad and good to be able to say what you mean, but the problem is that what you might mean is very often far from fact. For instance that Muslims hit their spouses and try to control their daughters, but in reality it is the same as to say that Islam contains suppression of women and so on. It is excused by an argument that we dare to discuss such issues and there we have a completely different approach and it is somewhat more simple. Sweden does not have this vulgar way of speaking, just to be able to say such things, just to be able to print the caricatures, I mean there was a chief editor on Sydsvenska Dagbladet, what was it is he said, he said ‘if I had believed this was an issue of freedom of expression then I would have printed it’, but he didn’t think so … [in] Denmark you not only have the Danish People’s Party and Nyrup Rasmussen’s party like in many other countries, but you have a lot of people whom I admire for their belief in individual freedom and I always felt much more welcome in Denmark when I was younger than I did in Sweden.

MBJ: Well that’s very interesting because many of the people I have been talking to said that – well if things don’t change I might leave for Sweden and you are saying that you felt more welcome in Denmark.

MK: Yes because it was during the 80s and we went by car to Denmark and met a freedom we didn’t find in Sweden and there was a diversity there that made us feel more welcome there, but at the same time we see that after 9/11 there an enormous fear and terror prevention have emerged in Denmark compared to Sweden. Danish Social Democrats say, wait and see you will have the same problems, but there are Swedes who say that we have already had these problems in the beginning of the 90s where Ny Demokrati gained access to the Riksdag, so it is discussed who has gone through what (interview with Mehmet Kaplan).

I choose to bring this lengthy part of the transcription as his line of argument is very illustrative of Swedish inclusiveness or tolerance. Swedish Muslims also entered the debate of the caricature crisis, but (without judging the caricatures themselves and whether this was in any way justified) there was far more consensus and agreement not just between Muslims organisations and the established political system, but also with other religious groups (as the Assyrians, e.g. Zinda Magazine, 15.02.06) and the Swedish media.

Contrary to this peaceful co-existence there is another tendency of an increased perception of hostility, in the Swedish discourse, of Islamofobia. This situation seems to be in contradiction with the first tendency, but can be explained by the recent focus on structural discrimination and equality in general that has been much more prominent in Sweden than elsewhere. When such concepts become part of the public and political agenda their perceived existence also becomes more present. As mentioned in the previous section, Sweden also has built up a diverse network of antidiscrimination bureaus and institutions in different levels of society. There is not necessarily more discrimination in Sweden, but discussions of discrimination will take place in very extended contexts. Mehmet Kaplan asserts that:

But there is another thing; that is we have a large degree of structural discrimination. I don’t think you have it to the same degree in DK as you have the courage to speak about such issues, which you perhaps don’t do in Sweden. I don’t think that the level of discrimination is lower in Denmark,

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31 From a discourse analytical perspective this is a trivial fact, but the same arguments are also found in sociological traditions where for instance the so-called Thomas Theorem is an example of this logic, i.e. the interpretation of a situation causes the action (Merton, 1995).
I don’t think so, but I think that you are more aware of the problem but that doesn’t mean that you do anything to remove the problem. You might have more knowledge about it happening, but no preventive measures to stop it structurally (interview with Mehmet Kaplan).

The argument is somewhat difficult to follow as he both says that Sweden has more problems with structural discrimination than Denmark but also has developed more preventive measures due to an open dialogue in Denmark. Going back to the findings in Chapter 5, I showed that there has been close to no focus on structural and institutional discrimination so I cannot agree with Kaplan’s analysis. However, the discussion has actually been going on for years in Sweden, where the founder of Miljöpartiet has claimed that ‘Islamofobia is the new racism’.

This specific discursive opportunity structure has had an immense impact on both the established political system and the immigrant organisations. Changing governments have over time formed independent advisory commissions and bodies and increased subsidies for antidiscrimination work (Bak Jørgensen, forthcoming). Likewise it has had an effect on the religious organisations that have ventured into this line of work and directed their claims making at such issues.

**Incorporation and collective organisation**

The overall impact of the Swedish opportunity structures and a corporatist system generates an organisational landscape characterised by several centralised unifying organisations at national level, each with a number of member organisations at local level and additional youth and women’s organisations also at a central level (see Appendix A for details). The federations are allocated subsidies according to size, which are channelled to the member organisations. This has created a situation where the organisations become stronger and at the same time very convergent. The latter is due to a demand for cooperation to gain access to the established institutional channels and as I have shown even the Kurdish organisations, which often have conflictual relationships, have been able to cooperate. But while there is convergence and in this way consensus, the incentive structure for influence paradoxically also impedes competition as the allocation of funding is dependent on the actual number of individual members.

From central hold the federations are made part of the decision making process via the Council for Ethnic Equality and Integration. In 2003 the council had 60 members each representing a national organisation. The members include not only immigrant organisations, but also labour market representatives and interest organisations, *e.g.* Saco – The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations, Confederation of Swedish Enterprise and LO, but the main part of the members are representatives from the ethnic federations. Among these the
Assyrian, Syriac, Turkish, Kurdish (KRF) are represented as well as two of the largest Muslim organisations, *i.e.* SMR and FIFS. Whether or not they have any real influence can, as Aytar does, be discussed (Aytar, 2007).

The impact of the incorporation system is very profound as both ethno-national, religious etc. follow the exact same course. These formations can be illustrated by looking at the organisational structures and interlocks in Figure 8.2. Also here I include only a selected number of organisations, which nonetheless represent the most prominent Turkish (Kurdish and Assyrian) organisations and the paths are strikingly similar in their structure and work together with the same Swedish partners. On a national level the most important partner is the aforementioned council and within civil society connections to ABF are important if not crucial. Most of the Turkish organisations are also connected through participation in SIOS. The youth organisations are generally connected by membership of The National Council of Swedish Youth Organisations (LSU) as well. The figure also shows that organisations outside the general subsidisation scheme, due to not meeting the required number of members etc., are more isolated, in my case illustrated by the marginal position of the Swedish Alevi Federation (interview with Helin Sahin, Gün Sahin & Eraslan Örgün).

**Figure 8.2 Interlocks between selected Turkish and trans-ethnic organisations**

Note: Borders with large dot and dash lines indicate a trans-ethnic organisation. *** dotted borders indicate a Swedish institution. Bold borders indicate umbrella organisations.
In the Swedish case I will conclude that organisations with vertical network ties also display a larger range of horizontal network ties. The reason can be found in the Swedish incorporation approach, which essentially proves to be an efficient tool of social engineering. Immigrants are supported only when following the outlined trajectory, which then strengthens the organisational structure and increases the density of the ties. If I compare the position of the Alevis in Sweden and Denmark the difference is striking. The ‘problem’ seen from the perspective of the Alevis is that they organised along a category not recognised by the Swedish state and hence are situated in the periphery. The organisational process has simply privileged well-established actors over new ones and has privileged the collective actors at the expense of individuals. Thus the autonomy of the organisations is in this sense limited. This seems somewhat enigmatic as the Swedish system as discussed in Chapter 6 has been completely censorious when it comes to group thinking (cf. Brekke & Borchgrevink), but the explanation may actually be straightforward as the individual is supposed to be incorporated through the group.

These very similar trajectories can be explained through a historical path dependency, in this case by strong connections to the Social Democrats. The Social Democratic Party has for many years sought to incorporate immigrants into the party as it regarded itself as a natural partner. In institutional terms integration in the Swedish system takes place through the welfare state (and folkhemmet), and the Social Democrats have been the traditional protectors of this system, which basically ends the story. Many immigrants worked in the industrial sector and were members of labour unions, which again were supported by the Social Democrats, or they had come as refugees, many being dissidents and very often left-wing. The Social Democrats and later other parties had and still have special sections for immigrants to help them participate in their own way and the outcome has been a considerable level of participation on all organisational levels of the political parties, reaching into membership of the government.

One of the most influential institutions for mobilising immigrant participation is as mentioned ABF – the Workers’ Educational Association, established in 1912. Although the ABF allegedly is a politically independent organisation, it shares the values of the labour movement and has traditionally been supported by the Social Democrats. It is funded primarily by the government and external funds and aims at strengthening democracy and empowerment through education in both a formal and informal sense. However, ABF has not only provided the room for immigrants to participate, but has had a pro-active strategy for involving immigrants on both an individual and a collective level by allocating them resources. In some cases direct funding, in other cases by providing facilities. Looking at the member organisations
today shows that many of the national ethnic federations are among these, e.g. respectively the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkish confederations (ABF, 2008). When conducting my interviews my informants directly mentioned this particular role of the ABF, mostly in positive terms, but a few in negative terms. The latter objected to the way ABF traditionally had monopolised and hegemonised immigrant participation and organisational structures (e.g. interviews with Mehmet Kaplan and Gulan Avci).

The Social Democrats no longer hold government power, and other parties have tried to set up organs appealing to immigrant participation, for instance *Liberala invandrarförbundet* (LIF) (the Liberal immigrant federation) connected to *Folkpartiet* (the liberal party) (Folkpartiet Liberalarme, 2008). This can indicate three things: One, that the internal competition not only happens among immigrant organisations, but also between mainstream organisations; second, that although the ABF and similar organisations are part of the state institutions they serve as important gatekeepers to the institutionalised political channels and as such are part of the political opportunity structures when it comes to the organising processes of immigrants; third, it indicates an incipient decoupling of the Social Democrats and immigrant incorporation trajectories. This latter tendency is expressed in the rise of a liberal immigrant elite being active for instance in LIF. Mehmet Kaplan explains the partaking in the decision making process and relationship and dependency of the Social Democrats in the following way:

Immigrant organisations are participants and I think that they have, they have quite good contacts among and with the authorities, but as far as membership of political parties they have for a long time been hostages, what can we call it hostages captured by the Social Democrats.

MBJ: Yes?

MK: It is through the Social Democratic Party that they [the immigrants] have been connected to [the political system], you have ended up in a difficult situation. Immigrant organisations have been able to do study activities and general education through ABF, which is related to the Social Democrats, and that has meant that immigrant organisations often have been allies with and cooperated with labour organisations and councils […] … what has happened if you look at it from my party’s perspective then it is the fact that with a real representation … many have discovered that it can be an alternative to the Social Democrats, or Partiet can be a liberal alternative to the Social Democrats, and this is what I mean that the automatic coupling that if you are immigrant then you are Social Democrat longer exists (interview with Mehmet Kaplan).

The Kurdish organisational processes point towards the same trend. Despite having 22 candidates up for election in 2002 the Kurdish electorates did not manage to send a single candidate to parliament. This could be due to political divergences between the organisations of course. In the general election in 2006 there were 33 Kurdish candidates for parliament, nearly the same for the regional election and about 70 for the municipal county elections (Khayati, 2008). None were elected for parliament, however, but for the first time the Kurdish
candidates at all three levels did not belong to the leftist political parties, most notably the Social Democratic Party. Instead new political alliances have been made for instance with the liberal party Folkpartiet where especially a Swedish politician Fredrik Malm has been actively engaged in the struggle for an independent Kurdistan. In 2006 the Swedish Parliamentary Network for Kurdistan was established by members from five different parties represented in the parliament, which further points to a more diverse and complicated political context. In other words, the Social Democrats seem to be loosening its ideological grip on the mentioned immigrant groups. It also shows how the Kurdish immigrants and organisations have a dual political agenda aimed both at Swedish and Kurdish politics, but even more important – so do Swedish politicians. It elucidates the notion of transnationalism as a site for political engagement further and shows that such types of transnational activities are not only matters for immigrants groups, but also for the host society.

Odmalm has made an interesting analysis of immigrant organisations and civil society in Sweden. Here he points to a contradiction in the Swedish official approach: On the one hand, it encourages immigrants to organise along ethnic lines, but on the other hand it is not inclined to sponsor ethnic identities over the ‘foreign’ or ‘immigrant’ status, meaning that immigrants are incorporated collectively as immigrants in the political system (Odmalm, 2004: 477). This could also explain the success of SIOS as I assume that the Swedish emphasis on immigrants over time would diminish or even eradicate internal ethnic conflicts. Odmalm also claims that there is a tendency for immigrant groups to remove the ethnic tag in the name of the organisation and replace it with for instance cultural tags.

I found little evidence of such a tendency, however, and interviewing the different organisations also pointed to ethnic self-identifications with even more organisations being founded by a particular ethnic group, e.g. TUF’s aims of establishing a Nordic federation (NTUF) and even a European version (ETUF) (interview with Serpil Önal Ercan). My argument is that Odmalm’s approach misses the transnational identifications that very well may allow the individual and an organisation to identify as immigrant, Swede and a particular ethnic identity at one and the same time. If I do find evidence of this tendency it is in the presence of a new liberal immigrant elite (as I also showed in the Danish case), e.g. LIF, that addresses immigrants in the common category of exactly immigrants. However, a leading member of LIF turned out to be engaged in the Kurdish issue as well as being former spokesperson for Kurdiska Ungdomsförbundet (interview with Gulan Avci) and hence only stepping outside the marker of ethnicity at given times.
Consequently, I will argue that people are very much capable of negotiating different identities in different social settings and consequently in managing multiple identities. Moreover, I will claim that while the Swedish state incorporates immigrants rather narrowly in the Council of Integration and Ethnic Equality, a main characteristic of the general organising processes is not one of total acculturalisation, but rather a nexus of assimilation and/or integration and transnational identification at the same time. These processes need not be opposing, but are steps towards redefining both integration and citizenship.

**General organisational patterns in Germany**

The organisational landscape in Germany resembles both the Danish and Swedish landscape. It is even more fragmented and diverse than the Danish and at the same time structured along ethnic lines as in the Swedish case, but with much more internal variation and tension. The non-recognition of immigrants as a permanently staying group created a framework that until recently generally lacked special institutions. It becomes even more complex as the different länder have had different practices with an outcome of quite divergent approaches. Furthermore the political opportunity structure, as discussed in Chapter 7, has offered different opportunities to different ethnic groups. While Aussiedlers had automatic rights to citizenship, other nationalities have had varying access to citizenship. The Italian and Turkish groups more or less followed the same trajectory as guest workers, but due to the EU framework, Italians today hold completely different rights than the Turks, e.g. have local voting rights as EU-citizens. Hypothetically these different societal positions are bound to impact the organising processes and expected claims making.

However, in recent years Germany has turned towards a new trajectory where immigrant organisations increasingly are incorporated as partners in the integration process. Public authorities today seek the cooperation of and advice from immigrant organisations. Perhaps even more importantly, at least on a symbolic level, the work that immigrant organisations have been doing over the last decades has started to be recognised by the state(s) (Cyrus, 2005). In a sense this points to a situation where both the German state(s) and the immigrants themselves have started to come to terms with reality – namely that the various immigrant groups are in Germany to stay. Still the German states have had a hard time incorporating the Turkish groups and understanding the variety. Özcan listed more than 3,000 Turkish organisations and associations in his dissertation from 1989 (Özcan, 1989). Kastoryano has an interesting quotation from Barbara John, who talks about the problems of unifying the Turkish community in order to get it represented in the advisory institutions: “there are 7,000 Greeks
in Berlin, and they are organised into 13 groups […] and the almost 125,000 Turks are divided into more than 100 groups. They do not constitute a community” (John quoted in Kastoryano, 2002a: 126).

This statement tells us something about the discursive setting in Germany. The problem of heterogeneity has not been raised in the other two countries in the comparison – why is that? The answer should probably be found in the extremely narrow channels of incorporation combined with an ideal of representativity from the German authorities. The next step is therefore to investigate how the forced attempt to create such an ethnic community also has impacted on the organising processes from the immigrant side. Different studies suggest that immigrants do not participate in civic organisations to the same degree as Germans. A report from Centre for Turkish Studies showed that about two thirds of the Turkish immigrants participate in one or more organisations (formally or informally). But only 10 pct. of the respondents declared to be actively engaged (Halm & Sauer, 2006). With more than 2.5 million Turks living in Germany even this pessimistic number nonetheless turns out to include quite a few people. Most studies agree that the membership of immigrants and Germans do not differ immensely, but the degree of membership does (Cyrus, 2005: 31). German organisations often require formal membership as a precondition for participation, while immigrant organisations require active participation as a precondition for granting membership, which complicates research and makes comparison asymmetrical (see Berger et al., 2004).

The German case is interesting for its heterogeneity and for the fact that although it is often claimed that the Turkish organisations generally are transplanted organisations, many of the existing organisations definitely cannot be characterised as such. Neither the Mosque associations nor the Alevi organisations existed in Turkey, but were established in the interaction with the host country. Furthermore the novelty of the German integration approach makes it interesting to investigate how existing organisations have to adapt to new structural possibilities and conditions.

**Organisational forms**

As expected, the overall situation, characterised by absence of an official institutionalised system that incorporates immigrants in centralised organisations, has created a very fragmented pattern of organisations. Being excluded from political decision making does not mean that the immigrant organisations have been totally excluded from other spheres. But the organisations have primarily been regarded as service providers alongside organisations as the *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* and not as political actors. Immigrant organisations have been regarded as
a site for self-help. This perception has started to change as the organisations slowly started to be perceived as political agents also. A main purpose of the organisations is still to tackle social problems and the (few) subsidies given are almost all earmarked to such activities. I will also argue that this type of activities actually has increased lately as the new integration courses have opened up further possibilities for providing these services and thereby get access to further funds. In other words, there now is a new incentive structure for organisational engagement. The organisations have gained better possibilities for entering the institutionalised channels and have increased their social service activities. Different organisations obviously emphasise the importance of either activity differently, but most organisations engage in both.

At the same time there has also been far more internal competition between the Turkish organisations to represent the Turkish minorities as such. One strategy is to boost the number of members of the organisations (interview with Safter Çinar). This is a strictly symbolic act as it does not influence subsidies as in Sweden where the number of members is decisive for subsidies, but points to the importance of gaining the hegemony of representation. The fact remains (contrary to the expectations derived from the POS framework) that the Turkish organisations definitely are fragmented but still have strong structural organisations and connect in centralised structures through organisational ties. A leading member of a large organisation in Berlin summarised the situation in the following way: ‘As we did not get any support we had to do it ourselves’. Organisations rely on membership fees and other types of private funding to a larger degree than in Denmark and Sweden.

Furthermore there may be a formal lack of institutional incorporation of immigrant organisations, but over the years there has been a tendency to privilege some groups over others. In this specific case the Ausländerbeauftragte in Berlin has mainly worked together with the Türkische Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB) and the Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB) and thereby informally excluded other groups. Each organisation has filled a specific purpose and slot and sought influence where possible. Only recently were religious groups invited to discussions, i.e. the Integration Summit and the Islam Konferenz, but generally still stand outside the formal channels of influence. The new integration approach and newly developed political initiatives and institutions have also created new possibilities for the immigrant organisations that have been taken up by the long-established organisations as well as new ones.

The internal competition within the infra-political sphere of obtaining the hegemony to represent the Turkish community has had an additional consequence in recent organisational
developments where especially younger generations have founded trans-ethnic consensus-seeking umbrella organisations in order to escape the control of the established organisations and transgress the ethnic classifications defining the organisational landscape so far. In the following sections I will describe the various competing groups in a general outline and afterwards give concrete and more detailed accounts of the most prominent organisations present in Berlin today and discuss how they are influenced by and react to the particular opportunity structures.

**Organisational patterns - discourses and content**

The first Turkish organisations founded in Germany were mainly leftist and rightist political workers’ organisations that were strongly focused on Turkey and on each others’ doings. This political polarisation was clearly transplanted from Turkey. The situation did not reach the height of conflict it did in Turkey but still violent clashes were not unusual in Germany either. In the 1960s Turkey witnessed an immense growth of political parties and interest groups in civil society but the military coup in 1980 created a completely new situation where many parties and groups were banned and the Turkish society was slowly depoliticised. These transformations impacted on the organisational forms among Turkish immigrants in Germany (and Western Europe in general) as oppositional and marginal groups set up groups here instead. This organisational form was later again adapted by other groups with a strong homeland perspective, who never before had been present in Turkey but here found the chance to organise. Such groups on the other hand forced the Turkish state to set up or support institutions in Western Europe, also in order to maintain a form of social control and put pressure on Turkish citizens living abroad. Hence, the first decades of collective organising processes are characterised by internal and external conflicts that interconnect and force one actor to take certain steps, which again creates a response from other groups and so on and altogether builds up a system of equilibrium.

Oppositions are found between radical left and right. These sometimes entered into different alliances with changing coalition partners. Over the years different organisations and fractions have tried to gain (national) control, but most of them have lacked the necessary stability and continuity. Until the beginning of the 1990s a number of national organisations competed for power. Among the most prominent are the right-wing Türk-Föderation, conser-

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32 Violent clashes still occur. As late as October 2007 several people were injured and dozens arrested when Turkish nationalists clashed with Kurdish protesters. Initially 600 people had joined in a demonstration protesting Turkey’s military engagement in Northern Iraq. The week after Turkish nationalists went to the streets under the slogan “Unity and Fraternity between Turks and Kurds” but later began to attack Kurdish people (see Spiegel Online, 29.10.07).
vative-liberal *Hür-Türk* and the left-wing (social democratic) *Föderation progressiver volksvereine der Türkei in Europa* (HDF) and *Föderation der Immigrantvereine aus der Türkei* (DIDF) (Özcan, 1989: Chapter 4, 6). Some of these have since closed down and new ones founded, so the story remains one of disruption.

The overall tendency has been that a local state federation goes through organisational growth and consolidation and then turns into an umbrella organisation representing smaller (and most often locally based) organisations. This was the case with the Hamburg Union of Migrants from Turkey that later co-founded the national umbrella organisation *Türkischen Gemeinde in Deutschland* (TGD) in 1995. The different organisations still understand themselves as representing the community in the broadest possible sense, *e.g.* in the purpose statement from the TGD:


While the organising processes in the first decades after the Turks had started settling in Germany can be characterised as transplanted homeland affiliations, the last two decades have opened up for rather different trajectories. Firstly the internal conflicts have become more complex. A number of new oppositions have been added to the division between left- and right-wing, *e.g.* between Sunnis and Alevis, between moderate nationalists and religious, between Kurdish and Turkish, between minor minority groups and the Turkish state, between official Turkish Islam and more radical Islamic groups. Some of these are also derived from homeland issues while others must be explained as deriving from conditions in Germany.

Secondly, another group of organisations have increasingly turned their attention to German issues and focus on integration issues and on how to improve conditions in Germany.

Thirdly (and partly connected to the first trajectory), the question of latecomers, in terms of collective identity formation and claims making, requires special attention. The Alevis are one such group. The Alevi organising processes were initiated in Germany and diffused from there to elsewhere in Europe. Therefore the question of whether or not latecomers are influenced by special determinants is of special relevance. The people later representing themselves as Alevis were already living in Germany at the time, but defining themselves in other

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33 Özcan brilliantly documents how the federations are interconnected and follow different organisational trajectories (Özcan, 1989). Over the decades other than the four mentioned federations are active on a national level, but the ones mentioned are among the most influential.
categories. In other words how did Alevis go from being good Social Democrats to being engaged in identity politics? What conditions such transformations?

Fourthly, completely new alliances within Germany and on a transnational level are now occurring. While there is immense competition within the infra-political sphere and at national public level, there are simultaneously alliances between the exact same actors at other levels.

Ethno-national organisations
Alongside the political and religious organisations, numerous hometown organisations were part of the immigrant organisations and constituted a social space for the work migrants, but also these were very often politicised up though the years. Like in Sweden, several studies have been made on migration networks from specific villages and regions in Anatolia to Germany, and there is no reason to repeat these findings (e.g. Abadan-Unat, 2005; Faist, 2000a). One of the large migration networks not receiving particular attention is the Assyrian community. Most members originate from Tur-Abdin in Turkey and are now living mainly in the Augsburg area.34

The Kurds on national level
The background for the Kurdish mobilisation and organising processes has partly been described in the Danish and Swedish case, so here I concentrate only on the actual organising processes in Germany. The size of the Kurdish minority in Germany is uncertain, but estimates range from 500,000 to 700,000 of which 90 pct. are from Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a: 61). The Kurdish conflict has transplanted to Germany as well, although only a fraction of the Kurds in Germany are presumed to be members or supporters of the PKK. Recent numbers claim that Kongra Gel, PKK’s successor, has around 11,500 members, but also that roughly 10 pct. of the Kurds in Germany potentially could be mobilised for the PKK/Kongra Gel cause. Various branches and shadow organisations for the PKK have been banned over the years, latest in 1993 where the Eniya Rizgariya Netwa Kurdistan (ERNK) was banned by the German authorities.

The two main Kurdish organisations today are KOMKAR and YEK-KOM. KOMKAR started out as a platform for workers’ associations, but later turned into the Kurdish interest

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34 The Assyrian/Syriac communities in Germany are estimated to number around 90,000 people. Compared to Sweden most of the Assyrians in Germany came as labour migrants but have since established businesses and are considered one of the more successful minority groups in Germany, especially in terms of entrepreneurship. The name strife very present is Sweden is also found in Germany although to a much lesser degree. Like other ethnic groups the Assyrians have also established social clubs and in recent history a national federation. I pay less attention to the Assyrians in this chapter and return to both the Swedish and German communities in Chapter 10.
organisation it is today. It is connected to KOMKAR branches all over Europe (including Denmark and Sweden). It supports the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK) and the HADEP Party in Turkey. PSK is now illegal in Turkey. Although working in a German context it works mainly for the benefit of Kurdish immigrants and refugees in Germany. Its webpage greets visitors in German, but the focus is unambiguously on Turkey (see Appendix A). Its claims are directed at Germany for the recognition that Kurds are different from Turks and hence works for the recognition of Kurdish identity:


Pursuing this aim means celebrating Kurdish festivals and advocating mother-tongue teaching in Kurdish. Both organisations publish journals in Kurdish and/or German. KOMKAR has faced difficulties when PKK-led violence escalated both in Turkey and Germany, as the Germans in general did not distinguish between the different Kurdish fractions. KOMKAR has managed to uphold ties with German authorities and is regarded as more intellectual (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). This characteristic follows the findings from Denmark.

YEK-KOM works for the same goals as KOMKAR, but the support for PKK and ERNK has put YEK-KOM in a difficult position. It was founded in 1993 in the aftermath of the German ban of all PKK affiliated organisations. It is slightly larger than KOMKAR nonetheless. There is an interesting difference compared with Denmark where both organisations are also present. In Denmark KOMKAR has attracted mainly refugees, while the opposite is the case in Germany where KOMKAR represents a large number of children of first-phase immigrants who are rediscovering a Kurdish diasporic identity. Both organisations, no matter their political sympathies and methods, work for recognition of Kurds as an independent minority in Germany.

Religious organisations

Religious organising processes took place rather late in Germany. After the first phase of left-right ideological polarisation, religious issues became more important (Doomernik, 1995). This also had to do with the process of family reunification and with the fact that Turkish migrants in general had settled permanently and started to build up religious organisational structures and institutions. The organisations initially reflected the religious organisations from Turkey.
Two thirds of the population in Turkey are Sunni-Muslims and an estimated one third Alevi, but neither group is homogenous. Moreover the organisations abroad support different political parties and principles (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a: 55). As a collective identity the Alevi are latecomers, and the Sunni organisations range from liberal to radical or belong to Turkish/global traditions like the Süleymannicis and Nurcus. The main purpose of the Turkish organisations is to make it possible for immigrants to practice Islam. In order to do so they have established mosques, provided Koran lessons for children, appointed imams, set up burial funds etc. But over the years they have engaged in political questions in Germany, most notably gaining recognition of Islam as an official religion in Germany, i.e. the KÖR status (cf. Chapter 7).

The development of the organisations is deeply influenced by the situation in Turkey however and it is very difficult if not impossible to understand the religious organising processes without a transnational perspective. The military coup in 1960 forced the elite of the forbidden religious groups in Turkey to emigrate, and these people later became part of the religious mobilisation in Germany. Some groups have an orientation towards Turkey, e.g.), others only exist outside Turkey and others again seek to promote a (relatively) universalist discourse by disconnecting themselves from both the country of origin and settlement, e.g. the Süleymannicis and Nurcus. Adding the public discourse and reception of Islam in Germany, the result is a very complex set of actors with different strategic interests. Like in other countries there has been a growing unease regarding Islam in public and the fact that the planning of the 9/11 attacks also took place in Germany (Hamburg) has not made the situation less hostile (communication with Ibrahim El-Zayat, Islamischen Gemeinschaft in Deutschland (IGD); see also Jonker, 2005). According to a study by the Institut für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung at the University of Bielefeld, 30 pct. of Germans living in the new federal states and 23 pct. of those in the old states hold the opinion that ‘Muslims should be refused permission to migrate to Germany’ (Mühe, 2007: 55). Table 8.2 presents an initial overview of the main religious organisations and their affiliated members.
Table 8.2 Religious Turkish Federations and Affiliates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federation</th>
<th>Member organisations and members</th>
<th>Local cultural centres / prayer spaces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DİTİB - Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği</td>
<td>300 - 110,000-150,000 members</td>
<td>Approx. 775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İFB - İslamische Föderation in Berlin</td>
<td>26 - ?</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGMG - Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş</td>
<td>16 - 26,500 members (87,000 in Europe)</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIKZ - Verband Islamische Kulturzentren (Sülemancilar)</td>
<td>300 - 21,000-100,000 members</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR - Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland</td>
<td>32 - 140,000 members</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AABF - Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinde in Europa</td>
<td>120 (165 in Europe) - one million members across Europe</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Sunni organisations

The landscape of Sunni organisations is heterogeneous. The first Sunni organisation was the VIKZ set up by Süleymancis in 1973. It has no direct political ties back to Turkey. Today it is one of the most popular federations for young people of Turkish origin. However other groups, e.g. the Alevi organisation, accuse VIKZ for being connected to the AK Party in Turkey, and Erdoğan is claimed to have close contacts with the VIKZ in Cologne (AABF, 09.02.08). They are also connected to Hür-Türk and the CDU. Later the organisation was followed by Nurcu initiatives and groups associated to the Milli Görüş.

The Milli Görüş organisation IGMG is likely to be the most known of the Sunni organisations. It was founded in 1985 (as AMGT) and has explicit ties to political parties in Turkey. It supported and was supported by the banned Refah Party and later the Fazilet Party, which was also prohibited in 2001. Members of these parties later became part of the ruling AK Party although its political agenda has distanced itself considerably from the former two parties and the most prominent members including the Prime Minister himself have distanced themselves strongly from the organisation. IGMG has been part of a transnational network between Germany and Turkey over the years. Money was sent to Germany to help fund the activities of the political parties and leaders were sent from Turkey for service in the IGMG. Several leaders of IGMG have stood candidates in Turkish elections and two were elected in respectively 1995 and 1999. Turkish politicians with a religious agenda show up at IGMG festivals (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a: 56).

The IGMG has long been under surveillance by the authorities (i.e. the Verfassungsschutz) for cultural and security related reasons, but has not been banned so far. Generally IGMG seeks to increase the tolerance of religion in the Turkish public as well as in Germany.
but has never propagated for the caliphate as for as the Kaplancilars have done.\textsuperscript{35} The Islamrat is a sort of sister organisation to IGMG consisting of different regional member organisations, one being the Islamische Föderation in Berlin (IFB). Where IGMG is not represented as in Berlin, these other organisations substitute the ideology of IGMG. The most active Sunni organisations are all in opposition to the state controlled DİTİB and make claims for the recognition of Muslims in Germany as well as increasing religious rights in public life. The present leadership has expressed pro-integrative opinions and tried to open up the organisation to the world outside.\textsuperscript{36} It today understands itself as an international organisation with branches in various countries. It maintains local mosque communities in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, England, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway and these countries each have a representative on the board. Being excluded from the institutionalised channels of participation has been a hindrance for success in other aspects as IGMG has been extremely successful in economic terms. It has an extremely high net worth and the money today stems from member fees, real estate speculation and investments and Islamic financial institutions in the Middle East (Argun, 2003: 156). Besides its religious and (at least previous) political partners it has been collaborating with the Islamic orientated employers’ organisation MÜSİAD. Together with different holding companies IGMG has allegedly been channelling money into Turkey as investments on the behalf of migrants’ savings in Germany where they offer a non-interest based business system (dubbed the ‘green capital’) in accordance with Islamic law. These investments have created thousands of new jobs in Turkey and provide a substantial contribution to Turkish export (Argun, 2003). This has put the Turkish state in a difficult position as it on the one hand is against the religious claims making of the IGMG, but on the other hand welcomes the financial contributions derived from IGMG business schemes.

\textit{The DİTİB and Turkish management of Islam}

The DİTİB was formed as a response to the non-state controlled developments in the religious organising processes in Germany but most notably as a direct response to IGMG. It provides the same services as the other organisations but is funded mainly by the Turkish state. It opened the first German branch in 1982 and has since grown into a huge organisation. Another parallel aim is to control and minimise extremist developments with Turkish Islam

\textsuperscript{35} The notion Kaplancilars refers to the Federation of Islamic Communities (ICCB) in Cologne. It is one of the most radical Islamist organisations in Europe founded in 1984 by Cemalettin Kaplan (hence the name) known as the ‘Khomeini of Cologne’. When Kaplan died in 1995 his son took over, but he was arrested in 1999 under suspicion for terrorism.

\textsuperscript{36} One example is the English language web pages of IGMG, which also has several articles and press releases on various integration issues <http://www.igmg.de/>.

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where the main opponent has been the IGMG whom DİTİB accuses of misrepresenting and exploiting Turkish migrants. The DİTİB has taken a difficult position, however, as it tries to represent all Turkish citizens within its Kemalist secularist discourse. This is not welcomed by Alevi and Kurdish groups or groups wishing to increase the role of religion. The very moderate and not least secular position of the DİTİB has made it a natural partner of the German authorities, who hold the same aims as the DİTİB. DİTİB was the only Muslim organisation invited and represented at Merkel’s Integration Summit in 2006. Again, this created a lot of tension among Muslim organisations, particularly among non-Turkish groups, who felt totally excluded.

The Alevi organisations
The AABF is the main Alevi representative in Germany, but there are other Alevi organisations as well, representing for instance Kurdish interests (cf. the description earlier in the chapter; Sökefeld & Schwalgin, 2000). The question of subsidies also divides the organisation. The Turkish state has sought to co-opt the Alevis by supporting them financially but some Alevi fear that the organisation will lose its autonomy while others find it fair that they receive the same support as Sunni groups. Another example of the uneasy relationship is a recent conflict. January 16 2008 the DİTİB published a press release criticising the present debate on youth-related crime as exclusionary. The petition was signed by an Alevi organisation with a name – Avrupa Ehli Beyt Alevi Federasyonu – resembling AABF’s. March 10 the AABF issued a press release rejecting the DİTİB release. The mentioned Alevi organisation did not exist, the Alevi organisations strongly rejected being mentioned alongside organisations like IGMG and ADTÜF (the Grey Wolves), and the DİTİB had no rights or mandate to speak on the behalf of any Alevi community. AABF’s press release contains both a critique of DİTİB’s methods and of right extremists and Islamic fundamentalists, but also of other moderate Turkish immigrant organisations, e.g. TGD for co-signing the release and thereby affiliating themselves with radical groups. The DİTİB has not reacted to AABF’s press release in public (DİTİB, 16.01.08; AABK, 10.03.08).

Political organisations - leftists, rightist and in between
There are both radical and moderate groups on both sides of the political spectrum. The leftist side has become less prominent after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Different splinter groups affiliated with the communist party used to be present in Germany, but are not significant anymore. Föderation der Volksvereine Türkischer Sozialdemokraten (HDF) is one of the main liberal left organisations that identifies, as the name suggests, as Social Democrats. It
was founded in Berlin in 1977 and today has more than 40 member organisations all over Germany and strong ties to the Turkish social democratic party. It is deeply engaged in Turkish issues but takes a pro-integrative approach and works specifically with antidiscrimination issues.

Another important liberal left umbrella organisation is the Föderation demokratischer Arbeitervereine (DIDF) founded in 1980 and based in Cologne with around 50 member organisations. It aims to promote equal treatment for all in Germany, but like HDF also engages in Turkish politics taking place in Germany. Although both organisations have tried to take specific immigrant perspectives rather than Turkish only perspectives, their agendas reflect a clear connection to Turkish political issues and conflicts. DIDF has also paid quite a lot of attention to the Kurdish conflict although it does not stress Kurdish affiliations in its profile. Both the HDF and the DIDF reacted strongly against the Turkish Prime Minister’s speeches during his visit to Germany in February 2008. Here Erdoğan stated that “assimilation is a crime against humanity” and stressed that integration and assimilation were two different things (quoted from Turkish Daily News, 13.02.08). He also offered to establish Turkish colleges in Germany (like Germany had done earlier in Turkey) where students could learn Turkish etc. Both organisations (and others) reacted sharply and declared that people with Turkish background should work for inclusion in Germany on equal footing with other Germans. Erdoğan should concentrate on securing rights for the minorities in Turkey instead of trying to represent minorities in Germany. His proposals were characterised as “Gift für die Integration” and the (Turkish) immigrants were abused as Turkish lobbyists (see DIDF, 10.02.08; DIDF, 29.02.08). HDF holds a much more Kemalist position and as a consequence has had little cooperation with Kurdish groups and religious organisations.

The Immi/Grün Bündnis is linked to the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen coalition. It is not a sub-division for Turkish members/voters but a platform for all immigrants. The majority of the members is nonetheless Turkish and the same goes for immigrants elected for the two parties. It was founded in 1994 and is now in a phase of re-structuring but it is not clear if it will re-appear (communication with Bündnis 90/Die Grünen). The platform seeks to promote “einer multikulturellen, zivilen und ökologischen Gesellschaft”, which basically is done by extending democratic rights. Hence they are one of the organisations speaking for installing local voting rights and have been speaking for dual citizenship. Today it (in competition with

37 <http://basis.gruene.de/immigruen/>.
the SPD on regional and local levels) is the party with the highest representation of immigrants, especially in the state level parliaments.

The relationship between ethnic background and membership of political party has been far more complex and even problematic in Germany than in Denmark and Sweden. The different ethnic and political fractions have put pressure on politicians with Turkish background to make them privilege or represent their specific groups. The first elected member of the Bundestag (for die Grünen) and later MEP Cem Özdemir describes the situation in his biography:

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Later he describes how the Turkish-Circassian community pushes him to present himself as Circassian. His father is of Circassian origin but Özdemir himself does not speak one word of Cicassian and at the time of writing it was 34 years since his parents left Turkey (ibid.). The title of his biography is \textit{Ich bin Inländer – Ein anatolischer Schwabe im Bundestag}, which presents an illustrative account of the intersections of identities that politicians like he have to deal with. In his political life he has worked for and with the Kurds, with and for the Turks, with and for the German and has helped the Alevi organise both in Germany and Turkey.\footnote{See \url{http://www.oezdemir.de} for more info and examples.}

Other politicians have experienced the same problems. The direct links between organisations and specific political parties are only one side of the story. The situation is even more complex if we include the indirect links and ties between organisations and political parties and German authorities in general are included. The two most prominent organisations in Berlin, the TBB and the TGB for instance both have indirect ties to political parties and the authorities in Berlin. They are respectively social democratic and conservative organisations.

Saifer Çinar, who is spokesperson for the TBB, is also leader of DGB foreigners commission (\textit{Ausländerberatungsstelle des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes}), has had a high position in the trade union (\textit{Die Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft – GDF}) where he later became chairman of the national committee for multicultural questions (interview with Saifer Çinar). He is also a board member of the \textit{Türkischer Elternverein in Berlin Brandenburg} and the national federation of parents’ organisations FÖTED. Çinar is an example of how interlocking directorates are established and managed in practice. The executive director Kenan
Kolat previously held the chair of the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Migration* of the SPD in Berlin and is furthermore married to a (Turkish) SPD member of the Berlin Senate (communication with TBB and TGD). Other members of the board of TBB have been part of different commissions of the SPD as well. Still the TBB denies any direct linkage to political parties. In contrast, the TGB has close links to CDU and FDP politicians and the former mayor of Berlin Eberhardt Diepgen (CDU) is an honorary member of the TGB. But also the TGB denies any direct ties to political parties (Yurdakul, 2006).

While the political ties can come from the immigrant organisations supporting political parties directly (*e.g.* *Hür-Türk*), by political parties who court Turkish individual and organisations directly (*e.g.* DTF), or indirect connections and ties as just discussed (TBB), the ties can also come directly from Turkey and be of a more informal nature. An example is the position taken by Mustafa Sarigül, mayor of the İlkı município in Istanbul, who actively supported Gerhard Schröder’s candidacy in 2005 and recently engaged in the election in Hessen. The latter activity has spurred strong reactions from the CDU (Linie Eins News, 18.01.08). Similarly, Erdoğan has interfered and tried to influence German and Turkish politicians, and the Turkish ambassador joined in the dispute following the Integration Summit in 2007 (*cf.* Chapter 7; see also Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007).

**Organisations and opportunity structures in Berlin**

The immigrant organisations in Berlin have had different conditions than in the rest of Germany (until recently at least). The policy here differs in two important ways. First the Berlin *Ausländerbeauftragte* has all along emphasised naturalisation and led various campaigns with a higher number of naturalisations as a result. Secondly, the *Ausländerbeauftragte* has given active support to immigrant organisations for many years, although trying to steer the organisations towards a specific organisational structure and indirectly privileging some organisations over others in order to secure the largest possible representation and subsequently constitutes a highly selective form of cooptation. However, including some means excluding others. The foreigners’ commissioner has given structural funds to be managed by the organisations, but has mainly offered subsidies for various targeted projects, *e.g.* self-help groups and social projects. Compared to the organisations in Denmark and Sweden the organisations in Berlin received less financial support but more compared to organisations nationally in Germany. One source estimates that the Turkish organisations were remitted around 200.000 € on average pr year in the 1980s and about 485.000 € in the 1990s (Uiterwaal quoted in Vermeulen, 2006: 86). The liberal policy of Berlin was limited by a much more exclusive integra-
tion policy at national level and by a more restrictive and conservative wing of the CDU locally. This is puzzling as the very liberal minded commissioner Barbara John herself belonged to the CDU.

It is difficult to tell exactly how many Turkish organisations there are in Berlin. Vermeulen & Berger found 231 active and non-active organisations in the 1990s going through the archive at the Chamber of Associations in Berlin and few but large interlocking directorates (Vermeulen & Berger, 2007). Although organisations must register with the authorities it is difficult to tell if the number is exhaustive as it does not necessarily capture the informal organisations. Either way, it still gives us a general idea of the size of the organisational landscape.

Several organisations have competed for power and representation in Berlin throughout the years. Today the two main organisations are the TBB and the TGB, but also the Alevi and the Kurds are represented in Berlin; likewise different Muslim organisations. Recently new trans-ethnic organisations led by third generation immigrants have sprung up and now offer an alternative to the established organisations. The overall structure nonetheless resembles the organisational structures in other Länder; the difference is rather that the organisations in Berlin have had more influence. That is a relative statement, of course, as the organisations elsewhere have had very little to say. Turkish organisations are definitely among the better represented. On the list of organisations invited to give their opinion on foreigners/immigrant political issues, 35 out 105 organisations are Turkish (five of these strictly Kurdish though) (Beauftragte für Integration und Migration, 2003). The list of invitees was initiated in 1983 and has been elaborated since. After 2002, 79 organisations have been added to the list, 25 of those Turkish. On the list are most of the large national federations discussed previously as well as a substantial number of local Berlin organisations. The number of Turkish organisations indirectly included could be much larger, however, as the umbrella organisations also represent the interests of the individual member organisations that sometime will be represented directly on the board of the centralised organisation.

Der Türkische Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg and the Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin
The TBB and TGB alone constitute networks of 78 organisations and hence indirectly represent around one third of the total population of Turkish organisations in Berlin. TBB appeals mainly to Social Democrats while TGB appeals to conservative (moderate Turkish nationalists as well). They both claim to represent the Turkish community in Berlin.
TGB presents this in the following way: “Die TGB, mit seinen 50 Mitgliedsvereinen treibt die Koordination mit anderen Vereinen und Institutionen voran und ist somit der Vorreiter des TÜRKISCHEN Lobbys” (TGB, 2008).

TBB’s spokesperson Safer Çinar joked about this and especially the proclaimed members of the rivalling TGB, but his own organisation nonetheless also speaks on behalf of the Turkish community as such (interview with Safer Çinar). TBB is explicitly secularist and speaks for Turkish immigrants’ assimilation into German society as an ethnic minority (TBB, 2006). Precisely because it regards Turkishness as an ethnicity the organisations sees no problems in assimilation and advocates that all non-citizens should strive towards naturalisation although they also favour dual citizenship. As mentioned, it has ties to the SPD but does not talk about it officially. TBB has been strictly against the Turkish state and Turkish politicians interfering with domestic issues in Germany. Its own agenda is only focused on German domestic issues and does not offer opinions on Turkish political matters.

TGB stands for all the opposite. It favours opening up for the role of Islam in public and has been the preferred ally of CDU in Berlin. TGB understands Turkishness in national terms and claims that it is important to protect it. It is against assimilation but speaks for dual citizenship. If this is not possible then it recommends keeping Turkish citizenship. Both organisations have a number of member organisations and the TGB seems to be slightly larger than TBB. TBB springs from an earlier organisation of Turkish academics and engineering students, and the elitist perspective also characterises the organisation today. In contrast, TGB is much more grounded in the local community and grew out of the local community in Kreuzberg, which is clearly reflected in the member organisations. Besides the various parents’ organisations and cultural clubs (more so for the TGB), TBB appeals to more intellectual and political organisations while the TGB is much more in allegiance with the Turkish state perception of Turkish migrants and actually includes the DİTİB as well as Hür-Türk among its members (see respectively TBB, 2008, Über uns: Mitglieder and TGB, 2008: Vorstand: Mitglieder). TGB also includes several sports clubs and homeland organisations carrying the name of the large soccer clubs from Istanbul. TBB is also connected to a national federation, which not surprisingly is the TGD.

There are several interlocks between the two federations and for instance the spokesperson I talked to was former chairman of the TGD (communication with Kenan Kolat). TBB has received far more financial support than the TGB. In 2003 TBB received 1.2 million € to conduct training and other projects for migrants (less than 30,000 came from member fees), in 2004 around 680,000 €, roughly 600,000 in 2005 and 800,000 in 2006 (TBB: 16.03.2003-
This is a surprisingly high amount compared to the subsidies given through the 1980s and 1990s and is and the explanation is that the TBB now facilitates many of the new initiatives following the integration law. TGB has not gained access to the same cash flow and receives around 27,000 € (Yurdakul, 2006: 443). Both organisations have been among the organisations favoured by the *Aufländerbeauftragte* as they were assumed to be representative of the Turkish communities in Berlin, but they work for different goals. TBB engages in political lobbyism and enhancing labour market integration especially among descendants of Turks. TGB has a different aim and works mainly to secure peace in the local communities through crime control. Working for integration from each their perspective has made the two organisations popular collaboration partners for the German authorities and mainstream organisations and the two organisations are as mentioned tightly connected to different political parties.

The TBB and TGB have had a hard time cooperating, even on issues they ought to agree on but have managed to cooperate in external organisations. While there are interlocking ties to a number of national federations and mainstream organisations there are very few interlocking directorates between the two. There used to be an interlock between the TBB and the TGB in the *Türkisch-Deutschen Unternehmervereinigung* (TDU), which had board members from both organisations. This is no longer the case, but TBB works with TDU in different projects. Both TBB and TGB are partners in TDU, however, although not represented on the board.

From a POS perspective their individual organising processes constitute a challenge. Both are included in the political decision making and have a good relationship with the German authorities. Labour market participation is a key feature of (also) the German integration discourse and since money follows projects and initiatives it makes sense that TBB emphasises such goals (see TBB, 2001). Security is another aim of the integration approach and TGB has more or less monopolised this aspect but is not rewarded with the same economic means. Yet TGB has more members than TBB. But why does TGB not bid in on the other integration aspects? Confining the analysis to the German POS alone cannot provide the answers to these questions. TBB takes a position that in many ways is more progressive than the German approach. Influence lies in gaining access to the German political system hence all non-citizens should pursue citizenship for themselves and their children. Safier Çinar stresses that the naturalised Turks constitute a very large vote bank that necessarily will receive the attention of the political parties. The same opinion is given in the integration courses organised by the TBB. TGB blankly rejects all talk of indirect or direct assimilation. Turks should
and can be mobilised as Turks and the large number of Turks residing in Germany indeed makes such a mobilisation possible according to TGB. Instead of assimilation they support recognition of cultural differences and special rights. This brings TGB closer to the trajectory of the Kurdish and other ethnic minority groups. The Turkish state has changed its perception somewhat over the recent years and no longer regards the Turks as ‘remittance machines’ (Østergaard-Nielsen’s expression) but as role models and citizens away from home. The ongoing negotiations of Turkish EU membership is an element in this approach but still lacks some explanation power. The fact is that both TBB and TGB support Turkish EU membership but only the road followed by TBB would enable ex-citizens to make their political influence visible by supporting pro-Turkish parties and candidates.

This is not a direct problematic discussed by the TBB and TGB in their daily work, but still they must find a way to address this issue. The solution has been cooperating on a German/European level by joining the Europäisch-türkische Zivilplatform (ATP) directed by the TGD (of which TBB is a member and vice versa) and TUSIAD. ATP’s aim is two-fold: to achieve political recognition for Turkish immigrants at a European level and to support and gain political support for Turkey candidacy. ATP’s activity level seems to be very limited at present however.

Kulturzentrum for Anatolischer Aleviten
The Alevi organisation is also represented in Berlin in the Kulturzentrum for Anatolischer Aleviten. Defining themselves as a religious organisation has left the Alevi community without much influence. They receive very little support and are not among the invited organisations with a say on immigrant topics. That said the organisation is linked to the national AABF, which has been far more influential. People with Alevi background have also been members of the TBB as it does not stress the nationalistic version of Turkishness as for instance the TGB does. AAKM is not directly linked to other Turkish organisations however and seems rather isolated in the organisational landscape in Berlin.

Kurds in Berlin
Many Kurds have also been members of TBB for the same reasons as the Alevis but they first and foremost organise in ethno-national organisations linked up to each other. YEK-KOM has a member organisation in Berlin (the Navanda Kurdish organisation) but this political branch of Kurdish activism is isolated and left outside influence. Different KOMKAR related organisations are gathered in the Kurdisches Zentrum home for 11 different Kurdish organisations.
Although the various non-militant fractions of Kurdish organisations have tried to disassociate themselves from PKK and its affiliations there is still a great deal of suspicion against Kurdish nationalists. The Kurds are nevertheless represented by Nazire Karaman in the Landesbeirates für Integrations- und Migrationsfragen, the state integration council. She is from the Kurdistan Komitee and member of Türkische Sozialdemokraten in Berlin (TSD), which is an influential organisation in Berlin. The latter fact is rather interesting as Karaman is Kurdish and yet member of an organisation stressing Turkishness as the main identifier. The explanation can be very straightforward though. No organisation combining Kurdish identity with German political work exists today. The reason can be that it is a both dangerous and difficult political combination to engage in and Kurdish people have better chances of gaining influence on the political decision making by joining organisations like the TSD than by pursuing this aim in Kurdish interest groups. In this sense the preferred and most successful strategy is institutional participation within mainstream institutions. Furthermore Karaman is elected as representative for the Turkish region in the council, which again seems slightly strange, but the representatives are elected by the organisations themselves.39 Also another member of the council, Hakan Taş, has Kurdish background but is elected on the non-regional quota. Finishing the question of representativity the TBB is represented indirectly by Çinar although elected as member of the trade unions. TGB was represented until last election by Ikin Özisik, who is another example of a person interlocking different directorates. He is chairman of the TSD and spokesperson for TGB, DİTİB, TDU and other Turkish organisations.

The religious organisations are influential within the immigrant communities but marginalised in terms of direct political influence and participation. The organising processes within the religious groups are very much found in the infra-political sphere where different mosques have been centres for organisations and various disputes (see Jonker, 2005).

**United but still divided?**

Generally there is far more tension between the different groups in Berlin. Lately however, the different groups have started cooperating on stopping the violent conflicts and the hostility in general. These issues have also been discussed politically in the integration council but the initiatives come from different organisations. TBB has issued press releases together with the Kurdische Demokratische Gemeinde and the Alevi organisation together with other Kurdish organisations. This is an emerging trend that the established organisations start to enter new alliances on issues everybody can concur to. Another example is the very broad support for a

39 The Landesbeirates für Integrations- und Migrationsfragen has 48 members. The immigrant organisations have to elect ten members for six regions of which one is Turkey.
recently launched campaign that aims at introducing voting rights for non-citizens at local level (www.wahlrecht-fuer-migranten.de; also Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007).

Different attempts have been made to unite the different ethnic and religious groups in one single umbrella organisation at a national level. None of these have been very successful but have ended with different groups breaking out and criticising others.

All the organisations are however joined in an antidiscrimination discourse, which the different organisations experienced sooner or later and felt they had to react upon (e.g. interview with Koray Yilmaz-Günay). Many of the members experienced discrimination and differential treatment in German mainstream organisations and ‘retreated’ to the Turkish/immigrant organisations to make stronger united political claims. TBB launched the Anti-diskriminierungsnetzwerk Berlin as a platform for combating discrimination and it has members from other organisations that they ideologically differ from. The question of Turkish EU membership has also been a uniting factor as all groups can see potential in this end-goal, but often for very different reasons.

Recently things have started to change somewhat as organisations led by the younger generations have started to emerge. This type of organisation wants to transgress the ethnic and religious boundaries and connect people on issues that are common for all, i.e. being migrants and/or descendants and discussing their structural position in German society. The most prominent is the Migrationsrat Berlin-Brandenburg (MR), which includes 59 very different migrant organisations comprising Turks, Kurds, Africans, Jews, Muslims, homosexuals and others. It is represented in the integration council by Mehmet Alpbek and advises the Berlin senate on integration and immigrant issues. Alpbek is also a board member in TBB, however. MR works with issues such as legal position in society and antidiscrimination – generally issues that are common for all (interview with Migrationsrat). A few of the established organisations are also members of MR, e.g. TBB and KDG, but the presence of organisations like GLADT, which represents homosexuals of Turkish origin, has indirectly excluded conservative organisations (interview with Yilmaz-Günay).

Figure 8.3 maps the most important umbrella organisations and a few examples of some of the mentioned individual organisations as well as the interlocking ties (cf. the findings by Fennema & Tillie). The overall landscape is extremely fragmented. Most of the organisations have many horizontal ties but a few have vertical ties.
Both the Sunni and the Alevi networks seem to be isolated but it should be stressed that the Alevi organisations have been working together with non-Alevi organisations on specific issues. The religious groups have not. I did not find the same linkage between the number horizontal ties and vertical ties as in Sweden. This can be explained by the efforts to control the Turkish organisations and steer the organising processes in a certain direction. Under the leadership of Barbara John the Ausländerbeauftragte selected a few chosen organisations for financial support. This strategy should fulfil the aspirations of fewer but more centralised organisations. Instead of gathering, this approach is more likely to have diffused the Turkish organisations as some organisations felt left out.

After the introduction of the new integration framework and most notably the integration courses some organisations have become tighter connected to the established system.40

**Overall patterns of incorporation**

Germany has gradually moved away from a very restrictive approach not recognising its immigrant population to increasingly seeking new ways of incorporation. The approach followed has been a combination of existing institutions and newly developed ones together con-

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40 Among the mentioned organisations in Berlin, the Kurdish organisations and TBB have developed such integration courses which they now offer. A list of all providers can be found at the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Bamf, 2008).
stituting a model containing both corporatist and statist elements. The overall landscape of the Turkish organisations is one of fragmentation. Homeland conflicts were transplanted to Germany and new types of claims making only possible in a new (non-Turkish) context were generated. The former division between left and right has been supplemented with several other divisions. Up through the 1990s and especially in recent years there have been attempts to transgress the differences by focusing on the things that people (as immigrants) have in common, but most of these attempts have as of today been futile. Nonetheless people still join the different organisations and engage in immigrant and identity political issues. A few studies have looked into the personal motivations and here one explanation can be transferred to the POS framework as well. Diehl has argued that participation in ethnic organisations (compared to mainstream German organisations) is the most attractive participation opportunity for migrants having a Turkish educational background (Diehl, 2001). In other words when all other doors shut holding a position in the ethnic organisation can be the possibility for social recognition.

The organisations in my analysis, here confined to the ones in Berlin, do not confirm this tendency however. Very few of the chairpersons and spokesperson mentioned directly had Turkish educations but still engaged in ethnic participation (some also in German ones). Although it cannot be dismissed that engagement in ethnic organisations is a response to unfavourable opportunity structures it would a very reductionist conclusion. My conclusion regarding participation on an individual level would add three claims: First, that leaders of organisations have different backgrounds where some are classical intellectual leaders with high educations and others have a community-based background where local network and contacts are the main assets (e.g. TGB). Common for both types is that people having acquired a reputation and organisational experience do not leave organisational life but build on this platform and use it for further advancement.

Secondly, ethnic and cultural differences make a difference for participational patterns and types of claims making, but these differences should not be understood in absolute terms and essentialised. Also in the German and local context of Berlin the analysis demonstrates that identities are highly fluid and are constantly re-negotiated. The fact that a Kurdish woman active in Kurdish organisations simultaneously is member of a platform for Turkish social democrats and elected as representative for the Turkish list in the in the federal advisory board indicates that people actually can manage conflicting and overlapping identities. However, the structural framework is also more receptive to some collective identities than others. Religious identities especially are left outside the framework for participation.
Thirdly, people engage in the organisations as active participants wanting to influence the political decision making processes. Furthermore I will argue that these Turkish elites have become important political actors that negotiate rights and memberships, which the recent amendment of the Integration Law and subsequent initiatives also show. Berlin used to be the exception with its non-exclusivist and in practical terms multicultural approach, but the legislative and political changes have made the rest of the states come closer to a Berlinian approach. Immigrants are in many ways marginalised in German society, but they are at the same time participating actors and it is important to acknowledge their agency.

Looking at the overall tendencies in migrant organising processes at a general level I will point to four characteristics of the POS that without doubt constitute a very ambiguous platform for participation and impact these processes in different ways.

First, there is a tension between the self-understanding of the immigrant organisations and the incorporation system. While the immigrants perceive themselves as political actors they are often regarded as service providers from the German perspective (in German known as Selbsthilfegruppen). This is directly derived from the welfare state model where social welfare services have been provided by the large voluntary workers’ welfare associations. The important one for migrants has, as mentioned, been the social democratic Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO). The immigrant organisations have worked closely with AWO and in many ways offered some of the same services. As money was gradually channelled into the organisations to provide these services, their role as political actors was threatened as they found themselves dependent on funding later on. Today the market for welfare provisions related to immigration and integration has opened further up as an important part of increasing job qualifications is language courses etc., which can be provided by anyone following specific guidelines.

Secondly, the size of the Turkish minority itself has made political parties interested in incorporating Turks and consolidating potential vote banks. Previously, following the same explanations as in Sweden and Denmark, immigrants were perceived to be closer to leftist and social democratic parties due to a class-based affiliation, but things have for one thing turned out to be far more complex than class-related interests can account for, and moreover have the Turks (not only the minority within the minority) in Germany been far more connected in homeland politics than their peers in Denmark and Sweden. Turkish politicians often visit Turkish communities in Germany, and Turkish organisations have branches in Turkey. Table 8.3 outlines the political ties between some of the most prominent Turkish organisations and German and Turkish political parties.
Table 8.3 Organisational relations to German and Turkish political parties

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>German party affiliation</th>
<th>Turkish party affiliation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIDF</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Labour Party (EMEP)</td>
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<td>Hür-Türk</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
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<td>Türk Föderasyonu / ADTÜF</td>
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<td>The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)</td>
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<td>HDF</td>
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<td>Democratic Left Party (DSP) and Republican People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTF</td>
<td>CDU</td>
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<td>LTD</td>
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<td>Immi/Grün Bündnis der neuen InländerInnen</td>
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<td>Arbeitsgemeinschaft Migration</td>
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<td>Türkische Sozialdemokraten in Berlin - TDS</td>
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<td>TBB (Berlin)</td>
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One of the most interesting findings from this analysis is that the political corporation of Turks has created competition between German political parties. Other parties than the SPD today attract Turkish members, politicians and not least voters. Still there are lots of challenges to be overcome in this political ‘game’. CDU’s rejectionist position on the question of Turkish EU membership has made it difficult to attract Turkish voters, although CDU’s values in general are much more in alignment with the conservative Turkish organisations.

This fact points to a third characteristic of the Turkish organising processes, namely that diversity both divides and makes room for new communalities. Besides the claims that most organisations (no matter ethnic and religious affiliation) have raised, such as demanding equality and better preventions against discrimination, joint-ventures have been made on educational issues. Lately the claim for local voting rights has resurfaced and is being backed up broadly by different ethnic, religious and class based fractions. Also the question of EU has created new alliances and led to the establishment of new organisations as the ATP illustrated. Bringing the immigrant organisations into the initial phases of political decision making processes, as for instance the Integration Summits, has also made the organisations work together in ways not seen before. The question and role of religion still divides however. Several organisations complained that only ‘conservative’ Sunni Muslims (i.e. the DITIB) were given
the opportunity to speak at the Islam Konferenz. Likewise can the question of EU divide as much as it unites. The focus on EU has for instance been utilised by different organisations as a critique of the German system. For instance when the EU recognises the Kurds as a minority that has rights that need to be secured and protected, then why does Germany not give the Kurdish minority minority status? The same question has been raised by the Alevi federation.

Fourthly, a last direct impact of the political and discursive opportunity structures is the difficulties for the minority groups within the Turkish minority and the religious groups to gain influence and possibilities for participation. No support is given to the religious groups and organising along religious lines is not recognised. Although things are starting to change slightly, the general position of the Muslims in Germany is still, in the words of Jochen Blaschke, ‘tolerated but marginalised’. When it comes to ethnic diversity different attempts have been made to overcome these divisions, for instance in antiracist discourses, but again and again internal conflicts have put a stop to these efforts. Internal differences are not the only unfavourable condition though. The lack of recognition from German authorities to support minority ethnic identities and claims making has created very few structural opportunities, e.g. in the case of Berlin where the two Turkish organisations TBB and TGB from state level were decided to be representative no matter the actual composition of the organisations. Instead Kurdish groups and Alevi organisations have taken up transnational alliances to strengthen their claims making.

**Conclusion – national claims making, political opportunity structures and the transnational challenge**

The political opportunity structures, *i.e.* the integration and citizenship regime and system of incorporation, affect the organising processes in ways both expected and unexpected. This does not come as a surprise however. As the analysis has shown, the immigrant organisations adapt to the structural limitations, and claims and identities are negotiated within the available arena. This creates a great deal of convergence even where the organisational landscape as such is more fragmented. I conclude that claims making perceived to lead nowhere disappears over time, and this strengthens the tendency of convergence further.

The systems with corporatist elements have managed to steer organising processes into specific directions, *e.g.* along ethnic lines in Sweden. Germany has developed a combination of a corporatist and statist approach and until recently sought to incorporate immigrants through the existing institutions, here especially through the welfare organisations. Recently Germany has tried to systematise the incorporation through new integration initiatives, and
most federal states today have equivalents to the Ausländerbeauftragte in Berlin. The Danish case presents a no less complex setting mixing elements of corporatist, statist and liberal approaches. The different approaches have particular effects on how the immigrant organisations are included and situated in the integration process. In Sweden integration activities are mainly directed by the state and professionals except for antidiscrimination activities. In Denmark such activities are funded by the state, which also determines the framework and field of activities, but the task of doing integration works constitutes one of the openings for ethnic minorities in terms of career paths. In Germany, integration activities are increasingly being pushed over to the immigrant organisations, which now share the role of service providers with the welfare organisations.

But the analysis has also shown that the discursive opportunity structures are decisive for potential claims making. Some claims are doomed to be a failure beforehand while other types of identity politics have much more chances of being a success. In the remaining part of the chapter I take a cross-national look at how the particular structural context has affected conceptualisations of integration and claims making in relation to access to naturalisation and dual citizenship. Finally, I discuss how convergences and divergences can be explained.

**Conceptualising integration**

The primary example has been the adaptation of the official integration discourse. In all three contexts subsidies have increasingly been coupled to a specific interpretation of integration. More so perhaps in systems with a strong degree of control like the Danish and Swedish, but the introduction of the integration course in Germany has also made a noticeable impact.

In Denmark most of the included organisations would position themselves as pro-integrative in the sense that they organise activities helping their members to participate in Danish society on different levels and by different means, be it homework help or setting up meetings between jobseekers and potential employers. In a broad sense it points to an understanding of integration as being engaged in society and an end-goal of participation in all aspects of society. The members of these organisations tend to describe themselves as well-integrated. It is a type of integration resembling the rephrased assimilation of Brubaker, *i.e.* assimilation as opposed not to difference but to segregation.

The organisations that I have investigated in Sweden do not differ in this sense. All organisations stressed their intentions to enhance the integration of their members and especially the broader community. Rather interestingly the individual ethno-national organisations emphasised that their group/community for different reasons was particularly integrated com-
pared to other groups (e.g. interview with Aycan and interview with ARS). TUF for instance has a vision of: “becoming one of the best organisations in Europe to develop integration encouraging solutions” (TUF Syfte & Vision, 2008).

In the case of Berlin I found much more variation in the understanding of integration. While the TBB stresses an assimilatory end-goal although making claims of being recognised as a national minority, the TGB oppositely emphasises Turkishness as the primary identity. Turks should integrate into German society but as Turks, while TBB would say Turks should aim at becoming German citizens. The difference can be seen in the attitude toward naturalisation where TBB says naturalise even if you have to give up Turkish citizenship, while TGB argues for dual citizenship and never suggests giving up the Turkish citizenship. TGB’s understanding deviates from the German approach but is in concordance with the opinion of the Turkish state. In the aforementioned speech in Cologne in February 2008 in front of 20,000 people of Turkish origin Erdogan stated that he understood that “you [the Turks in Germany] are sensitive about the issue of assimilation” and that “nobody can demand that from you” (Spiegel Online, 11.02.08; Deutsche Welle, 13.03.08).

Another distinction in the understanding of integration is the one between a more traditional understanding of integration and the liberal-entrepreneurial understanding (in lack of a better term). The first one is most often employed by the established organisations that have been active for several years and provides an understanding of cultural dialogue, building bridges between immigrants and natives, bringing women and children into organisational life and so on, while the latter is expressed by some of the most recently established organisations. This understanding basically seeks to transgress the notion of integration in itself. These organisations claim that the notion and usage of integration inevitably indicate that somebody is a problem for others and uphold the distinction between us and them. As resourceful and well-educated they do not feel that they belong in this category. Integration is so to speak taken for granted and what matters is being part of networks, position in society and mobility. Birgül from G-2 expresses this point of view: “I don’t like this integration. To me to be integrated is to function in society as any other ordinary citizen. It is [to be integrated] not to be Danish” (Aktuelt, 18.12.96; recall also the words of Zafer Şenocak).

The same distinction was found among the recently established organisations in Germany that have incorporated the younger generations. They do not want to be regarded as objects for integration and prefer different terms instead (interview with Yılmaz-Günay). They claim that the notion is pre-defined in a way that both excludes people beforehand and holds a number of expectations to the immigrants and hence defines a one-way approach. The
Migrationsrat in Berlin deliberately choose this name as it emphasises the common condition for migrants and not points to requirements to be fulfilled by one part only.

I did not find the same distinction in Sweden however. Instead most organisations voice a perception following the Swedish official position narrowly. Emphasis is put on democratisation and equality, especially between the sexes, in combination with the aforementioned focus on preserving culture, language and identity. One example is taken from Hujâdâ where the aim is presented as: “Integration is an important process in society, which is why ARS offers its opinion on how our members can be integrated in society while maintaining culture and identity” (Hujâda, 2007: 4). The KRF provides the following definition of integration:

The integration process is a relation between the majority population and minority groups and different individuals. This process should build on mutual respect for the individual and different groups’ freedom of choice, not least when it comes to language, culture and identity. Differences within the human rights limits ought to be regarded as an asset and should be utilised as a resource in the societal development (Fkks, 28.03.07).

This definition both reflects the ‘traditional’ Swedish approach and emphasises the protection of culture and language. It does not stress equality as such. In a number of concrete claims posed to the government, the KRF suggests that Kurds are recognised as a minority group and given minority status, ethnic registration in order not to be registered as Turks or Iraqis etc. as it happens now and special efforts against discrimination and racism (ibid.). Here conceptualisations are framed as identity politics (diagnostic frame), which becomes the framework needed to achieve success in the integration processes (the prognostic frame).41

The overall understanding arising from the conceptualisation of integration in the Swedish case points again to the impact of the corporatist system and the political opportunity structures that both affect the collective organising processes and the claims making. This is very evident when investigating the organisations’ activities in civil society, but the analysis also shows a very complex and multilevel sets of ties from the organisations to international partners with many of the organisations having a dual political agenda that cannot be understood in the framework of national integration regimes alone. This transnational dimension also affects the understanding of integration and it is separated from the idea that one integrates into one national state only. Rather the organisations to different degrees express the idea that people at one and the same time can be active in more than one national setting

41 Also some of the Muslim organisations have raised claims of receiving minority status. This would create categorical difficulties as some people would belong in multiple categories and be given special entitlements. The Swedish state has until recently rejected such claims blankly as it would stand against the overall aim of equality and equal possibilities regardless of race, sex, religion etc. Whereas the recent opening towards affirmative action programmes could change the situation some, the conclusion is that immigrants are encouraged to organise along ethnic lines but cannot expect special treatment according to the same criteria.
without hampering national integration processes. The same situation characterises the German case and to some degree the Danish.

**Naturalisation and dual citizenship**
The issue of naturalisation and dual citizenship illustrates how the political and discursive opportunity structures intertwine. In Denmark immigrants have substantial political rights that give them local voting rights. The same is true in Sweden, while immigrants lack political rights in Germany. Only Sweden allows dual citizenship and the discussions were taken by other actors than the immigrants themselves. While the prohibition has been framed as a democratic problem in Germany, the ban on dual citizenship has not really been framed as a concern in Denmark.

Surprisingly few of the organisations I have investigated or directly communicated with in Denmark emphasised the issue of dual or multiple citizenship. Most organisations were automatically concerned with still tougher naturalisation criteria and even more the very long processing times, but almost everybody I talked to actually had Danish citizenship. Several of them divided the identity following from Danish citizenship between a formal and substantial identity and said that they wanted to have the entitlements the passport and citizenship offer, but did not necessarily feel included in Danish society in terms of belonging (*e.g.*, interview with Berkhan & Suyaip). Presently there is a campaign and an online petition open to allow dual citizenship. It is organised by an NGO named statsborger.dk, but the sole focus is dual citizenship for Danes living abroad (see [www.statsborger.dk](http://www.statsborger.dk)). No similar campaigns have been made by immigrants (or mainstream) organisations in Denmark, nor are there any alliances between the interest groups. This is the complete opposite situation of Germany where immigrant organisations have been among the leading advocates of dual citizenship.

A tentative conclusion is that the continuous tightening of this policy area has given the actual decision makers hegemony and proposing changes in this regards seems purposeless (see also Timmermans & Scholten, 2006). In practice many people with Turkish origin hold dual citizenship both in Denmark and Germany. Turkey has made new legal arrangements so former Turks can maintain certain rights although they do not hold formal citizenship, but this rather pragmatic approach still seems to have replaced any systematic criticism against exclusivist citizenship from a Turkish organisational perspective (Kadırbeyoğlu, 2007). Criticism of the naturalisation criteria has been raised recently in media though, but not on a collective level, and to my knowledge not by Turkish immigrants. Especially young and educated people find it humiliating to have to pass tests in language, cultural and societal issues when they
have already passed their high-school exams for instance, but again these criticisms are raised by individuals and not on a collective level. In general citizenship and issues of identity and belonging turned out be a complex issue that deals with transnational belonging.

The difference between Denmark, Sweden and Germany can be partially explained by the structural framework, in this case especially in the political constituency. The three countries have right-wing governments, but they deviate in their framing of dual citizenship. In Denmark the ‘idea’ of dual citizenship is primarily supported by very few political parties, and besides the Social-Liberal Party mainly by leftist parties (Klitgaard-Holm, 2007). Today the tightening of naturalisation criteria is supported by most of the parties.

In Germany the attitude towards dual citizenship has been much more fragmented, and the legislation has been amended several times going from a very exclusivist system towards a more liberal, back to a more exclusivist to the present middle position (see also Gerdes, Faist & Rieple, 2007). The claim for dual citizenship is now being used strategically by both mainstream organisations and immigrant organisations (see for instance the press monitoring of Turkish print media: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007). Today a range of the political parties support the establishment of dual citizenship and regard it as an instrument to inclusion and enhanced integration, which thereby opens the arena up to such claims. The same is not possible in Denmark. In other words immigrants must perceive that the possibilities exist, what McAdam has dubbed the feeling of ‘cognitive liberation’ (McAdam, 1986), in order to articulate such claims. Sweden has so far upheld a very liberal approach to naturalisation. The introduction of dual citizenship was expected seen from a path dependency perspective but has possibly strengthened the transnational political engagement. For the Kurdish minority, the combination of such structural possibilities and a changed political context in Iraq has meant increased engagement in Kurdish politics.

As mentioned, new ties and alliances have developed between not just Kurds, Kurdish organisations and the autonomous region of Kurdistan, but also with Swedish politicians. Consequently, the issue of dual citizenship and criteria for naturalisation have little attention among the Turkish and other minority organisations due to the inclusiveness of the existing legal provisions and structures. This has created a slow but probably irreversible move away from national citizenship as the sole legal category towards the development of a multilocal, transborder or transnational citizenship. The effects could easily be still more ties between Swedish and national and international politics.

Another reason for the difference in the organising processes and the mobilisation around these issues can be explained from the position in society. The degree and nature of
political rights moderate other types of claims. The local voting rights given to denizens in Denmark and Sweden provide the immigrants with a channel for influence that in the Danish case may make them go easy on demanding extended political rights. All of the organisations took voting rights very seriously and encouraged their members and communities to vote. This goes also for the organisations mostly focused on homeland issues, such as KOMKAR, which in the 2005 elections coined the slogan ‘Use your rights to get your rights’, rephrasing the dictum that ‘rights must be taken’. As I have already discussed with a backdrop in Togeby’s studies, the Danish voting system with its proportional lists makes it possible for ethnic candidates to ‘jump the list’ with even a limited number of personal votes. The organisations were aware of this and tried to mobilise voters.

Sweden also provides voting rights for denizens after three years of residence (cf. Chapter 6). Thus, also this dimension is given less attention than in Germany as this right has already been obtained. Like in Denmark the organisations stress the importance of voting but the system does not offer the same possibilities as the Danish one. Although elements of preferential voting were introduced into the electoral system in 1998 (cf. Togeby, 1999), it does (still) not provide the beneficial structure the Danish system does. Immigrants are under-represented in political parties (Soininen, 1999). What has changed is the attention given to immigrant voters and candidates from parties other than the Social Democrats. This is a quite recent turn, perhaps initiated by the conservatives in 1999, but lately Folkpartiet has been very active in incorporating immigrants as well.

In Germany immigrants without citizenship have no possibilities for influencing the political decision making (although there are deviating practices for membership of political parties for non-citizens). The demand for local voting rights is therefore strong and also backed up by mainstream organisations and some German political parties. But it co-exists with demands for the implementation of dual citizenship that is not possible in the present ‘optional model’. This model may soon face its abolition however, if and when it is taken to court. The problem is that the model does not apply to children of mixed marriages. This will leave one type of descendant with fewer rights than others which can be judged as differential treatment and discriminatory and subsequently as breaching the German constitution (see also Joppke, 2007). It is still too early to tell what will happen in this regards, but implementing a revised framework for dual citizenship will leave the demand of local voting rights less important as the majority of Turks holding Turkish citizenship will be able to apply for German citizenship as well and thus obtain equal footing in regards to political rights.
Other convergent trends - how to explain divergence and competition

The issues of integration, naturalisation and dual citizenship are not the only types of claims making where the impact of the given integration regime can be detected, but I have chosen to deal with these issues in more detail as they are important pointers in the configuration of citizenship for both the state and the immigrant organisations. Other issues have been discussed throughout the chapter. In all three settings I found a common discourse of equality backed up by most organisations with very little variation. Most organisations also spoke for a multicultural society (in Denmark) and managing diversity (in Sweden). Here I actually find an example on immigrant claims making that may have affected the decision making.

The claim that diversity is a resource that can and should be utilised is perhaps one of the most defining features of the organisations, but one that until very recently was ignored or even rejected by the established political system in Denmark. The organisations at stake, again more so the youth organisations, generally moved away from being objects of integration and placed the responsibility on society, which they claimed should recognise diversity as a strength for modern-day societies. Very interestingly, the official discourse has been challenged by a multiculturalist position and only recently has the Danish system acknowledged the need to manage and accommodate diversity. Parallel with this approach however, the Ministry of Integration has run the ‘We Need All Youngsters’ programme (see Appendix A). The public attitude towards diversity also plays a role as these well-educated persons were tired of apologising for having another ethnic background (i.e. Turkish) and wished to change focus to their contributions to society. In Suyaip’s unflattering words: “Continue paying his taxes so that the man on the bench can keep on being a barfly” (interview with Suyaip). In the Swedish context managing diversity means securing all equal access and rights and is hence intertwined with preventing discrimination. Also this area is less disputed as diversity has been the official back-drop for Swedish policy making. Diversity programmes have been made mandatory and diversity is seen as one of the main characteristics of the future Sweden.

There are of course significant internal differences. While the Swedish public policy in my interpretation has abandoned the multiculturalist discourse and instead emphasised exactly diversity, some of the organisations have an explicit emphasis on multiculturalism. Most of the organisations generally have a dual agenda with focus on cultural and identity preserving activities (supporting mother tongue learning etc.) and a transnational focus. They are in principle quite reactionary when it comes to diversity management, however. SIOS for instance advocates a cultural, identity and language preserving perspective, which will lead to the realisation of a substantial multicultural society (SIOS: Verksamhetsplan och budget 2007). The
back-drop is (as mentioned) equal rights and possibilities, but with the possibility of protecting, preserving and developing the existing cultural pluralism. The ethno-national organisations in general support the cultural and identity preserving perspective and actively pursue this goal in the organisations. Most of them, especially the younger generation, also stress the importance of integrating into society – here understood as getting an education and equal footing with the majority Swedes and preventing segregation and marginalisation.

Germany presents a slightly different scenario. Racist attacks and tragic incidents of fatal arson have united the Turkish groups up through the decades. They have demanded that the German state took responsibility and did something to prevent such incidents. These collective stances never lasted long and soon after each case the internal divisions overpowered the common cause. Nonetheless, several antidiscrimination and antiracist groups exist in the Turkish communities. Exactly the type of collective organising processes occurring on this basis also demonstrates one of the peculiarities of the German case, namely the interference of the Turkish state on such matters. The triadic relationship between the host state, homeland state and immigrant organisations as also Brubaker and Østergaard-Nielsen have pointed to (Brubaker, 1996; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2002a) is very visible in Germany.

In February 2008 what was initially perceived to be yet another fatal arson took place in Ludwigshafen where nine persons of Turkish origin ended up dead. Both the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and the minister responsible for the affairs of Turks abroad soon after visited the place and put pressure on the German authorities. After similar incidents in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, Mölln and Solingen the German authorities failed to clearly condemn the attacks. Then Chancellor, Helmut Kohl went on television and repeated that Germany was “not a xenophobic country” (Spiegel Online, 07.02.08). This time also, the responsible minister Kurt Beck, Premier Minister of Rhineland-Palatinate, was fast to rule out racist motives, which was severely criticised by the Turkish authorities, who for their part ‘offered’ to send in a Turkish investigation team. This proposal was immediately criticised from German side, however, and Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble complained about Turkey’s lack of trust in the German police and interference in German domestic matters. The civil Turks on the other hand felt that Merkel and the German authorities neglected the Turkish minority and

42 A somewhat related situation took place recently in Denmark after the murder of a 16 year old newspaper boy with Turkish background. Both the Turkish Minister for Family affairs and the Prime Minister himself called directly to the family of the dead boy and gave their support and condolences. This spurred a mixed reaction from the Danish side and very interestingly pointed to differences within the Turkish community. One of the MPs with Turkish background (Yildiz Akdoğan) understood the purpose without supporting it, while the other (Özlem Cekic) was downright against it and regarded it as interference in domestic issues. This again illustrates how the nexus between homeland-host country and the immigrants themselves is tested.
welcomed the presence of Erdoğan and others. The main organisations have been more ambiguous about Turkey’s interference, but welcome the focus on the conditions of Turks living in Germany. Kenan Kolat for instance coupled the tense atmosphere with the lack of political rights and argued that local voting rights and the right to retain original citizenship when naturalising would strengthen the social cohesion (DW-WORLD, 01.03.08).

Berlin differs from the federal level. Diversity is in many ways the fabric of Berlin, and throughout the last decades it has strived towards a multicultural ideal (Kiliç, 2004). One of the symbolic institutions is the influential Radio Multikulti, which started broadcasting in 1994. Probably Berlin defines itself as multicultural because it is. It is not an island, however, and is connected to the rest of Germany and Europe and faces the same structural problems. Nonetheless some of the steps taken earlier in Berlin can now be found in other federal states. Differences between administrative levels are not distinctive to Berlin either – they are found everywhere. In Denmark this situation is paralleled in the relationship between the Municipality of Århus and the national level. Århus has created a far more liberal integration approach based on an acknowledgement of diversity (Århus Kommune, 2005; 2007). This is a more recent development and it is still too early to tell if the new approach will also change social practice.

In all three settings there are varying degrees of internal competition. Much of this is taking place in the infra-political sphere where different groups compete over members, leadership, representation, and funding without the struggles reaching into the public. The Danish case showed fairly little competition, most of it between Sunnis and non-Sunnis. The 2007 election demonstrated alliances between Kurds, Alevis and Turks and the internal competition between the Kurdish fractions has decreased. There is a larger degree of internal competition in Sweden, but also more consensus as argued previously in the chapter. The German case contains the largest variation with fractions consisting of very different groups, as the Kurdish and Alevi organisations as well as the TGD and TBB demand that their respective groups are recognised as ethnic minorities in Germany. Other groups like Hür-Türk and TGB regard Turkishness as a nationality. The difference compared to Denmark and Sweden is that the competition reaches the public and is taken to the media and public agenda as some of the examples I have given illustrate.

What are the reasons for the competition in Sweden and Germany then? The Swedish and German systems have developed incorporation models with marked differences but share

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[^43]: <http://www.multikulti.de/>. 
the characteristic of being open for internal competition. One tentative explanation is that exactly the corporatist system and resulting organisational structures in Sweden have made the organisations very similar in regards to aims and perspectives and hence set the frame for public competition, meaning that convergence in itself forces organisations into competition as they end up seeking the same goals. This would be a logical outcome of neo-liberal impacts. In Germany the competition can be explained from a lack of possibilities that has made the organisations turn towards political partners in both Germany and Turkey, which has placed the organisations within a sphere of political competition and contention. The lack of rights for immigrants in Germany also conditions far more encompassing claims making and some of these claims are supported by mainstream organisations. Also the sheer size of the Turkish minority and sub-minority groups explains the internal competition, and the heterogeneity itself makes it difficult to imagine that the 2.7 million people with Turkish background could ever be mobilised in one single cause. The size of the Turkish community could also explain the number and volume of the direct political ties to homeland political parties (cf. Table 8.3). 1.7 million Turks living in Germany hold Turkish citizenship, which makes them a huge vote bank. The Turkish legislation requires that citizens must cast their vote in Turkey physically, which means that very few use their voting right. The number of actual votes given at custom gates was 115,459 in 2002 (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2006). The transnational political ties must have other explanations as well.

**What the political opportunity structures cannot explain**

The POS framework convincingly explains convergences in the organising processes but has more difficulties explaining the divergences. The different positions taken by the TBB and the TGB are hard to explain as the outcome of the exact same integration regime for instance.

Some explanatory factors could be derived indirectly from the POS such as the political constituency in the given country that makes certain types of claims making seem more pursuable than others. The change from social democratic government to right-wing (with different supporting parties) in all three countries has also opened up the field for new (political) identity constructions. The emergence of a more ‘neo-liberal’ immigrant elite could be seen as an outcome of the change of power. Firstly, because people sharing such political opinions now have potential partners and can enter political alliances; or secondly because it only now has become possible to be immigrant and liberal (here not understood as conservative or traditionalist); thirdly, and derived from a structuralist perspective, this identity position arises as it is interpellated by the system.
Other types of political identities, such as the Muslim Democrats in Denmark, point to the importance of the discursive structures. At present there is room for negotiating this type of collective identity which is supported by political parties, civil society actors and the private market enterprises. Religious-political identities have long been accepted in Sweden although religion in general is seen as a private matter. In Germany both the political and discursive structures exclude Muslims identities but controversially have tried to prioritise Christian occidental identities (Joppke, forthcoming). No efforts have been made to launch a German version of Democratic Muslims, for instance, as it would be left outside any influence anyhow. Even moderate Muslim organisations are regarded with suspicion and basically marginalised.

No matter what, the conflation of the institutional-political and discursive structures is decisive for the organising processes as the analysis has shown, but this approach perhaps faces the biggest difficulties as far as explaining transnational engagement. As I argued in Chapter 3 it is necessary to identify the specific opportunity structures that affect transnational engagement. Implementation of dual citizenship without doubt enhances transnational engagement, but not all persons with dual citizenship are necessarily transnational (Faist, 2007b). It is also difficult to explain why the organisations with most transnational political ties are found in Sweden, which allows dual citizenship, and Germany, which does not. Here other factors must be taken into the analysis and the issue of heterogeneity in the Turkish community seems to be an important factor.

A main flaw of the framework is that integration regimes mainly account for actions taking place within the framework of the nation-state, collective identities and claims making that go beyond are much harder to capture. In other words there is an inherent ‘methodological nationalism’ in this framework as has become even more apparent in the analysis. Whether a given system is restrictive (ethno-cultural) or liberal does not seem to matter, what mainly matters is the constituency of the immigrant group and the internal organisation (that will be dependent on the POS and hence indirectly impacted by the type of system). The trajectory outlined by Layton-Henry (cf. Chapter 2) is too simplistic as it neglects that people and organisations may move towards increasingly more assimilation and acculturalisation, but simultaneously remain or even become transnationally engaged. This was also the argument for incorporating the framework partly drawn from Marques & Santos (cf. Chapter 3). Even where I find internal differences due to deeper social structures of class, ethnicity or religion I also find united platforms being established that essentially are transnational in scope. These
processes, mechanisms and strategies need to be scrutinised further, which I will do in Chapter 10.
Chapter 9
The construction of collective identities

Introduction
In this chapter I will pay more attention to the discursive construction of identity than I have done so far. In Chapter 5 to 7 I looked at the national integration and citizenship regimes and identified the framework for incorporation that again sets the framework for the negotiation of identities, which I will look into here. Chapter 8 looked at the impact of these political and institutional structures on the collective organising processes, i.e. at the organisational patterns. In this chapter I go one analytical step further and refine the analysis to look at the impact on the Turkish identity construction within and across the three national settings. Besides discussing the notion of identity I look further into the various strategies, frames and actions these identity constructions employ. The analysis will build on the framework outlined in Chapter 3 although I only pay attention to the collective identities and strategies of realisation at stake in reality. Subsequently, the following analysis will first and foremost be an empirical analysis. Furthermore the analysis will mainly deal with the identity categories that are of importance for Turkish identity as my focus confined to Turkish immigrants in a broad definition.

Prescribed identities - official categories and the discursive structures
Migrants may willingly identify along the status categories offered by state policies – what Tilly terms corporate identities (cf. Chapter 3). Such categories tell a lot about the state approach to immigration as such. In Denmark the overall status category changed from the 1980s’ use of ‘foreigner’ to the use of ‘immigrant’ and was in 1991 supplemented with the category of ‘descendants’. This can be illustrated by the specific name of laws etc. Only in a few cases are other categories used. One example is the rarely used ‘ethnic minority’ category as in the Council for Ethnic Minorities, oddly replacing the previous title – the Immigrant Council.

Two recent tendencies could point to a discursive shift, however. One is the tendency to use the adjective ‘new’ in various ways. The Ministry of Integration uses notions such as newly arrived, new Danes, launched a diversity programme called ‘workplace for new Danes’, publishes a magazine entitled New in Denmark and perhaps most illustratively changed the actual address of the Ministry’s webpage from inm.dk to nyidanmark.dk [newindanmark.dk]. This has moved the focus away from more problematic issues of refugees, inte-
gration and so on and carries connotations of a service provider aiming at making it easy for newcomers. This is interesting as the Danish state, as shown, has one of the most restrictive entrance systems in Europe.

If I scrutinise the status of people taking temporary residence in Denmark it not surprisingly shows that most people today enter on study visas and work permits accepted via the positive list. Denmark has accepted to receive 1000 refugees in 2008 and 2009. Compared to this modest number, the Immigration Service in 2007 issued 37,476 work and study permits. 4,462 persons entered the country via family reunification; the majority from Nordic countries, but 340 from Turkey. 968 persons were given asylum in 2007 (Ny i Danmark, 30.01.08). So the actual number of newcomers to Denmark is firstly very modest and secondly includes groups of people who are not obvious targets of a highly culturalised integration policy, i.e. most of them being from EU-25 countries. The change of rhetoric both reflects an actual change in the type of newcomers and blurs the fact that the entrance system to Denmark is extremely exclusivist.

The other trend takes a completely different direction where the indirect aim is to essentialise cultural differences. As I have claimed throughout the dissertation there has been a tendency to define immigrants in religious categories or more specifically to target Muslims in religious terms. In some cases the category of immigrant has been entirely replaced by the category of Muslims. Immigrants from so-called Muslim countries, i.e. countries with a predominantly Muslim population, are primarily defined as Muslims and secondly in other categories. When I look at the webpage of the Ministry of Integration for instance, the information on ‘Immigrants and descendants in Denmark’ tells the reader that there are presently 452,095 immigrants and descendants in Denmark of which approximately 120,000 in 1999 were expected to be Muslims, but it is added that the number could be 210,000 today (Ny i Danmark, 2008a). No such information is given about other religious minorities.

The other headlines under the category of integration also contain specific knowledge about Muslims. The headline ‘Dialogue at all levels’ mainly legitimises the actions taken by the Danish state during the caricature crisis and furthermore lists specific Muslim organisations the Prime Minister has visited the last three four years (Ny i Danmark, 2008b). The intense emphasis on Islam builds on a diagnostic frame claiming that problems related to integration, marginalisation and extremism are caused by religion. Having a Muslim background hence demands specific attitudes of being prodemocratic etc. in order to be accepted in soci-

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1 This finding also reflects the emphasis other researchers have placed on the Muslim/non-Muslim distinction as a conflict line between majority and minorities (see especially Modood, 1997; Modood et al., 2006).
Muslims, despite their degree of religiosity, are expected to renounce extremist discourses of *sharia* etc. and have better chances of recognition and success if they use assimilative and acculturative identity strategies.

The problem with such prescribed identities is that they are very hard to transgress and policy makers and public opinion leave very few openings for doing so. The organisation Democratic Muslims as mentioned provides one strategy of recognition – distancing oneself from ‘bad’ Muslims.

Transgressing the category of immigrants and descendants is even harder. A good example of why this indeed is a difficult task is the reports done by the sociologist Eyvind Vesselbo for the municipality of Ishøj in 1990 and 2000. Ishøj was one of the first municipalities to experience neighbourhoods with a predominant immigrant population. In the report entitled *I går i dag i overmorgen – Indvandrerrapport* [Yesterday, today, the day after tomorrow – Immigrant report] Vesselbo shows how the population of Turkish newcomers has grown from 145 persons in 1969/70 to 1,824 persons in 2000 (Vesselbo, 2000). The findings are presented in a technocratic ‘objectivist’ manner, but one that ignores that people since may have obtained Danish citizenship for instance. The report has been much cited in the Danish parliament since and has been used as an example of how things can get out of control. Vesselbo himself used the report to suggest that Statistics Denmark change their system so it would be possible to follow immigrants for three to four generations; again regardless of naturalisation (Folketinget, 2003-04).² In 2001 Vesselbo joined the liberal party *Venstre* and is today member of *Folketinget* and of the Committee for Immigrant and Integration Policy.³

The consistency of such identity categories affects not only the immigrant organising processes but also challenge the aim of equality and citizenship that Danish integration policies allegedly adhere to. The field for negotiating identities in this sense is narrowed and a special type of identity is promoted by giving access to funds that support such identities, for example different campaigns for breaking repressive family patterns in Muslim families.

As I shall get back to in the section on religious identities, the constraining character of the prescribed identities can also create ‘undesired’ responses in terms of reactionary religious identities moving away from democratic ideals and building on explicitly dissociative strategies. The increased demands for naturalisation and gaining citizenship also consolidate these status categories. People, even born in Denmark, are maintained in an immigrant status.

² Denmark already uses register-based data, but it only covers first and second-generation immigrants.
³ Interestingly he is today one of the critical voices against the government’s own integration policy and has called for further research and evaluation of the existing policies.
Immigrants in Denmark both show adaptation to these identity structures and pursuit of own interests. The lack of umbrella organisations organising immigrants across ethnicity makes it difficult to identify the immediate impact. The Turks I have spoken to reject being called immigrants or descendants on a daily basis. The organisations nevertheless consider themselves immigrant organisations and often emphasise that although the organisation for instance has the ethno-national term Turkish in its name or mainly has Turkish members, that the organisation is open for all immigrants and Danes as well. Hence, the official categories work intrinsically.

In each their way, the Swedish and German systems both resemble and deviate from the Danish system. In Sweden the official categories take a dual direction. Firstly the subsidisation system promotes the promulgation of ethno-national identities as discussed in Chapter 8, but the official incorporation and categorisation of non-Swedes treats everybody regardless of ethnic origin as immigrants. The institutional channel for incorporation, the Council for Ethnic Equality and Integration, does not promote identity categories as such, but reflects the aim of co-citizenship and equality. Enigmatically it includes the ethnic minority category that is only distributed to a few ethnic groups all being historical immigrants to Sweden, e.g. the Finnish, but ethnic minority here is more or less equal to language groups. The reluctance and unease of prioritising cultural groups has resulted in official categories either emphasising the individual or on the contrary emphasising the broadest possible category, that of immigrants. The easy access to citizenship also minimises the use of special categories as the majority of newcomers take Swedish citizenship after the required four or five years of residence depending on the status of arrival. On the other hand the legal acceptance of dual citizenship makes it possible to maintain a hyphenated or combined identity including Swedish and another ethno-national membership. The emphasis on equality and structural barriers underlying the integration policies similarly moves the focus from the immigrants to structural conditions in society. Instead of initiating political initiatives with the immigrants as object, social phenomena, such as social marginalisation, are taken as the starting point, which makes a difference for the distribution of identity categories. The responsible institution for asylum and refugee questions, the Swedish Migration Board under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department, illustrates the same point by carrying the process of migration itself in the name rather than taking the objects. In the statistics and policy documents Sweden differs between domestically born and foreign born but does not provide general information on descendants if the parents have naturalised.
Germany upheld a very hierarchical system of stratification for years. The three main categories were German citizens, Aussiedlers and foreigners.\(^4\) Again this corresponded with the immigration policies. This system has changed as Germany introduced the foreigner law in 2007. The official categories have changed as well; from being Ausländer, people who have moved to Germany are now identified as Zuwanderers. Zuwanderung is thought to be different from the category of Einwanderung and Einwanderer, which in German official use only includes prepared and long planned residence in the country, while Zuwanderung encompasses everybody who has ‘crossed’ the border and now lives in Germany.

The category of foreigners is still used in statistics however, as is the former category of Gastarbeiter.\(^5\) Furthermore the category of Personen mit Migrationshintergrund is now used by the BMI (Bundesministerium des Innern). It was introduced with the Mikrozensus in 2005. Until then it was not possible to trace generations statistically as Germany has not had register based data like Denmark and Sweden. Foreigners only counted in the statistics in regards to non-German nationality, but persons who naturalised disappeared from the statistics. The new category makes it possible to trace mobility and development over generations by including descendants and naturalised. This increased the numbers of immigrants immensely and made people and policy makers realise the importance of developing suitable and efficient integration policies (interview with Ulrich Raiser). Interestingly, it was favoured by people working proactively for integration and who were liberal minded towards immigration. The importance is seen in revealing the size of the ‘problem’ and reframes the problem by making both diagnostic and prognostic frames allegedly reflect reality, which necessitates a demand for new strategies. The category will probably have to be revised later, but so far very few regard the category as discriminatory as is the case in Denmark (and the Netherlands). The introduction of the category ‘persons with immigrant background’ enters the political vocabulary at a time when Germany has made restrictions for entering the country.

Today very few unskilled migrants enter the country and the political debate reflects the policy development and focuses on integration politics rather than immigration politics, i.e. on education, social and labour market policies. The introduction of integration policies and increased possibilities can be said to contain some successes in making the various ethnic groups work together and overcome differences. A representative from the Ausländerbeauf-

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\(^4\) Germany has open the doors for nine categories: EU internal migrants; spouses and children of foreigners with permanent residence; ethnic Germans; Jewish immigrants from CIS countries; asylum seekers; Geneva Convention refugees; temporary protection refugees; new guest workers (contract labourers etc.); and foreign students (see Borkert & Bosswick, 2007).

\(^5\) The category of Ausländer is defined as: Ausländer ist jeder, der nicht Deutscher im Sinne des Art. 116 Abs. 1 des Grundgesetzes ist (§ 2 Abs. 1 Aufenthaltsgesetz). <http://www.aufenthaltsgesetz.de/1_statistik.html>.
tragte in Berlin tells that the different immigrant organisations have managed to elect members across ethnic categories and furthermore have been able to enter joined alliances for the first time in years (interview with Ulrich Raiser). The integration council itself, as mentioned in Chapter 8, consists of representatives from different national regions, but even these regions have in some cases been filled out with persons with another ethno-national background than expected, e.g. a person with Kurdish origin acts as representative for the Turkish region. Raiser also tells about an Arab representative making claims on behalf of the Turks. In this sense the strategy contains some success as one goal of the integration strategy has been to combat ethnic segregation. Hence, promoting and even more identifying a collective uniting identity category being adapted counts as a success.

Officially the inclusion of religious identities has been totally absent, no structures include such, however, indirectly I find the same tendency as in Denmark to categorise immigrants as Muslims. The concept in this sense is overdetermined by including even non-Muslims and secular Muslims.

After 2000 the federal government has published different reports estimating the number of Muslims at between 2.8 to 3.2 million, but the basis of these numbers it is questionable. Since 1987 religious affiliation has not been registered (and even then it was optional), hence the numbers are found by adding persons from predominantly Muslim countries, again regardless of personal affiliation and religiosity.

The latest example is a recent publication entitled Muslime in Deutschland – Integration, Integrationsbarrieren, Religion sowie Einstellungen zu Demokratie, Rechtsstaat und politisch-religiös motivierter Gewalt (BMI, 2007). It is written by researchers from the University in Hamburg and is more nuanced than some of the earlier reports. It nevertheless uses of specific diagnostic and prognostic frames that policy makers make of use of later. Muslims are perceived as a special category that demands special instruments in regards to integration, involvement in democratic processes etc. Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble stated before the first Islam Konferenz in 2006 that he wanted Muslims in Germany to ‘become German Muslims’ (DW-WORLD.DE, 27.09.06). Furthermore he demanded that Muslims living in Germany have to accept the country's basic laws, norms and values, and that Germany's constitutional law could not be negotiated. Although the notion of becoming ‘German Muslims’ is framed in a civic-political discourse, Muslims are at the same time included (but in a repressive way demanding a specific mindset) and excluded as dominant political parties keep talking about a Christian-Occidental foundation of the German constitution and society. Some states have sought to allow the Christian crucifix but ban the Islamic head-
scarf although the latter has so far been rejected by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Joppke, Forthcoming). Hereby being Muslim in itself is an excluding factor.

Identifying the actual number of Muslims may of course convey the group of persons originating from countries with a majority population of Muslims but it really says nothing about the ‘real’ number or nature of Muslims in Germany. It is a sweeping generalisation that nevertheless has had consequences for the collective organising processes. The public debate and immense focus on Islam and not least the perception that Muslims and Islamic culture are here to stay in a way has turned former foreigners not into Germans as planned but into Muslims. With the new focus on religion, Turks who have long naturalised suddenly become Muslims, which sparks an interest in forming and altering the perception of what Muslims are and do.

**Religious identities**

Continuing the discussion on religious identities shows that the presence of this type of identity differs considerably in the three countries and is heavily impacted by the political and also discursive opportunity structures. Adding to this complexity is the revival of Alevi identity, which is a religious identity but also goes beyond this.

As I briefly introduced in the previous section, the contemporary political context in combination with a security and antiterrorism discourse has put a lot of focus on Islam in Europe. Islam is very simplified framed as a social and cultural phenomenon that controls the life of its adherents and is to blame for the problems experienced by Muslims (Spielhaus, 2006). The question I touched earlier was what effect this has on religious collective identification. Religious identities obviously are very diverse and adhere to different belief systems but the focus on Islam has been dominant. The majority of the Turkish minority characterise themselves as Sunni Muslims, Alevi or agnostics/atheists (and Christians in the case of the Assyrians).

Denmark upholds a state sponsored church and thereby privileges a specific religious tradition but other religious denominations have been granted substantial rights along the years, among them also a large number of Islamic congregations (Familiestyrelsen, 2007). The Turkish Muslims, who are my interest, have lived a rather secluded existence outside public attention. Most of the Turkish Muslims who actually are religious are connected to the Danish branch of the Diyanet and one of its 27 member organisations. They have managed to remain profoundly apolitical but will obviously be affected by the general perception of Mus-
lims and so on (interview with Isa). This generalising presentation of what Muslims are and do has made many of the organisations react to and speak out about religion.

The religious identification is perhaps more interesting to investigate on an individual level as several of my informants for the first time had to make utterances and even public statements about their own religiosity. One of my informants, who wishes to remain anonymous, states that:

> I must admit that this is the first time that I have been out and have been this active in relation to religion and integration in general because the other activities we had were also promoting integration but they rested more on a mixed perspective. This is the first time I am member of an organisation that only consists of ethnic or how shall I put it new Danes with the common denominator that they have a Muslim background of this or that type (interview with NN).

NN later tells me that when she decided to go into politics, she was asked by a journalist what her ‘father felt about her living on her own and entering politics’. Despite being active in the organisation loosely described above, she defines her relationship to religion as: “[But] I mainly consider myself a democrat and Islam probably plays as small a role in my daily life as [religion] it does in yours”.

During the interviews I heard several such statements and this position today appears to be rather common. Being positioned as Muslim at the same time carries negative connotations and affects the life and identity of my informants. Another informant gave an example of how the Muslim-terrorist nexus appears in daily life. At a staff meeting at the hospital she used to work at, she empties her handbag during a meeting to find a pen and takes out a candlelight holder that her small son has made for her in kindergarten and she had forgotten to remove. Being made by a five year old child it may not be the most aesthetic piece of art, but when she took it out the staff nurse says:

> ‘Oh my god I thought it was a bomb’. And then I laugh a bit [Cekic] as I thought it was a strange joke. […] Then it hits me and it is only then I realise that she really meant it! Then I think, what is it that makes her think that I would bring a bomb and blow up five psychiatric patients? What would I gain by that? (interview with Özlem Cekic).

Proclaiming oneself democratic minded has become a daily practice for people considered to be Muslim. Some organisations like Democratic Muslims have taken advantage of this situation and advanced the public opinion by creating a self-identification as democratic and demanding that other Muslims individually and collectively do the same. Muslim-religious identities have in this way become extremely politicised both internally and externally. The same politicisation has happened in Germany where the public perception has had a homogenising effect on meso level. Although the various Muslim denominations express great diversity, the organisations have felt a pressure to unify and homogenise and have for the first time
started making claims for increased religious rights and recognition on equal footing with other (non-Muslim) religious groups as a collective voice (cf. Chapter 8).

Turning back to the Danish context, we find the exact same pattern of mobilisation. Yet another actor has joined in the effort to unite Muslims, this time the Danish Muslim Union (DMU) founded March 29 2008. The union seeks to establish a broader representation of Muslims than the Muslim Council of Denmark (representing approximately 40,000) and the more controversial Islamisk Trossamfund (representing approximately 15,000). The new Union consists of 30 individual member organisations and is estimated to represent some 25,000 individuals.

On an individual level I heard the same stories from informants in Germany as I did in Denmark (e.g. interview with Safet Çinar; interview with Koray Yılmaz-Gunay). This is quite ironic as precisely the public pressure to keep religion a private matter has triggered public claims making on a religious basis. Muslim groups have already had some success and have lately been included in advisory institutions and decision making processes. The downside is the radicalisation of some Muslim milieus where the public attitude indirectly has promoted increased segregation and marginalisation and religious identifications drawing on dissociative strategies of rejecting the world (Schiffauer, 2004). Very few of these groups have used violent means, most of them simply take reactive actions and reject demands of proclaiming loyalty to democracy or being self-critical etc. Such responses again turn into an even more negative public image. Although the structural opportunities are different in Denmark and Germany the discursive setting is similar.

The situation in Sweden differs somewhat from the situation outlined above. The separation of state and church probably affected religious identities as such. Although some organisations argue that there is a great deal of islamofobia in Swedish society (cf. interview with Mehmet Kaplan) the public attitude is not as hostile as in the other two countries. The Swedish state has been active in minimising antireligious sentiments and the media has not been chasing populist stories to the same degree as in Denmark and Germany. As Hedetoft states in a recent publication it is not a coincidence that the Swedish Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds was forced to resign after her handling of the Muhammad caricature drawings as the conflict spilled into Sweden, while her Danish equivalent remained safely in his chair although the conflict originated in and had severe consequences in Denmark (Hedetoft, 2006d). Swedish Muslim organisations have been more successful in entering the political decision making processes partly due to a favourable structural framework, but also due to internal alliances and a more peaceful co-existence among the various religious groups.
I will claim, however, that religious identifications in both Sweden and Germany play a smaller role in public claims making than ethno-national claims making. The situation is a bit more ambiguous in Denmark where there are no special opportunities on a particular ethnic basis. Neither should the potential influence of religious identities in Denmark be overestimated. Inclusion has so far been based on ad hoc initiatives all taken from above by the Prime Minister and or ministries. In the municipalities the inclusion of religious organisations is likewise marginal.

Turning now to the construction or revitalisation of Alevi identity reveals strong congruence across the countries and therefore may have more to do with other factors than the opportunity structures. Alevi is not only a religious identification but also an ethno-religious identification with the same background as Jewish identity for instance. Alevi identity construction has, as discussed in Chapter 8, been influenced by incidents and limited structures in Turkey. The incident in Sivas sparked a successful revitalisation of Alevi identity and mobilisation across Europe. It is perhaps more correct to say that Alevi identity was re-invented among the Alevi communities outside Europe. The Alevis living here had for a long time engaged in left-wing and social democratic projects but had not mobilised around Alevi spirituality.

All this changed with the arson in 1993. Alevi identity making and mobilisation were diffused and they adapted methods of organising through a strong transnational European network. In their own way they have tried to put pressure on the Turkish state and simultaneously sought recognition in Europe, but they have not had the strong lobbyist tradition as for instance the Armenians. The incident in Sivas opened up for a new framing of their situation. Although they have long been denied basic rights and recognition in Turkey they were not able to get such claims through inside or outside Turkey and had not been successful in mobilising many people. While the Jews as victims of Holocaust rightfully have been able to employ an injustice frame and are legitimate speakers in pointing out racism and xenophobia, the Alevis have not been able to draw on the same frames. But the specific incident and general treatment in Turkey placed the Alevis in the same position as the Armenians and the Assyrians. They were now able to position the Turkish state as the perpetrator of injustice and contextualise this position in public claims making, e.g. in relation to Turkish negotiation agreements with the EU. I will return to the transnational aspect and patterns in the next chapter and here limit focus to the religious aspects of Alevi identity.

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6 Exceptions could be integration councils constituted through representation of ethno-national groups.
Emphasising the religious content and the particularities of Alevisim, such as gender equity, tolerance, non-orthodox understanding of religion etc., has put the Alevis in a favourable position in Germany. In Denmark public knowledge of Alevisim is limited and in Sweden more or less non-existent. Nonetheless the Alevis have been successful in employing assimilative and acculturative strategies for fitting in the host society, and today people with Alevi background are visible in both political parties and societal institutions. A fact that they consider to be the result of a proactive attitude to integration. Obtaining the status of recognised belief system in Denmark has created new openings for the Alevis. They are now trying to obtain the same status elsewhere legitimised by the Danish decision. Furthermore the decision has made a symbolic demarcation to Islamic groups as they are classified in the category ‘other’, which besides the Alevis only includes a group adhering to Norse religion. In other words the organisation is not classified among Islamic or Islamic inspired belief systems.

The new status has also gotten increased attention to the Alevis. In the past six months I have seen three or four articles on Alevisim describing rituals, beliefs etc. Before this the only article that appeared in a search in Danish newspapers was an article by an assistant professor at Aalborg University. Furthermore the TV channel DR2 made a programme on Alevis as part of a serial describing different belief system. The programme was highly contested by the Alevi organisation as the research apparently was amateurish and the persons participating in the programme were not involved in the Alevi organisation as such (interview with Dincer Metin). The increased focus and interest from media and public have made the Alevis revise their religious profile. Applying for the status of recognised belief system in itself demanded that the organisation presented a written description on faith, rituals, musical tradition etc., but dealing with such issues has also created a new consciousness and revised perception of what it means to be Alevi.7

Visiting Alevi organisations and cem houses gives a very familiar feeling no matter the country or city. When I visited the headquarters in Randers, Rinkeby and Berlin I saw the same paintings and decoration of the 33 martyrs of Sivas, Ali and Alevi symbols. But the new

7 See the English description of Alevi belief taken from the webpage of DABF: “FDAA’s [the English abbreviation of the organisation] principals are those have been in Alawi belief; science is our way, love is our religion. Our book, our belief is human being without the Kaaba at Mecca. We look at to all nationality same. We don’t separate the man and women. Against to cruel and support the oppressed. We take control of our hands, tongues and sexual needs (do not steal, lie, and go for anyone other than own partners). We are revolving Semah like the whole universe, and defend non-stop evolution and non-stop improvement. We work and produce, come together and have CEM. Be holy brother and share sweet and hot morsel and share everything other than loved one’s lips. Believe that the affection is the school for perfect mature human. Pick essence from every different flower (every different culture) and make honey. Respect every religious but do not put us under the yoke, defend the secularism. Keep ownership of our past and future. Alawite is our belief, knowledge, resistance and love”.

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and stronger position may affect the symbolic religious organising processes as well. Feramuz
laughingly told me an anecdote about a friend and member of the city council who when visit-
ing the Alevi premises looked around and asked:

Feramuz why don’t you tell me who the persons on these pictures are? And I began to tell, this man
is named … he was in prison for 27 years and died, this one was burned, this one hanged, all of the
dead you know. Then he said, Feramuz this looks like a tomb, why don’t you start to put up posters
for the activities you have now and in the future? And it is true and we then discussed it at a mem-
bers meeting (interview with Feramuz Acar).

It was obviously meant as a joke, but Feramuz had nonetheless reflected on this and planned
to discuss a possible symbolical revision with the national organisations. The reason for men-
tioning this story is to illustrate how strategies may change over time. Having constructed a
self-identification based on an injustice frame, the Alevis might enter a new phase and try to
re-frame their identity and claims making in different ways in the years to come and possibly
in a more progressive future oriented manner.

Racial identities
Racial identities are not a common identification for the Turkish immigrants in any of the
three countries, for obvious reasons; nor are they particularly visible among other ethnic
groups. Although both Denmark and Sweden have fairly large Asian communities, if taken all
together, this category is rarely used and stands in the shadow of particular ethno-national
identifications. I have only found racial categories in either derogative usage or in self- ironic
usage. In the first case, the Swedish notion of svartskalle – literally black skull or black head
– has been used as a discriminatory term denoting people with inferior qualities etc. The same
can be said about the usage of the term perker in Danish, literally meaning a person from Per-
sia. It is used as a derogative collective term defining non-Westerners or sometimes even non-
blondes. In Germany, Kanak carries the same connotations. In all three national settings this
quasi-racial category has been appropriated by immigrants themselves and holds a different
meaning when being used by a non-Dane, non-Swede etc. It can even serve as a positive cate-
gory in the sense that it illustrates mental surplus and knowledge of discriminatory structures;
however it is used by certain social groups more than others. Very few of my informants
would characterise themselves in either term. Different studies on musical sub-cultures such
as hip-hop provide plenty examples of such usage. Here the term is part of a deconstructivist
and dissociative strategy where the rappers use precisely Kanak speak (in the case of Ger-
many) to reclaim a pejorative term indicating a position taken because they have been disen-
franchised and lack recognition in society (see Kaya, 2001).
The same type of mechanism was used in Sweden in a political struggle by the FAI (Fackligt aktiva invandrare), which through a diffusional strategy tried to turn ‘black skull’ into a constructive political consciousness.\(^8\) Identifying as a black skull paves the way for an identification transgressing ethnic borders and pointing to the central problems common for all immigrants. FAI’s members are not necessarily of African origin and or have the same migration experience, but all of them are migrants and more importantly non-Swedes in racial terms (see also Mulinari & Neergaard, 2005). This type of identification is not a new thing. As Layton-Henry has written, identification with a workers’ proletariat transgressing ethnic and religious differences was defining for the collective identification in the first decade of labour migration (Layton-Henry, 1990; cf. Chapter 2). In the case of FAI, the identification has racialised a working class identity.

**Ethnic and national identities**

The far most common collective identity among Turks in the three countries is based on ethno-national criteria. Although the three countries offer different opportunities for this type of identity, ethno-national identification remains an important marker. An explanation is that Turkish and Kurdish identities contain transnational aspects, which transgress the national opportunity structures.

Kurdish organisations in all three countries have framed their identity in the situation Kurds face in Turkey. Kurdish organisations continue making claims as Kurds targeting problems in Turkey. In Sweden such claims have been more successful than in Denmark and Germany, and the Kurdish Federation has managed to make alliances with Swedish politicians supporting these claims. In Germany the Kurds have been claiming minority status – something their fellow organisations elsewhere have not done. The Kurdish organisations in Denmark have made alliances with individual politicians, and Kurdish identity may turn out be more visible now that a member with Kurdish background and a strong Kurdish identification has been elected to parliament (interview with Özlem Cekic). This year the Kurdish New Year, Newroz, was celebrated in the parliament premises organised by the party SF and Özlem Cekic. This definitely sends a symbolic message to the Turkish state, that the Kurdish minority is recognised as an independent group with its own celebrations and rituals. Moreover it becomes an important marker in creating a collective identity with its own notions of time and space (della Porta & Diani, 1999).

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\(^8\) FAI was founded in 1997. The last posts on the webpage are from early 2006, which could indicate that the union no longer is active <http://www.fai.a.se/>.
The Swedish system has promoted ethno-national identities directly, and not surprisingly almost all of the organisations I have dealt with carry a national marker in their name (see Appendix A). The interesting thing is that when asked about the importance of being Turkish (identity-wise) the answer was always combined with assimilative and cultural strategy emphasising how they engaged in Swedish society and did not employ for instance a marginal or dissociative strategy that a strong feeling of being Turkish would indicate. Not only has the system of incorporation promoting immigrants along ethnic lines had importance here, but also the legal acceptance of dual citizenship creates this combination of ethno-national identity and strategy of assimilation. For the Turks I talked to in Sweden and the organisations I investigated in general, combining these presents no problem. The members of Türkiska Ungdomsförbundet expressed that they wanted to be ‘champions’ in promoting integration, and at the same time they were in the midst of building up a Nordic Turkish organisation and a European Turkish youth organisation (interview with Serpil Önal, TUF). In this way they combine an assimilative strategy with a genuine transnational identity and have no problems doing so.

The corporatist system of supporting ethnic groups in combination with a percentage of the immigrants and descendants having dual citizenship creates a condition for maintaining Turkish identity at the forefront. The same can be said about the large minority of Assyrians/Syrians. Although they have fewer incentives to maintain Turkish citizenship they emphasise the ethno-national identity. Belonging to ethnic groups without a homeland has without doubt strengthened a sense of long distance nationalism (cf. Benedict Anderson) and the task of restoring language and cultural traditions must be understood in this context. Being Assyrian was for many the primary identity, but also the members of the ASR for instance identified their members as being among the best integrated in Sweden, having reached the highest educational achievements etc. and had a discourse that established Assyrian identity and culture as flexible and receptive. Besides being an ethno-national (and ethno-religious) identity, also this type of identity is profoundly transnational. Living and feeling at home in Sweden the members of Assyriska Riksförbundet (ARS) would not dismiss the idea of one day moving to a restored Nineveh if it should ever be restored (interview with Rachel, ARS). Such claims were made jokingly but nonetheless express sentiments of belonging somewhere else than Sweden no matter the imaginary status.

While ethno-national identities are supported by the Swedish system this is not the case in Denmark, nevertheless ethno-national identifications are very common on a collective and organisational level. An explanation is the shared migration experience and the hemşeleri
networks. It is not an identity pursued in public claims making however. I found very few cases where Turks represented themselves as Turks to achieve something. One of the few examples was a rejection of a specific rather orthodox imam in Århus, where a small umbrella organisation for local Turkish organisations stated to the press that they were against the imam’s claims. Here the strategy was to present the Turkish minority as different as and much more adaptive to Danish society than Middle Eastern Muslims.

Turkish identity is rather something that is promoted on the individual level. Many of the people of Turkish background that I spoke with and interviewed over the last years would say things like, ‘of course I am Danish but I am also Turkish’, and again I will argue that a transnational identity is inherent for even the most integrated and assimilated. After the European Championship semi-final between Germany and Turkey earlier in 2008, a German-Turkish fan interviewed for Danish Radio responded that: “Die Türkei ist mein Mutterland, Deutschland ist mein Vaterland”. Many Turks (including naturalised ones) maintain strong ties to Turkey, have family there, go on holiday there and invest in the country.

The politisation of integration issues in Denmark also affects this type of identity. Although the official focus is on the individual and the employed categories are immigrants and descendants, statistics, press releases from ministries, social research findings etc. classify immigrants according to ethno-national background, especially when it comes to achievements in the educational system and on the labour market. Reading the newspapers will bring daily stories of Somalis faring worse than other ethnic groups, Turkish men having the highest drop-out rate from vocational training, Pakistani youth scoring the highest grades etc. Hence there is self-contradiction in the aim and discourse of the official categorisation. Instead of breaking down ethnic categories the state in this way essentialises ethnic differences. The immigrants are highly aware of this type of classification and what follows from this in terms of expectations and connotations. Speaking to residents from the neighbourhood of Gellerup in Århus, for instance, reveals a complex system of ethnic stratification. The position in this system clearly affects the public use of ethno-national identification. Iranians ranging high in the system will quickly let others know where they are from and what they are not (‘we are not Arabs’), while Palestinians are placed much lower in the hierarchy and Turks are positioned somewhere in the middle.

In Germany the internal competition alongside a larger range of internal divisions affects the use of ethno-national identification. Most organisations tag the ethno-national belonging in their name and often try to represent themselves as the representative organisation for the particular ethno-national group. The very large Turkish minority numbering 2.7 mil-
lion in Germany indirectly also promotes this type of identification. Political parties and other agents have indirectly promoted the ethno-national identification by establishing special branches or organisations targeting the Turkish community, as the sheer size of it constitutes a large potential vote bank. Furthermore the exclusivist character of the German access to citizenship and restrictions on dual citizenship has maintained the ethno-national identity as the primary. The obvious question is: Why would people identify as Germans when they have had limited access to the system?

The different Turkish organisations emphasise different aspects of identity. For TBB Turkishness is mainly an ethnicity, and Turks living in Germany should therefore aim at becoming German citizens. In contrast, TGB emphasises the national aspect and regards Turkishness a nationality that should be preserved. TBB speaks for assimilation, while TGB speaks against but both for different reasons are in favour of introducing dual citizenship. Both underline the importance of enabling Turkish non-citizens to vote but for different reasons. TGB’s strategy is to mobilise Turks as a nation and thereby put pressure on the German government, while TBB wants Turks to engage in society as citizens first and foremost. Still TGD (the national federation that TBB is linked to) was among the Turkish interest groups that pulled out of the Integration Summit in 2007 and encouraged other Turkish organisations to do the same and hence understand Turkish interest to be the same for all Turks. The reason was a perception that a proposal to tighten regulations of family formation was discriminatory towards Turks.

Subsequently, perceived discrimination and social marginalisation can be a factor for emphasising ethno-national identities. In a recent survey by Die Zeit based on 400 interviews with Turks in Germany, 92 pct. of the respondents agreed that: “Turks in Germany should preserve their own culture”, and almost as many agreed with the statement that: “German society should be more considerate of the customs of Turkish immigrants” (Die Zeit, 07.03.08). Yet two thirds did not regret their decision to come to Germany. The survey is in no way statistically representative but the answers are nonetheless interesting and it does tell us something about Turkish identity in Germany.

Identity is a very complex and multifaceted construction that can be influenced by many factors. Some of these factors are structural, but others also influence feelings of belonging and cognitive aspects. In an interview with the German-Turkish magazine Taz a well-known actor, Yüksel Yolcu, defines his Turkish identity in the following way:

Turkishness in Yolcu’s definition is understood as a type of concentric circles or a type of nested identity, where the crucial part turns out to be a sense of feeling Turkish that stands over his ethnic ancestry, his place of upbringing and place of residence today.

**Cosmopolitan / postnational identities**

The analysis of organising processes on a collective level, as well as of the examples at the individual level, illustrates that identities indeed are complex, multilevel constructions. Some of the first types of identities succeed in overcoming particularities and unite individuals under a collective heading. This fifth type of identity is grounded exactly in this mechanism where particularities are overcome to claim a universalist position transgressing national identity. When members of the ‘Western elites’ enter such a position we often speak of cosmopolitanism, e.g. ‘I am citizen of the world’, ‘I belong nowhere and everywhere’ (cf. Favell, Chapter 2). This is a rather privileged position most likely to be taken by economically independent people and it clashes with the nationalistic resurgence seen in many European countries. Nationalism is considered an anachronism and in the most radical form the borderless world is seen as a global future. Globalisation is internalised so to say. The fact remains that legal requirements, entrance restriction, financial capacity only allow very few to take such a position convincingly (Amit, 2007). The rich vacate and the poor migrate, the saying goes. It is also found among Turkish immigrants, however, in both a similar and slightly different form. My informants and other individuals from my material in general gave examples of such a type of self-identification.

First I will turn attention back to the postnationalist framework outlined by Soysal (cf. Chapter 2). Within this framework she argues that denizenship must be regarded as a type of membership in its own right (Soysal, 1994). In other words the rights of Turks in Germany are not contingent on their nationality. This former relationship has been replaced by a universalised discourse of entitlement derived from international human rights that underpins the claims for social and political inclusion made by immigrants and their descendants. This is of course also expected to affect articulations of identity (cf. Chapter 2). If Turks in Germany have no substantial incentives to become German citizens, what type of identity can we expect? Does the postnationality also affect the ethno-national background of the individual? The attempts by the various immigrant groups to establish European Federations could per-
haps point in this direction. The transnational federations aim at putting pressure on EU to obtain different rights and entitlements in both Turkey and in the host countries.

However, the most discussed example of the few substantially postnational projects so far has been the European Union Migrants’ Forum sponsored and initiated by the European Commission. It only survived for a few years before closing down due to internal discussion, divisions and conflicts. The other federations are not trans-ethnic organisations in the same way but particular national federations taken to a higher level, making them profoundly trans-national but not necessarily postnational. Their claims making touches aspects in both the host countries and in Turkey, but is first and foremost made on behalf of a particular ethnic group. The aim of universalising particularities is hard to find when looking at actual practices.

Secondly, the postnational framework would indicate that claims making in relation to citizenship would be less important, but fact is, especially in Germany, that obtaining citizenship or limiting the criteria is an extremely important claim for most organisations. The same can be said of obtaining local voting rights. The motives differ from organisation to organisation but it is one of the claims that actually is capable of uniting very different groups across ethnic particularities (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007). The ongoing campaign Wahlrecht für Migranten (cf. Chapter 8) has shown an enormous potential for mobilising and uniting very different groups. The first success was in late 2007 when Duisburg decided to introduce local voting rights for non-EU citizens. The decision was hailed by the involved actors such as Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Migranteneverbände (LAGA), Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) and the Spitzenverbänden der Freien Wohlfahrtsflege (BAGFW), who had initiated the campaign and petition originally. The Turkish newspaper also published in Germany quoted Sevket Avci, the chairman of the Beirates für Zuwanderung und Integration of Duisburg, hailing the Duisburg decision as a “historisches Ereignis” and that a “Schandfleck der Demokrati” had been eliminated (HÜRRİYET, 12.12.07). Whether this decision was what made the city of Cologne consider the same steps is unclear, but shortly after a range of politicians including the mayor, Elfi Scho-Antwerpes, decided to look into the possibility. Another Turkish daily published in Germany declared, not completely untrue, that “Wegen des kommunalen Wahlrechtes für Migranten gehen sie von Tür zu Tür, um Unterschriften zu

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National claims making is consequently the most common type, which is also reflected in the collective identities. Collective postnational identities are indeed rare. An example is the Migrationsrat in Berlin, which directly has sought to transgress national affiliations and focuses on the common position in being immigrants, again universalising the particularities by targeting antidiscrimination, structural barriers etc. But also Migrationsrat target its claims within the national context and seeks to increase political participation, strengthening the educational achievements of immigrants within the framework of the nation-state. It cooperates with the *Ausländerbeauftragte* in Berlin and does not consider over-national legal systems for instance.

Perhaps the perspective requires that we look at the individual rather than the collective level. As Soysal argues the individual is presumed to transcend the citizen in this framework. Here it is perhaps more accurate to speak of a cosmopolitan identification. This type of identification is definitely defining for many of my informants. The following statements are taken from Turkish youths active in G-2 and other organisations in Denmark. They define their identity as follows:

The Danes say: You are Danish. The Turks say: You are Turkish. The Kurds say: You are Kurdish. Nobody asks me what I want to be. I am born in the Eastern part of Turkey in a small Kurdish village. My parents’ mother tongue is Kurdish. My mother, who only started speaking Turkish at the age of 16, today speaks nothing but Turkish – a result of the Turkish strategy of assimilation. I myself have grown up in Denmark and Denmark has become my new homeland. And if my parents had been able to go to Mexico, it would have been Mexico that had become my new homeland (Birgül Ergin, interview Aktuelt 08.07.96).

There are things I like about Danish culture and things I like about the Turkish. And then I combine it and construct my own little culture. I am neither Danish nor Turkish (Yildiz interview in Aktuelt 18.12.96.).

I am from Denmark, but I do not say I am Danish. I cannot relate to any flag. Believe me, we are not new-Danes. Surely I am neither new nor Danish (Birgül Ergin, interview Aktuelt 18.12.96).

Here I find clear examples of national identity being down-scaled. Birgül rejects being prescribed either ethno-national identification and instead tries to transgress these through a marginal strategy. Both Yildiz and Birgül are Danish citizens, however, and later explain that citizenship more is a practical formality than anything else. In an interview a decade later, Yildiz gave another version of the importance of citizenship (P1 Hjørnet, 21.11.07). Today she describes her identity as an ‘identity pyramid’ where she first and foremost considered herself as human and woman, next as citizen and later down in the hierarchy in ethnic and

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10 The campaign was extensively covered in both German and Turkish media. See the updated list of press coverage etc. at: <http://www.wahlrecht-fuer-migranten.de/xd/public/content/index.html?pid=517>.
religious terms and she emphasised the importance of obtaining Danish citizenship. Another interviewee, elected to the local council in Århus, employed a deconstructivist strategy to break down pre-allocated perceptions. When she spoke for a new audience she described herself as a ‘female from Århus’, which challenged people’s expectations of meeting a politician with immigrant background (interview with Susan Arac).

The same type of identity is found in Sweden and Germany. If the opportunity structures would influence such an identity I would expect it to be a more common type in Germany as the structural framework here has excluded many from becoming German citizens. Consequently a postnational identification could be a solution to a lack of inclusion. I cannot confirm such a conclusion however. My material may be biased in the sense that I conducted more in-depth interviews in Denmark (and Sweden) than in Germany, but I found this type of identification to be more common in Denmark than elsewhere. Most of my informants have experienced upward social mobility and have parents with a different social background than themselves. Most were Danish citizens but many had dual citizenship, hence this postnational position is more a discursive construction than an identity defined from a structural position, i.e. being denizens. At the same time people mentioned that they wanted their children to learn about Turkish culture, and those who had partners had found people of the same ethnic origin as themselves.

These findings resemble other studies in completely different settings. One example is a study of ‘white’ middle-class Cubans living in exile in Spain. They proclaimed a cosmopolitan identity, but in reality they only mingled with other whitish middle-class Cubans and had no ties to the large community of black Cubans in Spain for instance (Berg, 2006). People may be very cosmopolitan in discourse, but less so in practice. In Germany people on the contrary wished to become German citizens, but direct structural barriers as well as indirect obstacles of discrimination and displacement at times made this hard to obtain.

**Transnational identifications**

In order not to repeat my findings I will only point to some of the conclusions I have reached in regards to transnational identity and dedicate the last analytical chapter to a thorough analysis. Transnational identities are extremely diverse. They are constituted through different strategies and are conditioned by different motivations. During my fieldwork and in the reading of organisational material I have come to different conclusions.

Firstly, the national integration model cannot explain transnational engagement sufficiently. Other factors must be added to the explanation also when it comes to transnational
identification. Turks in Denmark, Sweden and Germany displayed more or less the same type of transnational identity but the conditions for articulating and maintaining such an identity differs from country to country.

Secondly, the immigration experience matters. Groups arriving as labour migrants via migration networks display one type of transnational identity while groups arriving as refugees or belonging to an imaginary homeland display another type. These types of political identities are conditioned by the available structural framework, e.g. Kurds in Sweden have better possibilities for expressing Kurdish transnational identity than Kurds in Germany.

Thirdly, the homeland situation is also decisive for transnational engagement and identity. The Turkish citizenship regime and managing of minority questions has an identifiable impact on the identity construction among ‘diasporic’ groups.

Fourthly, transnational identities must be understood as a genuine type of identity, one that is not necessarily derived from a restrictive or inclusive incorporation system although transnational identities may be part of both a proactive strategy or be a reactionary, marginal strategy, e.g. as a consequence of perceived discrimination. Transnational ties and identity are constructed by the means of complex strategies of diffusion and adaptation where one group takes in the experiences of another groups. In this sense transnational identity may be something latent that can be pushed forward in some situations. Dencir’s story reflects one such example (interview with Dencir Metin).

Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, transnational identity is an intrinsic part of immigrant identity as such. If we recall Castles’ words: “It is possible that transnational affiliations and consciousness will become the predominant form of migrant belonging in their future” (Castles, 2002: 1158), I have come closer to agreeing with this position during the analysis. If this is the case I will also expect this to have consequences for the immigrant organising processes as such. One consequence could be a gradual transformation of immigrant engagement in civil society. Faist captures this social transformation with the notion ‘transnationalising civil society’ (Faist, 2000a; see also Bak Jørgensen, 2008a). Furthermore I will point to the development of transnational citizenship as a distant but possible option. The following chapter will focus on this transformation and the power of transnational engagement to condition structural changes in civil society.

Subsequently, transnational identity turns out to be more complex than any of the other aforementioned identities. If cosmopolitanism is the underlying philosophical/theoretical framework, transnationalism denotes agency. It is first and foremost something that people do, which exactly is the beauty of the concept. People articulating such an identity not alone
make use of different strategies, but transnational identity is constructed alongside conventional approaches to integration. By this I mean that people at the same time by all means may fulfil the criteria of being well-integrated and also emphasise such facts themselves but at the same time emphasise transnational identification. It has been truly fascinating to witness the Assyrians and the Alevis compete about being most integrated, while both at the same time express profound transnational identification and have developed strong transnational political ties outside their respective countries of residence. This challenges the nation-state oriented models of integration from a theoretical perspective.

Towards a conclusion
Social and political categories serve to frame what is perceived to be the political reality. In doing so they are not neutral but affect social reality. In other words: discourses matter. The political establishment has in each national context employed specific categories for specific groups that constitute what Morris has termed ‘hierarchies of civic stratification’ (Morris, 2002). In this system different categories are given different rights and entitlements but also differing degrees of possibility. In a system where labour market participation and self-sufficiency are perceived to be the end-goal, preventing certain status categories from working as is done in Denmark affects their position in society. Official categorisation defines who is in and who is out and such classifications may over time be perceived to be natural and in a Bourdieuan terminology be subjected to symbolic violence. Categories and social identity are especially receptive to the power of definitions and immigration and integration policies are highly dependent on these to be effective. For instance a crucial element in the Danish integration policy is limiting the number of objects of integration, which is done by minimising access to the country and here categorisation plays an important role. Rejecting claims of asylum limits the number of newcomers although it may conflict with international norms and obligations. Defining who is eligible for asylum played a big role in the latest Danish election where the rejected asylum seekers from Iraq were discussed throughout the election campaign. Then minister Rikke Hvilshøj is quoted as saying that: “Under any circumstances we do not send refugees home. But rejected asylum seekers” (Information, 22.10.07). She hereby delegitimises the category of asylum seeker (Bak Jørgensen, 2008b). Categories do not necessarily hold the same meaning in different contexts as the example of the descendant category illustrated. Hence another almost trivial conclusion is that also context matters.

A similar but much more carefully delivered conclusion is that inter-group differences seem to matter also. If inter-group differences did not impact the particular identity construc-
tions I would expect the trajectory to be more or less dependent on the specific opportunity structures. However, the analysis identified convergence in organising patterns and identity constructions across the national context, e.g. that Alevi identity is congruent across national borders and therefore not only affected by national structures. At the same time Alevi identity is different from other types of Turkish identity. Again the transnational factor and the transnational opportunity structures must be taken into account.

Common for the three countries and especially Denmark and Germany is that officially prescribed categories are hard to transgress. Immigrants thus use different strategies either to alter, deconstruct or fill out the content of these categories, but the conclusion must be that this negotiation of identities happens on a field that the state policies and public have been dominant in constructing. When these categories are transgressed it often happens in combination with the articulation of transnational identity.

Turning to transnational identity requires another critical remark. Cosmopolitanism and postnationalism may resemble transnational identity but it is not the same. Transnational affiliation to various degrees is an intrinsic part of the Turkish identities I have dealt with individually and collectively throughout the analysis. Transnational engagement and claims making work within and across the nation-states but does not eradicate this. The nation-state still provides the main field for negotiating identity and claims making but strategies are diffused and adapted in different ways by different groups. In the following chapter I turn attention specifically to the transnational dimension of Turkish identity and organising processes.
Chapter 10
The development of transnational social spaces and transnational identity

Introduction
This chapter continues where Chapter 8 and 9 ended and addresses three analytical dimensions. First I will discuss the transnational opportunity structures implicitly following the framework outlined in Chapter 3. A crucial institutional structure for transnational identity is the legal possibility of dual citizenship, and I will focus specifically on position taken by the three countries on this matter. Dual citizenship touches upon issues of obligations, loyalty and rights that have been framed differently in the three countries (cf. Chapter 5-7). The adaptation of neo-liberal elements in the integration policies seems to be a convergent tendency, which emphasises individual responsibility. This begs the important question if the ‘neo-liberal’ turn will lead away from institutionalising transnationalism in a time where everyone seems to become more transnational. Transnationalism subsequently challenges established conceptions of nationhood.

The countries display each their path-dependencies in this matter where Denmark and Sweden have taken each their, nonetheless, stable direction and Germany perhaps has the largest fluctuations in legislative development. An initial presumption is that exactly because we are dealing with the essential aspects of what it means to be nations in terms of belonging and loyalty, the discursive structures play a major role in policy approach on this area. This analysis is followed by an analysis of the Turkish citizenship regime and transnational opportunity structures. Not surprisingly Turkey displays a somewhat different attitude to this issue than the countries of settlement. Here I also briefly discuss the impact of the Turkish negations of EU membership.

Secondly, I look at the transnational engagement of Turkish minority groups paying attention to the inter-group differences. An argument here is that different groups display different forms of transnational identity, and thereby I claim that heterogeneity matters. Moreover I nuance the analysis by paying attention to individual group characteristics as a means to avoid the danger of sampling on the dependent variable addressed in Chapter 2. By looking at the particular types of transnational engagement (hypothetically also the possibility for no such engagement and social formation), I seek to come to a more subtle understanding of the formation of transnational social formation and the dynamics that put this into motion. More
specifically I set the frame with a brief overview of transnational identification drawing on quantitative research. This is followed by shorter and longer analyses of the distinct groups: Euro-Turks; the Armenians issue; Kurdish transnationalism; Assyrian transnational identification; and Alevi organising processes.

Finally I discuss the consequences of transnational identifications for the conventional integration theory and outline one of the potential outcomes for civic society, here captured under the heading ‘transnationalising civil society’.

**Transnational opportunity structures in Denmark, Sweden and Germany**

I have already touched upon the parts of the integration and citizenship policy that stimulate or impede transnational engagement in the three countries, but in this section I will summarise and elaborate these findings.

The most influential opportunity structure is without doubt the legal framework for dual citizenship. Legal arrangements for dual citizenship impede transnational identity (Faist, 2007b; Faist & Kivisto, 2007) but it does not follow from this that immigrants living in states that do not allow dual citizenship will not have transnational identities, the question is rather what difference such a legal arrangement makes for the identity constructions and formation of transnational social spaces.

A basic question that occurs when the issue of dual citizenship is discussed is: If a prohibition of dual citizenship prevents people from obtaining citizenship and indeed seems to be the main determinant for not naturalising, why not allow dual citizenship then? Why would any nation-state want to maintain a large group of denizens? The questions relate to the fact mentioned in the introduction – that citizenship touches upon aspects of belonging, loyalty and markers of exclusion. Brubaker’s now seminal, although also criticised, analysis (1992) of citizenship regimes in France and Germany, despite its lack of dynamics and eye for transformation, convincingly depicts how conceptions of nationhood are determining for the citizenship policy development. Nation-states have developed particular path-dependencies, grounded on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation-state that are hard to change once established.

Table 10.1, which is inspired by a recent work by Faist, summarises the recent status and developments in the three countries (see Faist, 2007a):
Table 10.1 Citizenship legislation and attitude towards dual citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional structures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalisation</td>
<td>After nine years of residence. <strong>Conditions:</strong> Dependent on residence permit. No welfare dependence. Naturalisation test. Language test (equal to the level of three years high-school). Access dependent on criminal record (eligibility prolonged if applicant has a criminal record).</td>
<td>As-of-right after five years of residence. <strong>Conditions:</strong> Five years for citizens from non-Nordic countries. Four years for refugees. Two years for Nordic citizens.</td>
<td>After eight years of residence. <strong>Conditions:</strong> No welfare dependence (not applicable if deemed to be out of own will). Language test (sufficient knowledge of German).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subsequent generations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Jus sanguinis</strong> Citizenship must be obtained before the age of 18. No criminal record. Other national citizenship must be relinquished.</td>
<td><strong>Jus sanguinis</strong></td>
<td><strong>Jus sanguinis; Jus soli</strong> Provided if one parent has lived for eight years in Germany or holds a permanent residence permit for minimum three years and have been educated in Germany for eight years for the second generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dual citizenship</strong></td>
<td>Not allowed except for special cases where former citizenship cannot be relinquished.</td>
<td>Allowed explicitly after 2001; No requirements to relinquish other citizenship.</td>
<td>Accepted for ethnic Germans; also in special cases where the applicant risks economic loss or loses right to expatriation (decision taken at state level). Option model: the child must give up either the German or non-German citizenship before reaching the age of 23; this does not apply to children with mixed parents, in that case both citizenships are allowed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discursive structures</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arguments for or against dual citizenship</strong></td>
<td><strong>The 2001 implementation due to a shift from national to transnational interests</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dual citizenship prevents social integration and creates segregation and parallel societies; proponents of dual citizenship use moral arguments</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dual citizenship prevents social integration; problem of dual loyalties; proponents of dual citizenship speak of the danger of unintentionally keeping wanted labour force out of Denmark due to the prohibition; the prohibition is regarded as old-fashioned.</td>
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It is possible to trace the paths of the respective country yet national approaches are open for transformation as both the case of Sweden (from being against dual citizenship to implementing it without limitations) and Germany (from very restrictive access to citizenship to unrestricted *jus soli* access to citizenship and some room for dual citizenship) show. Furthermore the nationhood-derived explanations have difficulties incorporating the social changes caused by Europeanisation and globalisation.
While Sweden has regarded citizenship as a prerequisite and means to integration, Denmark and Germany have had a more ambiguous approach but with a predominant approach that regarded it as the end goal for integration. Germany has lately gone in a less restrictive direction while Denmark has restricted access further.

The effects of both having non-restrictive access to naturalisation and accepting dual citizenship can be found immediately when looking at the naturalisation rates. Sweden with fewest restrictions among the three countries tops the list of number of naturalisations.

Although the identity component of citizenship is crucial, the legal aspects should not be underestimated. The passport is a legal document enabling the person not only to travel out of the country but just as importantly to re-enter the country of residence without restrictions. In the case of Denmark, for instance, people living in the country on temporary residence permits cannot get these extended or become eligible for naturalisation if they leave the country for more than six months over a given span of years. Likewise is citizenship for the applicant a protection against expulsion while granting citizenship from the perspective of the state closes such a possibility.

The issue of expulsion (here not to be confused with expatriation) is given different attention in the three countries. In Sweden it was given minimal attention. In Germany the experiences from the Nazi-past make the question of expulsion a sore point, but the demand for expulsion has been employed over time, also in regards to the Turkish minority group. An example is German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who in 1994 called for the expulsion of Kurds who participated in highway blockades and violent demonstrations. Also the so-called ‘Caliph of Cologne’, Metin Kaplan, was expelled to Turkey. In Denmark the instrument of expulsion is an intrinsic part of not only the Immigrant Act but also the general discussion of integration (Information, 11.10.07). The possibility of expulsion is coupled with the threat of terror, which is the basic legitimising factor, but also persons who do not show the will to live in Danish society are, in principle, subject to expulsion. The Danish Immigrant Act has been accused of not living up to EU’s minimum criteria for expulsion and guarantees on the refugee area (Information, 11.10.07). Maintaining these standards has been considered the reason for the Danish reluctance to drop the opt-out in the asylum area in the EU framework.¹

¹ An example in Denmark is the case of the cousins Ferhat and Hizir Kilic. The two were sentenced to prison and expulsion for the murder of a young Italian tourist in Copenhagen in 2003. The cousins were at the time of the murder 16 and 18 years and were not Danish citizens, although Hizir was born in Denmark and Ferhat came to the country at three years old. The case is controversial because it is the first time persons raised in the country with no apparent connections to their families’ home country were expelled. Neither of the cousins speaks Turkish and they have no connections to the country they are being expelled to.
Repatriation programmes can also impede transnational engagement. If a given country from the beginning has made institutional incentives to return home one day this may affect the ties a given person keeps to the homeland. Also here I found different practices.

The first Danish Act on Repatriation went into force January 1 2000. The overall purpose of the Repatriation Act is to provide non-citizens residing in Denmark with the best information possible in order to facilitate their decision on whether they should repatriate or not and to support repatriation. The law applies to refugees, aliens with residence permits on humanitarian grounds and immigrants. Basically the Act provides benefits enabling the person/family to reintegrate in the homeland. The benefits include (one-way) flight ticket; roughly 2,400 €, purchase of professional equipment (amounting to 1,500 €) etc. Persons who have come to Denmark on the basis of family reunification are only entitled to repatriation benefits if they repatriate together with the person they were reunited with. Besides this, persons wishing to repatriate can apply for a monthly so-called re-integration allowance for up to five years that differs according to geography, but for Turkey it amounts to 1,900 €. Immigrants are not entitled to return to Denmark once they have repatriated. All in all 460 persons have chosen to repatriate since the Act went into force, hereof 12 of Turkish descent. Facilitating repatriation is a clear strategy of the Danish state but very few have made use of these possibilities. Opening for dual citizenship would probably make more people return to the homeland as they would still have the possibility of returning to Denmark. In addition, people retired from the labour market would be able to bring their pension with them. None of these possibilities are regarded positively by the integration regime.

The Swedish remigration policy precedes the Danish one by a decade but generally resembles it (Proposition, 1988/89:100). The possibilities for returning to Sweden are slightly better but also here the door closes when repatriation is done through the formal system.

In terms of repatriation Germany is more complex than the two other countries. One set of policies is targeted at ethnic Germans returning to Germany and other programmes and policies have been targeted at labour migrants and refugees. It is worth noting that although Germany declared that it was not a country of immigration, very few measures were taken to facilitate that the labour migrants left the country again.

Family reunification and formation is another instructional structure affecting transnational ties. Denmark has, as mentioned in Chapter 5, introduced the 24 year rule, which indirectly aims at preventing ethno-national marriages. Such institutions also exist at EU level although it here is specified that the member states as a maximum can employ a 21 year age demand.
Other structures such as *mother tongue education* may also impact on transnational identity. Denmark has moved away from offering this nationally and it is now a matter for the municipalities and a disappearing phenomenon. Sweden has until recently offered mother tongue education twice a week if there were at least five speakers of a given language, but last year both the municipalities and the government have started discussing a possible abolition of mother tongue education. In Germany it has been a matter for the individual state and there are different practices. A general trend is increasing focus on obtaining the language skills in the country of settlement and language proficiency is regarded as a key for gaining foothold on the labour market. In Denmark and Sweden language proficiency has furthermore become a prerequisite for obtaining citizenship, as shown in Table 10.1.

Finally the question of remittances can be of importance for transnational social formation. Turkey has not implemented special licenses for handling remittances. It is done through banks and post offices or via agencies handling MTOs.

The transnational opportunity structures in the three countries are closely related to the ideological basis of the individual integration regimes. Not surprisingly has ‘multiculturalist’ Sweden been the first of the three to formalise dual citizenship and has the least restrictive access to citizenship in general. Denmark and Germany both have employed more demanding eligibility criteria and have limited access. Denmark has provided substantial rights for non-citizens however, while Germany for long categorised non-citizens solely as foreigners. Things have changed in the two countries. Denmark has implemented even more criteria for obtaining citizenship and at the time of writing it is being discussed if the naturalisation test is too easy (although the increased language criteria have limited the number of applicants considerably). In Germany access to citizenship has been softened and the *jus soli* clause in the citizenship legislation is actually rather generous compared to other European countries.

**Turkish transnational opportunity structures**

To understand the transnational social spaces present in the three countries I need first to look at the citizenship regime in Turkey. Turkey has since its birth as a republic offered little room to debate ethnic, religious and other societal issues.

Looking inward things have started to change up through the 1990s where the role of NGOs increased greatly. A large variety of political and civil society actors managed to put

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2 The literature on the determinants and impact of remittances is abundant and still growing. I do not wish to go into this discussion and only bring in the concept and action as one factor among others in maintaining ties to the homeland. It should also be mentioned that economical remittances only constitute one type of remittances. Social remittances that can be defined as the ideas, practices, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending countries can be of even more importance for local communities.
their mark on the citizenship developments. The proposal to amend the citizenship law was drafted after the ‘architect’ behind had met with Türkische Gemeinde zu Deutschland several times in Germany to learn about the experiences and problems with the existing legislation at the time for Turkish nationals living abroad (Kadırbeyoğlu, 2007). The outcome at the time was the aforementioned ‘Pink Card’ (pembe karte in Turkish). The real influence of such NGOs can be disputed as the actors are set in an unequal and asymmetrical relationship where the Turkish state holds a different mandate than the non-state actors.

Turkey has since the labour migration started showed great interest in their kin living abroad but the launch of the long-lasting National Project for Development of South-Eastern Anatolia (GAP) also affected the relation to Turks living abroad in terms of attention and allocation of resources. In 1998 the High Council of Nationals Abroad was established as a consultation and meeting centre for kin minority and migrants NGOs at home and abroad (Özgür-Baklacioglu, 2005). The Council works with three different types of groups: 1) Turkish citizens living abroad, most notably in Germany; 2) immigrant communities living in Turkey; and 3) kin minorities living abroad, primarily Turkish minorities in South-Eastern Europe. In practice the emphasis has been on the first group only and it is a key actor in understanding the relations between the Turkish state and the Turks in Western Europe.

Looking outward, Turkey has kept relations to Europe and the world since the Ottoman Empire. Staying with recent history Turkey entered the European framework with the Ankara Association Agreement signed in 1963, and already in 1961 had Turkey and Germany created bilateral agreements on temporary labour migration. The recent conflicts and partnership lines have been centred on future EU membership. After the European Council meeting in Helsinki 1999 Turkey was declared official candidate for full membership. In 2001 the Turkish government launched the ‘National Programme’, which was designed to elevate the structure and quality of Turkish democracy to the level of European democracy (cf. the Copenhagen Criteria) by creating a legal foundation for the full protection of individual rights and freedoms, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, and enlargement of the space of civil society in Turkey (Keyman & Içduygu, 2003). The programme has in many ways been a success for the government and has also affected the national minority groups, although improvements are still to be seen in many areas. The reforms include abolishment of the death penalty, elimination of legal restrictions on the rights of ethnic minorities to education and to publishing and broadcasting in their mother tongue and the right for non-Muslim minorities to acquire property. For the minority groups I have been dealing with it meant that the question of minority
rights was furthermore politicised but moreover placed on a European level and political agenda, which has increased the room for claims making.

The growth of civil society actors and the crisis of the strong state in Turkey can be exemplified with the tragic earthquake near Marmara in 1999 where more than 20,000 people lost their life. The Turkish state’s response to the crisis was inadequate, and many of the efforts were done by civil society organisations from both Turkey and abroad (ibid.). The earthquake generally spurred a form of civic engagement among Turkish nationals everywhere. The highly developed infrastructure in regards to travel and telecommunication brought the incident closer to people and some of my informants entered organisational life on this occasion (interview with Ayhan Can).

Seeking to steer and increase remittances has been extremely important for the Turkish state. Different estimates show that numbers may have risen as high as from 14 pct. of Turkey’s foreign currency earning in 1964 to 70 pct. in the early 1970s (see Kadırbeyoğlu, 2007: 131). During the 1980s, 24 pct. of Turkey’s import was covered by cash remittances and foreign exchange deposits of Turkish workers abroad (ibid.). Different measures were taken to increase the cash flow and workers were initially encouraged to remain Turkish, indirectly to continue the ongoing cash flow, e.g. special interest rates were given to foreign currency saving accounts. Being dependent on these remittances indirectly opened up the room for negotiation. The amendment of the 1995 citizenship reform cannot be isolated from the claims making by interest groups abroad. Opening up this box also opened up for claims not wanted by the Turkish state such as Kurdish separatists claims, which meant that the development of Turkish citizenship has taken some peculiar and non-egalitarian directions, e.g. dual citizenship being allowed for ‘good’ nationals but leaving out supporters of for instance PKK. The latter claim was even pushed onward to Germany where German Interior Minister Schily ended up stating that persons with affiliation to PKK would not be eligible for dual citizenship no matter the obstacles for relinquishing other nationalities, which normally has paved the way for dual citizenship (ibid: 132).

The Turkish republic and citizenship are based on civic-republican ideas but are in reality more complex because they draw on an implicit ethno-cultural grounding as well. Emphasis has been on duty rather than rights, and citizenship is regarded as a civic practice. Turkish citizenship and the Turkish Republic have been defined as an “anomalous amalgamation since its conception” (Koçan & Öncü, 2004: 464). On the one hand it excluded religion and various ethnic and cultural identities from politics and the public sphere, and on the other hand it promoted a particular religious identity, a Sunni-based version of Islam, in order to control
and promote cultural and social solidarity among its citizens. In its self-perception the citizenship regime rests on the principle of secularism (as one of the six arrows of Kemalism); the reality has meant that a Sunni-dominated institution has excluded other religious minority identities. Even though the Turkish nation state was created on a communal adherence to a civil identity of politically created Turkishness by all the means of nation building processes, it never separated religion and the state fully but instead established an institutionalised state control over religion in the form of the Diyanet.

The directorate was established in 1928 and was supposed to represent a ‘true’ version of Sunni Islam; by doing so the state explicitly adopted the Sunni Islam identity and incorporated it into its institutional structures. The directorate has since repressed and harassed the religious minority groups, for instance by establishing mosques in villages where Alevi constitute the majority population. Until recently it forbade cem houses and even after allowing the establishment of such places (from the early1990s) the directorate hired Imams to conduct the prayers although the Alevi do not recognise this authority. It thus sought to deny Alevi differences by condemning their cem ceremonies as deviations from proper Islam. The ‘positive side’ was financial support although many local Alevi communities rejected these attempts to co-opt their associations. The 1998 budget for the first time allocated 435 billion lira (roughly 1.6 million dollars at the time) for different Alevi associations (Yavuz, 2003). The Diyanet is an example of a context-specific opportunity structure that has had a decisive influence on the shaping of religious collective identities and position in both the homeland and the host society.

Turkey was earlier reputed to make it difficult for Turkish citizens who wanted to give up Turkish nationality in order to naturalise in the settlement countries (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). The Turkish state allegedly wanted to maintain control and linkage to the nationals living outside Turkey, not least due to economic interests and interdependence as mentioned above, but in 1981 Turkey allowed dual citizenship after constitutional changes.

The Pink Card arrangement secured that nationals who, due to host country demands had to relinquish Turkish citizenship, still have the same rights as if they had kept their Turkish citizenship, e.g. are allowed to live and work in Turkey without further permission (Cicekli, 2004). Turkish nationals not applying for this status will not have these positive rights if they give up Turkish citizenship and will for instance have to enter military service until the age of 27 (or pay a substantial amount to shorten the period to one month). Citizenship practices are privileged for Turkish emigrants, however, and offered to or allowed for immigrations in Turkey. More specifically Law No. 2383 limits the option of dual citizenship
to citizens who lost their citizenship status due to discharge (see Table 10.2). It provides a privileged acquisition for applicants with Turkish ancestry in other words (Özgür-Baklacioglu, 2005).

Table 10.2 Changes in citizenship legislation in Turkey affecting Turkish nationals abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Changes for the political and discursive opportunity structures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Citizenship Act (Turkish Nationality Law No. 403/1964)</td>
<td>Citizenship based on jus sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Low No. 2383 (Amendments to the Turkish nationality Law No. 403)</td>
<td>Introducing dual citizenship after it became evident that Turkish emigrants would not return and on the contrary hoped to acquire another nationality. Dependent upon official permission based on the decision of an authorized body. Hence, Turkish nationals accused of activities against the internal and external security of the state are subject to a permanent loss of citizenship, e.g. Kurdish nationalists or Armenians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Law No. 1111 (Military Law)</td>
<td>Amended to allow persons who had served in the military in the country where they hold a second citizenship to be exempt from military service in Turkey. Must have emigrated before the age of 18 or be born in another country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Law No. 4112 (Amendments to the Turkish Nationality Law No. 403)</td>
<td>Also known as the ‘Pink Card’ law. Includes legal acceptance of a non-citizen status for those who have been asked to relinquish their Turkish citizenship. It does not provide the right to vote in either local or national elections however.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For a detailed account of the specific implications and changes in Turkish citizenship policies since 1980 (Cicekli, 2004).

Lately the Turkish attitude has changed considerably. From, if not directly speaking against giving up citizenship, then definitely not encouraging it the Turkish state now has taken a proactive position on naturalisation and dual citizenship. Turkish ex-citizens are now regarded as representatives abroad and are expected to provide good examples. Østergaard-Nielsen has used the notion “from ‘remittance machines’ to ‘Euro Turks’” (2003c) that actually seems to fit quite well. The Turkish EU negotiations without doubt play a part in this position. Basically the state perception of Turkish nationals living outside Turkey has changed from a perception of our ‘workers abroad’ to ‘our citizens abroad’ (gurbetçi or yurtdışındaki vantandaşlarımız) (Kaya & Kentel, 2005). In more derogative terms the Turks are defined as Almanyali or Almanci by Turks in Turkey indicating that they are becoming German and losing their Turkishness (Diken, 1998; Kaya, 2001). From the state perspective, however, Turkish nationals are no longer primarily expected to remit cash to Turkey, but rather to be good
representatives of Turkey, again closely related to the EU membership negotiations. The government wants the Turkish to settle, integrate and even naturalise but not to assimilate – on the contrary to remain Turkish at hearts. Erdogan’s aforementioned Cologne speech provides a very recent example of this attitude (cf. Chapter 8 and 9).

The Turkish state has tried to accommodate the claims for influence from the Turkish organisations abroad, but the response has to a large degree been symbolic. The above mentioned Consultation Commission for instance has included 45 nationals living abroad, included proportionally after country of residence. There were several criteria for applying for this position: must be employed, well-educated, no jail record etc., which make them less representative of the general Turkish population abroad, but arguably more qualified to discuss certain matters. The main organisations were all bypassed however and were extremely critical of the purpose of the commission (see Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a: 85-86).

Generally the Turkish state tries to use the emigrants as an instrument for political pressure in Europe by influencing the huge vote bank to influence political decisions in Germany, e.g. trying to make Turkish nationals vote for political parties in favour of Turkish EU membership. However, as shown in the previous chapters the composition of the Turkish minority is far too complex to talk of one single group of potential voters.

Voting rights or rather facilitation of voting rights in Turkey remains a problem. Although people can vote they must be present in Turkey, which makes it a both expensive and difficult task for many potential voters. Not surprisingly many of the people who do undertake such endeavours are idealistic and typically vote for parties that oppose or favour instance Milli Görüş (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b). While the Turkish state favours increasing political rights for its nationals abroad, it does not facilitate this right with the same eagerness within its own system.

The general state - transnational identity as a generic category

Was Castles right then? Especially the American literature has given various accounts of immigrant’s transnational belonging. Some have put up variables and sought to create general indexes measuring people’s level of transnationalism. The question is likely to be far too complex to be answered in such a simplistic manner. My departure point is rather that transnational identification varies immensely and differs from group to group according to (intersecting) categories of ethnicity, religion, class and possibly gender. Furthermore the institutional structures outlined in the previous sections are perceived to make an impact on this type of identification. Having said that I will venture into some general reflections on Turkish
transnationalism in the three countries before going further into detailed accounts of the different groups at stake.

Snel, Engbersen & Leerkes made a survey-based study of 300 immigrants in the Netherlands (not including Turks) where they differentiate between transnational activities and transnational identifications (Snel et al., 2006). I include this study as it points to relevant findings that are useful as backdrop for my own analysis. In the study they conclude that transnational activities constitute a substantial part of migrants’ lives in the Netherlands. A conclusion that goes for all migrant groups included in the study. Furthermore they are able to show that it is not the groups often considered as poorly integrated that are involved in transnational activities, but quite the contrary. Transnational activities are equally distributed among immigrants, independent of level of education, social status, and length of stay but differ according to social background. The second part of the study concerns transnational identifications and points to three general findings; that immigrants identify themselves more with compatriots living in the Netherlands or elsewhere than with Dutch people; that they identify more with co-ethnics living in the Netherlands than elsewhere; a relatively weak identification with the international Diaspora (ibid.). The latter two conclusions actually speak against transnational identity being the most prominent in terms of multiple or nested identities. When relating these findings with measurements of structural integration (which also is the political aim and definition in the three countries I deal with) they find that there is no unequivocal relation between migrants’ transnational activities and structural position. Migrants with good social position are neither more or less active than socially marginalised people.

Turning attention specifically to the Turkish minorities Kaya & Kentel did a much larger study on German-Turks (and French-Turks). Their findings both confirm and reject the findings by Snel, Engbersen & Leerkes. As a starting point they argue that the Turks are upwardly mobile in social terms and now have a large group of middle-class people in their communities, e.g. politicians, artists, businessmen bureaucrats, journalist, teachers etc. (Kaya & Kentel, 2005: 27). They also confirm that unemployed (i.e. marginalised) people tend to show distrust towards the Turkish and German states and hence may turn to alternative community formations such as Mili Görüş. These findings follow those of Schiffauer and others

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3 Mikkelsen draws the opposite conclusion by presenting what he terms the paradox of integration (Mikkelsen, 2001). Here he explains transnationalism as relative deprivation. Immigrants that are marginalised themselves perceive to be doing fine as they compare themselves not to majority society but to kinsmen in their homelands. This analysis may point to one dimension of transnationalism but leaves out others. This sociological logic was not apparent in my interviews.
(e.g. Schiffauer, 2004). Interestingly they mention attachment to the Alevi Cemevis among such alternative formations. My own findings derived from the interviews with members of these alternative formations on the contrary showed very little distrust in the Danish/Swedish/German states, but obviously they were critical towards the Turkish state in terms of minority rights.

Leaving this discussion aside for now they present some general characteristics of the Euro-Turks in Germany. They find that 42 pct. of the respondents take no interest in Turkish politics. Among those who do, one third is in favour of the AK Party while a similar proportion supports none of the large parties listed in the survey. The latter indicates that these voters could be in favour of Kurdish, leftist or other oppositional parties. Very few of the respondents have voted in the recent Turkish elections, which could be both due to lack of interest in Turkish politics but also to the demand of being present in Turkey to vote. Asked which country the respondent feels most affiliated with, 49 pct. say Turkey, 22 pct. Germany, and 27 pct. both countries. In Kaya & Kentel’s interpretation the last number indicates that:

Turks no longer essentialise their homeland and they actually challenge the *gurbetçi* discourse common among the Turks in Turkey. They are no longer *gurbetçi*; they have already become active social agents in their new countries. They have actually accommodated themselves in the transnational space bridging the two countries, homeland and host-land (Kaya & Kentel, 2005: 42).

They also claim that these Turks have constructed: “reflexive, active, transnational, postnational, universalist and cosmopolitan identities” (ibid.).

I think that Kaya & Kentel intermingle too many identity categories in the last statement. I find it difficult to accept a conflation of transnational and postnational identities, unless of course the term postnationalism is used in a looser understanding than the one coined by Soysal. Their findings nevertheless contain important facts. When they go into the numbers in more detail they find that persons identifying both with Turkey and Germany, in their definition the Euro-Turks, mainly come from the second and third generation. Moreover the majority of these persons belong to the upper strata of the middle class (ibid: 43).

The class perspective is very significant but often left out of the analyses of transnational identifications. It is too often presumed that immigrants on the verge of being marginalised must have stronger affiliations to their homeland than immigrants having integrated into the new country. It is also left out of the general understanding that the majority of the ‘native’ citizens expressing postnational or cosmopolitan identifications stem from the higher strata of the social classes. The same insight is not taken into consideration when investigating immigrant groups. Several studies have looked at everyday transnational practices also
among Turkish minority groups and contribute important knowledge to the understanding on embedded transnational practices.4

A study by Özcan (2004b) building on data from the Micro Census of North Rhine-Westphalia (home to one third of the Turks living in Germany) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) comes to somewhat parallel results.5 A majority of both the first and second generation Turks orient themselves towards permanent residence in Germany. In 2002, 75 pct. of the Turks living in Germany had lived in the country for more than eight years and hence fulfil one of the important criteria for naturalisation, but only 30 pct. of the first generation expressed intentions of applying. The number for the second generation was 49 pct. However, asked if the possibility of dual citizenship would make a difference the numbers changed. Half of the first generation would apply and 79 pct. of the second generation would prefer dual citizenship. More than two thirds of the second generation nonetheless felt German. Finally, questions about the connection to Turkey reveal that a higher number of respondents in the first generation, 59 pct., feel closely attached to Turkey, compared to 37 pct. in the second generation. Even more striking given the fact that the second generation has predominantly spent their life in Germany, 39 pct. felt ‘immediately’ at home when visiting Turkey (Özcan, 2004b).

My own findings resemble both Kaya & Kentel’s and Özcan’s but are derived from a qualitative angle. The most reflexive articulation of transnational identification was actually found among the well-educated and presumably well-integrated and among people engaged in long-distance nationalism. The first part obviously has to do with my research design that has focused on Turkish organisations, which very often are run by people with substantial resources. Other studies have argued that positions in organisational life appeal to persons without social recognition in mainstream society (cf. Chapter 8). Subsequently, identifying organisational engagement as a middleclass phenomenon may also be too generalising.6 Reality is far more complex than either explanation makes room for.

Both on an individual and collective level people spoke of affiliation to both country of settlement (and it could be argued the new homeland) and homeland. Informants talked about their life in terms of their ambitions and achievements in Denmark. At the same time they talked about being part of Europe and having ambitions for Turkey in terms of development

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4 Especially the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (JEMS) has published several such articles.
5 For more on the GSOEP see <www.diw.de>.
6 The same exercise has been made in feminist studies where scholars like Angela Davis and Beverley Skeggs portray feminism as primarily a white middle-class phenomenon or even more harshly; women’s liberation movement as a toy.
and possibilities. On a more immediate level my informants articulated transnational identity by being members of ‘modern’ versions of hemşeleris both physically and on the web. For most of Turks I have spoken with, no matter additional ethnic and religious identities, Turkey is a space of belonging (excluding the Assyrians). Not only in terms of vacations and leisure but also as a political space. What happens in Turkey does not necessarily stay in Turkey – people harboured opinions on Turkish matters. Very few of my informants had ever voted in Turkey and had no ambitions of doing so. Still they had clear opinions on the political agenda in Turkey, the issue of Turkish EU membership and Turkey’s development.

Mesut for instance talks about having visited a small coastal town at the Black Sea close to his family’s village and here is surprised but amused to see that young people are wearing alternative clothing, e.g. punk style clothing, something that was out of the question when he was young (interview with Mesut, TriEU). But transnational identity is not only a question of Turkish lifestyle coming to resemble ‘Western’ lifestyle. Selim, who used to live in Denmark but a few years ago went back to Istanbul, told me that he more than once had scolded Turkish youths in Denmark behaving badly, e.g. making noise, shouting at people, throwing thrash etc., saying to them that they would never dare do that in Turkey (informal interview). Here the standards are turned around.

On the other hand Cengiz Kahraman, the editor of the monthly newspaper Haber published in Denmark in Turkish and Danish, said that they had conducted polls among their readers showing that issues of Turkish EU membership was of less concern and interest than local matters (interview with Cengiz Kahraman). Haber generally tries to avoid domestic Turkish political issues although it has a brief summery to present an overview in a ‘neutral’ way. It does however bring gossip stories and news from the Turkish world of sport. Looking at a recent edition from April 2008, the main story was the killing of the 16 year old Deniz, but discussed with both a focus on the Danish setting as well as the Turkish interference. Another main story was the recent discussion of introducing dual citizenship, which cannot be regarded as an exclusively Danish discussion. So even though Haber’s aim is to focus mainly on Danish domestic (political) issues, many stories overlap with a Turkish agenda and in this sense can be conceived as part of a ‘transnational news flow’.

Turning the gaze towards Sweden, Euro-Turk (TUF’s journal) appears to be more than a name. It seems really eager to bridge between Sweden, Turkey and Europe. In addition to the

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7 Haber was originally a project by the Danish daily Politiken but closed down to resurface as an independent monthly newspaper. It is loosely connected to the Turkish newspaper Milliyet and makes joint stories with Radikal another Turkish newspaper. Besides Haber, the conservative-religious (affiliated to Fetullah Gülen) Zaman publishes a local version in Denmark in Turkish only.
Moving to a more general level I will argue that few of the Turks I came across during this study have lost affiliation to Turkey, although many of them were born in the country of settlement. This is also reflected in the Turkish media in Denmark, Sweden and Germany. Affiliation is more an intrinsic form of belonging rather than a reflexive strategic choice (as Kaya & Kentel argue). Transnational affiliation in this sense is the incorporated notion that Denmark, Sweden and Germany are not the only places of belonging, and although the political engagement for instance may be located in Denmark, Turkey is a mental space that holds specific values incorporated into the life abroad. Often in a rather unreflective way, I will argue. Many of the younger respondents I spoke with for instance wanted to have (if they did not already have) a spouse of their own background, somebody who shared their cultural values. Although they mostly were very Danish or Swedish in appearance (acculturated in all aspects) and saw themselves as integrated or assimilated by choice (or transgressing these ideals), they had a notion of values being special for Turkey. The same goes for transnational cultural habits; many respondents confirmed listening to Turkish pop music and had taken part in Turkish cultural festivities in the ‘host land’. Turkish music was perceived to be more emotional and nostalgic and evoked feelings of a lost past.

Whether or not they felt more or less Turkish or Danish etc. also depended on the political context, i.e. the discursive setting, of the country of residence. When I started conducting my interviews in Denmark in the aftermath of the caricature crisis several informants told me that they felt alienated by the public atmosphere and seriously considered moving to Turkey (cf. interview with Murat) or at least hold on to property and affiliation to Turkey to keep the door open (e.g. interview with Dincer). Different studies conducted in Denmark the last years point to an increasing number of well-educated immigrants (and descendants) leaving the country (Statistics Denmark; Politiken, 24.06.08). The study shows that the immigrants at stake will not tolerate discrimination in the long run and know that their educational background will be appreciated elsewhere in the world. The most popular destination is Sweden, which has received every fourth immigrant who left on this account, followed by England and

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8 Feramuz Acar from the Danish Alevi Federation told another version where people with Alevi background have begun to sell of acquired property in Turkey to invest the money in Denmark.

9 The selection of Turkish newspapers is greater in Germany. Most of the major Turkish newspapers are also published and circulated in Germany and France, e.g. Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Cumhuriyet and Evrensel. Although the content is limited in regards to news about the homeland, they offer a wide range of news about Turkish Diasporic communities in Europe (see Kaya, 2001; Kaya & Kentel, 2005).
the US (ibid.). All three countries are more receptive to diversity than Denmark. Murat’s understanding of the process of integration is illustrative for this tendency. Telling me about what works in relation to integration he states that posing more demands and excluding people is counterproductive.

Because if you want me to obtain this or that then it does not help to make me angry because then you will never reach your goal and this is exactly what the government does wrong. They make me angry, they make so angry that I have begun to doubt if I should live in Denmark in the future. I can easily imagine that if this trajectory is continued then there are many who [perceive to] have possibilities in other countries, and then it is people with the educations and possibilities that leave Denmark, which then ends up with all the bad things. I know a lot of people who have begun to move out and people who really have left.

MBJ: People with Turkish background?
Murat: Yes. One of the things that really annoy me is that I have done everything to integrate, in terms of language and jobs, I have never been unemployed, I have never been a negative asset for society, but every time I open a newspaper or TV I hear that I am a negative asset and that irritates me. Sometimes I have it up to here [puts his hand over his head].

He then elaborates how he understands identity, which he describes as an in-between type of relationship. He starts out by saying that he has watched the Danish serial *Matador* to get a brush-up on Danish culture10:

I am at episode 21 and the more I watch it the more I realise inside how much I love that I have a Turkish culture and in a way it also deters me as I ask myself why have I become like this when I didn’t use to be like this. I was not like this before; there were many things I liked about Danish culture, but a lot of things have changed inside me after all that has happened.

MBJ: All this, as for instance the Muhammad crisis?
Murat: Yes and 9/11 and all that happens in the world right now. Believe me, it cannot be explained by words… how much it has changed me and I consider how much hasn’t it changed for others, it is … how can I explain it? OK, if we say that this glass is Danish culture and this glass Turkish culture, then I was everywhere, I was in the middle and I had perhaps created a new culture for myself from these two and it went really really well … but after all that happened is it as if everything is separated again, separated the culture I had created and now I am stuck in the middle and considering which way to jump … I guess this is the best way to describe it and I think it is extremely sad (ibid.).

Murat is a financial advisor with wife and children and engaged in various organisations. On any scale of integration he is well-integrated, but as can be read from the abstracts the identity scales are tipping towards Turkey, and a latent Turkishness has surfaced as the outcome not of his structural position but of the attitude of the Danish society.

Murat’s story moves beyond the stereotypical story of ‘in-betweenness’ where the person due to marginalisation and alienation is forced into a nostalgic and revisionist longing for the homeland. Nor does it necessarily reflect the notions of hybridity or postnationalism (e.g. Kaya, 2001; Soysal, 1994). Rather it introduces a transnational dimension into the mode of identification. It is an interesting type of identity as it differs completely from the stereotypi-
cal marginalised and excluded immigrants joining fundamentalist organisations to gain some sort of recognition. In contrast, Murat has increased his business activities in Istanbul and thereby strengthened the transnational ties and is perhaps mentally preparing himself and his family for life in Turkey. Nur Beier, former member of the Council for Ethnic Minorities, tells a similar story with the important difference that she has already relocated to Turkey. I heard no such stories in Sweden, which must be characterised as a more inclusive country also in terms of attitude to immigrants (cf. Chapter 4), or in Germany, which is more in line with Denmark when it comes to attitude towards immigrants. The difference between Denmark and Germany can perhaps be explained by a stronger disappointment in Denmark as people like Murat previously felt included, but increasingly feel excluded, while many immigrants in Germany have never felt included.

Patterns of transnational affiliation among these ‘ordinary’ Turks can also be analysed by looking at the rates of dual citizenship. In Denmark and Germany this information can in theory only be derived indirectly looking at the number of naturalisations given although current citizenship cannot be relinquished. Unfortunately, no such information exists in Denmark. Indicated from my interviews and previous research a large share of the Turkish minority is nevertheless expected to hold dual citizenship, as many people have re-gained Turkish citizenship (in the form of the Pink Card) after becoming Danish citizens.\(^{11}\) In Germany more than 40 pct. of all naturalisations included maintenance of original citizenship, and most of these were Turks (Migration und Bevölkerung, 2001). It should be remembered that the naturalisation rate is far below the Danish and especially the Swedish and never exceeded 2.6 pct. even when the rates increased. The explanation is found in institutional structures. The prohibition of dual citizenship combined with restrictive access prevented many from applying. Even when Germany changed its approach to citizenship amongst other things to overcome the problem that one fifth of the immigrant population was actually born in Germany, a limited number applied. Turkish organisations in Germany explain the decline in naturalisations, most notably from 2000 and onwards, as a result of the introduction of integration tests and other requirements (see Anil, 2007). Basically people who wanted to naturalise did so before these eligibility criteria were implemented. In Sweden the number of persons with dual or

\(^{11}\) Hülya Yarar (female of Turkish origin), now administrative officer in the Ministry of Integration Affairs, provides a good example. A few years back she wrote in an article about Danish naturalisation policies that many naturalised Turks regained their Turkish citizenship after first haven given it up to obtain Danish citizenship. Although Danish legislation does not permit dual citizenship when applying for Danish citizenship, the state so far has not acted when people, including Yarar herself, regain their original citizenship afterwards and thus in reality hold dual citizenship (Yarar, 2001: 43–4). My respondents confirmed this tendency.
multiple citizenship is estimated to be around 400,000, but there is no registration as persons gaining Swedish citizenship are registered only as Swedish citizens.12

This pattern is a powerful argument that institutional structures matter and are decisive for the choices made by individual and collective actors. In Denmark and especially Sweden immigrants have had better access to citizenship, and I have found the Euro-Turk position much more outspoken here. Basically being already included in society offers a stronger platform for expressing transnational identification of the type outlined in this section. As discussed in Chapter 8 and 9, Germany presents stronger conflicts lines about naturalisation that also affect the way people conceptualise homeland, host country, immigrant status and consequently transnational identity.

Returning briefly to the organisational level, Turkish organisations in the three countries have formed networks transgressing the national borders. Religious networks like Milli Görüs are one example, but there are also business/entrepreneurial networks going from a particularly country to Turkey and back (for the latter see Dişbudak, 2004). As discussed in Chapter 8, several Turkish organisations have strong political ties to homeland political organisations and political parties, but there is no united Turkish lobby as such compared to the Alevi or Kurdish examples. Turkish organisations are much more fragmented and are established to pursue specific goals. Furthermore they are polarised and reflect the cleavage structures also found on local and national level.

The overall tendency of the transnational affiliation captured as Euro-Turks points to the following conclusions:

Firstly, there is evidence of a large group being equally affiliated with the homeland and the country of settlement. Persons born in the settlement country may display the same type of affiliation; hence the migration mode is definitely not the only determinant for transnational affiliation. Examples of this type of affiliation are organisations appealing to the young and educated, e.g. TUF and O.N.E., and those who engage in creating business and entrepreneurial transnational social spaces, e.g. TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD.

Secondly, transnational identity can perhaps be re-articulated as a ‘betwixt and between’ type of identity where the boundaries are drawn by the new and the old country (cf. Murat). This seems to hold more explanatory power among the second and third generations but may also describe persons from the first arriving generation.

12 This estimate was given by an official from the Board of Immigration (communication with Louise Utter, presstjänsten Migrationsverket).
Thirdly, transnational identity may be situated within a strategy of keeping the options open. Obtaining or having dual citizenship may be seen as an asset if life in one setting looses value and the other option therefore seems worth pursuing.

Fourthly, there is little evidence for transnational identification and engagement being in opposition to processes of integration. Seeking a spouse from Turkey may for a Danish educated Turkish woman be a strategic choice to find someone with the same level of education and attitude to life, considering the gap between male and female levels of education among Turks in Denmark or Germany (Straßburger, 2004).

Fifthly, this particular mode of identification is not easily captured in institutionalised practices or in terms of broad or narrow modes of participation. It is rather an intrinsic type of identification that can be both more or less reflexive.

**A short digression to the European level - the Armenian issue**

The ongoing dispute about what happened to the Turk-Armenian community in the year 1915 under Ottoman rule is of special interest for my analysis. Although the specific example is not centred specifically in any of the three countries I have worked with, I include this example as it focuses on the object of overall dissertation – Turkish national and transnational identity constructions. Turkey claims that no more than 300,000 Armenians died and that it happened as an act of self-defence. It is illegal under law to call it genocide (article 301), while most historians will consider it to be precisely a genocide that systematically eradicated 1.5 million Armenians.

France, which has both large Armenian (400,000) and Turkish (380,000) populations, has played a leading role in the dispute. In 2001 France officially recognised the incident as genocide and in October 2006 a new law that makes it illegal to talk about this historical incident in any other terms than genocide was proposed in the parliament (Politiken, 29.09.06). The dispute has caught on in the European Parliament where a group of parliamentarians wanted to demand that Turkey officially recognises it as genocide if it wants to continue the negotiations of membership. However in the national elections in Belgium and the Netherlands it also became a political topic that mobilised the Turkish minorities in both countries. In the Netherlands it came out that the Social Democratic PvdA had two candidates up for election who denied the genocide, both with a Turkish background, and the ruling Christian

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13 Why France at this point wants to take part in what normally is considered a task for historians can be discussed of course. Some critics have claimed that it coincided with the upcoming elections, as the Armenians constitute a large vote bank. Other regarded it as a violation of the freedom of expression, since Turkey prohibits terming it genocide, but that France should not follow the same example as it may be have a counter effect for the development of substantial democracy in Turkey, which includes dealing with a troubled past.
Democratic CDA had one such candidate. All three were taken of the lists. These candidates were first seen as pull factors to gain Turkish votes – approximately 235,000 are entitled to vote – but instead these candidates now urged the Turkish voters either to boycott the election or to vote for other parties (Kristeligt Dagblad, 23.06.06). Turkish immigrant associations took up the same agenda (e.g. the TICF – Türk İslam Kültür Dernekleri Federasyonu, a large umbrella organisation for Turkish Islamic associations). In Belgium the Dutch case had some interesting effects, while some politicians made the same claims to candidates with a Turkish background, the socialist MEP Véronique de Keyser changed from this position to a perception that claimed that a recognition of the genocide was desirable, but should not be a formal demand out of considerations to the Turkish voters and – would critics claim – to secure her party colleague the post as mayor in the city of Schaerbeek.

Germany has also had its Armenian-Turkish dispute. In 2005, Germany’s Parliament urged Turkey to examine its role in the killings. Lawmakers adopted a cross-party resolution that urged the German government to put pressure on Turkey. The question of the genocide has created a conflict line in German politics that is closely related to the opinion on Turkish EU membership. At the time Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had been one of Turkey’s strongest supports in the campaign for membership, while most the CDU was against and argued for a type of privileged membership. The CDU has used the failure to take responsibility for the genocide as an argument for not letting Turkey into the EU on full terms. However, Turkish-Armenians themselves, for instance Turkish-Armenian writer and editor Hrant Dink, have been critical towards the German involvement. Dink criticised bringing up the genocide in the German Parliament: “Ms. Merkel isn’t bringing this instance up in the German parliament because she likes black eyebrowed Armenians. She’s playing this card because she’s against EU membership for Turkey” (quoted from Spiegel Online, 25.04.05). No matter the Merkel’s ‘real’ motives her position on the Armenian issue becomes part of multilayered agenda where the different protagonists have different interest.

The Armenian issue has not divided neither Danish nor Swedish party politics to the same degree, but the genocide has been discussed in the media and especially by sceptics of Turkish membership. In Sweden the Assyrian claims making in relation to the Seyfo has been more prominent than the Armenian formulation, but both obviously relate to the same historical incident.
Kurdish transnationalism

The Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without a state. Estimates suggest that there are around 20-25 million Kurds in the world, of which half live in Turkey and the rest in Iran, Iraq, Syria and the former Soviet Union. In addition, more than 1.5 million Kurds live in Europe, the majority in Germany. I have already presented the organising processes of Kurdish groups within the specific national frameworks (cf. Chapter 8). In this section I concentrate on the transnational aspects of Kurdish organising processes and identity construction and focus mainly on the Turkish Kurds.

Kurds lost important rights and privileges already in the aftermath of the birth of the Turkish republic and up through the 20th century the Turkish state’s response to the Kurdish issue has been more or less hostile, but has never really opened up for neither Kurdish independence nor a framework for legal rights or recognition. The military regime in 1980-83 tried to silence the Kurds, which definitely had a counterproductive effect for the sympathy of the PKK. Trying to prevent relations with Europe from deteriorating, the government gradually toned down actions against Kurdish separatists and opened up for the use of Kurdish language in publishing, which led to a resurgence of Kurdish cultural activities (Van Bruinessen, 1996). However, military campaigns against Kurdish military fractions have continued and the official use of Kurdish identity is not readily accepted.

Besides a minor group arriving as refugees after the 1980 military coup, most Kurds arrived in Europe as labour migrants, Sweden being the exception where the majority arrived as refugees. In reality many were assimilated Turks, a consequence of the Turkish citizenship regime previously outlined. Many Kurds have little knowledge of Kurdish identity besides the language and few cultural traditions. I emphasise this fact to show that Kurdish transnational activism is not a widespread phenomenon although newspapers may give that impression. Konkra Gel (PKK affiliated) is estimated to have only about 11,500 supporters, which not is a high number considering the estimated number of Kurds in Germany (cf. Chapter 8). Like other marginal identities Kurdish identity has been revitalised after being located in Europe, however, as the opportunity structures allowed for this identity. It is these processes I concentrate on in this section.

Kurdish groups in Europe have made use of both confrontational and institutionalised strategies in their claims making. Furthermore the Kurdish Diaspora has managed to build up

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14 Some Kurdish organisations claim the number to be 35-40 millions.
an extensive media infrastructure with several TV and radio channels, written publications and a just as extensive presence in cyberspace.\footnote{To date I have found more than 18 Kurdish TV channels broadcasting from various destinations in Europe. See for instance the direct links at: <http://www.pdk-xoybun.com/index.php?newlang=English>}

The Kurdish groups can, as outlined in Chapter 8, be divided in KOMKAR-related organisations and pro-PKK organisations, the main one being Kon-Kurd. KOMKAR groups are connected to the Kurdish Socialist Party (PSK) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Besides having different goals and strategies another difference is that the KOMKAR-related groups focus on the grand Kurdistan, while PKK/Kon-Kurd have been more focused on Turkey. The national, and here I could have added regional and local, affiliations are summarised in Table 10.3:

Table 10.3 Main Kurdish organisations in the national frameworks and on European level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KOMKAR</th>
<th>PKK affiliated/sympathetic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Det Kurdiske Råd, Det Kurdiske Initiativ</td>
<td>Fey-Kurd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Kurdiska Riksförbund, (KOMKAR-Swed)</td>
<td>Kurdiska Rådet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>KOMKAR</td>
<td>YEK-KOM, Kongra Gel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European/international</td>
<td>DEM-Kurd, PKE-Platform</td>
<td>Kon-Kurd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Staying within the perspective of political opportunity structures an initial conclusion is that these organisations have taken more or less the same trajectories despite the national POS impact. PKK has faced harder times in Germany than in the other two countries but besides these minor differences the organising processes are strikingly parallel. The national POS are not without importance though. Firstly, internal relationships are influenced by three structures. The Swedish state has been far more supportive than others of both fractions and both sides have developed strong national federations and have found a rather peaceful relationship. The Swedish state does not support political activities as such but allow for political questions, which in reality mean that many NGOs and immigrant organisations may have a political agenda. Being engaged with such questions has for some been a stepping stone into established politics to address these questions more specifically. Gulan Avci from the Liberal Party describes her motivations in the following way:

\begin{quote}
I made the decision, Gulan you are a committed person, it is important for you to go into politics and work for the values you believe in so it was easy for me […] I came here when I was five and grew up with freedoms and rights […] if I make an effort to inform Swedish politicians about the Kurdish question. It was a duty and that was why I entered politics (interview with Gulan Avci).
\end{quote}
In Germany the PKK and later organisational offspring have been left outside influence, and the German federal states have with a few exceptions categorised Kurds as part of the Turkish minority. In Denmark both Kurdish groups are relatively weak but again the KOMKAR fraction has better political connections than the Fey-Kurd. Secondly, the sheer size of the Kurdish minority, no matter the reception from the host country, impacted the organising processes. KOMKAR was founded in Germany and spread to the rest of Europe where some local-national fractions still carry the name. Thirdly, the federations have utilised the framework of opportunities available across the countries. Sweden has been more supportive of Kurdish minority claims and several international organisations were founded and based in Sweden as well as a major bulk of the publishing and broadcasting industry.

Looking in more detail at the discursive content of the claims making and the employed strategies there are several differences between these two major fractions. Furthermore the Kurdish groups differ from the other involved groups in this study in terms of transnational ties and strategies. Both fractions are characterised by both narrow and broad forms of transnational participation. The following is a very condensed analysis of the two fractions.

The PKK-affiliated organisations have stereotypically been depicted as favouring political violence and pursuing only such aims, but the picture is more complex. Although most of these organisations will argue for the legitimacy of the PKK struggle, they simultaneously employ other strategies and most often reject political violence. Kon-Kurd makes use of confrontational strategies as well as institutionalised narrow approaches. Kon-Kurd has been especially active in claiming recognition of Abdullah Öcalan as a political representative of Kurdistan rather than a terrorist. Kon-Kurd is based in Brussels and has taken this and related claims to the General Secretary of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Union, the European Parliament, the EU member states and the respective committees of the United Nations. The ties to established political channels are nonetheless scarce. Kon-Kurd’s political aim -Kurd is not necessarily to gain independence as a state but to gain recognition and cultural and political rights in Turkey. Confrontational strategies such as street level rallies is still used, but combined with campaigns like the ongoing ‘Boycott Turkish Tourism’ campaign (see www.kon-kurd.org). One cannot ignore the violent confrontational activities either. The last clashes between Kurdish separatists and other groups were led by PKK/ERNK sympathisers, and in Eastern Turkey there is still a military struggle going on.

The KOMKAR-related organisations have generally been engaged in non-violent activities and very often in institutionalised types of participation. Some of these connections are outlined in Chapter 8. The overall aim of this fraction is to be recognised as a nation with all
the rights such a status implies. Another agenda focuses specifically on Turkey with a perhaps less ambitious goal and seeks recognition as a minority group in Turkey with all cultural and political rights. The various KOMKAR groups and DEM-Kurd are extremely active on different institutional levels. In all countries they have sought to gain political support from mainstream parties with most success in Sweden and Denmark. The same strategy has been employed on European level where they have been lobbying for Kurdish rights. Besides these efforts the various groups made a strategy programme in Stockholm in 2002. They formed working groups in different European countries, set up a web site, increased the amount of publications, made a programme for future conferences and wrote a renewed strategy for lobbyist activities seeking to create Kurdish unity in Europe (European Kurdish Platform, 2002). They have managed to engage a number of European parliamentarians mainly with the focus of perhaps not obstructing Turkish negotiations with the EU but definitely to frame the Kurdish issue as an important question within these negotiations (PSK Bulten, 2004; 30.10.07). They make sure to state explicitly that the PKK is excluded from this so-called Kurdish unity.

These different efforts are directed from Sweden or Germany.

A main strategy has been to point to Turkish ‘hypocrisy’, for example in a press release after Erdogan’s Cologne speech. Here KOMKAR supports the overall statement “Ja zur Integration, Nein zur Assimilationspolitik!” (KOMKAR, Presserklärung 12.02.08). They turn the message around by saying that the rights that migrants have in Germany, the Kurds do not have in Turkey and point out that if Erdogan is favours integration policies over assimilation policies, he should start out implementing such policies in Turkey: “Es ist unmoralisch, sich über die Integrationspolitik Deutschlands zu beschweren, wenn man seit über 80 Jahren eine grenzlose Assimilationspolitik gegen Kurden in eigenem Land betreibt” (ibid.).

Similar arguments are found in the report by the PKE-Platform where Turkey again is accused of being hypocritical in its protection of Turkish Cypriots when it simultaneously suppresses a minority counting 20 million (PKE-Platform, 2004; Verband der Vereine aus Kurdistan, 12.02.08). Common is that criticism of Turkey is channelled through a German public agenda.

These different arguments and many others are mostly framed in connection with the EU negotiations where parliamentarians and institutions are encouraged to stop the process unless things are improved in terms of recognition of Kurdish identity. The same perception was repeated in my interviews “I want for Turkey to become a member but not until …” (interview with Aycan Bozarslan). Ignoring these claims will degenerate EU norms, they argue. They have several times lobbied to make Kurdish representation an institutionalised partner in
the negotiations, so far without any luck. Although these fractions primarily have used peaceful means and will continue to do so they emphasise that this type of engagement will continue: “The Kurdish nation throughout its history has never accepted any surrendering policies and will continue its struggle until its national and democratic rights are recognised” (ibid.).

Summing up, the Kurdish fractions have managed to construct a transnational social space bridging different European countries, large parts of the Kurdish Diaspora and political groups in Turkey and the Middle East. Sympathies for Kurdish claims making have been seriously challenged by the violent path of some Kurdish groups, which as a response have excluded from the social space. This points to a crucial problem in the Kurdish endeavours; namely that there really is not one united Kurdish space. Earlier attempts in Germany to create such unity have been short-lived (e.g. the Kurdische Gemeinde zu Berlin uniting 20 or so organisations) and furthermore met with little understanding from Turkish organisations and German authorities. The Kurdish Federation in Sweden remains the most successful federation to date, bridging different fractions and language groups, but it also competes with other Kurdish fractions (see Table 10.3 and Chapter 8).

The fact remains, however, that the Kurdish question has proven capable of mobilising large shares of the Kurdish minorities, and sometimes peaceful strategies are fused with more confrontational ones. The Kurdish groups make use of multilevel strategies that involve actors on different levels. They no longer maintain activities within the (given) country and Turkey, but also given them an international/European dimension – lobbying the EU and the European Commission for instance. For the Kurdish groups, transnational engagement is a site for political engagement, perhaps more than for any other group. Here long distance nationalism is conflated with and strengthened by sustained transnational ties. I also find important contextual differences however. The Kurds in Sweden are much more engaged in national political processes and are considered good partners by the political establishment, who in general considers them to be well-integrated. The obvious reason is that they here, contrary to the situation in Denmark and Germany, are recognised as an independent minority in their own right. In comparison, very few from the German political establishment speak up for the Kurds. Finally it is interesting to witness the efforts to create new alliances with other groups such as the Alevis. In the early 1990s the Kurdish political groups tried to incorporate the emerging Alevi collective organising without much luck, but they continue to stress the parallels between the two groups’ structural position in Turkey.
Assyrian transnational identification

In the following section I discuss Assyrian transnationalism in general but focus empirically on the communities and activities in Sweden and Germany. As mentioned in Chapter 8 almost 160,000 Assyrians live in the two countries.\textsuperscript{16} Two main migration patterns can be identified. Many arrived in Germany through the guest worker scheme and when Germany introduced a stop for immigration, they continued on to Sweden where they applied for asylum. The other trajectory was the gradually increasing flow of refugees to Sweden as first destination country.

Many Assyrians arrived as work migrants from the Tur Abdin region in Turkey. It is estimated that more than 45,000 people have left the region since the 1960s and that only 5,000 Assyrians are living in Turkey today. The Swedish case is an illustrative example of chain migration as the Assyrians already living in Sweden provided kinsmen with the necessary networks and knowledge needed to enter and settle in the country. Thus, almost 16,000 ended up in the municipality of Södertälje south of Stockholm.

The Assyrians like the Armenian community take part in a ‘by the book’ Diaspora scenario by telling a long story of centuries of persecution culminating, also from an Assyrian perspective, with the genocide in Turkey in 1915 where almost half the Assyrian population died (according to Assyrian sources). “We have been refugees for more than 1000 years, perhaps more than 2000 years”, said Andreas Arsalan from Assyriska Riksförbund. The Assyrian transnational restructuration started much earlier than the Alevi revitalisation of identity. They constitute a smaller community compared to the Kurdish and the Alevi minorities, but have a much older history. Nonetheless the community was close to disappearing due to dispersion, assimilation – what the Assyrians term ‘Arabisation’.

Although the Assyrian history goes a stunning six and half millennia back, Assyrian identity still needs to be constantly renegotiated and reconfirmed like any other social identity. It is not static, but has meant different things over time. However, the recent immigration history means that people with Assyrian background coming to Sweden and Germany (and elsewhere) had to adapt to life in a new context. Like with many other minority groups, be it ethnic or religious groups, the next generation (of immigrants) seems to be most interested in revitalising the cultural and original parts of the identity at stake. Andreas explained that: “My son can say that he is both Swedish and Assyrian. But I cannot say I am Swedish, it is impos-

\textsuperscript{16} There is a small Assyrian community of about 3,000 persons in Denmark. Most come from Iraq and today live in the vicinity of Århus. As they mainly originate from Iraq I leave them out of my analytical focus to remain loyal to empirical demarcations (Chapter 4) although they probably would share many of the characteristics of Turkish Assyrians in Sweden and Germany.
The recent restoration of the Assyrian identity is built on a cultural project that led the way towards a political self-consciousness, which makes the Assyrian case different from the other cases. This process has only been possible through strong transnational linkages. The cultural restoration focused on restoring the language and constructing a visible and symbolic Assyrian identity. Especially the Assyrian flag holds an important position in Assyrian consciousness that can be hard to grasp for a native Dane like me, living in a nation that allegedly has the longest existing state flag. For the Assyrians the flag visualises a mythological and geographical depiction of all that was lost and is to come. Most web pages of Assyrian organisations have special sections describing the understanding of the flag for instance. The restoration of the language (and discussion of the flag) also revived the old divisions between Assyrians and Syriacs who clashed in the name strife (cf. Chapter 8).

The specific Swedish opportunity structures have had a clear impact on this restoration. A liberal attitude towards cultural differences coupled with incentive structures was the opening for recent and ongoing organising processes: “Here you had the possibility to show the flag, had a periodical, opportunities and programmes on national TV – you had the freedom to show the flag” (interview with ARS). The opportunity structures, migration networks and, after an ambiguous beginning, liberal access to asylum constituted the social space that paved the way for a strong Assyrian community in Sweden.

The political Diaspora has its stronghold in the US where the strongest claims making for national recognition and independence is taking place initiated with nationalistic exile organisation Assyrian National Association of America, which entered the political stage after World War I. One of the important actors is the Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA). The AUA and the Assyrian Democratic Organisation (AMO), which since 1957 have been active in Turkey and Syria, also helped establish the national federation of Assyrians in Sweden collective organisation across the globe. Today the federations in Sweden (followed by American, German, and Dutch organisation) have a leading role in developing a global transnational community.

Having the possibility to develop their language and culture, i.e. the incentive structures for organisations in Sweden, empowered the community in a way has led them back into the political struggle. The cultural restoration has taken a very peculiar trajectory where the football team Assyriska FF became the symbol for Assyrian unity and nationalism.
The foundation of the team precedes the establishment of the ARS by three years. It was established in 1974 by members of the Assyrian Association in Södertälje, which itself was founded in 1971. Assyriska FF soon became a platform for Assyrian diasporic identity. The symbolic importance of the team should not be underestimated. For instance, a former spokesperson of ARS wrote in an editorial in *Hujådå*: “We have no country, have obviously never had any ambassadors as the Assyrian empire fell approximately 2,500 years ago, but now we have a football team that can function as ambassador for the Assyrian people, which is fantastic” (Hujådå, 2004: 12). Likewise it is stated in another article that: “The supporters of Assyriska are not like the supporters of any other team. For the supporters of Assyriska the match is not limited to a matter of three points. It is about the existence of an entire people, an overlooked people that demands to be redressed” (Hujådå, 2005: 9). The supporters of Assyriska, known as Zelge Fans, have the largest banner of any football supporter group in Scandinavia, measuring 52 x 30 meters and weighing 700 kilos (Nordgren, 2006: 121).

The club won the Swedish Super Cup in 2003 and later entered the qualification for the UEFA Cup. The team from then on became the Assyrian national team and the final itself drew in Assyrians from Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands and even as far as Australia and was broadcast via satellite to as many as 82 countries (see Dagens Nyheter, 31.10.03). During the final, the flag was folded out and transmitted for the world to see. *Hujådå* described this event: “With a gigantic flag the whole world was shown that the Assyrian people are alive are aware of a distinguished heritage” (Hujådå, 2003: 12). The story (and perhaps not matching glory) of Assyriska was captured in a documentary *Assyriska: A National Team Without a Nation* in 2006 portraying the importance of the team in re-uniting the Assyrian Diaspora. The abstract of the movie states that: “Assyrians in Syria, USA, Europe, Russia and burning Iraq tuned into their matches while their fellow Assyrians in freezing Scandinavia reached international stardom. This is the story of how a local team from a small Swedish town went national for a people without a country”. Consequently, the team constitutes a platform for political protest and claims making and constitutes the basis for an extremely broad form of transnational participation. When Assyriska played a match on April 24 2005 the date coincided with the 90 year anniversary for the *Seyfo*. The whole team wore black bands around their arms and held one minute of silence in commemoration (Hujådå, 2005: 5). This action spurred a lot of reactions that went all the way to the Swedish parliament.

Returning to the importance of language, the revision of the language still is the core of Assyrian identity coming together. For instance, Abboud from ARS said: “I personally think that the language developed here in Sweden has become much more pure than the language
my parents speak”. Getting back to the roots or the search for purity is only one dimension though. The continuing publication of the Sweden based *Hujådå* journal published in Assyrian, Swedish, Arabic, Turkish, and English discussing historical, political, cultural, and linguistic issues with subscribers in 35 countries has played an important role in building up a cultural infrastructure.¹⁷ The restoration of language and publication strategies should not be underestimated for Assyrian nationalism. In some ways it constitutes a parallel to the printing capitalism Anderson (1983) holds responsible for the emergence of nationalism, here following a path of restoration and political opportunities.

Compared to the Alevis, the Assyrians found openings in the cultural sphere and not in the religious institutional structures, which was the case for the Alevis (*cf.* Chapter 8 and the forthcoming section). I expected a larger discursive openness to the Assyrian group due to a Christian legacy, but Andreas and the ARS reject this point of view and downplay the religious dimension. Rather cultural identity created a strong community that has affected the processes of societal integration also. The knowledge of being Assyrian has been passed on in summer youth camps organised by the ARS. Rachel describes this experience in the following way:

> Take me as an example. I was born in Sweden but my parents came from the middle of Turkey. I participated in such a summer camp that the organisation had in Södertälje. Andreas was teacher there, for me it was an immense feeling of cohesion and at the same time learning more about myself and the identity that I constantly carry with me. But simultaneously I recognise what Sweden has done for me as an Assyrian and I probably would not have had that possibility in any other country (interview with Rachel, ARS).

Here Rachel expresses a strong collective (transnational) identity, but at the same time positions herself within Sweden. The incentive structures offered by the Swedish state (the summer camps are financed by Sweden) to maintain and develop transnational identities do not clash with processes of integration, perhaps on the contrary. ARS at least believes in learning about Assyrian culture and strengthening Assyrian identity as an important tool for integration: “Those who participated in colonies benefited a lot from it in relation to later education”, and “90 pct. of the original immigrants were illiterate [this is ARS’ own figures], but 70 pct. of the descendants [that participated in the youth camps] have taken an education”; consequently “the fruit came later” (interview with ARS). The figures are not scientifically derived of course and could be disputed, but the Assyrian as a collective group definitely has experienced upward social mobility.

¹⁷ <http://ars.hujada.com/>; see also Nordgren, 2006: 72-76. Here I should perhaps add that the rivalling Syrian organization, Syrianka Riksförbundet, publishes its journal *Bahro Suryoyo* in an even larger edition and has subscribers in an equal number of countries.
Both in Germany and Sweden Assyrians are considered to be easier to integrate and more successful than other groups. In Germany many Assyrians own their own businesses and in Sweden they have been able to reach a relatively high level of education compared to other foreign groups in general. Moreover they have been successful in accessing the conventional institutional channels. The explanation in Sweden has a lot to do with the extremely dense organising processes of the Assyrian minority (leaving out the internal demarcations). A very large share of the overall minority group is taking part in the local, national and international Assyrian organisations, which creates a very strong cultural community.

Rather than stressing politics, Assyrian identity today stresses culture. But culture has also led to a political renewal. Talking about the aims of the ARS and its different activities the board stated that: “What is the aim? Not just to integrate … we have a dream, we don’t know how realistic it is, but you don’t know where history will end” (interview with ARS).

The last ten years has seen an increased emphasis on a political struggle that has been more or less visible for a least half a century. On Hujâdâ’s web page an ongoing poll shows that the majority of those who have cast their vote declare the situation in Iraq to be the most important issue for the Assyrian organisations.

The establishment of an Assyrian nation seems like a utopia. The last serious political attempt was supposed to be made at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919 but as history showed the British state was not interested in an independent Assyria and the outlined territory was divided between Turkey, British Mesopotamia and the newly but short-lived independent Syria. Iraq is home to the imaginary homeland Assyria where the historical province of Nineveh in the North-East represents the dream of a unified and independent Assyria, but the war in Iraq has made the Assyrian story seem never-ending. However, although the invasion of Iraq and turnover of power initially, at least theoretically, paved the road for also Assyrian self-determination, nothing seems to be going in that direction at the moment and at best it remains a utopia. There are not really any political structures to take part in for the Assyrian minority. The AUA wished to fill this gap: “In the absence of functioning national institutions that may be deemed necessary to meet and fulfil the essential functions on behalf of the Assyrian nation, AUA shall serve by filling in for all the manifested vacuums and gaps” (Assyrian Universal Alliance, 2008: Ideological Principles). Like the Kurdish Parliament in Exile, the AUA holds no real power and in reality is one lobby organisation among
others. Although the diasporic organisations have been institutionalised over a long time their influence is marginal.

In 2007 the Assyria Council of Europe (ACE) was established, inspired by the Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project. ACE is located at Brussels and has now employed a full-time lobbyist Ninos Warda, a British Assyrian. ACE responds to an International Advisory Committee consisting of members of European Assyrian Federations. The construction of ACE is both an attempt to seek direct influence through the established institutional channels and to unify the Assyrian communities across Europe further. A Swedish member of the council describes ACE: “It is a great achievement of the Assyrian nation” (Press release from Assyriska Ungdomsförbundet, 07.12.07). In all press releases and general description of ACE exactly the notion of Assyria as an existing nation is repeated, which is a way to legitimise and naturalise claims from ACE and the Assyrian communities. ACE has a small group of supporting patrons where Swedish members of Riksdagen count two out of ten. This once again illustrates the favourable discursive position the Assyrians have obtained in Swedish society. The main objective of the ACE is not to lobby for an independent nation (which is a goal for the AUA), but to provide an effective lobbying tool to help realise social, political and economic rights for the Assyrians of Iraq.

Nevertheless the idea of the imaginary homeland has played a crucial part in creating, maintaining and revitalising Assyrian identity pushing the weak opening in Iraq to the limit. The utopia has led to several international conferences addressing these issues.

ARS’ board also reflected this view: “at the same time we dream of returning to our countries. Five year ago we never would have believed that opportunities would open up in Iraq, but today it is discussed at all levels” (interview with Andreas, ARS). I interviewed Andreas, Abboud and Rachel from ARS’ board. Andreas, the senior of the three and from the older generation, thought that the future was in Sweden and the key to recognition was through education and hard work using the already established channels. The younger Rachel and Abboud both dreamed of a self-governing Assyria and the faint, although in their own words unrealistic, dream of one day ‘returning’. “Leaving on a plane”, as Rachel expressed it. Not returning to something they had left themselves, but returning as an Assyrian people.

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18 Although it is a member of the UNPO – The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization.
19 The Wiesbaden based Assyrian Democratic Organization (ADO) seeks to fulfil the same purpose. It sees itself as: “A national, political and democratic movement whose objectives are to safeguard the existence of the Assyrian people and the realization of its legitimate national aspirations (political, cultural, administrative) in its historic homeland” (About ADO, Assyrian Democratic Organization, 2008).
21 The same support is also shown to the Kurdish minority.
ACE is an example of an organisation with a ‘pure’ political agenda, but very often political claims making is situated within a conflation of culture and politics. An example is the large scale movie project *Assyrian: The Struggle for Identity*, which tells the story of Assyrian culture and identity (http://assyriandoc.com). In reality it is a political project with clear-cut political goals:

The injustices wrought upon Assyrians must be made known to the world and so do their nearly 7,000 years of misunderstood history. The intellectual approach, which includes Assyrian history, culture and politics as well as reinforcing this approach with an exciting artistic approach, makes the *Assyrian Identity* movie an unwritten history book whose impact will certainly be powerful! (quoted from “about the movie”).

In this sense this framing provides an illustrative example of what Benford & Snow define as an injustice frame. Assyrians are perceived to be victims of millennia of injustice.

The Assyrian organising processes and restoration of cultural identity are a perfect example of the development of transnational social spaces. Institutionalisation of the organisations was utilised through both favourable political and discursive opportunity structures, more than elsewhere in Sweden. Several other actors influenced the re-structuring of the transnational Assyrian Diaspora, however, such as pre-existing international organisations. The process led to a gradual development of a collective identity strengthened by cultural symbols and the idea of a shared destiny and future. In an almost postmodern fashion this development was led forward by a local soccer team. The increasingly growing community in Sweden led to the establishment of a migration network gradually transforming the civic society in especially Södertälje and vicinity. This was only possible due to a relaxed Swedish refugee approach, however. In this re-gained territory, being Assyrian is an intrinsic part of identity. Political loyalty is directed primarily at the host state and dual citizenship is not a decisive factor Assyrian transnational identity as there simply is no other place to belong to in political citizenship terms.\(^{22}\) Assyria is a nation without institutional structures but still comprises a context that people feel they belong to. Hence Assyrian transnationalism is also a site for political engagement, which the construction of the ACE clearly shows.

Especially young Assyrians have high hopes for the future, having coupled a good position in the countries where they are living with a strong cultural identity. As a young Assyrian PhD student says: “Guys, be proud of being Assyrian […] we ruled the world’s oldest civilization once upon a time and will rule the whole world in days to come” (quoted from Assyria Times, 28.02.06). Recently a new publishing house, Gilgamesh Press, opened in Norrköping,

\(^{22}\) Persons with Assyrian background may of course have dual citizenship, *e.g.* Swedish and Turkish, but this fact and tendency was downplayed by the people I talked to.
Sweden. The founder has an ambition of bringing Assyrian culture out into the world (Norrköping Tidningar, 19.05.08). It has received attention from New York and London and the Assyrian return to the world may very well be fuelled by cultural rather than political initiatives.

**The revitalisation of Alevi identity**

The Alevis are a religious minority in Turkey with a slight resemblance to Shiite Islam. As such the name Alevi is a heading for a large number of different heterodox communities. They are opposed to Sunni Muslims because they regard Ali as the rightful successor of Mohammed and the name ‘Alevi’ means supporter of Ali. Other than that there are very few overlaps with Islam as they do not recognise the five pillars of Islam, reject the idea of mosques and have their own religious ceremonies, the *cem*. Due to the injustice done to Ali by the Sunnis most see themselves as being on the side of the downtrodden and marginalised and adhere to two basic principles of social justice and equality (Argun, 2003).

The re-emergence of Alevis in the public sphere has led to a nascent differentiation between the Alevi organisations. Çaha points to four divergent ‘currents’; one that prioritises the religious side; an intellectual approach leading Alevism away from Islam completely and for instance claims that the name itself stems from the Zoroastrian ritualistic word for flame; a third group that seeks to combine Alevism with Kurdish identity; and a fourth and marginal group that emphasises the Shiite roots (Çaha, 2004: 334). I will not pay special attention to any of these groupings but rather cut across and will furthermore argue that traits of at least the first three groups intersect in the national and European federations.

Women traditionally have enjoyed relatively freedom and equality compared to other Islamic groups and Turkish society in general, a fact that it repeatedly emphasised by the Alevi organisations. Due to this ideological self-understanding the Alevis have been ‘natural’ partners for left-wing parties and organisations in the last decades.23 It is unclear how many people are of Alevi background in Turkey as they until very recently, due to the religious Sunni hegemony, have kept their religion private, but estimates range from 10 to 40 pct. (van Bruinessen, 1996) with 30 pct. being the most common estimate (Koçan & Öncü, 2004).

Both Kurds and Turks are Alevis; the Kurds are the minority within the minority (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). Kurdish Alevis define themselves as Alevi first and secondly, if at all, as Kurds (Van Bruinessen, 1996). This was also confirmed when I spoke to Feramuz Acar in Denmark, although he also claimed that ethnic identities did not really matter. Both

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23 This legacy is still emphasised as for instance in the declaration from general secretary of the AABF Ali Toprak “Aufruf zum 1. Mai” (AABF, 30.04.2008).
the Turkish state and the Kurdish organisations have as mentioned tried to become allies with the Alevi, but neither has been successful. As mentioned in Chapter 8 and 9, the Alevi sympathies for the PKK-led struggle increased after the massacres in Sivas in 1993 and Gaziosmanpaşa in 1995. These incidents provided the fuel that lit a new Alevi consciousness. Feramuz Acar states that:

If this hadn’t happened I think that Alevism slowly would become extinct. But surely when something like this happens, then we react against it. Because, dammit if we will accept being burned. We will not accept religious fundamentalism. So when we today stand united in our faith it is a consequence of the religious resurgence in Turkey and in many other Muslim countries (interview translated from *Islams ansigter* Sandahl, 2004: 127; translation MBJ).

Members of both the Anatolian Alevi Cultural Centre (AAKM) and the Swedish Alevi organisation gave the same explanations (informal interviews at the AAKM; interview with Helin Sahin, Gün Sahin & Eraslan Örgün). The Sivas incident may well be a paradigmatic case for the Alevi organising processes (Sökefeld & Schwalgin, 2000) but the Alevi have in reality been in conflict with the Turkish state since 1925 when all heterodox religious traditions and orders were prohibited. The antagonism with Sunni Muslims has been larger than the conflict with the Turkish state however, and the Alevi were supporters of Kemalism as it provided the secular bulwark against Sunnism, which the Alevi strongly support. The ‘massacres’ against Alevi as they define them took place before 1993 also. The political violence grew in Turkey between 1977 and 1980 when Bülent Ecevit was Prime Minister. In 1978 violence escalated in Maras, killing several Alevi also. In fairness it should be said that the Alevi were actively involved in these fights.

These different cases of suppression and down-right massacres on Alevi have been a crucial part of the framing of Alevi identity. Alevi frame themselves as victims in a process starting with the killing of Ali and his son imam Husayin in 680 ending with the ‘massacres’ in Maras, Sivas and latest Gaziosmanpaşa. The perpetrators were Sunni Muslims, and the perceived islamisation of the AK Party is the latest example of Sunni oppression, which the Alevi organisations repeat time after time.24 The motivational frames employed to combat this development include the necessity to build a strong European federation and continue institutionalising, to enter politics both in Turkey and in the European nations and to find political partners that agree on the course. These processes have only been possible through transnational ties, knowledge transfer and diffusion and adaption of strategies from one national setting to another.

24 Examples are press releases from the Danish Alevi organisation, e.g. “’Taliban Tayyip’ on his way to the position as Prime Minister in Turkey” (DABF, 08.05.07) and “Turkey: Faith, tolerance and silent terrorists” (DABF, 08.05.07) both warning against the AKP and especially Erdogan.
Thus, even though the Sivas arson cannot be regarded as the only driving force for Alevi organisation processes, the number of members in the Federation of European Alevi Organisations (AABF) nonetheless grew between 1993 and 1996 from 32 to approximately 130 (Argun, 2003: 110; Østergard-Nielsen, 2003a). Today there are more than 200 Alevi organisations around Europe, 129 in Germany alone. The AABF is located in Cologne and has played a leading role in strengthening the ties among Alevi organisations across Europe. The AABF has the sister organisation Alevi-Bektashi in Turkey with between 500 and 600 individual member organisations. Hence, the Alevis have created a hierarchical structure going from European level to national to local levels with a parallel national structure in Turkey. According to themselves, the Alevi organisations represent approximately one million Alevis (cf. Table 8.2). This puts the Alevi organisation in the same league as for instance the Kurdish European organisations. Compared to the Kurdish community the Alevi Diasporic institutions do not have a long and settled history but they are still in the process of institutionalising. Furthermore it is questionable how many people the organisations represent. Sökefeld for instance estimates that the German Alevi organisations in total have around 12,000 direct members (Sökefeld & Schwalgin, 2000). This might well be a reasonable estimate of the number of people engaged in narrow participation, but the number of persons taking part in a broader form of participation definitely is many times higher. A central demonstration in Cologne in 1993 drew more than 60,000 (Alevi) attendants from all over Germany and neighbouring countries, to give just one example of broad participation.

The AABF lobbies for constitutional changes in Turkey, recognition of Alevism as an ethnic and religious minority inside and outside of Turkey, and to end the Turkish state’s official support of Sunnism, i.e. more specifically abolish the Directorate for Religious Affairs. The last claim has put the Alevis in direct confrontation with the Turkish state and the political parties sympathetic to Alevi claims making have had to leave out this claim not to be banned.

Pursuing this goal the organisations have made use of indirect strategies of gaining attention, e.g. rallies and demonstrations; direct confrontations, e.g. petitions and declarations; as well as institutional channels. The recognition as an independent belief system provided a major breakthrough in Denmark. This experience is being diffused to other countries as well.

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25 The situation is more complex when it comes to organisational patterns. The Alevi-Bektashi is the largest organisation but the Alevis have organised under other headings and foundations. Cem Vakfi, Pir Sultan Abdal Association, Haci Bektasi Veli Association and Karacaahmet Associations are the most prominent (Çaha, 2004). All these have naturally played an important role in the shaping and revitalization of Alevi identity.
For instance, the Swedish national federation has had representatives in Denmark to learn about the Danish organising processes (interview with Helin Sahin).

A somewhat similar status although less comprehensive was obtained in Berlin in 2000 when the AAKM was given the KÖR status of religious community. The newly won status provided the setoff to seek the same recognition on state level. The Alevis mainly live in five federal states, which considered the issue to be a national question and hence gave a united response to the claim and in the end granted recognition. The ‘victories’, in terms of recognition, are later being used on a European level. Feramuz Acar from the Danish organisation describes the motives for applying in the following way: “To put further pressure [on Turkey] or as we term it ‘help the Turkish system along the way’ we will apply for [institutional] recognition in all European countries where we have organisations and in that way Turkey more or less has to consider it” (interview with Feramuz Acar).

It is interesting, however, that the discursive and political opening happened in the sphere of religious political opportunity structures considering that the Alevis traditionally have downplayed the religious dimension and emphasised compatibility with European culture and values. Asked about the linkage and involvement in Turkish politics and the possibility of an Alevi political party, Feramuz is very clear when he replies that: “We do not want to become a religious party”. It shows how the existing political opportunity structures firstly influence national organising processes and secondly how openings in one set of opportunity structures can be employed to challenge the closed position in another opportunity structure – in this case the Turkish.

Perhaps driven by social engagement and an established link to the political left individual Alevis joined political parties in the European countries but generally they lack visibility as a collective group in the three countries. A member of the AAKM formulates it like this: “Most Europeans don’t know we exist” (quoted from Time, 06.10.02). Few people from majority society know what Alevism is, and the Alevis in this regard have a difficult case. Even in Denmark where they have gained institutional recognition there is little attention to the Alevi cause. This is one of the reasons for the Alevis’ self-positioning and for drawing on a discourse of sameness and difference. Sameness to European values, attitude to religion, position of women etc. and difference to orthodoxy and lack of democratic values symbolised by Islamism and Sunni Muslims. Alevis have been efficient in taking up the anti-Islamist discourse for instance.26 Again it is interesting to notice that what legitimises subordination of

26 An example is the Danish Alevi organisation’s support to the government’s decision to prohibit religious clothing and symbols by judges (and other courtroom employees) in Danish courtrooms (DABF, 16.05.08).
Alevis in Turkey makes them likeable in Europe. In both settings they are positioned in cultural hierarchies but in different ends.

Having looked in detail at the various organisations and done a number of interviews I will claim though that there sometimes is a gap between discourse and practice. Women definitely are regarded as equal to men but the organisational structures are nevertheless highly gendered, more so in Germany, and men hold most of the organisational positions.27

Another interesting strategy is relinquishing Turkish citizenship as a signal of dissatisfaction with the present Turkish regime. Dual citizenship is seen as a crucial marker for transnationalism but in this case giving up one nationality can be considered equally transnational as it is done to express sympathies with a collective group outside the country of residence. The use of the first person plural pronoun ‘we’, emphasising a collective identity transgressing national borders, was a very common way of speaking about Alevis during the various interviews.

The Alevi organisations without doubt tried to take over the experiences learned by the Kurdish organisations and have recently tried to mobilise European politicians and members of the European Parliament. They gained some recognition when the European Commission specifically mentioned the weak structural position of the Alevis in Turkey (Commission of the European Communities 2004; 2006; see also AABF, 07-11-07). This message was shortly after reframed in national press releases to put pressure on national politicians to prioritise this in the negotiations between Turkey and the EU. Furthermore this diagnosis of the European Commission now constitutes the legitimising argument in a European/international campaign addressing a number of specific claims to the Turkish state. The petition is co-organised by the national organisations, the AABF and the Alevi Bektashi Federation in Turkey, where they aimed at handing over 100,000 petitions from Western Europe and one million from Turkey to the Turkish Prime Minister, the EU Commission, heads of state and political group leaders at the EU Summit in Brussels December 17 2004 (see AABF, 23.10.04; DABF, 23.10.04).

The AABF is mainly a homeland orientated organisation. It supports Alevi organisations and political parties in Turkey and has been given extensive coverage in the Turkish press as the Federation’s endorsement of a particular political party affects the way Alevis vote in Turkey. The AABF supported the creation of the Bariş Partisi (the Peace Party) in 1996 and the chairman of AABF at the time even stood as candidate. The party did not understand itself as an Alevi party but as a mass party with focus on peace. The party did not meet the 10 pct.

27 Sökefeld has come to the same conclusion (Sökefeld & Shwalgin, 2000).
threshold though and dissolved itself afterwards. However also in the recent elections did the Alevi organisations try to collectively mobilise voters in and outside Turkey. This time not pursuing electoral influence through their own party but by trying to mobilise left-winged and liberals in general to agree on supporting one party in order to reach the high Turkish threshold. An example is the appeal from the national Alevi federation in Denmark, which released the following press release:

The Alevi organisations in Turkey and Europe have lit an Alev (flame) to show a path out of the darkness. The Alevi organisations have in the last month decided to influence the political process and the election in 2007. Several parties have already contacted the Alevi organisations to get their support. However, the Alevi have especially encouraged the many Social Democratic and left wing parties to join together in one party and all oppositional groups, popular movements are encouraged to join this party (DABF, 08.05.07; translation MBJ).

The interpretation of the Alev as in flame symbolises an important demarcation to the Sunni Islamic AK Party, which the Alevi regard as a setback for secularism in Turkey. Furthermore mentioning a flame both holds connotations of resistance (one need only think of the epic film adaptation of Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings where fires are lit to show the way accompanied by heroic music) and of enlightenment. Making a broad alliance is very important for the Alevi. Feramuz Acar for instance said:

We perceive ourselves to be the cement in between. And that is one of our main goals, we would very much like to change the government in Turkey and we want to be the linkage between different political and ideological groups in Turkey – from the Social Democrats to the left that is, there are many within that bloc that have been separated for the last 20 years that indirectly have paved the way for the religious taking power (interview with Feramuz Acar).

The situation today somehow bridges between the approaches pursued throughout the century. While the European federation very much focuses on homeland political affairs the local and national Alevi organisations also have a religious and cultural agenda. Some from the younger generation have sought to revitalise the religious and cultural content of Alevism and even succeeded in creating their own European youth federation (Association of Independent Alevi Youth – BAGD), which confirms the existence of various ‘currents’ within Alevi self-understanding, but gradually the youth organisations have been absorbed by the main organisations. However, several members of the younger generation whom I interviewed almost all spoke about the spiritual side of Alevism as something they intended to explore further. The Danish Alevi youth organisation has held several summer camps discussing these issues and has been very popular among Alevi youth. The national context matters of course; while Feramuz Acar told me that they had received not just criticism but also threats from the Muslim groups in Denmark, the youth had no such stories to tell. However, in Germany the cleavages with the Turkish and Kurdish communities have been much stronger and the Alevi youth
there spoke about ‘fighting violence with violence’ (Argun, 2003: 101-118; Kaya, 2001; Time, 06.10.02). Subsequently, I will argue that homeland conflicts and cleavages are not transplanted to the receiving society necessarily but are dependent on the structural position of the immigrants in the new context.

Consequently, the mobilisation and re-vitalisation of collective Alevi identity and establishment of Alevi organisations across Europe in the early 1990s had less to do with the national institutional structures than with homeland incidents most notably. Thus the motivation for establishing the organisation thus came from outside the host countries but their organisation within the host countries may well reflect the institutional arrangements. The Alevis have very different structural positions and possibilities in Turkey and Europe and even between the three countries at stake here. Moreover the development of the organisations and a collective identity has been developed mainly in Europe and from here going back to Turkey with the European Union as a mediating level. No Alevi organisation has so far been accredited by the European political institutions however, which makes influence more indirect. Institutional frameworks shape also the transnational organising processes and putting transnational links into practice can the other way around challenge institutional frameworks.

Like the Kurds the Alevis have made use of multilevel strategies linking different political spaces and levels. In both Denmark and Germany Alevi organisations have been active voices in the debates of integration and specifically in Germany been engaged in the campaign for local voting rights (AABF, 30.10.07). The struggle for recognition has been taken on different levels, at national and European level, and they have tried to establish themselves as a lobby and pressure group. They have been involved in party politics in Denmark and have entered new political alliances in Turkey in order to strengthen the united political bloc against the AK Party’s dominance rather than seeking to gain political representation as Alevis. In this specific sense Alevi transnationalism is definitely a site for political engagement.

There has been a continuing exchange of knowledge, resources (it is difficult to get an answer on the quantity in financial terms) and people across Europe and Turkey. Political ties only constitute one form of exchange however and mainly characterise the narrow form of participation. A broader base is found in the cultural exchange and consumption. Leading intellectuals and artists are transported between the cultural centres and the organisations’ web pages advertise events in and outside the given country. Some of these leading characters – for example the musician Arif Sag and one of the survivors of the Sivas arson, the writer Lütfi Kaleli – have influenced the formation of the social spaces that Alevis today occupy.
The same characterises the prominent political leaders, e.g. the Chairman of AABF Turgut Öker, Ali Ertan Toprak and the Danish Feramuz Acar.

Institutionalisation is also taking place within the ‘mediascape’. Over the years several Alevi radio and TV programmes have been launched, again making use of the existing opportunity structures such as Radio Multikulti in Berlin (see also Kosnick, 2004 for a discussion on Alevi broadcasting). A few years ago, a private sponsor even gave the AABF 300,000 € for the establishment of the YOL-TV, which is an independent Alevi (satellite) TV channel broadcasted from Cologne. Together these various transnational networks and ties and cultural consumption in different settings and levels have constructed the basis for the Alevi transnational social space.

**Summing up – theoretical outcomes of transnational social spaces**

In this analysis I have followed the logic provided by the theoretical framework and dissertation itself. The analysis of the integration regimes led to the analysis of the immigrant organising processes within the particular structural frameworks. This analysis pointed to at least two main conclusions. The first was that immigrant organisations adapt to the institutional structures. Hence, differences are found in the organisational patterns and structural position in the three countries. The second conclusion, transgressing the individual three cases, was that the emergence of transnational social spaces and transnational engagement challenges fixed notions of integration but transnational engagement does not necessarily lead to less integration, rather these processes seem to run parallel. This chapter has continued this discussion by focusing exactly on the development of transnational social formations seen in relation to the opportunity structures in the three countries as well as in Turkey.

One of the methodological challenges and general flaws in the first ‘generations’ of transnational studies is the inclination to sample on the dependent variable. The previous analysis tried to overcome this challenge by looking at the heterogeneity of the Turkish community and then look at the individual trajectories within the different internal divisions. This more subtle exercise does not solve the problem in itself however, as it also opens of for only looking at active transnational agents, among these not just narrow groups. Subsequently, I have tried to pay attention to the general populations and made it clear whom and what has been at stake.

This analytical perspective furthermore has re-addressed the claim that inter-ethnic differences do not matter for also transnational claims making compared to the impact of the national opportunity structures (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005). Here my analysis clearly showed that
the political opportunity structures definitely matters but cultural and ethnic differences also hold explanation power. The case of the Assyrian minority shows that receptive opportunity structures empowered the organisations and helped to restore cultural identity. At the same time internal differences has created a continuous competition that prone organisations to create linkages to transnational actors and likewise influenced the particular formation of a transnational social space.

The different cases each demonstrate how transnational formations and relations are dependent on different factors. One of the things that occur is the differences in the collective organising processes. Sweden has a strong system of co-optation, which encourages immigrants to organise along ethno-national lines in order both to receive state support in terms of finances, but also in terms of inclusion in the political decision making. The Alevi community in Sweden has suffered under this system because it is quite small and does not meet the size required to gain support. Thus, they constitute a marginal group in Sweden compared to the situation in Germany and Denmark. Recently the Swedish Alevi organisation has contacted the Danish national federation and is now organising after the Danish example. When I conducted interviews with the Swedish board, the atmosphere was quite optimistic, but the goals was first and foremost to become a political partner of the Swedish decision making institutions rather than pursuing cultural or religious goals.

I will also argue that the German structure in being exclusivist in its way of (only recently) incorporating immigrants oppositely and indirectly has strengthened the organisations as they (from the beginning) did not receive support and were forced to have a strong support from the members. The infra-political factors, such as a much larger number of Turkish migrants in Germany, have also provided a context with much more ecological variation among the organisations and internal competitors for the administrative positions in the organisations, to the degree that they have served as platform for recruiting people to organisations in Turkey. The organisational support and transfer of leadership these associations offer should not be underestimated. The infra-political sphere can also explain the strong organisations of the Assyrian minority. From initially having a non-recognised status the first groups that were granted asylum and work and residence permits in the late 1970s provided the setting for migration networks. Furthermore being supported in establishing organisations by transnational federations provided the resources needed to rather quickly reach the aforementioned demands put up by the Swedish state and the Assyrian communities are now influential partners in the immigrant political institutions.
A closer look at the proposed clarifications of transnationalism shows that different aspects may provide stronger explanations for some rather than others. The Alevi, Kurds and Assyrians use narrow forms of transnationalism, while the briefly discussed Armenian case showed how influence is sought by broad means of transnational engagement. For the latter case it is also interesting to see that while Turkish immigrants in Europe were easy to mobilise for the Turkish state, the population in Turkey, or at least in the larger cities, took another position and identified with the Armenian Turks. The killing of the Turkish-Armenian writer and editor Hrant Dink indirectly strengthened the anti-nationalist discourse that challenges nationalist sentiments (BBC Monitoring, 20.01.07). Thousands of people from both the majority and minority groups in Turkey joined in Dink’s funeral procession with banners saying: “Hepimiz Hrant Dink’iz [We are all Hrant Dink], Hepimiz Ermeniyiz [We are all Armenian]”.

An impact of what I have termed the transnational opportunity structures can be identified. The different organisations have made strategic choices and utilised the possibilities. The size of the group has been a primary factor for the development of social spaces and more specifically for the success of the organisations. The Kurdish organisations were initially established in Germany, which did not offer openings for this type of collective identity, but the size of the minority group made it possible and necessary to organise outside the established channels. Later these organisations diffused to other European countries. However, as Sweden has offered far better incentive structures and institutional support than most other countries, Kurdish organisations and transnational activities have increasingly been directed from Sweden. For instance, the Dutch system until recently upheld a very inclusive incorporation system, often described as multicultural and resembling the Swedish system, but it did not offer the same possibilities for Kurdish organising processes as the system of pillarisation prioritised religious identities and gave little support to ethno-national identities (e.g. Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001b).

The legal acceptance of dual citizenship both held the importance that I had expected but also turned out to be less important in some specific cases. For the ‘Euro-Turks’ and Turks living in the three countries in general the importance is clear. In Germany it has turned out to be the main conflict line between host society and immigrant groups. The discussion has been more marginal in Denmark and when resurfacing often initiated by mainstream political actors rather than situated in immigrant political claims making. A conclusion could be that the aspect of dual citizenship is less important for immigrants living in societies offering
substantial political, social and economic rights. Hence, the rather trivial statement that context matters again shows to hold truth.

Also the homeland’s political opportunity structure in terms of citizenship regime plays a role, in this case mainly the Turkish state. Here I pointed to a peculiar combination of a universalist notion of the citizen synthesised with a particularist religious identity that has created a rather exclusivist and intolerant definition of citizenship. This again has created the incentives for immigrant groups to organise and orient themselves towards the political situation in Turkey, most notably the Kurds and the Alevi, taking their claims to not just a national level but also to an international and transnational level. Most of the activities and claims making undertaken by the Alevis and Kurdish organisations on an international level are targeted directly at Turkey. The complex interplay between countries of residence legislation, homeland legislation and immigrant claims making and expectations (as also Brubaker analysed as a triad relationship) becomes very visible in the case of Germany (see Brubaker, 1996). The Pink Card was created from pressure of Turkish organisations in Germany and was meant to create a status that would allow people living in Germany to obtain German citizenship without loosing their rights and privileges in Turkey. In practice the Pink Card was difficult to use however as the Turkish bureaucracy has not been properly informed about this mechanism. Hence, when the German citizenship law was to be revised in 1999 with a section opening for dual citizenship as a distinct possibility, it was hailed by immigrant organisations. The CDU/CSU managed to keep dual citizenship out of the legislation however, which angered many of the large Turkish organisations (Gerdes et al., 2007). Today Germany still does not allow dual citizenship except in special cases, i.e. between the age of 18 and 23 in the optional model and in cases where people cannot be released from the original citizenship. Exactly the latter exception has been employed in the Turkish organisations’ claims making towards the Turkish state where the organisations have called for legislative action making it impossible for Turkish citizens to relinquish their citizenship. At the same time Turkish organisations like TGD and TBB take a pro-active position on assimilation and naturalisation in Germany and repeatedly assert that the future for Turks living in Germany exactly is Germany. Again I will conclude that citizenship is of crucial importance for Turkish immigrants and proposed notions of postnational identities seem to have very little grounding in these specific immigrant groups. Furthermore the sheer size of Turks living outside Turkey and especially their economic significance for Turkey provides a strong explanation for the Turkish stance on dual citizenship.
Most of the particular cases illustrate that transnational engagement can be a site for political engagement. For example I found that the Alevi organisation has a national agenda that strives towards gaining recognition as an independent belief system, which should be given distinct rights and at the same time have local affiliations working with local integration tasks, such as study help groups and provide lectures on Alevi culture and traditions. On a transnational level the organisation from different countries seeks to put pressure on the Turkish government and create a united opposition for the coming elections to improve conditions and gain recognition for Alevis in Turkey. On all levels the construction of an Alevi collective identity is taking place but by different means and channels. Also the Assyrian case points to transnationalism as a site for political engagement, although the extremely difficult situation in Iraq does not really offer any solutions in the near future. But we do see political claims in line with the Armenian for the Turkish state to recognise the Seyfo. If not instead of then alongside I find that an internal restoration of Assyrian identity and language has become a main priority.

Finally the cases show that transnationalism also must be seen as a mode of belonging. The different groups understand and position themselves in more than one national context. What is interesting of course for particularly the Assyrian case is that a transnational context can be a mental site as well and the idea of a self-governing Assyria is very much a ‘Neverland in Cyberspace’ as one author put it – but nonetheless a mental space of belonging for the Assyrians. This not only describes the particularistic identities within the overall category of ‘Turks’, but also shows to be the case for ‘ordinary’ Turks. Although it can be argued that the next generations in some aspects tend to loosen some ties to the homeland of their parents and grandparents (while strengthening others), most of the actors in my analysis, both on micro and meso level displayed transnational affiliations. The type of affiliation differed of course; upward mobility in the new country reflected less interest and affiliation to Turkish politics while cultural affiliation was maintained. Having both Danish and Turkish citizenship, considering the endeavours needed to maintain this status, really would not make sense if not based on a feeling of multiple belongings. The very large number of people with multiple citizenships in Sweden offers the same conclusion, although it here escapes the strategic choices required in Germany and Denmark.

These different aspects of transnational identity lead to an outlook for the future. What are the consequences of transnational identities for the host societies? And can such a general societal transformation be witnessed? Some scholars have been fast to incorporate the potential outcomes conceptually and theoretically. Bauböck for instance speaks of transnational
citizenship (1994) and Fox (2005) of transnational civil society as a given fact. I would rather follow the processual understanding that Faist proposes, that is identifying a transformation also affecting civil society. Here captured under the heading ‘transnationalising civil society’ (Faist, 2000a). It simply is too difficult to locate the given quasi-state structures to guarantee rights of members, organisational autonomy and the assurance of pluralistic political life across borders (Faist, 2000a: 324). These would be necessary prerequisites for functional civil societies (cf. Chapter 1). By following this understanding I remain sceptical of the postnational expectations: the institutions needed to enter a space independent of the nation-states simply do not exist yet. The EU framework is still weak when it comes to inclusion and entitlements of rights of non-citizens. Discursively the EU has opened the discussion of opening the borders (for the best and fittest at least) but practice remains one of exclusion.

Furthermore I will argue that the generalising trend of transnational transformation ought to be emphasised much more. Joppke dismissed the postnational framework by claiming that immigration is only a fringe phenomenon – most people indeed are not migrants (Joppke, 1998). However, transnational identity and engagement are not only characteristics of immigrant behaviour, but also of autochthonous, natives or whatever one chooses to call people and in this way steps beyond the categorical statuses. The Danish liberal-minded and urban daily Politiken recently ran a campaign entitled ‘I am also Danish’ providing short interviews with people who obviously did not meet stereotypical images of Danes or expressed opinions deviating from the thick cultural Danishness advanced by the Danish People’s Party for instance. An example from the campaign is an interview with a Danish innovator and entrepreneur who states that: “I strongly believe that you can be more things at the same time. I am half Swiss, but feel more like a Dane because this is where I live […] Basically the relevant part is not where you are from, but who you are as a person” (Politiken, 01.06.08). Cosmopolitanism may be a position for the privileged few, but also middleclass families buy property in Eastern and Southern Europe, plan retirement in another country than where paid their taxes, get their teeth fixed in Poland or India, have children studying abroad, enter in transnational marriages and increasingly have become transnational consumers.

Taken together, these claims point to both a de facto phenomenon and a need to reconceptualise relationships affected by the transformation. The most important requirement is a reconceptualisation of the relationship between societal integration and transnationalism.

I do believe that there is basis for understanding transnational identification as an important component of identity. Most people are today socialised into the nation-state and through this process acquire a national identity. When advancing transnational identity I have no in-
intentions of replacing one essentialist understanding of identity with another. Societal development may however have come to a point where national identity is no longer the primary identity but can be supplemented by other forms of affiliation here among transnational identification. This claim also touches the aspect of ‘newness’ often addressed in studies of transnationalism. Here I will argue that transnational engagement probably is as ‘old as man himself’, although different phases of intensification arguably can be observed (e.g. Fuglerud, 2001). A consequence of these phases is a questioning of the nation-state as the sole organising principle for society, as also the postnational position would argue. The growing and convergent implementation of dual citizenship is an important development towards a new global status. While there are limited institutional indicators to support the postnational position, the dominance of the nation-state is indeed challenged mentally and discursively. Integration is nevertheless still regarded as a matter for the nation-state. The same can be said of welfare provisions. These relationships build on macro and micro levels, but transnational social transformations is located on meso level.

Common for transnational activities is that few take place in the official institutional channels and the majority take place in a civil society setting. Participation in civil society institutions and in organisations and associations in general can be argued to have positive outcomes no matter the orientation and content. Recalling Fennema & Tillie’s quite provocative conclusion by (cf. Chapter 2): “To have undemocratic ethnic organisations is better for the democratic process than to have no organisations at all”, opens for a new understanding of transnational engagement. The organisations discussed in this dissertation would by no means be characterised as undemocratic. On the contrary a general characterisation is that immigrant organisations adapt to the structural requirements and moreover adapt the forms that have proven successful. But Fennema & Tillie’s conclusion can be twisted into a perception that argues that engaging in also transnational organisations will benefit the receiving society, increase social capital within these groups and enhance social trust. Mandatory integration into a single nation-state with the demand of unconditional loyalty is indeed an anachronism. Citizenship is most often conceptualised as comprising two elements – rights and identities – but a third aspect is that of democracy, which exactly is put to the fore in the logic following from Fennema & Tillie’s conclusion. Transnational identification can provide a platform for civic participation and agency that consequently can lead to empowerment. It remains a fact that the general trends I have outlined in this chapter describe activities that take place within a completely legal and democratic sphere. Although many organisations employ confrontational strategies, organisations using undemocratic means remain scarce.
One explanation is that such an approach simply has proven highly unsuccessful and therefore not worth pursuing.
Chapter 11
Conclusion and future outlook

Introduction
This study has focused on the interplay between national opportunity structures and immigrant organising processes. For both aspects the literature is rich and has provided a general framework for the analysis. The aim of the study was to provide further understanding on how field-specific opportunity structures affect immigrant organising processes and construction of identity. By field-specific I mean the particular political and discursive opportunity structures that are expected to influence such processes, i.e. the integration and citizenship regime in the three countries. This particular type of opportunity structure is, so to speak, at the core of the nation-state in that it defines the framework for social closure and distinctions between insiders and outsiders.

Another aim was to qualify the understanding of the opportunity structures by employing a comparative approach and thereby be able to identify the main structural determinants in different national settings (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Looking at associational behaviour of the same group, i.e. the Turkish communities (in the broadest possible sense) within different structural settings has pointed to differences and similarities in the organising processes. Pursuing a comparative perspective along these lines has helped to understand the importance and impact of the particular social context and power relations in which the immigrants live and avoid overgeneralisations which stem from a single national model.

An important premise has been that immigrants despite the asymmetrical power relations are not “passive entities in a social vacuum” (Yurdakul, 2006: 449) but on the contrary active participators. The opportunity structures are without doubt decisive for immigrant behaviour and collective identity constructions (cf. Chapter 8 and 9) but agency is indeed present in this socio-political context where it points to lived citizenship or citizenship as practice. The methodological backdrop of this study is precisely a variant of “constructivist structuralism” or “structuralist constructivism” (cf. Bourdieu & Wacquant; Chapter 4), which, when reassessing, puts forth an understanding of social life as being both constrained by social structures and part of an active process of production which transforms social structures (cf. Chouliaraki & Fairclough).

Seeking to understand organising processes within a particular social context moreover readdresses the discussion of collective action and social integration. Whereas earlier studies up until the 1960s regarded collective actions and social movements as anomic behaviour and
a token of social disintegration (della Porta & Diani, 1999: especially chapter 5) later research argues that collective actions and social networks stipulate social ties and enhance social trust and capital and therefore has a conducive impact on democratic processes (cf. Putnam; Fennema & Tillie).

Here the fact that immigrant organisational engagement is embedded within a discourse of integration provides a challenge. As Geddes writes: “we usually recognise integration only in its absence as social exclusion or disintegration rather than being able to specify what is meant by an integrated society” (2003: 23). As a consequence many studies have focused on organisational behaviour in the margin of society and on alleged problems of integration while fewer have looked at the organisational patterns within mainstream society and reflected upon incorporation patterns not defined beforehand as problematic. This particular study wanted to do the latter.

Thirdly, this study points to the limitations in the existing models of incorporation both conceptually and empirically. As an increasing number of scholars have pointed out, patterns of assimilation or integration are not necessarily in opposition to transnational and cosmopolitan processes but may easily co-exist and even stipulate each other. This study follows these general findings and shows how particular groups appear to be integrated (or assimilated) in majority society while they at the same time display sustained transnational ties and in general articulate transnational identifications (cf. Chapter 10). Hence, an ambition has been to understand how processes of internationalisation and globalisation influence organising patterns within the given nation-state as well as on a transnational level.

In this concluding chapter I will not go systematically through the findings of the study. Each chapter ends with a summary and this will stand as conclusions for the different parts. Rather I will provide a final set of reflections of the main analytical findings and shortcomings as well as the theoretical and conceptual questions and problems emanating from the analysis and in this way assess the general outcome of the study.

(1) Comparing the integration- and citizenship regimes cross-nationally
In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I pointed to differences and similarities between the three national incorporation models. In this section I will summarise the main findings and discuss the findings further. Framing the individual national model within the two dimensional model outlined by Koopmans & Statham situates the three countries in the following way:
The arrows indicate the position of the national model and the degree of changes in the analysed period. However, a limitation is that such a depiction can be no more than a general synchronic depiction of reality. Denmark still offers civic, political and social rights for non-citizens; hence the differences between citizens and denizens are limited. It has become more difficult to qualify for Danish citizenship in the sense that more criteria have been added in combination with an increased focus on so-called Danish values. It has also become harder to become eligible for family reunion, where Denmark indeed has one of the most exclusivist practices in the EU. Oppositely it has become easier to gain access for other (privileged) groups filling in labour shortages in specific sectors. In general the largest movement has been on the cultural axis where there has been a tendency towards less acceptance of diversity and understanding of special needs based on cultural or religious diversity. Preventions of discrimination are the weakest among the EU countries. Koopmans et al.’s two-dimensional space and framework in general has difficulties capturing the Danish ‘model’ sufficiently. At the moment there is a tension between a strong emphasis on cultural homogeneity and social closure and a practical acceptance of difference fuelled by the global competition and need to attract qualified labour force to the country. While the first tendency strives towards social cohesion the latter takes a much more pragmatic perspective, which indirectly states that if newcomers are able to provide for themselves differences are to a larger degree accepted (cf.
Chapter 9). Subsequently, the Danish model is situated somewhere left of the middle. I have put arrows in both ends, which symbolise a form of stability or equilibrium in the position as the driving forces pull in each their direction. Recalling Entzinger’s claim of an alleged trade-off between public investments in integration and economic prosperity (Chapter 3), the conclusion in the Danish case appears to be that prosperity places less emphasis on social cohesion as maintaining economic prosperity has higher priority.

Germany has continued the development it initiated in 1990/2000 and has moved towards the middle of the cultural axis. The ethnic conceptualisation of citizenship has been gradually replaced with a civic understanding although some issues, such as accommodation of religious claims and special needs, are rejected. Practices differ from state to state to federal level however, and there are internal contradictions. One example is the approach taken by Berlin, which was among the most tolerant and liberal-minded states and one of the first to see the potential in immigrant organisations and support them, although at the same time it has excluded any cooperation with and support to religious organisations. It has become easier to obtain citizenship after elements of *jus soli* were introduced, although the ‘optional model’ and prohibition of multiple citizenship most likely prevent a large group of non-citizens from naturalising. In practice a large number of people today have dual citizenship allowed for different reasons, but also this practice differs from state to state where Berlin has been rather generous in granting dual citizenship, while Hamburg has rejected most applications.

September 1 2008 differences between the states may become smaller, however, as Germany from federal level introduces a citizen test, which must be passed to obtain German citizenship (BMI, 2008; Bundesregierung, 2006-2007). The test resembles the Danish, Dutch and English tests and brings Germany in convergence with a general trajectory in Europe. The test is developed by the Humboldt-Universität in Berlin and not as ‘caricatured’ as the preceding tests in respectively Baden-Württemberg and Hesse which especially targeted Muslim applicants. Nevertheless, the introduction of the test accentuates a development that can be recognised elsewhere.

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1 The test itself is a multiple choice test where 17 out of 33 questions must be answered correctly. The questions are drawn from a catalogue of 310 questions (10 are particular to the state the test is taken in). The questions and answers can be learned in advance. It centers around three themes: “*Leben in der Demokratie*”; “*Geschichte und Verantwortung*”; and “*Mensch und Gesellschaft*” (BMI, 2008). The test has been criticised by immigrant organisations, most notably by Kenan Kolat from TGD, Serdar Yazar from *Bundesverband Türkischer Studierendenvereine* and Kerim Arpad from European Assembly of Turkish Academics, who argue that it tests for values and opinions rather than knowledge (Information, 11.07.08; Todays Zaman, 15.07.08).
The dispute up to the Integration Summit in 2007, which caused the Turkish delegates to walk out, revolved around the amendments of the Immigration Law, which introduced language tests for spouses in connection with family reunification, but does not apply to Americans, Japanese or European Union citizens (Bundesregierung 2006-2007; Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2005a; Spiegel Online, 05.04.07; 12.07.07). Knowing the language of the country one is going to live in is definitely an advantage, but no matter one’s political attitude it is difficult not to regard this amendment as different treatment. The reasoning behind this initiative is (like in the case of Denmark) not alone to control immigration, but also to steer it in a benign direction by selecting the ‘best immigrants’. Comparing this development with the fact that some states either have decided to introduce local voting rights or are considering it (cf. Chapter 9), points in another direction however. Moreover Germany in 2006 introduced the very first anti-discrimination measures; these practices are still rather weak and the mandate of the Antidiskriminierungsstelle is currently being reassessed. The conclusion is that Germany overall has taken a somewhat ambiguous position and perhaps stands at a crossroad where it must decide which direction to take. Nonetheless the changes taken from 1990 to 2008 have moved Germany from a very exclusivist model towards a position in the middle.

Despite a change of government and a political move to the right on the political scale, the Swedish integration and citizenship regime remains among the most liberal in the EU. The Swedish system offers easy access to naturalisation and provides substantial political, civic, and social rights for non-citizens. The latter group is a minority however, as Sweden has managed to secure a very high rate of naturalisations, most probably because it accepts dual citizenship.

Whether high rates of naturalisation are regarded as a desirable outcome obviously depends on the political and public attitude towards this goal. As shown the Danish approach is negative and naturalisation regarded as the crowning achievement, while it in Sweden is regarded as a means to integration. Germany stands somewhere in the middle with the conservative part taking the Danish position and the centre-left parties claim the opposite. But also the immigrants themselves and the organisations are divided on this matter. Aforementioned Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland for instance argues that Turkish immigrants should naturalise in order to create a Turkish vote bank, which could put pressure on political parties and thereby force them to notice problems related to Turks in Germany (here referred to by Yur-
Sweden takes an interesting and complex position on cultural differences and group rights; the tendency is arguably moving away from a multiculturalist position towards a more civic oriented approach, resembling for instance the British approach. Based on the outlined measurements of integration and citizenship, Sweden is still closer to the multiculturalist position than anywhere else in the model.

Concluding this section I ask whether path-dependencies then explain the national trajectories. The answer must be yes and no. There is no doubt that once collective actors and state institutions have started down a particular path the costs of reversal are high. Moreover the path will be strengthened by a discursive consensus that makes some options more plausible than others. The Swedish case illustrates this extremely well. A model building on consensus building combined with a specific historical-political path paved the way for introducing dual citizenship. Oppositely the German case presents a challenge to incorporation models and indeed symbolises that paths can be changed. What made Germany change its previous position is much more complex, however, and to provide an adequate answer other factors such as socio-economic ones must be taken into account. Exactly the economic context seems to a large extent to explain the Danish trajectory. A mono-cultural value-focused discourse is being supplemented with a much more pragmatic discourse in order to remain competitive in the global economy. I will return more specifically to these factors below. First, a brief summary of the main tendencies on an organisational level in terms of agency and strategies.

(2) Agency and strategies - revisiting the meso level
Chapter 8 in particular looked at organising processes in the three countries, Chapter 9 at collective identity making and Chapter 10 at transnational social formations and identification. These three chapters all deal with the agents at stake in this study, namely the immigrant organisations. In these analyses I have pointed to various findings.

Firstly, it is clear that the opportunity structures have a profound impact on the migrant organising processes and condition claims making. The countries display different patterns, but a common fact is that convergence occurs due to high degree of adaptation to the structural conditions and given incentive structures. This can of course lead to different outcomes in terms of discourse and practice in different contexts. The analysis also indicates that adaptation is stronger in settings that already offer substantial rights as well as in corporatist models. This would be the reason for the higher degree of convergence in Denmark and Sweden. Claims making is clearly affected by the specific position in society.
Other factors also matter though. The differences in welfare state models have a noteworthy effect on the organisational patterns. Immigrants have been framed as a burden for the welfare state to a greater extent in countries with a universal welfare state model, e.g. Denmark, whereas the presumed impact of immigration on social policy in Germany has been a less controversial issue as social rights to a large extent are insurance based (Kraus & Schönwalder, 2006). Hence, entitlement to social rights is dependent on labour market participation, which makes it difficult to legitimise welfare chauvinism for instance. Immigration is rather problematised in terms of parallel societies and alleged segregation.

Another example is the presence of political allies. Both in Sweden and Germany immigrant organisations have found allies within the mainstream political parties, which for instance the Kurdish organisations in Sweden have benefited from. The same goes for different alliances between immigrants and political parties in Germany (cf. Table 8.3). In Denmark there is not the same degree of alliances, and political participation is very much an individual entrepreneurial project.

The political opportunity structures also decide who is in and who is out, which again influences the inter-organisational relationships. In Denmark and Germany religious organisations, and more precisely Muslim organisations, are offered very few possibilities for institutional participation and therefore show much more exclusive affiliations also to other organisations. In contrast, Sweden gives religious organisations the same incentive structure as other organisations that even has access to the formal institutional organ, the Council for Ethnic Equality and Integration (cf. Chapter 8). Perhaps for this reason Swedish Muslim organisations also have horizontal links to secular organisations such as SIOS and in general have multiple affiliations (cf. Fig. 8.1; Fig. 8.2; Fig. 8.3). But my study has also shown that even when the political opportunity structures are closed to particular types of claims making and identity, the discursive context may be recipient. The relative success of Democratic Muslims in Denmark is one example.

Subsequently, not only the integration regime itself but also the welfare state arrangements, political constituency and other factors define the social reality that immigrant organisations correspond to and act within. This also applies to the construction of identity, which is also conditioned by the social and political context as discussed in Chapter 9. Discourses, context and institutions all matter. Conforming to the structural context may be a conscious choice as there are incentives to do so, e.g. subsidies, access to established institutional channels etc. Adaptation may also be of a more unconscious nature, where rhetoric and discourses may say one thing and actions and behaviour another.
Where does this leave agency then? The short answer is that agency definitely matters. The integration and citizenship regime together with the welfare state model constitute the social context of action. But organisational participation has both direct and indirect effects. Collective actions may lead to (individual) empowerment and at the same time unite and create collective identity (della Porta & Diani, 1999). Self-recognition arises in the social process when the actor realises his/her own potential. Participation strengthens social trust and capital and expresses that citizenship is not only a legal status but also a practice. As Moya claims, participation may first and foremost be a social practice with no political agenda (Moya, 2005), but in my understanding participation, no matter the purpose, also expands social ties and resources and serves a democratic purpose (cf. Fennema & Tillie). Interaction and participation also have indirect outcomes however, as participation potentially makes differences visible and actually creates divergence between majority and minority and reinforces inter-group differences. Differences may not have been there from the beginning but are created in the interaction.³ Identity making is a social process that may strengthen commonalities but also reinforce boundaries.

The analysis also shows that rights not only ‘must be taken’ but also are taken as the Alevi process of being recognised as a religious minority illustrates. Moreover the analysis points to a finding where opportunities in one context indirectly may strengthen collective identities and ties in other countries. Again, the Kurds are a good example: The favourable both political and discursive opportunity structures in Sweden for Kurdish collective identity and claims making have turned Sweden into the main centre for Kurdish political activism. Large parts of the Kurdish media infrastructure are placed in Sweden, but benefits Kurds outside Sweden as well. In other words immigrant organisations and international federations utilise the possibilities for organising and influence that already exist and build up structures, which again may create stronger organisations and a broader basis for mobilisation, which again increase influence. Transnational activism is a commonly used strategy (Tarrow, 2005). Immigrants today make use of multilevel institutional channels and may have multiple agendas. Some activities are pursued at local level and others at international level, e.g. specific claims for the city council and others addressed to the European Parliament. Both the Alevis and Assyrians show examples on this type of activism.

Migrant organisations not only adapt to the dominant discourse, but also raise claims that seek to change the political agenda and structures. Large-scale campaigns for local voting

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³ This finding takes a different theoretical perspective than the framework I have followed otherwise.
rights may serve as an example. The demand was initially raised by immigrant organisations and was later supported by German organisations, which may have tipped the scales for even larger mobilisation. No matter what, the demand is now supported also by German politicians and as mentioned, two different Länder are today in the process of introducing local voting rights.

(3) Culture, multiculturalism, welfare and social cohesion

Immigration and modes of adaptation challenge national homogeneity and the ‘philosophies of integration’ reflect attempts to come to terms with this challenge. First of all I will argue that the question of cultural diversity and rights for cultural groups cannot be understood in terms of concrete policies and institutions alone. The question is far more complex and has a discursive dimension that underlies the political development in this area. This especially regards the discussion about diversity vs. social trust. Sceptics of multiculturalism have claimed that the welfare state builds on horizontal trust and social cohesion that can or even will be undermined if diversity increases. The solution seems either to be a type of welfare chauvinism based on a two-tier welfare state with some entitlements for citizens and others for non-citizens or to close the borders to newcomers and enforce more control. Both solutions have to some degree been implemented across Europe and the Danish introduction of the ‘start allowance’ is an example of such a practice. Also the mantra of ‘firm and fair’ policies claimed in several countries is a sign of this development. In Germany the chosen mantra is ‘fordernd und fordern’ and the SPD variant ‘faire Chancen, klare Regeln’. If the sceptics are right in their diagnosis, welfare state models coupled with an integration regime as the Swedish model presents should not be able to exist – but apparently they do.

The question is of course if we can find any linkage between the degree of multiculturalism and threat towards the welfare state as we know it. Some, like Goodhart, would claim that it cannot be upheld in a framework of multiculturalism (Goodhart, 2004). In his words “the glue of ethnicity […] has been replaced by the glue of values” in the modern liberal state (2004: 32). Goodhart, himself a critic of multiculturalism, understands this as a tension between solidarity (high social cohesion and generous welfare state) and diversity (equal respect for a wide range of values, people and way of life). But is that true? While liberal values certainly are highlighted in a discourse of civic integration there is simultaneously a culturalisation of the discourse emphasising Danish values as superior etc. Goodhart’s point of view was originally expressed in an editorial in Prospect, which led to refutation from a large group of scholars, among these Banting, Kymlicka, Glazer, Parekh, Sassen, and Spencer (see Prospect,
Especially Banting and Kymlicka are deeply engaged in these questions and refute a trade-off between recognition and redistribution and basically refute that multicultural policies and the welfare state stand in opposition (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006). Taking a somewhat median position Koopmans claims that multicultural policies may have counter-productive effects for integration: ‘Good intentions sometimes make bad policy’ (Koopmans, 2004).

In the critical perspective, securing social cohesion is the crucial task for the nation and welfare state. One way is by promoting labour market integration, which makes everybody pay taxes to uphold the social system and hence secures social trust, as nobody can take advantage of system – no rights without responsibilities etc. In this framework social inclusion ties mainly to the labour market and not to society or the nation-state as a whole, and social cohesion basically becomes a question of securing a given social order rather than promoting equality (Joppke, 2007; Vasta, 2008). Neither is the concept of social cohesion a neutral concept when implemented in policy. Vasta contributes with a powerful argument when she claims that: “Social or community cohesion is also problematic because […] hegemonic groups are in a privileged position to define the terms and characteristics of social cohesion” (Vasta, 2007a: 34). This argument is also in agreement with the critical discourse analytical perspective that I have taken as my point of departure (cf. Chapter 3). Consequently, social cohesion, in an integration framework, is concerned with identity and sense of belonging and less with participation and equality. Social cohesion is the effort of maintaining social order in a disciplinarian Foucaultian sense.

As also Banting and Kymlicka state, overcoming the economic and social exclusion of the immigrant minorities is one of the great challenges confronting European countries (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006: 43). Anti-diversity and anti-immigration attitudes are gaining force and in combination with a convergent trend of neo-liberalism this leads to further control and restrictions rather than accommodating diversity and expanding the welfare state. Both the welfare state and the integration regimes are in need of restructuration and the neoliberal state is prevailing over both (Vasta, 2008: 16). Banting and Kymlicka (following Schierup, Hansen and Castles) address this point quite well: “The restructuring and integration agendas are driven by separate forces, with the pressure on the welfare state flowing primarily from globalization, economic restructuring, technological change, and neoliberal ideologies” (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006: 43). The solutions to overcome the possible problems are clearly interrelated however.
(4) Does the socio-economic context matter?
The socio-economic dimension is another aspect that is captured by neither the political nor cultural dimensions of citizenship but which, as just discussed, nevertheless frames the whole setting. Denmark has had a very strong economy for some years now; the Swedish economy more recently started to prosper, but today is almost as strong. Germany has experienced economic decline and is still troubled by structural expenditures after the reunion, however in very recent years the economy has shown positive tendencies and Germany today has the lowest unemployment rate in 15 years.

The unemployment rates more or less reflect this tendency, with an employment rate of 3.4 pct. in Denmark, 3.8 pct. in Sweden, and 5.7 pct. in Germany (OECD Observer, 2008). In all three countries the unemployment rates among third-country nationals are higher than among national citizens. But who fares best is still an extremely difficult question to answer (cf. Entzinger & Biezeveld; footnote 9, p. 38). Different studies point to different conclusions and some even seem contradictory (Jean et al., 2007; for Germany see OECD Employment Outlook, 2008 and Liebig, 2007a; for Sweden see Lemaître, 2007; for Denmark see Liebig, 2007b). A multitude of variables need to be taken into consideration when looking at the integration patterns in the light of the socio-economic context. Are immigrants getting jobs that correspond to their formal qualifications for instance and what does a potential mismatch imply for the integration criteria?

There might not be a positive correlation between an exclusive approach to integration and a high level of employment among immigrants. The type and number of newcomers (e.g. fewer low-skilled), general economic trends and so on may also affect these outcomes. Denmark as an example currently appears to be loosing immigrants with higher educations due to lack of recognition (Politiken, 25.05.08; Politiken, 24.06.08). It is beyond the scope of my investigation and moreover beyond my expertise to discuss these issues in more detail; nor will I comment any further on labour market arrangements as such. I merely wish to make the rather trivial point that integration policies obviously are not created in a vacuum but in a specific social-economic setting. Likewise, the analysis shows that economic surplus on a national level does not necessarily lead to increased tolerance towards immigrants. The Swedish change of government is illustrative in this sense, as the centre-right government in other aspects resembles the liberal-conservative government in Denmark and yet maintains a liberal approach to integration. Also CDU-led changes in Germany link a liberal approach to integration with positive economic expectations.
Hence, economy obviously matters, but in unexpected ways also. The so-called crisis of the welfare state has not only led to an attenuation of social rights as the global economic competition simultaneously has led to inclusion and opening of national borders.

The analysis also reveals that integration is fused with economic concerns to the extent that one can talk about integration policies being tools for migration control. This is perhaps a logical consequence of the social challenges brought up by processes of globalisation and migration in general. However, while policies of integration previously followed from immigration flows, it can be argued that new preventions as the one posed in Germany (demands for basic knowledge of German etc.) points to a situation where measurements developed for a framework for integration are being implemented in a framework for immigration. The change of social practice being the result of these changes is a possible transformation of the entire immigration flow. Whereas most newcomers arrived either as refugees/asylum seekers or via family reunification, which is a fundamental right under the ECHR (Article 8 – right to respect for private life), reality is now a targeted selection of persons with such a status where mainly resourceful persons, in terms of human capital skills, are welcomed. Humanitarianism has in some countries been pushed to the back and outward-looking perspectives have been substituted with an inward looking perspective, *i.e.* first and foremost to ensure global competitiveness and protect national interests.

(5) The European level

Having pointed to the impact of global processes on the integration agenda, welfare states and economy I will turn to the European level. In my study Europe and especially the framework of EU has mainly served as one arena for collective action and negotiation among others, but the influence and importance of especially EU could obviously be emphasised much stronger than I have done. Especially the EU framework deserves to be mentioned in its own right. The efforts to create convergent and comprehensive policies of asylum, immigration and integration have also put their mark on national legislations.

The so-called CBPs (Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU) are the basis for the new German Law of Immigration (Council of the European Union, 2007; Justice and Home Affairs, 2004; Leise, 2007). Denmark chose to have an opt-out from the areas of justice and home affairs in 1992/1993. Yet, a recent discussion about alleged misinformation by the Danish Immigration Service to citizens regarding the right to bring a spouse to Denmark shows that EU regulations regarding the free movement of workers overrules the Danish opt-outs in the areas of justice and home affairs. As I write, several mixed
couples who have been forced to live in Sweden with less strict rules than Denmark are now moving back to Denmark or considering the move. The example shows that EU regulations from one area may affect parts of the national legislation that was not expected, in this case the strict Danish rules for family formation and reunification.

The coming years will bring further attention to the area of immigration and integration within the EU framework when the French, Czech and Swedish presidencies have to define the frames for a post-Hague framework by drawing up a new multi-annual strategic work program for the period 2010-2014 (Council of the European Union, 2008).

While it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to understand national developments without reference to the EU, the discussion of whether EU provides new opportunities for ethnic mobilisation is less clear. Some of the most eager approaches saw EU as offering a new framework for membership (e.g. Kastoryano, 1998; Soysal, 1994; 1996a) but the development of institutions and opportunities has not followed the trajectories these studies foresaw. EU citizenship is still very weak and the institutions arising at European level such as the Migrant’s Forum have been unsuccessful and rather been attempts to provide a whiff of legitimate representation at EU level (Favell & Geddes, 2000; Piper, 1998).

Immigrant mobilisation and organising processes may however make use of EU without having its own institutions. As shown in Chapter 10, agenda setting and claims making at EU level are becoming still more important, and the different European federations are increasingly professionalising to accommodate the technocratic and bureaucratic language of the EU, e.g. as shown with development of the Assyrian ACE. Although the EU framework admittedly may point to new types of membership, the specific claims I have looked at do not concern such. Neither do they go beyond national or ethnic divisions by universalising particularities. They first and foremost concern a demand for particular rights for a particular ethnic or religious group in a specific national context. National citizenship remains indispensable for integrating immigrants. Initiatives like ENAR and anti-discrimination issues may however be able to articulate claims with reference to personhood and human rights, but I have not looked into this in more detail.

The type of claims making taking place at EU level does not follow a strictly general pattern however, but depends on the agenda and context. Turkey here is a very special case by being both inside and outside the EU framework; inside as an affiliated partner and outside as official candidate. Moreover it is special by having a large minority already living in EU countries – a minority, which actually is larger than the individual populations of the seven smallest member states. The claims making portrayed in this study reflects this fact, as pres-
sure is put on the Turkish EU candidacy. The Alevi question for instance was placed on Turkey’s European agenda without the awareness and approval of the Turkish government and the discursive opening for this type of agenda had a unifying and impeding effect on the different national Alevi organisations to strengthen corporation further.

(6) The return of assimilation or civic integration?
The analysis demonstrates that national models are not static but indeed malleable. This has recently become a fairly conventional argument in the literature, but here I give the empirical evidence for such a claim. Brubaker, who conceived the former theoretical position, has also revised his understanding. In 2001 he published an article entitled ‘The Return of Assimilation?’, which continues the discussion of his earlier research. In the article Brubaker argues that France, Germany, and the United States have changed the perception on immigration and returned to a re-conceptualised version of assimilation derived from the normative expectations of cultural conformity as the basis for citizenship.4

The re-conceptualisation of assimilation that Brubaker points to, certainly describes the political development of approaches to integration and citizenship in Europe to some degree. As also Joppke argues, the changes in German citizenship law in 1990 guaranteeing as-of-right-naturalisation build on an approach where assimilation simply was deducted from the number of years the applicant had resided in the country and no other criteria were included (Joppke, 1999: 638). In this sense membership in the German nation-station is not really premised on being part of the ethno-cultural nation (ibid.). Joppke suggests two possible interpretations of this change. One, that state and nation are effectively de-coupled because membership in the latter is no longer a pre-condition for membership in the former; and two, that the meaning of German national identity has undergone a transformation and is no longer defined in ethnic terms (ibid.). This seems very reasonable and in congruence with what Brubaker writes a few years later. Institutional changes are not the only support of this trend. Also the immigrants themselves express such a position. Most of my informants would portray themselves as well-integrated and stress that the younger generations would become like the majority population, not by force but by will. This somewhat changes the understanding of assimilation: previously most would have argued that integration is done by will and as-

4 Brubaker lists six elements in a re-conceptualisation of the concept: from organic to abstract understandings of assimilation; from transitive to intransitive; the unit that changes is a multigenerational population (compared to the person); a shift from thinking in terms of homogeneous units to heterogeneous units; from cultural to socio-economic matters (assimilation as opposed not to difference but to segregation, marginalisation and ghettoisation); and a shift from a holistic approach with a taken-for-granted reference population to a disaggregated approach (2001: 542-544).
similation by force (Joppke, forthcoming), but for instance Kenan Kolat from TGD claims that “there is no enforcement in assimilation” (here quoted from Yurdakul, 2006: 447). This position stands in stark contrast to the position of Prime Minister Erdoğan however (cf. Chapter 9).

The framework of multiculturalism was what supported the common-sense and pragmatic notion of integration in many countries, i.e. the idea that ethnic groups were allowed to maintain and be supported in upholding their culture of origin, rather than describing a social transformation indicating changes among both immigrant group and recipient society. That form of integration has more or less disappeared; very few states for instance today offer mother tongue education in school. Moreover the existence of what Banting and Kymlicka would term multicultural policies has not altered the fact that most national models of incorporation have not aimed at a two-way form of adaptation. Instead there has been convergence towards a national self-identification with liberal-democratic values and a demand of respect for these values. These values, as I have shown, really are very common democratic liberal values, but in some national contexts they are given a national imprint as I showed in the Danish case. Also a more culturalised version is found in some places though, again in the case of Denmark, where a special variant of Danishness is promoted in the integration and citizenship test. Thus Brubaker’s claim that there has been a shift from cultural to socio-economic matters is somewhat exaggerated, at least the socio-economic and cultural discourses seem to run parallel in some countries. Lately however, economic concerns and demands for labour have made some countries enter a more pragmatic discourse of incorporation, even the most restrictive systems. The nexus between integration, migration and security, which was further strengthened with 9/11, was at the forefront of discourse only few years ago (e.g. Faist, 2006), but seems to have loosened the grip on legislation and policy making. Economic and market-oriented concerns have in recent years taken over the pole position and paved the road for more pragmatic solutions and openness in general. The security-driven discourse and path towards closure are still found in all the countries however, and could end up being defining again.

Taken together the national trajectories and collective identities of immigrants challenge the existing models of incorporation also conceptually. Brubaker’s return to assimilation might not be a sufficient concept for adequately understanding the incorporation processes and new identities that this study has come to. Demanding that newcomers and non-citizens in a broader sense learn the language of the host state is a rather weak form of cultural adaptation. Instead of a return of assimilation, or in addition to, a convergent trend is the institution-
alisation of civic integration. Sweden is an exception while Denmark and Germany both have implemented and made such instruments mandatory. Civic integration rests on the pillars of liberalism, but has been pushed in an authoritarian direction where obligations are stressed over rights. Integration in this sense has to do with social control and upholding a specific social order, which is why for instance labour market integration is seen as the main indicator. This creates a tension between autonomy and control as both notions are important for this process, but giving priority to the former will challenge the latter and vice versa. In comparison, Sweden upholds an egalitarian approach aiming first and foremost at social equality. When analysing the German policies the aims mentioned could point in the same direction.

Does the increasing convergence in incorporation models across Europe in combination with new complexities arising from processes of globalisation imply that we can no longer speak of national models? Koopmans et al. obviously think that we can as their framework symbolises. Joppke does not: “The notion of national models no longer makes sense, if it ever did” (Joppke, 2007: 2). In his reading of the current state the convergence in civic integration policies, e.g. as symbolised in the introduction of civic integration tests, has obviated national models. The Danish dilemma created by the European Court’s decision on the mobility of goods and labour vs. the Danish opt-outs stands as another argument for Joppke’s position. My own position lies in between these two options. I would disagree with Joppke and claim that while there are noteworthy convergences there still are substantial divergences in policies as also shown in the analysis of the Danish, Swedish and German models. Hence it does make sense to analyse distinct national policy trajectories. At the same time I acknowledge that simplistic classifications need to be refined and re-examined, which Koopmans et al. also have done within their framework. However, as my analysis has shown also that framework needs to be elaborated if we want to understand the complexities arising from transnational affiliations and the dilemma between ideals of social cohesion and at the same time wish to fortify economic interests. Consequently, I will argue that it is difficult to speak of a given national model as being only assimilatory for instance, as most models contain contradictions and paradoxes pointing to other conceptualisations also. What can be stated as a fact however, as especially the case of Germany has shown, is that national models are capable of change and policies can and will be modified.

(7) Transnationalism and social integration - new models of incorporation?
As discussed throughout the dissertation, transnational identification is turning out to be a problem for the theories of integration and for policy makers. There is an assumed tension
between the two concepts. The continued identification with the country of origin or internationally dispersed communities will impede the processes of integration in the host country, it is claimed. States are gradually moving away from frameworks of multiculturalism and post-nationalism towards more civic oriented approaches in combination with a strong emphasis on cultural adjustment.

The reality is however, that people at the same time identify transnationally and are integrated according to all measurements. I for instance found that the members of the Alevi organisations both expressed the highest form of transnational identification and had sustained political ties to Turkey and the European Alevi community (if we can speak of a such) and at the same time were extremely well integrated in the host societies and performing well according to educational achievements, position on the labour market and political participation. Depending of course on how the notion of transnationalism is understood, the self-identification of being Turk in Denmark, Sweden or Germany quintessentially is a transnational identification. This is a very inclusive definition of transnationalism obviously. Transnationalism, as I argue in Chapter 3, is both a physical and a mental space, that is, it may involve for instance border-crossing activities but also remain a form of identity.

In the legislation and political discourse one of the nodal points is the issue of dual citizenship. Facilitating that people may belong to more than one national setting has sparked debates of loyalty and national identity. Some countries reject this form of membership exactly because they deem it unacceptable to have double loyalties, sometimes resting on hypothetical scenarios such as divided loyalties in case of war between the two countries. Especially the fear of Muslim fundamentalism and Muslim immigrants’ possible identification with a global umma has been discussed vividly and in some cases led to a firm belief that immigrants will have to choose to be loyal to the host country now that they are there to stay, e.g. in Denmark and Germany by renouncing former citizenships (e.g. Schiffauer, 2006). Although football cannot be compared to military conflicts it has been interesting to follow the European Championship this year and especially the match between Germany and Turkey, which showed that Turkish nationals living in Germany actually were more than capable of handling dual loyalties and manage being both Turkish and German. Also majority Germany was able to handle this complexity and everybody celebrated loss and victory together.

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5 I can only support this claim with my own empirical findings derived from the study of particular groups within the overall Turkish community as well as the quoted literature supporting the same argument. Further studies are definitely required to gain further knowledge on this particular issue.
But the tension is still there as the old variant of assimilation has gone out of fashion and no state will demand directly that immigrants let go of their old culture. Merkel’s ‘arriving at the future without abandoning the past’ is an example of this. So on the one hand, there needs to be some sort of cultural openness from a state perspective (no matter how weak) while on the other hand there is a strong demand for loyalty and cohesion. As Favell stated, this becomes an even more difficult task when national elites simultaneously are letting go of national identity in the search for a (however privileged) form of transnational or cosmopolitan identity. The convergence towards instruments of civic integration in this sense can be argued to be a response to this tension. Ideally and in theory it is a political solution that presents an alternative to both excluding notions of national identity and transnational identifications by pointing to the middle way everybody can agree upon. In reality these concrete approaches are endorsed with national and cultural imprints.

(8) Social transformation - has immigration changed society?
Within migration research the importance of the global labour market has come back to link migration to the wider processes of globalisation. From initially looking at why people move and the effects on both the sending and receiving countries stating that there were winners and losers at both ends, the perspective turned to questioning the nation-state as the sole analytical unit and today the question of migration once again is set in wider social structures.⁶ The question that follows from this insight is how the development and challenge from immigration can be located in society. This will be my final reflections in this dissertation.

Firstly migration has gone from being a fringe phenomenon (cf. the claim of Joppke, 1998) to constituting a central challenge for both nation and welfare state.

Secondly, Europeanisation does bring about both challenges and solutions for the national models of integration and immigration. Although the divergence between the countries is profound, the challenges that immigration and human mobility bring about are too large for any one nation-state to cope with. They resemble the challenge of environmental problems, which could not be tackled by one particular national approach.

On a higher but interrelated level, globalisation is challenging the economic, political and social relationships between states. As Vasta rightly states: “Global and state economies are based on structured inequalities and the changes in subjectivities and societal practices have developed from these structured circumstances” (Vasta, 2008: 19). Change accommodates change. Globalisation therefore brings about a need for restructuring societal models in

⁶ This summery of the immigration research development must be ascribed to Robert Cohen at COMPAS Annual Conference 2008 – ‘Theorising Key Migration Debates’ earlier this summer.
the economic, political and social spheres. The neo-liberal turn is not congruent with the Marshallian type of citizenship, which seeks to reduce inequalities (Faist, forthcoming). Neoliberalism pushes the scales toward more control, which may condition growing inequality. No matter the outcome, the neoliberal instruments have been implemented in the integration regimes I have focused on in this study and have had an impact on the policy development. This turn also conditions the uneasy relationship between cohesion and diversity.

Fourthly, this challenge leads to acknowledging the new complexities and mobility that authors like Manual Castells and John Urry have written extensively about for more than a decade. Here I will argue for specifically expanding the perspective from only encompassing immigrants to include majority residents. If mobility is a premise for societies today then immigrants may actually be better suited for the new complexity than majority society.

This points to a final conclusion, namely that theories will need to change attention from minority to society as such to identify and analyse social transformation and social change. As I have argued in the dissertation, transnationalism is not only a characteristic of immigrants but a general societal characteristic. Yet the nation-state, despite the precise criticism of methodological nationalism, remains a crucial unit for organising society. There are no institutions yet to replace the national frameworks although the impact from supra-national entities such as the EU is noticeable. Therefore it is also premature to speak of transnational citizenship. Citizenship so far remains anchored in the nation-state, which especially the problems of providing EU citizenship with proper substance and mandate illustrate. If the nation-state remains the organising principle of global society despite challenges from immigration and globalisation then it is indeed more accurate to identify social change exactly as a proces-sual transformation and a central task may be to investigate the transnationalisation of society further.
## Appendix A - List of organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/Abbreviation/Website</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Aim/purpose</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alevi Forbundet i Danmark / DABF / <a href="http://www.alevi.dk/">http://www.alevi.dk/</a></td>
<td>Religious organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, Homeland, and Diaspora politics</td>
<td>DABF is the main organisation for the Alevi organisations in Denmark. It has eight member organisations across the country and is part of the international Alevi Federation based in Cologne. It was established under the name Haci Bektas Kulturforening in 1994 but changed its name in 1997. The main purpose of the organisation is to inform about Alevi culture – both internally among its members and externally in a Danish context. It also has left-winged political agenda. The last years the organisation has taken an outward position and also deals with integration issues in general. The agenda however, is also turned towards the condition for Alevis in Turkey and towards recognition at all levels. Have both Turkish and Kurdish members with the common denominator of being Alevi.</td>
<td>Active (nationwide - head office in Randers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alevi Ungdom</td>
<td>Religious organisation</td>
<td>(Immigrant politics)</td>
<td>Alevi Ungdom is an organisation for second generation Alevi youth. Established in 1999. The aim is to discuss issues of Alevi culture and religion youth amongst The organisation was created as response to the lack of religion in the more left-winged Alevi self-understanding characterising the parent generation.</td>
<td>Active (but now an intrinsic part of the Alevi Federation in Denmark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anatolsk Kulturforening</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>A typical example of social cultural organisation for Turks in Århus. Established in 1977. Besides providing a social space for the members its objectives are to inform majority society about Turkish culture and to engage itself in culture protecting integration. Have sports, culture, leisure and social activities.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumsuz / <a href="http://www.bumsuz.com">www.bumsuz.com</a></td>
<td>Ethno-cultural organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics (social-cultural)</td>
<td>Bumsuz is a typical example of a hemşelerik organisation. The name stems from the Kurdish village that the members originate from. This one was established in 2006. Besides providing the space for social and cultural ties the organisation works with integration related issues in regards to Kurds in Denmark.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compas/ <a href="http://www.clubkompas.dk/">http://www.clubkompas.dk/</a></td>
<td>Ethno-cultural organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>A local Turkish organisation working with issues of integration. Part of the Po-Kurs umbrella organisation. Established in 2006.</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The list includes Turkish organisations in the broadest possible sense as well as specific transethnic organisations that are of importance for Turkish organising processes in general.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dansk Tyrkisk Kultur Forening Hedensted</td>
<td>Ethno-cultural, religious organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics (homeland politics)</td>
<td>Ethno-cultural organisation member of the Alevi organisation in Denmark. Besides the affiliation with Alevis in Denmark interests seems to be on labour market issues and providing a local social and cultural space for Alevi-Turks.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialog Forum / <a href="http://www.dialog-forum.dk">www.dialog-forum.dk</a></td>
<td>Religious organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Sunni-Muslim organisation that connects to the Fethullah Gülen movement in Turkey and elsewhere. Seeks religious dialogue, proactive integration approach and to promote (inter)cultural understanding and a demand for recognition. Active in Islamic schools.</td>
<td>Active (but low level of activities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fey Kurd - Sammenslutningen af Kurdiske Foreninger i Danmark / <a href="http://www.kurder.dk">www.kurder.dk</a></td>
<td>Ethno-national, political organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, Homeland, and Diaspora politics</td>
<td>Earlier known as Folkets Enhed (Union of the People) established in 1976 a Maoist left-winged movement on a global level. In 1980 overtaken by the Danish fraction of PKK, since then known as FEY-KURD (and The Kurdish House) and has become an umbrella organisation for Kurdish organisations. Supporting the struggle of Kurds in Turkey and elsewhere and in Denmark working with integration issues in relation to Kurds. A main activity is to tell the Danish public about the situation for Kurds. Affiliated to Fey-Kurd is Dansk-Kurdisk Kulturcenter. Fey-Kurd is member of KON-KURD.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreningen O.N.E. / <a href="http://www.1-online.dk/">http://www.1-online.dk/</a></td>
<td>Ethno-national, business, interest organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Formerly known as Søjlen but the board changed the name as some people found it had religious connotations (to the pillars of Islam instead of the pillars of democracy as it was intended). The objectives of the organisations have since been specified to: Network, Carrier, and entrepreneurship. The name O.N.E. is an abbreviation for Organisation, network, and (sharing of) experience. Publishes the bimonthly O.N.E. Magazine.</td>
<td>Active (mainly in and around Copenhagen, but expanding nationwide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreningen Stifinder / <a href="http://www.stifinder2002.dk">www.stifinder2002.dk</a></td>
<td>Educational /Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Established in 2002 by students from various higher education institutions. Apparently Stifinder is part of the global Nurcu-movement established by Fethullah Gülen. The objective is to organise youth with another ethnic background (than Danish) and to promote their integration into Danish society. Key-words are integration, resources, ethnic potential, education, intercultural understanding, recognition and positive role-models.</td>
<td>Idle (although no official statements on its closure has been given - according to other informants some members went on to be active in Søjlen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOMKAR – den kurdiske forening i DK / <a href="http://www.kurds.dk/dansk">www.kurds.dk/dansk</a></td>
<td>Ethno-national, political organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, homeland, diaspora politics</td>
<td>KOMKAR; Association of workers from Kurdistan established in 1986. Has sister organisations in a number of European countries. Works to tell about the Kurdish condition but most activities focused on the Kurdish situation in Denmark. Activities within sport, culture and counselling.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kurdisk Ungdomsforening (KUF)</td>
<td>Ethno-national, political</td>
<td>Immigrant, identity politics</td>
<td>Youth organisation addressing youth between the ages of 15-25. Works with issues of identity and culture, e.g. their slogan “if you don’t know where you are coming from you don’t know where you are going”. Emphasises networks building.</td>
<td>Active (vicinity of Copenhagen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positiv integrationsforening Randers (Pirder)</td>
<td>Political, religious organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Positiv integrationsforening Randers was established in 2000. It is a member organisation of the DABF but has launched itself as a transethnic organisation aiming at joining the different locally immigrant organisations. Generally has a left-winged agenda.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rådet for Dansk Tyrkiske Studerende (RDTS)</td>
<td>Educational, ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>RDTS was established by two young Turkish students at a Danish university. The organisation seeks to help students in higher education with a Turkish background to overcome problems related to having a minority background. The members seem to be majority Turks and the organisation has no engagement in religious or ethnic issues. The keywords are empowerment, counselling and networking.</td>
<td>Active (lost contact in 2008 - inactive?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLEN</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Established in 1999 by Turkish youths. Dialogue with the Danish society, basically to show Danes how Anatolian Turks live.</td>
<td>Active (Århus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sejlen</td>
<td>Ethno-national, business, interest organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Network and organisation established in 2002 by youth studying or recently finished with higher educations. Main aim is to establish and strengthen business related networks. Initiatives has been conferences, mentor institutions, knowledge-sharing. Published the free bi-monthly Sejlen Magazine (changed the title to O.N.E. Magazine later). The Magazine puts focus on business possibilities in Turkey and brings interviews with ‘successful’ Turks performing well in all areas of society to serve as inspiration and possibilities for networking.</td>
<td>Changed name to Foreningen O.N.E. in 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrkisk-Dansk Forening</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Typical family based organisation established in 1979. Focus on the members’ family life. Special focus on the wellbeing of the elderly etc. Due to high number of Alevi members the organisation has now become member of the national Alevi organisation.</td>
<td>Active (Århus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrkiske Foreningers Sammenslutning (TFS)</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Umbrella organisation for nine Turkish organisations in Århus established in 2000. Sharing of information. Objective to gain foothold in the integration council.</td>
<td>Active?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name/ Abbreviation/ Website</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Aim/purpose</td>
<td>Status</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brug for alle unge / <a href="http://www.brugforalleunge.dk/">http://www.brugforalleunge.dk/</a></td>
<td>Educational organisation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Brug for alle unge (&quot;We Need All Youngsters&quot;) is not an immigrant organization but a government run campaign launched in 2002 but as I have talked to several votaries here from I include a short description here. The aim is to ensure that a greater number of young people with a non-Danish ethnic background enroll for and complete a youth education program. This is done having a staff of role models, which is youth with a non-Danish background who has taken an education which they tell interested about.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreningen Nydansker / <a href="http://www.foreningen-nydansker.dk">www.foreningen-nydansker.dk</a></td>
<td>Interest organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>The name itself is short for the 'association for integration of new Danes on the labour market'. The organisation was established in 1998 by mainly Danish business people and leaders. The aim is to break down barriers that new Danes face in the labour market. Key-words are, counselling, diversity management, influence the public debate and attitude towards immigrants, empowerment and personal potential.</td>
<td>Active (based in Copenhagen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreningspiloterne</td>
<td>Educational, interest organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Project launched by Dansk Ungdoms Fællesråd (DUF) in 2006. The objective is to engage youth with immigrant background in voluntary organisations. Regards participation in organisations as a democratic benefit. Pointed out a number of so-called 'organisation-pilots' that are role models.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslimernes Fællesråd <a href="http://mfr.nu/">http://mfr.nu/</a></td>
<td>Religious organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, Diaspora politics</td>
<td>An umbrella organisation combing the different Muslim organisations in Denmark established in 2006. Objective to contribute to developing substantial citizenship, promote dialogue and mutual respect and tolerance in both the Danish society and internationally. Counselling body on topics perceived to be important for Muslims in Denmark. The member organisations are Afghansk Islamisk Kultur Institut, Danish Muslim Aid, Dansk-tyrsk Islamisk Stiftelse, Den Albanske Forening, Den Islamiske Forening, Dialog Forum, IQRA Foreningen, Islamisk Forum, Islamisk Kultur Center, Muslim Cultural Institute, Muslimer i Dialog, Pakistan Welfare Society, and Vestegnens Kulturforening.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vakif / Diyanetvakfi / Dansk Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse <a href="http://www.diyanetvakfi.dk">www.diyanetvakfi.dk</a></td>
<td>Religious organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics / Diaspora politics</td>
<td>The Danish branch of the state-driven Diyanet. Provides counselling and social tasks for Turks in Denmark e.g. make funeral and pilgrimage arrangements. But also provides the Turkish state version of sunni Islam by providing hodjas to religious congregations across Denmark. It was established in 1981.</td>
<td>Active (office in Copenhagen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name/Abbreviation/ Website</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Aim/purpose</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alby Turkiska Arbetar och Kulturförening <a href="http://www.albyturkiska.nu/">http://www.albyturkiska.nu/</a></td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>A typical homeland organisation established by Turks from Kulu. In 1973 the Botkyrka-Huddinge Turkiska-Svenska Kulturförening was initiated but as more Turks arrived to the area the Alby Turkiska Arbetar och Kulturförening was created in 1984. Helps it members to fit into Swedish society and provides a social space to be among own kin. It aims at facilitating integration and to help members develop Turkish culture over generations. Besides the main organization female members also established the Alby Kvinnocenter.</td>
<td>Active (Botkyrka-Stockholm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assyriska Riksförbundet i Sverige (ARS) <a href="http://ars.hujada.com/">http://ars.hujada.com/</a></td>
<td>Political, religious organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics/Diaspora politics</td>
<td>The Assyrian Federation in Sweden was established in 1977. The federation is seeking to protect the Assyrian designation of our people, and is out to acquire a minority status for Assyrians by the Swedish government and the UN. It has 26 member organizations and independent youth (AUF) and female organizations (AKF). ARS cooperates with corresponding Assyrian federations in Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, France and the USA. Keywords are integration, mobility, education and cultural engagement.</td>
<td>Active (Södertälje)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assyriska Ungdomsförbundet i Sverige / AUF <a href="http://auf.nu/">http://auf.nu/</a></td>
<td>Religious, cultural organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, Diaspora politics</td>
<td>Assyrian youth federation established in 1991. In 1997 it officially separated the ties to ARS although they obviously co-works on a number of issues. Their aims are similar to Ars’ while the issues of integration into Swedish society perhaps are stressed even more here.</td>
<td>Active (Södertälje)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isvec Alevi Kultur Merkezi / <a href="http://isvecakm.com/">http://isvecakm.com/</a></td>
<td>Religious organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, Homeland, and Diaspora politics</td>
<td>Isvec Alevi Kultur Merkezi is the Swedish Alevi Federation. A Swedish variant of the German and Danish but less prominent in Sweden. It does not qualify to accepted as minority Federation entitled to financial support.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdiska Riksförbundet (KRF) <a href="http://fkks.se/">http://fkks.se/</a></td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, Homeland, and Diaspora politics</td>
<td>The Kurdish Federation (KRF) was established in 1981. The objective is issues of language, identity politics and cultural-political questions. Keywords are integration, democracy, antidiscrimination equality, and support to refugees. Information about Kurds and Kurdistan. KRF is allegedly the only Kurdish organization worldwide who has succeeded in establishing one organization for Kurds from all parts of Kurdistan. KRF also has independent youth and women organizations. Has since 1981 Published the journal Berbang.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdiska Rådet</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, Homeland, and Diaspora politics</td>
<td>Kurdish federation sympathetic to the aims and goals of PKK. Part of Kon-Kurd</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Active</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kurdiska Unionen</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, Homeland, and Diaspora politics</td>
<td>Kurdish federation. Difficult to find any information on its affiliations, ideology and activities.</td>
<td>Active?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svensk-Turkiska Riksförbundet (STRF)</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, Homeland politics</td>
<td>Established in 2003 by members of TUF. Has since 2007 published the journal Vizyon</td>
<td>Active (Göteborg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svensk Turkiska Sällskapet</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Svensk Turkiska Sällskapet is Stockholm based organization promoting integration of Turks into Swedish society. Provides information about Turkish culture and Turks living in Sweden. Especially active in promoting travels, cultural initiatives and conferences.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkiska Rikförbundet</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>The Turkish Federation was established in 1979 and has member organisations all over the country. The aim lies close to the official Swedish integration policy stressing: Equality, freedom of choice and corporation. The purpose is to minimize the gap between Turks and Swedes and in general to promote substantial citizenship. But issues of Turkish cultural identity seem to be very important as well. Publishes the journal Yeni Birtik that is distributed throughout Sweden to Turkish speaking households free of charge.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkiska Student- och Akademiker Föreningen (TSAF)</td>
<td>Ethno-national, educational organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>TSAF was established in 2002 with the aim of collecting all students of Turkish origin in one organization. Exactly building a network has been the main motivation. Keywords are educational issues, promoting Turks to study but also a proactive approach to issues of equality and to inform the Swedish society about Turkish culture and about Turks in Sweden.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkiska Ungdomsförbundet / TUF /</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Turkiska Ungdomsförbundet (TUF) was established in 1983 as an independent committee under the Turkish Federation. The aim is to gather and organize Turkish youth in Sweden. TUF seeks to strengthen the dialogue between Swedes and Turkish youth. Keywords are two-way integration, cultural recognition and cultural identity. It has a vision of belonging to the best of European organizations when it comes to developing instruments of integration. Lanced the Nordic Turkish Federation Nordisk Turkiska Ungdomsförbundet (NTUF) recently and has aim of establishing a European version Europisk Turkiska Ungdomsförbundet (ETUF). Publishes the journal EuroTurk.</td>
<td>Active (nationwide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name/Abbreviation/Website</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Aim/purpose</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antidiskrimineringsbyrån / SDB / <a href="http://adb-stockholm.org/adb-sthlm/index.htm">http://adb-stockholm.org/adb-sthlm/index.htm</a> + <a href="http://www.antidiskrimineringsbyran.se/">http://www.antidiskrimineringsbyran.se/</a></td>
<td>Political, counselling organisation</td>
<td>(Immigrant Politics)</td>
<td>The antidiscrimination bureau (ADB) is a semi-public institution financed by Migrationsverket and driven by SIOS. They have regional offices. As the name suggests, they provide assistance when people have been or felt being discriminated against. They also offer information and counseling work about equal rights etc.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberala Invandrarförbundet / LIF / <a href="http://www.folkpartiet.se/FPTemplates/AreaStartPage___4499.aspx">http://www.folkpartiet.se/FPTemplates/AreaStartPage___4499.aspx</a></td>
<td>Political organisation</td>
<td>(Immigrant politics)</td>
<td>Liberala Invandrarförbundet was launched in 1988 and is partly connected to Folkpartiet (the Liberal Party). LIF was established by immigrants and have a socio-liberal agenda. Their objectives are to spread social-liberal ideas among immigrants, to have immigrants represented in Folkpartiet, to provide knowledge about immigrants (factual) position in Sweden and to support processes of integration into the Swedish society.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIOS / <a href="http://www.sios.org/">http://www.sios.org/</a></td>
<td>Political, interest organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>SIOS was established already in 1972 and stands for The cooperation Group for Ethnical Associations in Sweden. SIOS consists of voluntary associations of both recognized and non-recognized ethnical minorities that want to create a multicultural society in collaboration with all democratic forces in Sweden. The objectives are to work with minority issues like mother language, culture and education, to pursue a diversity policy that mainstems the entire society and to strengthen the cooperation for the Members common interests. SIOS also has a women’s committee and a youth committee. SIOS has national Federation and both regional and local member organisations.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sveriges muslimska råd (SMR) <a href="http://sverigesmuslimskaranad.se/">http://sverigesmuslimskaranad.se/</a></td>
<td>Religious organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>The Moslem Council in Sweden (SMR) consists of nine member organizations. SMR seeks to unite the Moslem organizations in Sweden into one Moslem minority regardless of ethnic, geographic and religious differences. SMR regards integration as a two-way process which it seeks to promote. Furthermore it wishes to engage in dialogue about Islam and to present information about the Muslim learning and position in Sweden.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name/ Abbreviation/ Website</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Aim/purpose</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alevitischen Gemeinde Deutschland e. V. / AABF / <a href="http://www.alevi.com/">http://www.alevi.com/</a></td>
<td>Religious, ethno-cultural organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, Homeland, and Diaspora politics</td>
<td>The AABF is one of the largest German Alevi organisations. It was established in 1990 but has changed its name a few times. Last time after the Sivas incident which made the organisation create a German organisation the Federation of Alevi German Communities (still abb. AABF) and a European Federation. The main purpose of the organisation is to inform about Alevi culture - both internally among its members and externally in a German context. The organisation has been deeply involved in politics in both Germany and in Turkey. Different from the cases of Denmark and Sweden, the Alevis in Germany have not organised in one single unity but different competing organisations exist side by side e.g. the FEK (Federasyona Elewiyen Kurdistan, Federation of the Alevis of Kurdistan) that organizes local groups of Kurdish Alevis in Hamburg. The cleavages between Alevis and other religious traditions are larger in Germany than in the two other countries.</td>
<td>Cologne (and nationwide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assyrischer Jugendverband Mittelauropa (AJM) <a href="http://www.ajm-online.com/">http://www.ajm-online.com/</a></td>
<td>Religious, ethno-cultural organisation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Web based forum for Assyrian youth. Deals with all aspects of Assyrians position in society and lifestyle, culture and religion as well as the imagined Assyrian homeland.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atour e. V. Verein für assyrische Jugend</td>
<td>Religious, ethno-cultural organisation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Web forum for Assyrian youth. It has discussions of language, culture, discrimination etc.</td>
<td>Active (online)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundesverband Türkischer Studierendenvereine (BTS) <a href="http://www.btsonline.de">www.btsonline.de</a></td>
<td>Ethno-national, interest organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>An umbrella organisation for Turkish students' organisations - mainly in higher educations. BTS seeks to inform the public about special needs of Turkish students and help solve such problems. Keywords are pro-active understanding of integration, participation, enhancing resources and building networks.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Das Antidiskriminierungsnetzwerk Berlin des Türkischen Bundes in Berlin-Brandenburg (ADNB) <a href="http://www.adnb.de/index.php">http://www.adnb.de/index.php</a></td>
<td>Interest organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>ADNB was launched by the TBB in 2005 to systematise and strengthen the efforts towards developing an antidiscrimination legislation from political hold. The objectives are empowerment and equality.</td>
<td>Inactive?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation Name</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Politics and Education</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>Der Türkische Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB)</td>
<td>Ethno-cultural organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant Politics (Homeland)</td>
<td>TBB was established as an umbrella organisation in 1991 and today has 24 member organisations. It is a highly political organisation that has a proactive approach to integration and citizenship. Its objectives include strengthening participation in the German society, to promote naturalisation and to work for election rights for non-citizens. It draws on a Kemalist legacy and has often been in opposition to religious groups. It has been a corporation partner with the German state in several years.</td>
<td>Active (Berlin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Assembly of Turkish Academics Berlin-Brandenburg (EATA)</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>EATA is a European interest organisation set up on behalf of second generation Turks in Western Europe, however as it so far at least only has German member organisations I include it as a German organisation. It seeks to be an active voice in the European-Turkish dialogue about social, cultural and political issues. EATA also seeks to present a picture of the other and successful Turks that they feel their members represent.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Föderation türkischer Elternvereine in Deutschland / Almanya Türk Veli demekleri Federasyonu (FÖTED)</td>
<td>Ethno-national, educational organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>FÖTED is the umbrella organisation for the many Turkish parents’ organisations in Germany. It was established in 1995. It is engaged in discussions about the position of children of Turkish origin in German schools and society. Its objectives are to advance social mobility of the Turkish children, strengthen language education and in general works with problems in the public schools.</td>
<td>Active (Berlin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gays &amp; Lesbians aus der Türkei Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. (GLADT)</td>
<td>Ethno-cultural, interest organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant (minority) politics</td>
<td>GLADT stands for Gays &amp; Lesbians aus der Türkei. As the name suggest it is an interest organisation. It has since 2003 provided a social space for homosexuals but is also engaged in antidiscrimination and equality work in general. Has launched a number of other initiatives such as <a href="http://www.kanakistan.com/">http://www.kanakistan.com/</a></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOMKAR / Föderation der Arbeitervereine aus Kurdistan</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, Homeland, and Diaspora politics</td>
<td>The main Kurdish federation in Germany since 1979 which also serves a European Kurdish bridgehead. Estimated to have around 50,000 members. Resembles the Swedish and Danish federations. Besides lobbying for Kurdish interests in Germany, Turkey and Europe it also engages in discussions of education, segregation and integration.</td>
<td>Active (Cologne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkisch-Deutsche Unternehmervereinigung Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. (TDU)</td>
<td>Ethno-national organisation</td>
<td>Business, Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Umbrella organisation for Turkish businesspeople and independent entrepreneurs since 1996. Has around 250 members and unites left-winged and right-winged organisations. Aims to create stronger networks between business people and in general enhance the Turkish contribution to German economy. Also participates in the public debate on diversity management and integration. Published the bilingual Zeitschrift Türk Ekonomi Dergisi (Zeitschrift für Türkische Wirtschaft).</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Website</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (TGD)</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Ethnic-national organisation</td>
<td><a href="http://www.tgd.de">http://www.tgd.de</a></td>
<td>A very large umbrella organisation claiming to speak for 2.3 million people of Turkish origin living in Germany. It was established in 1995. It deals with the position of Turks in Germany in general, and works with issues of anti-discrimination, integration and equality. It has a pro-active approach to integration seeking Turks to become members of the German society by naturalisation and by using the rights given. It builds on Kemalist principles and does not have any religious or minority ethnic groups among its members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin e.V. (TGB)</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Ethnic-national, religious organisation</td>
<td><a href="http://www.tgb-berlin.de/">http://www.tgb-berlin.de/</a></td>
<td>The other main umbrella organisation in Berlin, uniting 49 member organisations. Like TBB is mainly gathering Turks and in the case of the TGD has an explicitly Sunni Muslim agenda. TGD was established in 1983 and works with public issues of the Turkish minority in the German society. It is interesting to notice that the DITIB is among the member organisations which somewhat gives the TGD a quasi-public recognition as a German minority and entitlement to minority cultural rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜSİAD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish industrialists' and businessmen's association.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.tusiad.org">www.tusiad.org</a></td>
<td>Turkish industrialists' and businessmen's association. Based in Turkey with branches in other European countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verein Türkischer Dönerhersteller in Europa e. V. (ATDID)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Business network for producers and sellers of the Turkish döner.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.atdid.de/">http://www.atdid.de/</a></td>
<td>Included as it one of the few interlocks between organisations that cannot corporate on other aspects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEK-KOM / Föderation Kurdischer Vereine in Deutschland</td>
<td>Immigrant, Homeland, and Diaspora politics</td>
<td>Ethnic-national organisation</td>
<td><a href="http://www.yekkom.com/">http://www.yekkom.com/</a></td>
<td>Kurdish federation allegedly with ties to PKK/Kongra Gel. Like KOMKAR claims to be the federation for Kurdish representation in Germany. Has member organization all over Germany. Put much focus on the situation of Kurds living in Germany and only secondly engages in the Kurdish international question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zentralverband der Assyrischen Vereinigungen in Deutschland und Europäischen Sektionen (ZAVD)</td>
<td>Diaspora politics</td>
<td>Ethnic-national, religious organisation</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bethnahrin.de/ZAVD.htm">http://www.bethnahrin.de/ZAVD.htm</a></td>
<td>The European Assyrian federation. Besides a few press releases it is hard to judge their level of activities and organisational profile. Apparently organised by the Mesopotamien Vereins Augsburg which was the first Assyrian organisation in Germany launched in 1978. Both organisations is orientated towards the Assyrian culture and language and the political situation in the imaginary Nineve - the Assyrian homeland.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. TÜSİAD has a competitor in Turkey where MÜSİAD provides an equivalent platform for businesspeople but grounded in a Muslim value system. MÜSİAD also has partners and networks in Europe but not as influential as TÜSİAD. It is mentioned in a footnote as it to my knowledge not is established as such outside of Turkey <http://www.musiad.org.tr>.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/ Abbreviation/ Website</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Aim/purpose</th>
<th>Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interkulturelle Rat <a href="http://www.interkultureller-rat.de/">http://www.interkultureller-rat.de/</a></td>
<td>Interest organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>The Intercultural council consists of both Germans and foreigners. It was established in 1994 and works mainly with issues of racism, discrimination and the dialogue between different religions.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland <a href="http://i-g-d.de/cmsde1/">http://i-g-d.de/cmsde1/</a></td>
<td>Religious, interest organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>Founded in 1958. A smaller organisation with around 600 members. Engages in discussions on Islam in Germany as the name suggests.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrationsrat Berlin-Brandenburg (MR) <a href="http://www.migrationsrat.de/">http://www.migrationsrat.de/</a></td>
<td>Interest organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics</td>
<td>MR was established in 2004 and unites more than 60 immigrant organisations in Berlin. It works for equal treatment for all citizens in Germany and offers counselling and different activities and courses. The organisation includes both older organisations as well as organisations started by second and third generation immigrants.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V (DITIB) <a href="http://www.diyanet.org/de/starts">http://www.diyanet.org/de/starts</a> eite/index.php</td>
<td>Religious organisation</td>
<td>·</td>
<td>DITIB is as mentioned the German branch of the Turkish Diyanet. It functions as an umbrella organisation for 880 cultural centres and mosques. It serves as the organisational shelter for Turkish Muslim organisations recognised by the Turkish state. Like the Turkish state it has a Kemalist agenda when it comes to religious issues and thus represents a state-controlled variant of Turkish Sunni Islam. It supports Turkish citizens with religious doings and brings in preachers from Turkey as well as educates preachers in Germany. Besides the strictly religious tasks the DITIB is engaged in leisure, culture and sport activities. After the introduction of the Integration courses DITIB has become one of the providers <a href="http://www.ditib.de/default.php?id=22&amp;lang=de">http://www.ditib.de/default.php?id=22&amp;lang=de</a>.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name/Abbreviation/ Website</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Aim/purpose</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assyria Council of Europe (ACE) <a href="http://www.assyriacouncil.eu/">http://www.assyriacouncil.eu/</a></td>
<td>Political organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, and diaspora politics</td>
<td>Lobby organization based in Brussels. Established to raise awareness to the Assyrian minority and put the Assyrian question on the political agenda of the EU.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avrupa Türk Kültür Dernekleri Birliği / Verband der Türkischen Kultur Vereine in Europa (ATB) <a href="http://atb-europa.com/">http://atb-europa.com/</a></td>
<td>Political, religious organisation</td>
<td>Diaspora, homeland politics</td>
<td>ATB is the European branch of the Büyük Birlik Partisi BBP an extreme nationalist and Islamic party in Turkey present represented in the parliament. Established in Frankfurt 1994 as an umbrella organization representing regional groups in Germany. Keywords are flag, fatherland and religion.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europäisch-türkische Zivilplatform (ATP)</td>
<td>Political organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant politics, homeland politics</td>
<td>Platform uniting a great range of organisations here among TGB and TBB (see above) but also collaborates with for instance Tüslad. The primarily goal is to raise awareness on Turkish achievements and to pave the way for Turkish membership of the EU. The last activities date back to 2005 although a spokesperson from TGB claimed that it was still active.</td>
<td>Active?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Kurds Democratic Coordination (Dem-Kurd) <a href="http://www.kurdistan.nu">www.kurdistan.nu</a></td>
<td>Political organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, homeland and diaspora politics</td>
<td>International federation for Kurdish organisations with linkage to Kurdish Socialist Party (PSK) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Works with Kurdish question on an international level.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinde / Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfedederasyonu Resmi Sitesidir (AABF) <a href="http://www.alevi.com/">http://www.alevi.com/</a></td>
<td>Religious, political organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, homeland and diaspora politics</td>
<td>Established in 1993 (?) when the German national organisation divided into a national and a European branch.</td>
<td>Active (Cologne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOMKAR <a href="http://komkar-info.org/index.htm">http://komkar-info.org/index.htm</a></td>
<td>Political organisation</td>
<td>Immigrant, homeland and diaspora politics</td>
<td>Similar goals and aims as Dem-Kurd. KOMKAR was founded in Germany and diffused from there to the rest of Europe where some local-national fractions still carry the same name.</td>
<td>Active (Cologne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KON-KURD / <a href="http://www.kon-kurd.org">www.kon-kurd.org</a> (see German description)</td>
<td>Political organisation</td>
<td>Diaspora, homeland politics</td>
<td>Kurdish federation. The members include YEK-KOM in Germany, Fey-kurd in Denmark and Det Kurdiska Rådet in Sweden. The international opposition to Den-Kurd/KOMKAR, works with the Kurdish question but has shown sympathetic to the PKK approach.</td>
<td>Active (Bruxelles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ZAVD) * see under Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C – Interview guide

Level of organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Analytical dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can you tell me a little about the organisation?</td>
<td>Meso - organizational level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- aim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- purpose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- members, who, why, how</td>
<td>Strategies and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- expectations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- success</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- partners</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in x (the given country)</td>
<td>Mobilisation and possibility structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- abroad</td>
<td>Transnationalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- the organisational goals vs. own goals

Personal level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity within the organisation</th>
<th>Background / Foreground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- why did you become active</td>
<td>Resources / potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- what type of motivation and engagement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- how did you become part of...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- what does it mean to you</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- are you member of other organisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- try to put a few words on the qualifications you have gained by being member of ...</td>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How do you perceive having a Turkish (or other background) background affects your possibilities in the x (given society)?</td>
<td>Ethnicity / identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion / exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Which barriers have you met if any and how can they be transgressed</td>
<td>Coping / barriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Has being member of ... in this sense made any difference?</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How do you understand integration and being integrated</td>
<td>Perceptions of integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Has the fact that you are engaged in this organisation affected your perception of integration and participation</td>
<td>Citizenship, inclusion, exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- not necessarily confined to yourself but in general?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Do you experience differences between x and people with another ethnic background than x?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- between Turks and people with another minority background?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In this version the English edition is listed as an example. Furthermore what I term the analytical dimension is maintained. In the version I used when conducting the interviews the right side was left out.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>or between Turkish minority groups?</td>
<td>Social stratifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is there A teams and B teams?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. between generations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you accept the idea of yourself being a role model?</td>
<td>Dispositions / resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What influence could this have later on then? Could your own engagement inspire others with Turkish or another ethnic background you think?</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Back ← X → Fore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you describe yourself and your own background</td>
<td>Self-definitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you expect for the future</td>
<td>Fore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And for the next generation</td>
<td>Generational aspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think peoples expectations have changed over time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation and why</td>
<td>Back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is your level of education compared to the rest of your family</td>
<td>Mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have they supported you in achieving your goal</td>
<td>Resources / socialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers</td>
<td>‘Who’s to blame’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you describe your family life and your own position</td>
<td>Back / patterns of integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which language do you speak with your family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And with your friends?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you from a religious home? Or which role does religion have for you if any? Has this changed after 9/11 and caricature crises</td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have x citizenship</td>
<td>Citizenship / the problematic of naturalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For how long? and how did you obtain it?</td>
<td>Belonging, affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you hold dual citizenship (and why)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you describe being x (Danish..) citizen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the present policies play a role for your choice of obtaining citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general - how do you relate to the actual policies within the area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever sought political influence</td>
<td>Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you point out as best representing your interests</td>
<td>Coping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim vs. possibilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the x state present you with possibilities to do the things you find important</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which topics/problems would you characterise as the most important in the minority area</td>
<td>Object → subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you experienced problems due to being Turk?</td>
<td>Structural discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the education system?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there at all any problems in this regard?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Transnationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Which relation do you have to Turkey today?</td>
<td>Homeland / transnationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you perceive yourself as Turk, Kurd, xx or Dane?</td>
<td>Loyalty, belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has your relation to Turkey in any way affected your choice of friends, education, spouse and/or citizenship?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you pay attention to Turkish politics?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever voted at Turkish elections?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you position yourself within the debate about Turkey and the EU</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priorities</th>
<th>Reflections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have your priorities in regards to the issues we have talked about changed as you have become older?</td>
<td>Foreground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or after you became entered x (organisations)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**General**

Are influence and participation more important to pursue actively for ethnic minorities than others?

Have your possibilities for participation become better or worse over the last years - and what could be the main reasons?

Can you as an individual do anything to change societal structures?

Do you feel recognised in the x society?

Is there anything more we should come back to or any issues that we have not touched, which are of interest to you?
## Appendix D

Institutional arenas and institutional levels in Denmark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARENAS</th>
<th>Political institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society organisations</td>
<td>EU; ICERD; ECHR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVELS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supranational/Transnational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCR; (LO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties(^1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration; Ministry for Employment; Ministry for Education (and Church); The Danish Immigrations Service; (The Refugee Board); National Labour Market Authority (AF); REM</td>
<td>NUF/PUF pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local city councils; Integration councils; Danish Employment Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site-specific initiatives, e.g. urban development plans, e.g. URBAN programme II(^2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Political parties are a potential channel for participation, especially at municipal level.

\(^2\) E.g. Urbact and Citiz@move. Read about the overall program here: <http://www.aarhuskommune.dk/files/aak/aak/content/filer/urban/div_information_arrangemerter/A_model_for_neighbourhood_development.pdf>.
Institutional arenas and institutional levels in Sweden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARENAS</th>
<th>Political institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society organisations</td>
<td>EU; ICERD; ECHR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Political parties; (ABF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Integration and Gender Equality; Department of Foreign Affairs, (Department of Culture and Education), (Department of Social Affairs); The Swedish National Board for Youth Affairs; DO; Swedish Migration Board; The Board against discrimination; Council for equality and integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational/Transnational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Anti-Discrimination Bureaus (SIOS)²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local city councils; Integration councils; AF (Swedish Employment Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The framework illustrates the status of today so previously influential institutions such as The Board of Integration and the Immigrants Court are left out.  
² There also exist a number of other semi-public antidiscrimination and racism agencies at national and municipal level such as Sverige mot rasism, Centrum mot rasism but these do not take part in operating the Anti-Discrimination Bureaus, which situates them outside the public institutional framework. Agencies such as ABF and SIOS are positioned in the framework as they due to a historical tradition have gained a special quasi-public status, but the same argument could be used for leaving them out as well.
### Institutional arenas and institutional levels in Federal Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARENAS</th>
<th>Civil society organisations</th>
<th>Political institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supranational/Transnational</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU; ICERD; ECHR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National</strong></td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF); Federal Commissioner for Integration and Refugees, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs(^1) (Bundesausländerbeauftragte), Ministry of the Interior, Arge-Flü;(^2) Sachverständigen-rat für Zuwanderung und Integration(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional</strong> (Länder)</td>
<td>Wohlfahrtsverbänden</td>
<td>Ausländerbeauftragte(^4) Landesbeirat für Integrations- und Migrationsfragen(^5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation of integration and language courses(^6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neighbourhood</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. BAMF is in charge of issuing guidelines for integration measures, while integration courses and language courses are implemented by local providers. These count more than 5,000 institutions, primarily local Wohlfahrtsverbände and immigrant organisations.

2. A permanent working group of experts from the state ministries on asylum politics.

3. Expert council on integration and immigration.

4. Different states have different institutions although the tendency has been to establish institutions similar to the Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats von Berlin (see Ohliger, 2006 for an overview of practices in different states and cities).

5. Integration council – here an institution specific to Berlin. Other states have implemented similar councils (again see Ohliger, 2006).

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In recent decades international migration has become a worldwide phenomenon. The novelty is not migration as such, but rather the challenges recent migration has created for the modern nation-state and in particular for the welfare state. Thus Brochmann points out that in earlier times receiving countries had time to wait for settlers to assimilate slowly over history, whereas modern welfare states of today do not have time for this due to the dynamics and expenses of the welfare system itself (Brochmann, 2003: 6-7; Schierup et al., 2006). The individual nation-states have been pushed to develop models of incorporation that can handle this challenge. In substantive terms the aim of my dissertation is firstly to identify the integration and citizenship regimes in Denmark, Sweden and Germany, secondly to investigate how these influence the organising processes and collective identity constructions within the Turkish minority in the three countries with special attention to the influence of transnational social transformation.

Social communities and organisations such as trade unions, political parties or religious and cultural association have usually been ascribed the capability to enhance relations between individuals and to extend trust, values, identity and social belonging. Whether we focus on the individual and the value of face to face contact or we focus on the role of the organisation as an intervening institution between the state, the political system and the citizen in strengthening democracy, such types of engagement also will have an effect on the processes of integration of immigrants in the host society. The Dutch researchers Meindert Fennema & Jean Tillie have in relation to this claim stated quite provocatively that: “To have undemocratic ethnic organisations is better for the democratic process than to have no organisations at all” (Fennema & Tillie, 1999: 723; italics in original). Their conclusion rests on Putnam’s investigation on American participation in civil society but especially concerns ethnic organisations. Exactly the study of ethnic organisations and what previously was captured in the heading ‘identity politics’ (Bernstein, 2005) holds a central role in the present study. Associational participation is on one hand a vehicle for active citizenship but can on the other hand also be a site for expressing dissatisfaction and hereby be a platform for new types of claims-making and social identities. Subsequently, such engagement can be a way of opposing dominant perceptions of integration and national identity. An urgent research question occurs in relation to this discussion, namely if ethno-national identities and sustained and consistent ties to the homeland have a promoting or disrupting effect on societal integration?

The research within the field of international migration and ethnic relations is abundant. In Chapter 2 I present a state of the art review and here seek to structure the existing literature
and situate my own approach and furthermore point to the research gaps which the literature despite the volume still displays. One of the central points in this regards, is that studies of well-integrated groups disappear within the vast range of studies focusing on marginalised and segregated groups. One of the ambitions with this study is to investigate the organising processes and internal dynamics within non-marginalised groups.

The dissertation is structured around three interconnected parts. The first part is a macro analysis of the integration- and citizenship policies in Denmark, Sweden and Germany that will be analysed within a theoretical framework looking at the dynamics between concepts as citizenship, integration and political and discursive opportunity structures.

Secondly I investigate the interplay between the particular opportunity structures and collective organising processes among Turks in the three chosen countries. In doing so one I revisit the fundamental sociological question of the relationship between structure and agency.

Thirdly I examine how transnational social formations and transnational identification effect established perceptions of incorporation (here primarily integration and assimilation) from both an empirical and theoretical perspective.

Subsequently, I employ a dual comparative research strategy. Firstly by looking at internal organisational differences within each national setting and secondly by comparing the three national cases.

The first part of the analysis as mentioned looks at the national opportunity structures. This part of the analysis rests on a theoretical framework originally proposed by Koopmans & Statham (2000). Their framework breaches with earlier macro-level models of incorporation by conceptualising such models as having both a cultural and political dimension which together constitute a two-dimensional space for reconfiguring citizenship. This presents a far more dynamic and nuanced model that avoids falling into the trap of over-generalising complex national models as examples to be solely assimilatory or multicultural. This framework also contains its own limitations however. The impact of the socio-economical context escapes the model for instance. The same does the relation between integration, citizenship and welfare policies. Furthermore the model cannot incorporate transnational affiliations adequately. The model in this sense suffers from focusing primarily on the nation-state as analytical object and therefore has difficulties in containing and explaining affiliations that trans-

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1 When referring to Turks I regard the contextual term Turks as a general category of people within/from Turkey which include Kurds, Alevis and other regional self-identifications such as Circassians, Laz and Assyrians. During the analysis I emphasise the heterogeneity within the Turkish minority and various sub-categories are dealt with in individual analyses.
gresses this. In Chapter 3 the different points of criticism are systematised and the framework is elaborated with a number of analytical tools which makes it possible also to understand transnational social formations and identifications in relation to the opportunity structure approach.

The analysis of the Danish, Swedish and German integration- and citizenship regimes is treated in three separate chapters (Chapter 5, 6 and 7). The respective analyses show that historical trajectories still contain some explanation when seeking to understand current integration- and citizenship regimes. Especially the Swedish model displays pronounced stability in the political development of integration policies. Hence, it is no surprise that Sweden was the first (and so far only) among the three countries to facilitate dual citizenship as this lies in prolongation of the previous development. Conversely do the analyses of the Danish and German case show that models are not static. Denmark followed Sweden shortly after in introducing local voting rights for non-citizens and generally non-citizens enjoy considerable political, social and civic rights. Nonetheless Denmark has especially since the change of government in 2001 taken a very restrictive direction and today has one the most restrictive models within EU when it comes to access to naturalisation and family reunification. The German model has oppositely moved from being a prototypical example on an ethno-cultural model with limited access to citizenship and few rights for foreigners, to today holding one of the least restrictive 

\textit{jus soli} models within EU. Today the German and Danish models actually have become rather close. Such a change of trajectory within a relatively short span of years demonstrates that even grounded historical models are malleable; contrary to what Brubaker’s otherwise seminal analysis seems to suggest. Therefore path-dependencies may not explain everything adequately. There is little doubt that once a regime has started down a given path which becomes consolidated in institutions the costs of reversal become higher as time goes, but nevertheless this is exactly what has happened. Here the explanation rests on other factors such as the impact of global economic processes and attempts to reduce segregation end hereby strengthen social cohesion.

The analyses also show that all three countries (like many other European countries) display a high degree of convergence. The countries have for instance implemented neoliberal instruments and today emphasise duties over rights, have introduced civic integration tests and other things. Sweden somewhat deviates from this pattern but still there is a noticeable degree of convergence across Europe. This has made some researchers as Christian Joppke reject the value and relevance of national models (Joppke, 2007); the impact of increased Europeanisation is simply too big Joppke claims. Koopmans & Statham contrary show how
employing a more subtle theoretical framework still makes it possible to capture national differences. My own position lies in continuation of this discussion, hence I argue that it still is fruitful to pay attention to distinct national models but that the theoretical models must be re-examined and made to encompass transnational formations as argued above.

The data material that is used in the analysis of collective organising processes in relation to the national opportunity structures consists of qualitative interviews with spokespersons and regular members from different Turkish organisations, expert interviews and material from the organisations themselves and public media. The material and the methodological approach and consequences hereof are discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 8 and 9 presents an analysis of the organising processes and of collective identity constructions. A general conclusion is that the opportunity and incentive structures clearly affect collective identities and the organising processes of the Turkish minority groups within in the three countries. The analysis shows that the immigrant organisations adapt to the structural limitations and claims and identities are negotiated within the available arena. This creates a great deal of convergence even where the organisational landscape as such is more fragmented. Summarising I will claim that claims-making that is perceived to lead nowhere disappear over time which strengthen the tendency of convergence further. The systems with corporatist elements have managed to steer organising processes into specific direction, e.g. along ethnic lines in Sweden. Germany has developed a combination of a corporatist and statist approach and until recently sought to incorporate immigrants through the existing institutions, here especially through the welfare organisations. Recently Germany has tried to systematise the incorporation through new integration initiatives and most federal states today have equivalents to the Ausländerbeauftragte in Berlin. The Danish case presents a no less complex setting, mixing elements of as well corporatist, statist and liberal approaches. Emphasis is here put on the immigrant as first and foremost an individual rather than as member of a group. Hence, there are no incentives for organising along ethnic lines. On the other hand Denmark has a long tradition for supporting civil society organisations and ethnic minorities in this sense have a favourable situation for establishing organisations while at the same time being without substantial influence. The different approaches have particular effects on how the immigrant organisations are included and situated in the integration process. In Sweden integration activities are mainly directed by the state and professionals except for the activities taken against discrimination. In Denmark such activities are funded by the state that also decides the framework and field of activities but the task of doing integration works constitutes one of the openings for ethnic minorities in terms of career paths. In Germany the integration activities
are increasingly being pushed over to the immigrant organisations which now share the role of being service providers together with the welfare organisations, which also stipulates increased competition.

The analysis also shows that the opportunity structure framework can explain the convergences in the organising processes very convincingly but has more difficulties in explaining the divergences. One of the explanations is that divergence often is related to transnational engagement. The maintenance of transnational ties challenges the conventional models of integration which also shows up in the study of opportunity structures. Chapter 10 investigates the conditions and explanations on transnational social formations and engagement. Some of the main conclusions are firstly; that the settlement countries themselves have an impact on the type and strength of transnational identification. In this way favourable incentive structures to ethnic minorities, including the Kurdish one, have created a better platform for organisational participation which has conditioned that a large share of the Kurdish cultural and political activities on a European level originate from Sweden.

Secondly; it is doubtful if transnational engagement can be generalised without taking the particular conditions into content. Here Turkey’s own citizenship regime and lack of recognition and entitlement of rights to ethnic and religious minorities have an important impact. Moreover Turkey’s relation to the European Union and status of being accepted candidacy country has put forth a situation where EU now stands as a potential platform for criticism and claim-making. The Kurdish, Assyrian and Alevi organising processes are good examples on this situation.

Thirdly; the analysis shows that transnational strategies have become a common tool within the collective organising processes. Immigrants today make use of multi-levelled institutional channels and may have multiple agendas, with for instance some activities pursued at local level and others at international level and likewise have specific claims for the city council and other claims addressed at the European Parliament for instance.

Finally; and this will stand as a conclusion, the analysis arguably shows that transnational engagement of Turks (and not immigrants as such) not is a rare phenomenon, rather a general characteristic but the type, degree and purpose vary immensely. In prolongation of this statement it will probably be too constraining to understand transnational affiliation only as a characteristic of ethnic minority identity as also majority society is in the midst of transnationalising. Transnational engagement however, does not necessarily stand in contrast to societal integration either which put forth a theoretical challenge. Even though transnationalism (in its various forms) not is a new phenomenon the research perspective definitely is a
more recent contribution. Both the empirical and theoretical analysis therefore point to the necessity in reassessing the existing conceptual models of incorporation in adequately understanding the incorporation of newcomers in society.
Dansk resumé

Gennem de seneste år er international migration blevet et globalt fænomen. Det har præsenteret både nationalstaten og velfærdsstaten med en række udfordringer, som sætter nye krav til, hvordan nytilkommere inkorporeres i samfundet, og hvordan samfundet generelt kan omstruktureres for at tackle disse udfordringer. Den norske forsker Grete Brochmann opsamler denne udfordring klart, når hun hævder, at mens modtagerlande tidligere havde den fornødne tid til, at indvandrere langsomt over generationer blev assimileret i samfundene, så har velfærdsstaterne ikke længere samme tid og tålmodighed på grund af de indre dynamikker og udgifter fra velfærdsstater selv (Brochmann, 2003: 6-7). De respektive nationalstater har derfor været nødsaget til at udvikle inkorporeringsmodeller, der kan håndtere denne udfordring. Det er studiet af disse strukturelle betingelser, der sammenfattet i betegnelsen om politiske og diskursive mulighedsstrukturer (Koopmans et al., 2005), for indvandreres aktive deltagelse i samfundet, der har været det centrale tema i nærværende afhandling.

Sociale fællesskaber og organisationer i civilsamfundet er traditionelt blevet tilskrevet evnen til at styrke relationer mellem individer og forøge social tillid, identitet og tilhøringsforhold. Uanset om vi fokuserer på individet eller på organisationen som intervenerende institution mellem staten, det politiske system og borgeren i den demokratiske proces, vil engagement i organisationslivet formodenligt også have en effekt på integrationsprocesserne i samfundet. De hollandske forskere Meindert Fennema & Jean Tillie fremdrager i den forbindelse en ganske kontroversiel antagelse, når de hævder: "To have undemocratic ethnic organisations is better for the democratic process than to have no organisations at all" (Fennema & Tillie, 1999: 723; kursiv i original). Deres konklusion bygger videre på Putnams undersøgelser af amerikansk deltagelse i det civile samfund, men fokuserer her på såkaldte etniske organisationer. Netop studiet af etniske organisationer, hvad der tidligere blev sammenfattet som identitetspolitik (Bernstein, 2005), tager en central plads i afhandlingen. Mens deltagelse i organisationslivet kan betrages som et redskab til aktivt medborgerskab, kan det ligeledes være en mulighed for at udtrykke frustration og kritik af begrensende strukturer og kategorier og dermed være en platform for nye typer af 'claims making' og identitetspositioner. Her igennem kan og bliver der formuleret kritik af den dominerende opfattelse af integration og national identitet. Et af de relevante forskningsspørgsmål i den forbindelse er, hvorvidt etno-nationale identiteter og fortsatte bånd til hjemlandet, her sammenfattet som transnationale tilhørsforhold, virker nedbrydende eller befordrende på den samfundsmæssige integration.
Forskningen inden for studiet af international migration og etniske relationer er særdeles omfattende. Jeg forsøger i afhandlingens Kapitel 2 at strukturere den eksisterende litteratur og peger her på dels det fundament, min egen teoretiske ramme bygger videre på, og giver dels et overblik over de mangler, forskningen, på trods af omfanget, stadig byder på. En af de vigtige pointer er her, at studier af velfungerende og velintegrederede grupper forsønner i mængden af studier af marginaliserede og segregerede grupper. I den forbindelse er det netop en af ambitionerne med afhandlingen også at undersøge disse velfungerende grupper og forstå de dynamikker, der findes inden for de givne grupper.

Afhandlingen er bygget op over tre sammenhængende dele, der afdækker den hidtil opridsete problematik og tematik. I afhandlingen har jeg for det første undersøgt, hvordan nationale mulighedsstrukturer, det vil mere specifikt sige integrations- og stats/medborgerskabsregimer, er bygget op i henholdsvis Danmark, Sverige og Tyskland i henhold til politiske institutioner og strukturer samt den diskursive kontekst.

For det andet undersøger jeg, hvordan disse partikulære mulighedsstrukturer påvirker og selv påvirkes af de kollektive mobiliseringsprocesser, i dette tilfælde tyrkiske organisationer i de tre lande.1 Herved vender jeg tilbage et af de klassiske spørgsmål inden for for sociologien, nemlig det indbyrdes forhold mellem struktur og aktører.

For det tredje undersøger jeg, hvordan transnationale sociale formationer og transnational identificering påvirker etablerede opfattelser af inkorporering (her primært integration og assimilation) fra både et empirisk og teoretisk perspektiv.

Samlet arbejder jeg derfor med, hvad der kan betegnes et dobbelt komparativt sigte. Dels undersøges nationale forskelle i inkorporeringsmodeller, dels undersøges minoritetsforskelle inden for den tyrkiske minoritet i den enkelte nationale kontekst.

I den første del af analysen undersøger jeg som nævnt de nationale mulighedsstrukturer. Denne del af analysen foregår på makroniveau og bygger på en teoretisk ramme oprindeligt fremsat af Koopmans & Statham (2000). Deres ramme bryder med tidligere inkorporeringsmodeller ved at forstå medborgerskabsregimer som havende en politisk og en kulturel dimension, som tilsammen danner et todimensionelt felt, den respektive nationale indvandrings- og integrationspolitik kan placeres inden for.2 Dette giver en langt mere

1 Her bruges ’tyrkiske’ i bredest mulige forstand til også at omfatte etniske og religiøse minoriteter inden for den tyrkiske minoritet selv. I selve analysen lægges der netop vægt på heterogeniteten inden for den tyrkiske minoritetsgruppe, og underkategorier som kurdiske, assyriske og alevitiske minoriteter behandles i selvstændige analyser.

2 På engelsk skelnes der ikke mellem medborgerskab og statsborgerskab, hvorfor Koopmans & Statham sammenfatter modellen som ’reconfigurations of citizenship’. Begge dimensioner er dog indfanget i deres

Selvte analysen af det danske, svenske og tyske integrations- og medborgerskabsregime bliver behandlet i tre selvstændige kapitler (Kapitel 5, 6 og 7). De enkelte analyser viser, at historiske indlejrede modeller stadig holder en vis forklaringskraft, når man vil forklare nutidige integrationsregimer. Navnlig den svenske model viser stabilitet i den politiske udvikling af integrationspolitikker. Det er således ingen overraskelse, at Sverige var det første og pt. eneste af de tre lande til at indføre muligheden for dobbelt statsborgerskab, da det ligger i direkte forlængelse af tidligere politikker og udviklinger. Omvendt viser analysen af Danmark og Tyskland, at modellerne netop ikke er statistiske. Danmark fulgte kort efter Sverige op med at indføre valgret til kommunalvalg for udenlandske statsborgere, og generelt besidder ikke-statsborgere betydelige sociale, civile og politiske rettigheder. Ikke desto mindre har Danmark, navnlig efter regeringsskiftet i 2001, taget en meget restriktiv retning og har i dag en af de mest restriktive modeller i EU, når det gælder adgang til fx statsborgerskab og familiesammenføring. Den tyske model har på modsat vis bevæget sig fra at være et prototypisk eksempel på en restriktiv etno-kulturel model med svag adgang til statsborgerskab og få rettigheder til udlændinge, til i dag at have implementeret en af de mindst restriktive jus soli-modeller i EU. I dag ligger den tyske og danske model relativt tæt på hinanden. En sådan kursændring på relativt få år demonstrerer, at selv historiske modeller er åbne for forandring, modsat hvad Brubakers analyse har vist, og vi må derfor må betragte sti-afhængighed med et vist forbipass. Der er ingen tvivl om, at når et regime først har bevæget sig ud af en bestemt politisk sti, og politikker indlejres i institutioner, bliver omkostningerne ved at ændre kurs højere, som tiden går, men ikke desto mindre er det nøjagtigt, hvad der er sket. Her forklaret

todimensionelle felt og ligeledes i min egen analyse, om end kritikere hævder, at netop Koopmans & Stathams model fokuserer mere på statsborgerskabsdimensionen end på rammerne for medborgerskab.
gennem globale økonomiske processer samt forsøg på at mindske segregering og dermed sikre social sammenhængskraft.

Analyserne har også vist, at alle tre lande (i lighed med en række andre europæiske lande) udviser en stor grad af konvergens, eksempelvis har landene alle implementeret instrumenter fra en neoliberalistisk politisk retning og betoner i dag pligter mere end rettigheder og har indført civilt orienterede integrationsprøver. Sverige afviger mere fra denne retning end de to andre lande, men generelt kan der iagttages en stadigt stigende konvergens på tværs af Europa. Dette har fået nogle forskere såsom Christian Joppke til at afvise relevansen af nationale modeller (Joppke, 2007); påvirkningerne af europæiseringen er ganske enkelte for voldsomme, hævder han. Koopmans & Statham viser omvendt, hvordan et mere nuanceret teoriapparat stadig kan indfange nationale forskelle. Min egen analyse viser i forlængelse af denne diskussion, at det stadig er frugtbart at undersøge distinkte nationale modeller, men at de tidligere teoretiske modeller må viderearbejdes for at kunne indbefatte transnationale formationer som nævnt ovenfor.


inkorporere indvandrere gennem de allerede eksisterende kanaler, ikke mindst velfærdsorganisationerne, der her ligger uden for statens regi. Gennem de seneste år har Tyskland dog foretaget et markant kursskifte, når det gælder inkorporeringen af udlande. For første gang er udgangspunktet, at Tyskland er et indvandringsland, og i den forbindelse er der blevet udviklet en række federale initiativer såsom Ausländerbeauftragte i Berlin. Danmark har opbygget en endnu mere kompliceret model, der ud over at minde om den tyske også rummer liberale elementer og samtidig har en universel velfærdsmodel lig den svenske. Vægten er her lagt på inkorporeringen af udlande, som individ og ikke som etnisk gruppe. Der er ingen incitamenter til at organisere sig via etno-nationale skel i Danmark, ej heller til at etablere store paraplyorganisationer som i Sverige og Tyskland. Til gengæld er der en lang tradition for at støtte foreningsdannelse og foreningsaktiviteter i civilsamfundet, og etniske minoriteter har i den forstand en gunstig situation, mens de samtidig er sat uden for politisk indflydelse. Undersøgelser af de formelle kanaler for indflydelse, integrationsrådene på kommunalt niveau og Rådet for Etniske Minoriteter på centrale steder, viser, at den reelle indflydelse er minimal.

Analysen viser også, at den teoretiske ramme, dvs. studiet af diskursive og politiske mulighedsstrukturer, meget præcist beskriver konvergensen i de kollektive organisatoriske monster men har vækere ved at forklare divergens. En af forklaringerne herpå er, at divergens ofte er forbundet med transnational engagement. Fastholdelsen af transnationale bånd udgør et problem for integrationsmodellerne. Afhandlingens Kapitel 10 undersøger derfor betingelser og forklaringer på transnationale sociale formationer og engagement. Den teoretiske ramme for denne undersøgelse beskrives som nævnt i Kapitel 3, men nogle af hovedkonklusionerne er for det første, at modtagerlandene selv spiller en rolle for graden og typen af transnational identifikation. Således har en gunstig incitamentsstruktur over for etniske minoriteter, inkl. kurdiske, skabt et større organisatorisk råderum her end i andre lande, hvilket har betinget, at en stor del af de kurdiske kulturelle og politiske aktiviteter nu udspringer fra Sverige.

For det andet kan transnationalt engagement næppe generaliseres uden at forstå partikulære forhold. Her spiller Tyrkiets eget medborgerskabsregime samt manglende anerkendelse af etniske og religiøse minoriteter ind. Herudover har Tyrkiets forhold til EU og status som anerkendt ansøgerland skabt en situation, hvor EU fremstår som en mulig platform for kritik og claims-making. Både de kurdiske, assyriske og alevitiske aktiviteter på europeisk niveau er eksempler herpå.

For det tredje viser analysen, at sådanne transnationale strategier er blevet et almindeligt redskab i kollektive mobiliseringsprocesser. Indvandrere benytter sig i dag af kanaler på

Endelig, og det vil her stå som konklusion, viser analyserne på tværs af kapitlerne, at transnationalt engagement ikke er et sjældent forekommende fænomen blandt personer med tyrkisk baggrund i de tre lande, snarere et kendtegn, med det forbehold at graden, typen og formålet varierer enormt. Ligeledes vil det være for snævert at opfatte det som en karakteristik af minoriteters identitet udelukkende, også majoritetssamfundet transnationaleres i stadig stigende grad. Dette engagement modarbejder dog ikke nødvendigvis, hvis overhovedet, disse personers integration i det pågældende samfund, hvilket fremsætter en teoretisk udfordring. Om end transnational identifikation ikke er et nyt fænomen, er det forskningsmæssige perspektiv. Både den empiriske og teoretiske analyse peger derfor på en revurdering af de eksisterende inkorporeringsmodeller for adækvat at kunne forstå nytilkommernes inkorporering i de respektive samfund.